

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE,

with special reference to party politics, 1872 to 1910.

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P R E F A C E.

This work is the result of a study entered on shortly before the Second World War broke out and would have been completed earlier had not war conditions prevented access to certain documents, - the Merriman and Hofmeyr Papers especially - which, for security reasons, were sometime removed from the South African Public Library.

The year 1941, and subsequent school vacations, were spent on research work in the Parliamentary Library, Cape Town, State Archives, Cape Town, and S.A. Public Library, Cape Town. To the officials of these institutions I owe a great debt of gratitude for their able and willing assistance. I am very grateful to the Trustees of the S.A. Public Library especially, and to its Librarian, Mr. D.H. Varley, for permission to examine the Merriman and Hofmeyr Papers when war conditions improved. The S.A. Public Library has a wonderful collection of old South African newspapers of which extensive use was made as the free press is the best source from which to ascertain the attitude of the public towards current problems and is usually the organ of the various political groups or parties and propagates the views of the group which it represents. It is a matter of sincere regret that the old newspapers housed in the S.A. Public Library are in such a poor state of repair.

I should also like to point out that the references to unpublished archival sources are still the numbers which these volumes had in 1941; since the completion of the manuscript of this work they have been changed but by using the old catalogue they can easily be checked. In footnotes, as well as in the text the references to newspapers are from leading articles unless otherwise stated.

I should also like to express my thanks to several persons for the loan of M.A. theses; they are: Mr. G.J. Smit, Principal of the High School,

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IN FOOTNOTES.

C. Argus.	The Cape Argus.
Cape B.B.	Cape Blue Book.
C.Times.	The Cape Times.
Coetzee: Politieke Groepering.	Coetzee: Politieke Groepering in die wording van die Afrikanernasie.
Colvin: Jameson.	Colvin: The Life of Jameson.
Colvin: Cecil Rhodes.	Colvin: Cecil John Rhodes.
Hansard.	The Cape Hansard.
Imp. B.B.	Imperial Blue Book.
Journal.	The Grahamstown Journal.
Merr. Papers.	The Merriman Papers. The name "Merriman" is also abbreviated to "Merr."
Michell: Rhodes.	Michell: The Life of the Rt. Hon. Cecil John Rhodes.
Millin: Rhodes.	Millin: Cecil Rhodes.
Min. Bk. L.C.	Minute Book of the Legislative Council.
Pat.	Di Afrikaanse Patriot.
S.A.News.	The South African News.
Theal: Since 1795.	Theal: History of South Africa, Since 1795.
Theal: From 1873 to 1884.	Theal: History of South Africa, 1873 to 1884.
Theal: Rec. C.C.	Theal: Records of the Cape Colony.
Walker: De Villiers.	Walker: Lord de Villiers and his Times.
Walker: History.	Walker: History of South Africa.
Walker: Schreiner.	Walker: W.P. Schreiner, A South African.
Z.-Afr.	De Zuid-Afrikaan vereenigd met de Volksvriend.

CHAPTER 1.THE BACKGROUND: DUTCH COLONISTS, BRITISH COLONISTS AND THE
AGITATION FOR A LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.1. DUTCH COLONISTS.

The Dutch East India Company was primarily a trading company. When it sent Commander Jan van Riebeeck to the Cape the chief object was to establish a refreshment station at which weary sailors could recuperate on their long voyages to and from the East Indian Islands,¹ on which the Dutch had their chief factories. Neither the Commander, nor the Company, had any intention of colonising the inhospitable and commercially barren shores of southern Africa, but unwittingly the Commander became a coloniser.

Jan van Riebeeck found that his handful of men could not do all the work that had to be done; they could not produce enough food, especially grain, to supply the needs of passing ships; they had not enough time to devote to animal husbandry so that the supply of meat would be sufficient, and moreover, they were numerically insufficient to defend the settlement against a possible attack from the native Hottentots. Therefore, emulating a Batavian example, the Commander applied to the Council of XVII for permission to allow Free Burghers to settle at the Cape of Good Hope. The first band of Free Burghers that were given ground at the Cape in 1657, numbered nine.² Thus the germ of what was to develop into a Dutch Colony was planted.

Seventeen years after van Riebeeck's departure, another commander took over command of the Cape station. He was

1. Theal: *Chronicles of the Cape Commanders*, ; p.22.
2. Ibid. p.68.

Simon van der Stel. Under him the puny settlement developed into a robust colony. With his profound admiration for everything Dutch he wished to make the Cape Settlement into a New Holland. His aim was no longer a refreshment station, but a home for European Colonists. His masters, the Council of XVII, assisted him in his colonisation ideals and made special efforts to send out Dutch colonists. Holland, however, was a flourishing power, free from religious and political persecution so v.d. Stel did not get as many Dutch Colonists as he wished for.³ A large number of Low German Colonists however, swelled the ranks of immigrants settling at the Cape of Good Hope, but they never formed a separate element in v.d. Stel's colony for they were speedily assimilated by the Dutch.⁴ A similar fate befell the close on two-hundred French Huguenots who set foot on South African soil in 1687-88. They were a valuable addition to the Cape's small population. Although they were anxious to maintain their language, found a separate settlement and live together, the authorities did not permit them to do so. Within two generations they had lost their identity.⁵

The Governor, Simon v.d. Stel was succeeded by his son Willem Adriaan. Under the latter's governorship the Colonists experienced a period of harsh and unsympathetic rule, during which the Governor and his clique monopolised the economic life of the young Colony. They sent petitions to the authorities at Batavia and in Holland. The Governor, on hearing of the discontent of the Colonists, imprisoned their leaders among whom the most prominent

3. Theal; *Chronicles of Cape Commanders*, p.217.

4. Colenbrander; *De afkomst der Boeren*, p.122, et vide Botha: *Social Life in the Cape Colony in the 18th Century*, p.9.

5. Botha: *The French Refugees at the Cape*, p.40 et Theal: *op. cit.* p.292.

were Henning Huising, Adam Tas, v.d. Heiden, Hercules du Pré and Guillian du Toit. Some of these were deported, others retained at the Castle for a long time. After much delay the Council of XVII examined the charges against the Cape Governor and the upshot was the liberation of the imprisoned and deported Colonists and the disgrace of W.A. v.d. Stel and his official clique. The Colonists had gained a total victory over a high official of whom they had formerly stood in fear.⁶

The significance of this episode lies in the fact that it accelerated the welding of the European Colonists into one homogeneous whole. This was especially the case with the French Huguenots, who, during the first years of their residence at the Cape, had stood aloof from the Dutch. Now, however, they united with the Dutch in the face of a common enemy--the tyranny, misgovernment and "intolerable yoke" of Willem Adriaan v.d. Stel.⁷ Further, this movement was of political significance because in it we have the first signs of political life among the Cape Colonists and definite indications of national consciousness: "Of Adam Tas and his men of 1705, the men who so stoutly maintained the rights and privileges of colonists, it may therefore be said with justice that they laid the foundations of our political consciousness".⁸ Owing to their remoteness from the land of their birth these people slowly and unconsciously lost contact with their European homeland and began to regard southern Africa as their only home and fatherland -- so a new nation was born on African soil.

6. For a full account of this conflict vide: Fouché; The Diary of Adam Tas.

7. Fouché; The Diary of Adam Tas, p.351.

8. Ibid. p.363.

The eighteenth century witnessed the gradual expansion of the Cape Settlement beyond the first mountain ranges -- the Hottentots Holland and Drakenstein Mountains. This expansion was due in the first instance, to the rise of a generation of stock farmers. The first Colonists were primarily agriculturists. Stock farming however, soon proved to be an easier and more profitable occupation than agriculture and soon the number of stock farmers increased. Towards the end of the seventeenth century it was the chief livelihood of a fair proportion of Colonists.⁹

In the beginning of the eighteenth century the Governor, Willem Adriaan v.d. Stel encouraged stock farming by issuing grazing licences with a free hand. To obtain more and better grazing for their cattle and sheep the stock farmers made liberal use of this facility.¹⁰ An important factor which encouraged the trek into the interior was the system of land ownership. East of the first mountain ranges the Company gave out land on a Loan Place System. The stock farmer chose a site for his wattle and daub house and his cattle and sheep pens; then, provided he did not encroach on a neighbour's property, he could claim all the veld surrounding this site as far as a horse could walk in half an hour.¹¹ Provided he paid his so-called "recognition money" annually, he was virtually in safe possession of this land. These Loan Places were easily obtainable and cheap and therefore accelerated the expansion of the Colony.¹² But, even although the recognition

9. v.d. Merwe: Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaap Kolonie, p.24 et 32.

10. v.d. Merwe: op. cit. p.55 et 133.

11. Ibid. p.83.

12. Ibid. p.128-130.

money was only introduced in 1714 and was a very small fee - £2-10-0¹³ - many of the stock farmers were unwilling to pay it and often they moved further and further away from the seat of government in order to escape payment. The Company, on the other hand, was thereby obliged to follow the stock farmers and extend the boundary of the Colony further and further eastwards in order to obtain the recognition money.¹⁴ When these stock farmers, also called "Trek Boers", reached the Great Fish River in 1775,¹⁵ the Bantu prevented their progress eastwards during the eighteenth century and for a good part of the nineteenth; nor could they move too far inland towards the north on account of the dry and semi-arid nature of the interior.

The Trek Boers who opened up the interior of the Cape Colony, had very little contact with more refined civilisation such as one would find in larger towns. The mothers passed a little elementary education on to the children so that they could at least read the Holy Bible and thus retain their religion which in the wilds proved to be a saving grace. At intervals they made special efforts to come to the nearest church for "Nagmaal" and to have their children christened. A striking characteristic of these men of the interior was their individualism and isolation. There was little group consciousness; each farmer had his own loan place and was very conscious of his rights as a private owner and the further away he was from his neighbour the happier he was.¹⁶

13. Walker: History, p.95.

14. v.d. Merwe: op. cit. p.150.

15. Gie: Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika, 1. p.190.

16. Walker: History, p.103, et v.d. Merwe: op. cit. p.76, 241 et seq.

The life of those Trek Boers was a hard one but it made them selfreliant. Their government gave them no or very little protection against the hazards of pioneering. They had to rely on themselves for defence against possible depredations from Hottentots or Bushmen and later from the Bantu. They had also to be ready to protect themselves and their stock from the attacks of wild animals. This life made them excellent shots and they evolved a system of mutual self-defence called the "commando system".¹⁷ This provided a loose organisation for concerted action which however, was only called on in times of extreme danger and seldom was there a whole-hearted response.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century there were really three groups of colonists in the Cape Colony. In and around Cape Town there were the officials of the Company and the more wealthy inhabitants of the metropolis. Further inland, but still west of the first mountain ranges in the vicinity of the settlements of Stellenbosch, Fransch Hoek, Drakenstein and Swartland there were the wine and grain farmers. To the east of the first mountain ranges there were the stock farmers described above. Racially and linguistically they were identical to those colonists living nearer Cape Town; but they had no love for the Mother City and only went there when compelled by force of circumstances. Moreover, they nourished a sense of antagonism towards those of their kin not employed in the same occupation as they themselves.¹⁸

Such was the position when the British occupied the Cape in

17. Walker: History, p.101.

18. Botha: Social Life in the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century, p.10.

1795. It was a temporary occupation and little friction resulted between British officials and Dutch Colonists. Eight years later the Cape Settlement passed into the hands of the Batavian Republic. For three years General Janssens and Advocate de Mist planned the improvement, progress and development of the Colony, only to see the Cape again occupied by British forces in 1806; this time the British were determined to keep it.¹⁹

At this stage in its colonial history, Great Britain had not had much experience in the administration of settlements founded by other European nations and populated by Europeans and which had later become British possessions. The two previous instances are the acquisition of New York, from the Dutch in 1667 and Canada from the French in 1763. Small wonder therefore, that Great Britain committed a series of errors which led to the estrangement of a very large portion of its newly acquired subjects.

General Baird remained at the Cape as military commander till January, 1807. By the terms of capitulation the Cape Colonists were guaranteed the existing laws, privileges and forms of worship. The old Council of Policy which had been the central government during the Dutch rule, disappeared and a government similar to that of the first British Occupation established. Certain improvements, which the Batavian Government had thought desirable were, however, retained²⁰ such as the Church Order of 1804 and the better administration of the country districts.

Civil government was re-introduced on the arrival of the

19. Gie; Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. 11, p.125.

20. Gie; op. cit. 11, p.126.

Karl of Caledon, May, 1807. The instructions issued, made him the autocratic ruler of the Cape for it was "Our especial Command that all the Powers of Government within the said Settlement as well Civil as Military shall be vested solely in you Our Governor".²¹ The Governor was therefore able to express his own will in no way bound by any local council or advisers. Sir John Cradock succeeded Caledon; the former was also given autocratic powers similar to those of his predecessor. It was only natural that an autocratic form of government should have been instituted at the Cape; it was conquered territory, its European inhabitants were Dutch, settled midst a large number of non-Europeans. Moreover, the Tory Government of Fox and Grenville, then fighting against Napoleon had been shocked by the cruelties perpetrated by the French Revolution in the name of Liberty. England, on account of the loss of her American Colonies still believed that liberal institutions in colonies were incompatible with unity of empire. However, although the form of government was autocratic, it was also sympathetic, as there was a conscious effort on the part of the governors to reconcile the Old Colonists to their new rulers. But the Cape never became a British Colony in the sense that Australia and New Zealand were British Colonies. The Dutch-speaking Colonists always outnumbered the British.

No remarkable event disturbed the public mind during the first years of the new British rule and there was little partisan feeling. The change over from Batavian to British rule had been accepted without demure.²² The year 1814 however, brought a change

21. Theal: Rec. C.C. VI, p.9.

22. Scholtz: Die Afrikaner en sy Taal 1806-1875, p.18.

in this state of affairs. Napoleon was defeated and sent to Elba; the Congress of Vienna followed and a convention was signed in London, August, 1814, between the Dutch and British Governments by which the Cape was definitely ceded to Britain. In 1814, also, Lord Charles Somerset arrived at the Cape, a man energetic and able, well-connected with the ruling Tory families of England. It was this autocratic and unsympathetic Governor who initiated a policy which eventually estranged the Dutch from British rule.

During his governorship, Caledon had already expressed himself in favour of cautiously introducing a policy of anglicising the Dutch and teaching them the English language.²³ A full flood of anglicisation however, swept over the Colony on the arrival of Somerset. He was determined to set about anglicising the Dutch in a systematic way.


Already in the time of De Mist and Cradock the need for more ministers in the Dutch Reformed Church was keenly felt.²⁴ As the position did not improve, Somerset made use of this opportunity to introduce Scottish Presbyterian ministers.²⁵ There was also a dearth of school masters and to supply the need and eventually anglicise the Dutch population through medium of the school, Somerset took "the liberty of submitting to Earl Bathurst the Expediency of having all the Schools in the Colony conducted by English Masters".²⁶

23. Theal: Rec.C.C. VIII, p.219-221 et IX, p.38-39.

24. Dreyer: Boustouwe. III, p.361.

25. Theal: Rec.C.C. IX, p.264.

26. Theal: Rec.C.C. XIII, p.402.



Ever since 1813, some knowledge of English had been necessary for those joining the public service.²⁷ On his return to the Cape after a period of leave in England, Somerset proceeded to entrench the position of the English language. He issued a proclamation which laid down that from 1823 all documents issued from the office of the Cape Colonial Secretary would be in English; from 1825 all the other public offices, except the Courts of Justice, would use English and finally as from 1827, the English language would be the only official language in the law courts of the Colony.²⁸

Simultaneously with the adoption of English as the language of the courts, the First Charter of Justice was issued 1826, and a Second Charter in 1834. The Commissioners of Inquiry who had been at the Cape from 1823-1825 condemned the old legal system. It was therefore decided to assimilate gradually the law of the Colony to that of England.²⁹ This change carried with it the abolition of the courts of Landdrosts and Heemraden and their substitution by civil commissioners and magistrates. Another popular institution which went by the board at this time was the Burgher Senate. To reconcile the Dutch Colonists to the loss of the Burgher Senate two Colonists were nominated to the Council of Advice-a-creation of the Commissioners of Inquiry - in 1828,³⁰ namely, Sir John Truter and Captain Andries Stockenström; but this satisfied no one. The Dutch Colonists had never had an important share in the central government of their country during

27. Walker: History, p.169.

28. Theal: Rec.C.C. XIV, p.452-3

29. Walker: History, p.169-170 et Rybers: Select Constitutional Documents, p.XXXI.

30. Theal: Rec.C.C. XXVII, p.5.

the Company's rule, and still less under the British rule, but, they took a keen interest in their local affairs and had much influence through their Boards of Landdrosts and Heemraden and the Burgher Senate. They keenly felt the abolition of these institutions as it deprived them of a share in their local government. Left to themselves to manage their own local affairs the Dutch Colonists were contented, but any interference with their traditions or long standing institutions and especially their substitution by English institutions, elicited a remonstrance of no uncertain note.³¹

With the passage of years the Dutch Colonists found that they were slowly being deprived of heritages dear to them and those institutions that were still suffered to exist - the church and school - were being strongly anglicised. Nor were these the only matters which estranged the Dutch Colonists from their new rulers. The British officials, and those British who immigrated as Colonists, assumed an air of superiority and indifference towards Britain's new subjects. It is no wonder therefore, that the Dutch Colonists became embittered towards their new rulers and in 1836, many of those living in the Eastern Districts decided to emigrate and establish their own republics beyond the Colonial boundary.³²

31. Zuid-Afrikaansche Tydschrift. V. (1828), p.239.

Et vide; Venter: Landdros en Heemrade, 1682-1827, p.226 et 228.

32. Vide: Schreiner O: Thoughts on S. Africa, p.235. et Heame: General Hertzog, p.25.

Throughout the rest of this work the following expressions are used synonymously to indicate those European inhabitants not of British descent:

Dutch-speaking Colonists; Dutch Colonists; Afrikaners; Boers.

11. BRITISH COLONISTS.

An event which was to have much influence on South African history occurred in 1820, when a large number of British Settlers came to the Cape. Until 1820, the European population at the Cape had been practically homogeneous; but, when the British Settlers were introduced, an entirely new element, vastly different from the old Dutch Colonists established itself in South Africa. This introduction of a large number of British into the Cape Colony must be regarded as part of the British Government's policy of anglicising the Cape Dutch.

The political significance of the British Settlers has often been overstressed. It must be borne in mind that before the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, very few of the people belonging to the classes from which the Settlers were drawn enjoyed full political privileges. Thomas Pringle, who came out with them, was however, a cultured and well educated man and he has given us the following description of them on their landing at Algoa Bay: "On the whole they formed a motley and rather unprepossessing collection of people. Guessing vaguely from my observations on this occasion and on subsequent rambles through their locations, I should say that probably a third part were persons of real respectability of character, and possessed of some worldly substance; but that the remaining two-thirds were for the most part composed of individuals of very unpromising description - persons who had hung loose upon society - low in morals or desperate in circumstances"³³. On the other hand, it must be remembered that they were used to holding public meetings and expressing their views

33. Pringle: Narrative of a Residence in S.Africa, p.13.

through the press. Further they were acquainted with more liberal institutions than were prevalent at the Cape, such as trial by jury, the Basis of British liberty.³⁴ Moreover, among these men were such persons as Bishop Burnett, Pringle and Fairbairn, advocates of liberty - imbued with public spirit - who were soon to lead the Settlers in the agitation against an autocratic Governor.

The immigration of the Settlers was badly organised. Their crops failed repeatedly and the Bantu plundered the settlements. Somerset made radical alterations in Donkin's arrangements for the Settlers and consequently "in the Governor the Settlers found a ready scapegoat, and his regime, with all its attendant changes, an explanation of their increasing misery".³⁵ There were also other matters on which the British Colonists came into conflict with Somerset. They claimed the right to hold public meetings. This Somerset would not allow.³⁶ Then there was also the struggle for the freedom of the Cape press led by Fairbairn, Pringle, Greig and Faure.³⁷ Simultaneously with these events, Somerset also clashed with two capable agitators Bishop Burnett and William Edwards.³⁸ Several other factors also contributed to the unrest and distress during the last years of Somerset's administration. Apart from the failure of the British Settlement of 1820 and its resultant agitation against the government, there was also an economic depression due to the slump in the wine trade and the depreciation of Cape currency. Furthermore the military

34. Gie: op. cit. 11, p.179.

35. Edwards: The 1820 Settlers in S.Africa, p.83.

36. Theal: Rec.C.C. XIV, p.376 et 378.

37. Theal: Ibid. XVII, p.293, 295, 301.

38. For a full account see: Cory: Rise of S.Africa. Vol.11, p.245 et seq.

forces and British fleet which were kept at the Cape during Napoleon's captivity on St. Helena, were removed and the Colonists lost a ready market for their produce. The inroads of the marauding natives in the Eastern Province added to the unrest of the Colony.

In agitating for constitutional changes the British Settlers took a bold step which was later to shape and advance public opinion. At first they did not have the support of the Dutch Colonists; referring to the agitation for a free press Somerset wrote to Bathurst in July, 1824; ".....it is a justice I owe to the Dutch population to say that scarcely any of them subscribed their names and the few that did so were cajoled into it without understanding its object"³⁹ However, the Dutch, of the Western Province especially, became more articulate when the Slave Question and other ills of the Colony agitated the public mind. In course of time the Dutch Colonists joined the ranks of the discontented British Settlers, who, as the Commissioners of Inquiry reported in September, 1826, "had the effect of exciting in the Dutch and native population a spirit of vigilance and attention that had never existed before to the acts of the government, and which may render all future exertion of authority objectionable that is not founded upon the law"⁴⁰

At the same time an agitation for a Legislative Assembly with which the Slave Question was intimately connected, was afoot. At first the English and the Dutch Colonists acted in concert

39. Theal; Rec.C.C. XVIII, p.59.

40. Ibid. XXVII, p.371.

but their co-operation could hardly last long as the interests of the predominantly British Eastern Province and predominantly Dutch Western Province diverged and public opinion in the Eastern Province favoured a separate government for that part of the Colony. To achieve that ideal they could not count on the Dutch of the Western Province as allies. Nor would the British approach to the view of the Dutch Colonists on the Slave Question.

111. THE AGITATION FOR A LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

During the administration of General Bourke and Sir Lowry Cole, 1826-1833, nothing excited the public mind more than the Slave Question with which the agitation for a representative Legislative Assembly was intimately connected. John Fairbairn and Christoffel Brand led the reform party and during the third decade of the nineteenth century they headed every movement that asked for a parliament. Unfortunately, these two leaders differed among themselves on the question of slavery. Fairbairn, who was the son-in-law of Dr. Philip, shared his views on South African affairs. Moreover, Dr. Philip held that the rights of all coloured races and aboriginal inhabitants in South Africa could only be effectively guaranteed by an Act of the Imperial Parliament. Brand however, had greater faith in the sense of justice of the Colonists and that they would give the slaves and coloureds fair treatment; he also believed in their ability to manage their own affairs and that therefore, the Imperial Parliament should grant a Legislative Assembly which would then assist in the abolition of slavery - a suggestion already made by slave owners at public meetings. To further his views Brand

founded the "Zuid-Afrikaan" a paper which was to interpret the views of the large landowners and slave holders at the Cape and oppose the voice of Fairbairn's "South African Commercial Advertiser".

The inefficient Council of Advice did not satisfy the Colonists at all and the slave regulations helped to bring it into further discredit so that the public cried aloud for reform and improvement in the government. The Council of Advice had to be freed from the shackles of Downing Street.⁴¹

The agitation for reform of the system of government dated from 1823, when the British Settlers sent a memorial to Bathurst in which they complained, amongst other things of being under the control of one person with almost unlimited power, namely the Governor.⁴²

In December, 1826, the question of a Legislative Assembly took on a more definite shape. The Colonists sent a petition to the House of Commons asking for a Representative Assembly. This was the first of a large number to be sent in subsequent years. It contained 1600 signatures representative of some of the most notable Colonists.⁴³ The Home Government did not give much attention to this petition. This is not surprising because the British Ministry of the time was having much trouble in trying to force the elected legislatures of the West Indies to improve the unsatisfactory conditions of the slaves of their plantations. The Ministry was therefore unwilling to incur similar trouble by granting a Representative Assembly at the Cape where slaves had not yet been liberated.

41. Vide: Kilpin: When Downing Street Ruled. C.Argus.1/3/1924.

42. Theal: Rec. C.C. XV. p1506.

43. Zuid-Afrikaansche Tydschrift. 1V.(1827), p.78.

In 1828, two vacancies occurred on the Council of Advice and these were filled by the appointment of Stockenström and Truter. But this did not satisfy the public; the Colonists wanted to elect their two representatives and when this was refused, the whole country was one ferment of excitement. They wanted representative institutions and petitions for a Representative Assembly found their way to the British Parliament.⁴⁴ Still the British Government remained deaf to the requests of the Cape Colonists. There were numerous obstacles in the way of a Representative Assembly; the Colony was poor and covered a vast expanse of territory which had no adequate communications. The sparse European population was racially divided, and there were few who had the ability and leisure to serve on a Legislative Assembly. Moreover, the Hottentots, slaves and Bantu far outnumbered the Europeans. The English Colonists no longer had the attentive ear of British officials⁴⁵ as they had had during the early 'twenties and as far as the Dutch Colonists were concerned British public opinion founded its views on information dished up by John Barrow in his "Travels" and reinforced by Dr. Philip's "Researches". Under such circumstances the British Parliament was very reluctant to give the Cape a Legislative Assembly and leave slaves and Hottentots to the mercy of Colonists who had fallen into disfavour, and who, it was feared, would oppress both slaves and Hottentots and ill-treat the Bantu on the Eastern Frontier, if they had an Assembly.

⁴⁴ Zuid-Afrikaansche

⁴⁴. Ibid. Tijdschrift. V. (1828), p. 239 et 317.

⁴⁵. Walker: History. p. 172.

The Colonists continued to press for a Legislative Assembly, and in 1830, drew up another petition. The authorities gave more attention to it than they had given to previous petitions but it failed to bring tangible results. In July, 1831, it was decided to petition the King and both Houses of the British Parliament. A large public meeting requested that the Colony should be ruled by a Governor and Executive Council nominated by the Crown and a Legislative Council freely elected by the people. This petition received the general support of the Colonists and moreover, the mature discussion at the meeting clearly showed that the Colonists were ripe for a more liberal form of government.⁴⁶

The elections of 1831, in Britain firmly established the Whigs in office for almost a generation. The growth of Liberalism was not confined to Parliament only. Outside, Edward Gibbon Wakefield's "Colonization Society" and such men as the Earl of Durham, Sir William Molesworth and Charles Buller promoted a more liberal policy towards the British Colonies. Under these circumstances the incessant demands from the Cape for an improved constitution could no longer go unheeded. The Cape Colonists were convinced that a Legislative Assembly would soon be granted. The "S.A. Commercial Advertiser" on 3rd July, 1833, confidently wrote:

"Now, we are satisfied that the present ministry (which carried the Reform Bill of 1832) are well disposed towards liberty and Popular Institutions, and that were a case clearly made out in favour of an enlarged and Open Legislative Council in this Colony, as a first step towards the renovation of the whole System, and the formation of a Legislative Assembly based on a very extensive Constituency, it would be immediately granted".

46. Zuid-Afrikaansche Tydschrift. VIII.(1831), p.316.

The "Zuid-Afrikaan" also believed that since the British Government had settled the Slave Question by passing the Emancipation Bill of 1833, a Legislative Assembly would be granted as the chief objection to an Assembly had been removed.

The Liberals in England however, were not prepared to give too much freedom to British dependencies and so the Cape Colonists were doomed to disappointment. For eight years they had persistently asked for a Representative Legislative Assembly but their requests were met by a half measure and they received instead a nominated Legislative and an Executive Council.⁴⁷

The Liberals sent out Sir Benjamin D'Urban to put the machinery of the new constitution in motion. He arrived on 16th January, 1834, and on the 2nd April, 1834, the Legislative Council held its first meeting. According to the Letters Patent issued, the Governor, was given:

"full power and authority with the advice and consent of the said Legislative Council to make, enact, ordain and establish Laws for the order, Peace and good government of our said Settlement and its dependencies of the Cape of Good Hope"

within certain restrictions.⁴⁸

Further the Legislative Council was to consist of not less than ten and not more than twelve members of whom five were to be officials and the rest persons not holding official posts.⁴⁹

The unofficial members were to hold their positions until disallowed by the Crown and if not disallowed within two years then during good behaviour and residence within the Cape Colony.⁵⁰

47. Cape Town Mail. 28/8/1841.

48. Min. Bk. L.C. 1, pp.8.

49. Ibid. pp.9.

50. Ibid. p.13.

From the above it is clear that the Colonists were not granted the privilege for which they had petitioned so often, namely that of electing those who had to legislate for the Colony - for this privilege they had to wait till 1850. The requests of the Colonists had been met by half measures and they were certainly not satisfied with the new constitution. They had asked for an Assembly in which they would have their own representatives chosen by themselves; they received instead a Council nominated by the Crown; a Council in which there were so many defects⁵¹ that it is no wonder that only eight months after the Council had been instituted they again petitioned for a Legislative Assembly.⁵² At the same time the public was not blind to the fact that the new constitution was, in many ways, an improvement on the old Council of Advice, and it was prepared to give it a trial. Thus the leading article of the "S.A. Commercial Advertiser" of 18th January, 1834, announcing the institution of a Legislative and an Executive Council, wrote:

".....all men will view this as an important boon. It is a beginning. It may not come up to, or it may exceed the expectations of some; but we repeat that it will yield satisfaction, if for no other reason than that it furnishes a pleasing and unerring proof....that the Barrier which has hitherto stood between us and the exercise of the proudest privileges of British subjects, is soon to be thrown down and that the Eye of the Community is to be admitted into the hitherto darkened Chamber of Cape Legislation".

The "Grahamstown Journal" of 30th January, 1834, pointed out some defects in the new constitution, but at the same time welcomed the establishment of Legislative and Executive Councils:

51. Grundlingh; The Legislative Council of the Cape of Good Hope, p.101.

52. Zuid-Afrikaansche Tydschrift. XI.(1834),p.399.

"These events must therefore be considered as an epoch in the history of the Colony, from which the most important and interesting alterations in the constitution and in the established usages of society may be dated".

The Legislative Council also played an important role in preparing the public mind for Representative Government. A very important function of the Council therefore:

"was to familiarize the minds of the people with the business of government and legislation, before they were called upon to take a share in the management of public affairs, directly, in choosing their legislators and indirectly in making laws in the persons of their own representatives⁵³"

The movement for a Representative Legislative Assembly led to the establishment of a Legislative Council. The Colonists were not satisfied, but because so many other affairs - the Sixth Kaffir War, reversal of D'Urban's native policy, the Great Trek, erection of Municipal Boards-occupied the public mind, the question of a Legislative Assembly was left in abeyance.

The movement to secure a more representative form of government started with fresh vigour in 1841. On the 24th August, of that year, a large public meeting was held in Cape Town and two petitions asking for a representative legislative body were drawn up to the Queen - one from all the Cape Town inhabitants and the other from the wardmasters and commissioners of the Cape Town Municipality.⁵⁴ In England however, Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for Colonies, poured cold water on the movement and at the Cape, Native Wars repeatedly disturbed the peace. Year by year public contempt for the Council increased as its inability to manage the affairs of the Colony

53. S.A. Commercial Advertiser, 26/1/1848.

54. C.O. 1371. Enclos. No. 2, to Desp. to Sec. of State, No.141, 20/12/41.

became more and more evident. It was most violently attacked by the Colonial press which demanded its abolition;⁵⁵ it had become truly obnoxious to the Colonial public and no one would have regretted its abolition.⁵⁶ In 1848, the movement was given a strong impetus when Earl Grey, Secretary of State for Colonies in Lord John Russell's Cabinet, asked Sir Harry Smith to report on the desirability of granting a parliament to the Cape. The Cape Governor favoured the idea and instructed the Attorney-General, William Porter, to draft a constitution; the other members of the Executive and the three judges of the Supreme Court all expressed themselves in favour of representative government.⁵⁷ On 31st January, 1849, the British Government referred these documents to a committee which reported a year later, 30th January, 1850. The committee agreed that a change of government was necessary and made certain recommendations as to the main features of the new constitution; further the committee recommended that the existing Legislative Council should pass ordinances regulating the details. Letters Patent, dated 23rd May, 1850, gave effect to these recommendations.⁵⁸

On receiving these Letters Patent, Sir Harry Smith was faced by a serious problem as there was no Council in existence - the previous one having been disrupted during the Anti-Convict Agitation.⁵⁹ At least four unofficial members were needed to constitute the Council on a legal basis and it would be no easy matter to find four men capable and willing to fill the vacancies.

55. Journal, 12/8/41, et Cape Town Mail, 1/4/48.

56. Imp. B.B. No. VI. Correspondence, pp.30.

57. Ibid. pp.16.

58. Appendix L.C. 1850, No.1. 6/9/50.

59. See Grundlingh: op.cit. p.133 et seq.

Smith complained to Grey that the general feeling at the Cape has been that

"the Legislative Council having been virtually dissolved by the violence of the people, it was at once resolved that the colony was ripe for Representative Institutions and that the Legislative Council thus abolished should only be replaced by a Representative Assembly"⁶⁰

In order to constitute a council, acceptable to the public, Smith then decided to hold what amounted to the first general election in the Cape Colony. He asked each Municipality and Divisional Road Board to send to the Government the names of not more than five Colonists who should be appointed to fill the vacancies in the Legislative Council.⁶¹ When the election lists were laid before the Governor he chose the four highest - three from the Western Province, Brand, Fairbairn and Reitz and one from the Eastern Province, Sir Andries Stockenström. The fifth on the list was J.H. Wight from the Western Province, but he was skipped and Robert Godlonton, from much lower down the list, was appointed. The reason given for Godlonton's appointment was that the Eastern and Western Provinces should have equal representation; the former province would then have Godlonton, Stockenström and William Cock who had remained a member of the Council despite all the turmoil. Now there were other Eastern Province candidates, such as Heintjies, for example, who had secured more votes than Godlonton; but still the Governor gave preference to Godlonton as he was a Separatist and Heintjies not and it was thought desirable to have Separatists on the Council so that their views on the proposed new form of government could

60. C.O. 1455. Desp. to Sec. of State, No. 82. 17/5/'80.

61. Imp. B.B. No. VI. Further Papers, p.3

also be heard in the Council.⁶²

The four "Popular Members" - Stockenström, Brand, Reitz and Fairbairn - came to the Council session determined to act as a party and discuss nothing but the constitution, on which, and in their hostility to Godlonton they were united. Stockenström and his party, the "Popular Members", found however, that on all matters of importance in the Constitution Ordinances they were outvoted by the official members supported by Cock and Godlonton. On 20th September, 1850, the Attorney-General moved that the Annual Estimates should be brought up for consideration by the Council. Stockenström and his party opposed this when the motion was carried by the official members and Cock and Godlonton, Stockenström rose, read eleven "Reasons for Dissent" and resigned his seat on the Council; Brand, Reitz, and Fairbairn after signing the "Reasons for Dissent" also left the Council chamber and the meeting had to adjourn.⁶³

In their "Reasons for Dissent" the four seceders explained that they had felt that they should resign because they had been chosen by the various constituencies to assist in the passage of the Constitution Ordinances only and that therefore they did not consider themselves authorised to discuss any other matter that did not in the remotest way concern the introduction of the new constitution.⁶⁴

The action of these four men showed that there were men at the Cape with independent minds and a high sense of responsibility. They were unwilling to submit to the dictates of

62. Cape Town Mail, 21/9/1850.

63. Min. Bk. L.C. III, p.425.

64. Min. Bk. L.C. III, p.426.

government officials and thus become an impotent minority whose only usefulness was that it completed the obsolete Legislative Council and enabled it to carry on its work whether good or bad. Above all these men fully realised the trust which their constituents placed in them and their responsibility towards them and therefore determined to resign rather than be instrumental in passing measures which in their opinion, would amount to betrayal of the trust of their constituents.

Whether public opinion outside the Council had developed such a high sense of independence and responsibility as shown by these four men is sincerely to be doubted. The public however, in and around Cape Town, applauded their action:

"Their acts and demeanour, in the performance of their official duties, have gained unqualified approbation. They have surprised and delighted their supporters, and have conquered the distrust of those who doubted them. The ability in argument, the practical wisdom, the extensive knowledge, the excellent temper, the freedom from prejudice and class feeling, and the noble and independent spirit, which they have displayed, have been observed with pride and satisfaction by their fellow-Colonists - and with most satisfaction by those who at first disposed to watch them jealously"⁶⁵

The Eastern Province quite definitely did not support them and did not appreciate the subtle arguments which prompted the actions of the Stockenström party. The Legislative Councillors from the Eastern Province supported the officials in the Council and the "Grahamstown Journal" of 5th October, 1850, attacked the malcontents and disapproved of their action in no uncertain terms. On 7th October, the inhabitants of Grahamstown

65. Cape Town Mail, 21/9/'50.

petitioned Smith that the vacancies on the Council should be filled by another election and further they

"deplore with unfeigned regret the dismemberment of the Legislative Council, by the resignation of four of the unofficial members belonging to that body, by which means the several legislative measures for the internal improvement of the Colony.....have been interrupted"⁶⁶

With the resignation of the four "Popular Members", Smith was again confronted with the very problem he had tried to solve by their appointment; the Council could not legally complete the Constitution Ordinances. The Governor therefore commissioned the official members and Cook and Godlonton to continue the work. Stockenström and his party, assisted by Wicht, drew up a draft constitution, the so-called "Sixteen Articles". Fairbairn, and later Stockenström, proceeded to England to put their case before the Secretary of State. They were coldly received and Fairbairn was interviewed by Earl Grey as a private individual and not as a representative of a large part of the population of the Colony; they had the support of a section of the press however, and were not without influence on further developments.⁶⁷ The commission of official members and Cook and Godlonton presented its report on 30th September, 1850. This was sent to Earl Grey but he did not give it his serious consideration because he believed that it conflicted with the Order-in-Council which demanded that the Legislative Council should complete the details of the proposed constitution.⁶⁸

Matters dragged on on account of the Kaffir War of 1851; but on 30th June, 1851, Grey instructed Smith to complete the

66. Imp. B.B. VI. Further Papers, p.188.

67. Theal: Since 1795. Vol.III, p.125.

68. Ibid. p.127.

Legislative Council and pass the Constitution Ordinances.⁶⁹

As Smith was at King Williamstown busy with the Kaffir War, he instructed Montagu, Secretary to the Government, to make the necessary appointments. On 10th October, 1851, the following men were sworn in and the Council was again fully constituted: W. Hawkins, C. Arkcoll, B. Moodie and E. Christian.⁷⁰

The reconstructed Council had a hostile reception from a certain section of the public in Cape Town and the "Cape Town Mail" wrote disparagingly about the new members.⁷¹ The Cape public in general however, believing that the measure was only a temporary one took up a more resigned attitude; thus the "Zuid-Afrikaan" wrote:

"The old Council has re-appeared in all its deformities, and though the public has resolved to bear insult for the sake of alleged important object, nothing can be more natural than that they should be very jealous of the exercise of the power with which it is invested.....Selected for the mere purpose of setting the machine in motion the present members will doubtless be deemed bound to play a submissive part....."⁷²

Despite the efforts made by Godlonton on behalf of the Eastern Province, to have the consideration of the draft Constitution Ordinances postponed till after the war on the Eastern Frontier, these ordinances were finally passed on 3rd April, 1852.⁷³ The Colonists, however, were doomed to experience further delay in the final granting of representative government. Sir John Pakington became Secretary of State for Colonies when the Russell Ministry was succeeded by that of the Earl of Derby,

69. C.O.1345. Desp. from Sec. of State No.650, 30/8/'51.

70. Min. Bk. L.C. 111, p.439.

71. Cape Town Mail, 11/10/'51.

72. Zuid-Afrikaan, 16/10/'51. At that time the "Zuid-Afrikaan" also published an English translation of its leading articles.

73. Min. Bk.L.C. 111, pp.614.

February, 1852. In December, however, the Duke of Newcastle became Secretary of State for Colonies with the Earl of Aberdeen as Prime Minister. On 11th March, 1853, the new ministry issued an Order-in-Council which ratified the Constitution Ordinances and the Cape of Good Hope received representative government on 1st July, 1853.⁷⁴

Thus, the Cape Colonists received one of the most liberal constitutions ever granted to a British Colony, and they were at last granted the Assembly for which they had continually petitioned since December, 1826.⁷⁵ The Western Province received the new constitution with great manifestations of joy and public opinion in the western districts gave it its full approval. In the Eastern Province there was less enthusiasm because of the separatist tendency of that part of the Colony.⁷⁶ The public mind had attained a high sense of responsibility for its own interests, but it had not yet been granted full responsibility in shaping the destiny of the Colony; that was only to come in 1872, but by that time other bases of party divisions had already become manifest in the Cape Colony.

74. Theal: Since 1795. III, p.128.

75. Supra. p.154.

76. Infra. p.27 et seq.

CHAPTER 11.

THE PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY.

1. UNDER REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

Ever since 1820, there were certain fundamental differences between the Eastern and Western Provinces of the Cape Colony. The East was predominantly British, it was still an open undeveloped country under the constant threat of attack by natives; the West was predominantly Dutch with old established customs and traditions and free from any threat of invasion. These differences brought divergency of interests which became stronger during the eighteen forties and led to the launching of a strong Separatist movement. It was on account of this movement that Sir Harry Smith appointed Godlonton instead of Wicht or Meintjies to the Legislative Council in 1850¹. When, however, the draft Constitution Ordinances had passed the Legislative Council, April, 1852, there was some delay in having them ratified in England on account of the fall of the Liberal Russell Ministry. The Western Province petitioned the British Parliament for the speedy introduction of the new constitution. The British Settlers in the Eastern Province were not in favour of the proposed new constitution, hence they petitioned that the change should be delayed, till the Kaffir and Hottentot unrest on the Eastern Frontier had been settled. Furthermore, they objected to the proposed constitution because it granted numerical preponderance to the Western Province in the legislative bodies

1. Supra, p.213.

and they demanded either the removal of the seat of government to their province or the separation of the Eastern and Western Provinces each with its own government. The Secretary of State for Colonies however, refused to listen to their petition and so the Constitution of 1853, was introduced without any concession being made to the Separatists, barring the stipulation permitting the Governor to assemble Parliament where ever he pleased and the promise that should it be found necessary to separate the two provinces, Parliament could take the necessary measures.² This was grist to the mill of the Separatists and accentuated the division which was to dominate Cape politics throughout the period of representative government and extend even into the period of responsible government.

Soon after the granting of representative government, J.C. Molteno, Saul Solomon and John Paterson, initiated another movement which had as its object the granting of full responsible government to the Colony; this movement was fated to experience the relentless opposition of the Separatists, who now definitely ranged themselves as an opposition to those who desired responsible government. It was due to the opposition from those Eastern Province Separatists that Molteno's repeated proposals for responsible government were wrecked.³ The Separatists feared that under responsible government the Eastern Province would be subordinated to the Western Province which would dominate the Colony; their own province was also developing on account of the trade which passed through it to the Republics;

2. Theal: Since 1795. III, p.128 et seq.

3. C. Argus, 10/6/'71.

they also hoped to extend their borders by the inclusion of British Kaffraria and Nomansland. The importance of the Eastern Province therefore, they argued, as much entitled it to an independent government as any other state or province in South Africa.⁴ Further the Separatists reasoned that if responsible government were carried the Imperial Government would withdraw the troops from the Eastern Frontier and they would be left defenceless against the attacks of the Bantu seeing that they would not receive much help from the callous and distant West where the real power rested. The Separatists wanted their own government so that it could be near the seat of danger to exercise effective control over the Frontier. They wanted to manage their own native affairs as they knew the native's nature, wants, failings and interests and they were better able to make laws that would meet the case than the West which was ignorant of the actual circumstances in the East and was guided by ideas of class legislation and dealt with natives in a manner dangerous to themselves and the Eastern Province generally.⁵ Responsible government would bring with it an ever-changing ministry with an accompanying vacillation of policy and the natives required above all a fixed and settled policy.⁶ The aversion of the Separatists to responsible government was further increased by the fact that it would mean giving greater political power to the natives and coloureds, who were in the majority in the country, and whose vote also would be exceedingly unstable⁷ and therefore not make for efficient government. Of far greater importance

4. Walker: History, p.255.

5. Journal, 5/4/'72.

6. Merr. Papers, No. 2.1870, J.X. Merriman to Aunt Sarah, 2 Jan.

7. Wilmot: History of Our Own Times in South Africa, 1, p.2.

than the native difficulty was the objection raised against responsible government by the Separatists on the ground that a large portion of the people of the Colony were of Dutch descent and the majority were situated in the Western Province, so that they feared what was to them ignorant and uneducated Dutch domination.⁸ Some feared that if responsible government were introduced the Dutch would use their political power to break away from the British Empire; such a fear was even expressed by such an enlightened man as John X. Merriman - member of the Legislative Assembly for Aliwal North and later a great friend of the Dutch - when he wrote that responsible government would make the Colony a "dutch republic".⁹

On the question of self-government, the Separatists were reinforced by a small section of conservative Dutch Colonists from the Western Province having as its mouthpieces the two papers "De Zuid-Afrikaner"¹⁰ and "Volkvriend" with its editor Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr.¹¹ This section of Dutch Colonists held that as long as territorial jealousy gave rise to so much pettiness, as was sometimes shown in Parliament, the Colony was not ripe for responsible government.¹² They also feared that the Colony was too extensive and undeveloped to support a system of government by the people themselves.¹³ It is clear therefore, that the country was politically divided into two groups of almost equal strength, namely, the Westerners in favour of responsible government and the Separatists (Easterners) reinforced by a few conser-

8. C. Argus, 12/1/'94. Sprigg's E. London speech, 12/1/'94.

9. Merriman Papers, No. 2. 1870. J.X. Merriman to Aunt Sarah, 24 Jan.

10. Z.-Afr. 24/5/'78.

11. Hofmeyr: The Life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (Onze Jan), p.101.

12. Z.-Afr. 24/5/'78.

13. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.104.

vative Westerners, who, although they were not at one with the other aims of the Separatists, agreed with them on the question of responsible government.

During the second session of Parliament, 1855, on the 26th March, Mr. Wicht carried a motion that a select committee be appointed to consider the introduction of responsible government; the inhabitants of the Eastern Districts immediately petitioned against this change and the Legislative Council took no further action. In the Assembly John Paterson carried a similar motion by 23 votes to 9. The committee reported in favour of responsible government, but nothing was done till the following year.¹⁴

During the recess the question of responsible government was fully discussed by the public, and the Legislative Council adopted by a majority of five, Stockenström's motion in favour. In the Assembly however, a similar motion in favour was lost by a majority of eight.¹⁵ During the same session, 1856, a motion in the Assembly in favour of the separation of the two provinces was lost when seven members voted for and nineteen against the motion.¹⁶

The desirability of introducing responsible government was not raised in Parliament again till 1860. The reason why it was not seriously propagated during this interval of years, was that there was as yet no strict party organisation and party fidelity, the country was prosperous and moreover, the tact and ability of Sir George Grey smoothed out all differences between

14. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.97.

15. Theal: Since 1795. III, p.148.

16. Theal: Ibid. p.149.

the executive and legislative powers so that there was no need for any agitation for responsible government.¹⁷ Even if there had been serious conflicts between the executive and legislature, Grey would no doubt have deferred to the wishes of parliament for he was really a firm believer in the system of responsible government: "...the Governor should....be assisted by what is called a responsible ministry....the Governor acting also in accordance with the advice of a responsible ministry would avoid all hazards now incurred by the High Commissioner of seriously involving Her Majesty with the inhabitants of this country, if he adopted any measures repugnant to their feelings".¹⁸ In 1860, however, the wave of prosperity which had swept the Cape was on the ebb and further Sir George Grey had temporarily left the Cape; now J.C. Molteno with the support of two officials and the Acting Governor, brought forward a motion in the Assembly for responsible government; he withdrew the motion however, in favour of an amended one that the matter should only be considered after the next general election - this amended motion was defeated by only two votes.¹⁹

In 1861, Separatism as well as the agitation for self-government took fresh life and the propagandists of the latter movement did not relax their efforts until they attained their aim. The Separatists also became more extreme in their demands; till now they would have been satisfied with a separate government for the Eastern Province federated with the West, but in 1860, on account of the proposed export tax on wool and money

17. Elignaut: Die Invoer van Verantwoordelike Bestuur, p.27.
 18. G.H. 31/7. Despatch Grey to Lytton "Separate" 19/11/'58.
 19. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.93.

spent on railways in the Western Province and Cape Town harbour, they demanded entire separation from the Western Province.²⁰ When Sir Philip Wodehouse, Grey's successor, arrived, he was confronted with these two issues, each supported by a party which believed that its remedy would be a panacea for the Colony's ills. The Colony was ill indeed: the treasury faced a growing deficit, the country was drought-stricken, blights destroyed the wheat crops and oidium the vineyards, and disease killed off cattle and sheep.²¹

On the opening of Parliament in April, 1862, Wodehouse declared himself opposed to Separation and the federation of the Eastern and Western Provinces and the permanent removal of the capital. He favoured alternate sessions in Cape Town and Grahamstown and the annexation of British Kaffraria to the Cape Colony.²² A motion to secure the latter was rejected in the Assembly by nineteen Western Province votes to fourteen of the Eastern Province - clearly showing how deep ran the differences between Eastern and Western Provinces. A motion in favour of alternate sessions was also rejected by seventeen to thirteen votes.²³

When Parliament met in 1863, a further step in the direction of responsible government was taken. The treasury was almost empty; most of the bills to increase the revenue were rejected and the Governor had to borrow money. Under such circumstances Molteno thought the time favourable for the introduction of responsible government as it had become clear that the executive

20. Walker: History, p.311.

21. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.99.

22. Theal: Since 1795.IV, p.26.

23. Ibid. p.27.

and legislative powers would clash at any moment, making good government impossible. Molteno's motion caused a long and serious debate; all the Eastern Province members opposed the idea and so also did a few Western Province members. The result was that the motion was lost by nineteen to eleven votes.²⁴ At the close of the session, the Governor, finding that his financial measures had not been carried entirely, as a sop to the Eastern Separatists, announced that the next session of Parliament would be at Grahamstown. At this session, on account of Western absenteeism, most of the Governor's measures were carried.²⁵

Another matter which clearly showed up early party divisions, was the annexation of British Kaffraria. The money which the Imperial Parliament provided for the administration of this strip of territory was hopelessly inadequate²⁶ and Wodehouse hoped to relieve the Imperial Government of this burden by having the territory annexed to the Cape Colony. The Kaffrarians did not favour the idea and wished to retain their identity as a separate province, but the Eastern Province members were strongly in favour of the proposed annexation as they believed that the members who would sit in Parliament for the annexed territory would increase the voting strength of Eastern Province Separatists. The Western Province however, did not favour the move as it would probably mean the removal of Imperial troops from the Frontier so that the Colony alone would be responsible for the defence of the Eastern border as well as the

24. Theal: Since 1795. IV, p.33

25. Ibid. p.38

26. Walker: History, p.315.

maintenance of order among the natives in the newly annexed area, - not a popular undertaking at a time when the Colony's revenue was falling. Moreover, they were not going to commit political suicide by voting for what amounted to increased representation for the Eastern Province. Nor did the Western Province wish to leave the financial control of the country in the hands of an irresponsible executive. When the second reading of the annexation bill was moved in the Assembly, all the Eastern Province members spoke in favour of it and the Western, against it. The debate continued for days and then an amendment was moved that it be read six months later; this was carried by 19 to 14 votes. On this division the two provinces were ranged sharply against one another - all the Eastern members voting in the minority and all the Western with the majority.²⁷

In order to bring about this annexation, Wodehouse, realising that British Kaffraria could no longer continue as a separate colony, persuaded the British Government to pass an act enabling him to annex Kaffraria should the Cape Parliament refuse to do so. The annexation question was again brought before Parliament in 1865.²⁸ One of the stormiest sessions in the history of the Old Cape House followed. To make his annexation proposals more acceptable, Wodehouse also introduced another bill proposing an increase in the number of members in the two houses, an increase which would still guarantee Western supremacy.²⁹ Moltene

27. Theal: Since 1795. IV, p.26.

28. Walker: History, p.314.

29. Walker: History, p.314. In the Legislative Council each province was to receive three additional members bringing the total in the Council to 21, the West having a majority of one; in the Assembly, Kaffraria was to receive four members and the total of members was increased to 66, - the West having a majority of two. Vide: Eybers: Select Constitutional Docs. p.59.

and Solomon objected strongly and obstructed the work of Parliament with all the means at their disposal, even carrying a vote of censure on the Government's native policy.³⁰

The Moltene-Solomon party proposed that the Kaffraria Annexation Bill and Additional Representation Bill should be tacked together. This proposal brought out afresh the antipathy between East and West. The Easterners wanted the Annexation Bill to pass as they thought that it would give them four more votes in the Assembly, but they were opposed to the Additional Representation Bill as it would nullify the advantage which they hoped to derive from the Annexation Bill. When the proposed amalgamation of the two bills was put to the vote, the majority of the Midland members who seem to have had more fear of Eastern than of Western domination voted with the Westerners and the amalgamation was carried by twenty to eleven votes. The second reading was carried by 21 votes to 10 on 2nd June, 1865, but now the opposition of the Eastern members became so determined that on the motion that the House go into committee, the Opposition resorted to obstruction and an all night sitting took place; the Eastern obstruction continued and it took the Bill twenty-one days to reach the committee stage. On 4th August, the Bill was brought up to be read a third time. Thereupon the Eastern members, left the House in a body rather than face a division. The Bill came before the Legislative Council where it encountered even greater opposition than in the Assembly and it was held up till 14th September, passing the third reading by seven Western Province

30. Theal: Since 1795. IV. p.73.

31.

votes to six of the Eastern.

Although the elections held in consequence of the additional Representation Bill of 1865, turned largely on the question³² of responsible government, no further attempt was made in Parliament to introduce a change till 1870. The Cape Colony suffered more and more from economic ills and depression and because the Eastern Province was still firmly opposed to it, Molteno was afraid to propose responsible government, knowing that he would be outvoted. Further Wodehouse was no believer in responsible government:

"I have the strongest conviction that Responsible Government is unsuited to, and will work great mischief to this Colony", because "I have never regarded Responsible Government as applied to a Colony, more properly speaking a dependency as anything less than an absolute contradiction in terms."³³

He was convinced that the remedy lay not in self-government but in increasing the power of the executive at the cost of the legislature, hence his repeated proposals for a change in the constitution, each bearing a more autocratic stamp than its predecessor.

The first time that Wodehouse suggested a change in the constitution was after the session of 1862, which rejected his British Kaffraria Annexation Bill and his measure to hold alternate sessions of Parliament at Cape Town and Grahamstown. He wrote to the Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle and put forth a scheme which provided a separate single chamber legislature for each province; further the two provinces were to be federated under a single chamber legislature. The Secretary

31. Theol: Since 1795. IV, p.73 et seq.

32. Theol: Since 1795. IV, p.79.

33. Imp. Blue Book.No. VIII. Desp. No. 6, Wodehouse to Granville 17/1/70, p.17.

of State however, rejected these proposals.

Wodehouse met Parliament in 1867, with a further decline in revenue and an estimated deficit of over £59,000, to meet which he proposed a duty on exports - a measure which Parliament had already rejected on a previous occasion.³⁴ The Governor followed this up with an announcement that the Imperial Government had informed him that British troops at the Cape would either have to be supported by the Cape Government or withdrawn. All the members felt that under circumstances then existing, the Colony could not possibly raise the necessary funds, and the alternative would then be the depredation of the Eastern districts. The Governor then brought forward his second scheme of bringing the executive into harmony with the representatives of the people.³⁵ He proposed a single chamber legislature consisting of three executive officers and eighteen members elected by six electoral circles. So great was the opposition to this scheme from all sides that it was clear to the Colonial Secretary, Richard Southey, that there was no possibility of carrying it, hence he withdrew it.

In 1869, the finances of the Colony not having improved, the Governor, in order to economise, submitted another scheme. There had to be one legislative chamber consisting of a president, nominated by the Crown, three official members and twelve members elected by the people. The Assembly replied by rejecting the proposal by 39 votes to 22, and demanding economy and retrenchment in the civil service. They were not, for the sake

34. Theal: Since 1795. 1V, p.85.

35. Theal: Since 1795. 1V, p.87.

of economy, going to exchange their constitution for an inferior one.³⁶ A financial deadlock followed between the Assembly and Legislative Council and between both and the Executive Council. In despair the Governor prorogued Parliament and dissolved the Assembly, appealing to the country on the future form of the government; it had to be either responsible government or a single legislative council of four official and thirty-two elected members.³⁷ The public took a keen interest in the elections and 22 members were unseated. When Parliament met in 1870, however, it was clear that the country was averse to increasing the power of the executive and the second reading of the Bill was rejected by 34 votes to 26 on 24th February.³⁸ Three months later Wodehouse left the Cape Colony.

It had become clear that, since it would have none of Wodehouse's reformed constitutions, the only constitutional escape for the Cape Colony was responsible government. The continual wrangling between the Cape Governor and the legislature made it clear even to the authorities in England that the Colony had outgrown representative government. The Secretary of State for Colonies, Granville was now prepared to grant self-government, if the Colony desired it;

"It becomes necessary, therefore, to bring the Executive Government and the Representative Legislature into harmony,....And if the Government cannot by some such measure be enabled to command the co-operation of the Legislature, it remains that the Legislature should be enabled to ensure the co-operation of the Government, that is that Responsible Government should be established in that ((Cape)) as in other colonies of equal importance. I have considered the difficulties you point out as likely to arise when such a change is made. But if the colonists will not allow

36. Theal: Since 1795. IV, p.101.

37. Hofmeyr: op.cit. p.102.

38. Theal: Since 1795. IV, p.103.

themselves to be governed - and I am far from blaming them for desiring to manage their own affairs, or from questioning their capacity to do so, which is seldom rightly estimated till it is tried - it follows that they must adopt the responsibility of governing"³⁹

But whether there would be responsible government at the Cape still depended on the attitude of the two parties; the Eastern Separatists were determined to fight the change tooth and nail and the Western "Responsibles" were equally determined that the measure should be carried.

When Sir Henry Barkly succeeded Wodehouse, it was clear that responsible government would not be a distant vision much longer. The Secretary of State had clearly expressed himself in favour of a change,⁴⁰ and with the increase of Cape revenue due to the discovery of diamonds, the Responsible Government Party gained considerable ground;⁴¹ the people realised that they were economically strong enough to govern themselves. Furthermore, one of the strongest arguments against responsible government, namely, that it would entail the removal of British troops, was now removed. In a despatch to the Governor, 26th January, 1867, Carnarvon stated that unless the Colonists undertook to pay them, the troops in the Colony would be withdrawn.^{41a} In his speech opening Parliament on 27th April, 1871, Barkly emphatically expressed himself in favour of responsible Government as the only means of securing harmony between executive and legislature. He also referred to the possibility of the Eastern and Western Provinces being united under a federal form of government, but before this would be considered, responsible

39. Imp. Blue Book. No. VIII. Section 9, No. 5. Granville to Wodehouse; 9/12/1869, p.16.

~~40. Supra, p. 40.~~

40. Walker: De Villiers, pl 47.

41a. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.101.

government had first to be carried.⁴²

On the 1st June, 1871, Molteno moved that the system of responsible government should be introduced into the Cape Province and a commission appointed to investigate the desirability of a federation of the various regions of the Cape Colony. Great earnestness characterised the debate and all the old arguments against responsible government were again raised.⁴³ Molteno had the support of the Governor, and all the members of the Western Province with the exception of a few "Conservatives"; furthermore, the members from the Midland Districts were also on his side as well as Sprigg and his Kaffrarians who on account of trade rivalry, - East London versus Port Elizabeth - refused to support the Eastern Province in their antagonism to the Western Province. Opposed to Molteno's motion there were the members of the Executive Council, the Western "Conservatives" and the members from the Eastern Province.⁴⁴ On 9th June, Molteno's motion was carried by 31 votes to 26 - twelve Easterners, placing their trust in the last part of Molteno's motion, voted with the majority.⁴⁵ Thereupon the Governor requested the former Attorney-General, William Porter to draft the necessary bill. The second reading of the Bill was moved on 30th June, and on 5th July, an amendment that it be read that day six months was rejected by thirty-four votes to twenty-eight. The Responsible Government Party mustered twenty-one votes from the Western Province, twelve from the Midlands and one vote from the Eastern Province; those opposed to responsible government ob-

42. Theal: Since 1795. IV, p.115 et seq.

43. Supra, p. 29.

44. Walker: De Villiers, p.52.

45. Theal: Since 1795. IV, p.125.

tained eleven votes from the Western Province, two from the Midlands and fifteen from the Eastern Province. The amendment was therefore rejected and then the second reading of the Bill was carried without a division. At the committee stage all the opponents of responsible government left the House so that the Bill went through without any important alterations. The third reading was carried without a division on 12th July.⁴⁶

The Bill was now sent to the Legislative Council which had not been expressly elected on the constitution issue, since it had not been dissolved by Kitchener prior to the election of 1869. On 21st July, 1871, the Council rejected the Bill at the second reading, by twelve votes to nine. Those in favour consisted of seven members from the Western Province and two from the Eastern; the majority consisted of eight Eastern Province and four Western Province representatives.⁴⁷

During the parliamentary recess public support for responsible government increased steadily and when Parliament assembled, responsible government was introduced as a Government measure,⁴⁸ in exactly the same form as it had been rejected by the Legislative Council. On 17th May, 1872, the Attorney-General moved the second reading whereupon John Eustace, member for Cape Town, moved that it be read that day six months. An animated debate followed till the 28th May, when the amendment was rejected by thirty-five to twenty-five votes. The original motion was then carried by thirty-five to twenty-five votes. The majority consisted of twenty-two Western Province and thirteen Eastern

46. Theal: Since 1795. IV, p.127.

47. Theal: Since 1795. IV, p.128.

48. Walker: History, p.349.

Province members, and the minority of nine Westerners and sixteen Easterners.⁴⁹

After passing the third reading in the Assembly on 3rd June, it was at once sent to the Council. During the recess two Western Province members of the Council - P.E. de Roubaix and Dr. Hiddingh - who had voted against responsible government the previous year, publicly asked the constituents of the Western Districts to express their opinion on the Responsible Government Bill. Deputations came to Cape Town from as far distant as a hundred miles and persuaded the two gentlemen to vote for responsible government. Accordingly, on the 11th June, 1872, the second reading was carried by eleven votes to ten instead of being rejected by twelve votes to nine as in 1871.⁵⁰ Nine Western and two Eastern members voted for responsible government and eight Eastern members against it.⁵¹ Thus the Responsible Government Bill became Act No. 1. of 1872.

It was a very short act, which, in brief, provided for five persons holding offices of profit under Her Majesty the Queen to be eligible for Parliament and responsible to the Colonial Parliament for their acts.⁵² At the same time another bill was also passed which at last provided for equal representation of the Eastern and Western Provinces in the Assembly.⁵³

49. C. Argus, 8/8/'72.

50. G.H. 31/11. Desp. to Sec. of State, No. 64. 17/6/'72.

51. C. Argus, 15/6/'72.

52. They were: The Colonial Secretary, the Treasurer of the Colony, the Attorney-General, the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works and the Secretary for Native Affairs.

53. Walker: History, p.349.

The Governor reserved the Bill for the signification of the Queen's pleasure and from the time that the Bill had been passed in the Council till the Queen's pleasure was known there was another strong agitation against the Bill, notably, from the Eastern Province where the Separatists once again advocated their ideal; they petitioned the Queen to refuse her assent and asked for separation from the Western Province. The leaders founded a Separation League but outside Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth they failed to gain much support.⁵⁴ The weakness of the Separatists lay in the fact that they did not have the unanimous support of all the Eastern Districts; the Midland area and British Kaffraria were dead against Separation;⁵⁵ the former because it felt itself more closely allied in occupation and racial similarity to the farming population of the Western Province, the latter because it was afraid of Algoa Bay domination and preferred the development of the Border with East London as port which would enable it to become economically independent of Port Elizabeth.⁵⁶ To oppose Separation therefore, they founded a Frontier League. Moreover, the Kaffrarians had not forgotten the keenness with which the Eastern Province had formerly wished for the annexation of their territory against their will.⁵⁷ The efforts of the Separatists in the end were of no avail because their petition to the Throne was refused and the Royal assent given to the Responsible Government Bill.

54.C. Argus, 3/9/'72. C.A. Smith's Address to electors, 17/8/'72.

55.C. Argus, 18/6/'72 et 20/8/'72.

56.C. Argus, 3/9/'72, Address of Frontier League.

57.Supra, p. 36.

11. FIRST YEARS OF THE MOLTENO MINISTRY.

The Responsible Government Party had carried the day and on 1st December, 1872, the Molteno Ministry assumed office. Very little machinery is required to change over from representative to responsible government; the Governor is merely given unlimited power to appoint new executive councillors, subject to confirmation by the Crown, on the understanding that such councillors have the confidence of the legislature of which they are members, and that as soon as they lose that confidence and support they will resign as councillors.⁵⁸ Thus everything connected with the Cape constitution, was, in theory, an imitation of the British constitution which rests to a great extent on unwritten laws, usages and traditions, and based on the constitution of 1853.

Sir Henry Barkly had some difficulty in obtaining a suitable Prime Minister. The first man he approached was Richard Southey, a capable administrator and Colonial Secretary during the last years of representative government. He however, refused as he had been one of the strongest opponents of responsible government and he was also afraid that tenure of office would be very insecure on account of the antagonism between the two provinces.⁵⁹ William Porter, the experienced ex-Attorney-General and advocate of responsible government would have satisfied most parties as first Premier, but he declined the offer on account of advanced age and ill health. The other

58. Nineteenth Century, Aug., 1880. Article, A. Mills: Colonial Representative Government, p.239.

59. Wilmot: The Life and Times of Sir Richard Southey, p.235.

possible candidate was Saul Solomon but he, a pigmy in stature yet giant in intellect, was no real leader of men and, moreover, his views on the native question would not have gained the support of the majority of representatives. This fact, and business considerations, made him stand back in favour of the dour fighter for responsible government - John Molteno.⁶⁰

In many respects, the first Premier and Colonial Secretary under responsible government, was a remarkable man. He had come to South Africa as a young man and had at first certain commercial interests in Cape Town, but had later become a sheep farmer on the Karoo plains of Beaufort West. After a sojourn of about fifty years in the Cape Colony, he had developed qualities in many respects similar to those of the Dutch leaders themselves: shrewdness, conservatism, reticence, caution, and restraint; at times, however, a violent temper would break through his reserve and "The Lion of Beaufort" would launch slashing attacks on opponents and try to achieve by threat and intimidation what more tactful and dexterous politicians would have achieved by compromise and persuasion.⁶¹ As head of the Responsible Government Party however, he had a firm hold on his followers and in that respect he was the right man to lead the ministerial party under responsible government.⁶²

When Molteno formed his ministry he took a large and liberal view of the political situation. He had succeeded in carrying the principle of responsible government, in the face of strong opposition, but now he bore no ill-will to those who had

60. Hofmeyr: op. Cit. p.121.

61. De Kiewiet: The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.60 et seq.

62. Z.-Afr. 1/7/'82. .

been his fiercest opponents. He was prepared to make a new start and give his opponents the same opportunities as his supporters in the new order of things. Hence, he tried to advance the welfare of the Colony by enrolling under his banner the best men in and out of Parliament. Thus Molteno took as his Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works, an uncompromising Anti-Responsible, Charles Abercrombie Smith of Kingwilliamstown. With regard to this appointment Sir Henry de Villiers, later Lord de Villiers, wrote:

"He gave offence to some of his party by appointing as Commissioner of Crown Lands a gentleman who had opposed the introduction of responsible government, but he defended the appointment on the ground that opposition to the introduction of the new system did not imply inability or unwillingness to serve the country after the change, and that it was his duty to appoint the best man he could find, provided only they loyally accepted the altered form of government. Mr. Abercrombie Smith, by his career as Minister and subsequently as Auditor-General, fully justified his selection"⁶⁵

As Attorney-General Molteno selected John Henry de Villiers, then an advocate at the Cape Bar; he soon afterwards became Chief Justice of the Cape Colony and later first Chief Justice of the Union of South Africa. To him also goes the distinction of being the first South African to be elevated to the British peerage. The Treasurership was first offered to Joseph Vincent who refused it; it was then assigned to Dr. Henry White a representative of the Western Division in the Legislative Council. Because he tried to make the Ministry as representative of the country as possible, Molteno offered the office of Secretary for Native Affairs to Thomas Glanville, Member of

65. Molteno: The Life and Times of Sir John Charles Molteno. Vol.1, p.199.(Quoted).

the Legislative Assembly for Grahamstown and editor of the "Grahamstown Journal". He declined the offer and the post was filled by Charles Brownlee, a man who had grown up among natives, knew them intimately and who was at that time Native Commissioner at Kingwilliamstown.⁶⁴ A seat was found for him in the constituency of Albert.

Seeing that it contained men of different political colour, the Molteno Ministry was a real coalition ministry; a man like Abercrombie Smith represented the extreme Anti-Responsibles and Separatists; Charles Brownlee, although not a member of the legislature at that time knew the Border and Eastern Province well and sympathised with the views of the Eastern Province on the constitution question.⁶⁵ Molteno represented a Midland constituency with Western sympathies; the other two ministers came from the Western Province. No doubt the Colony's first Premier acted wisely in not limiting his choice to men of the Responsible Government Party. Seeing that the responsible government question had been decided, the old parties which ranged round this question ceased to exist and in course of time an entirely new orientation would come into existence, an orientation based on fresh problems which confronted the Colony. Molteno was therefore justified in ignoring past political divisions which had ceased to count and in soliciting the aid of all sections in promoting the welfare of the Colony.

The new ministers entered on their functions under very

64. Z.-Afr. 8/11/'72 et 13/11/'72.

65. P.M. 312. Minute No. 1. 3/1/73.

favourable circumstances; the Governor, at this stage of responsible government at the Cape still a powerful influence, was favourably disposed towards the Government; the members of the Cabinet were capable men firmly held together by Holtzner. Financially the Colony was progressive; the Colony was at peace with natives within and without its borders. Moreover, there was a keen desire amongst the Colonists for progress in education, railways, telegraphs and other benefits and improvements.⁶⁶

The policy of the Holtzner Ministry like that of all coalition governments was not revolutionary; the chief aim was to vindicate their advocacy of responsible government by making a success of the new form of government. Public interest centred mainly round two matters, native affairs and communications. In opening Parliament in 1873, the Governor outlined the ministerial policy. The "influence and power" of the Colony was to be increased over the native tribes between the border of the Cape and that of Natal in order to keep that territory quiet and ensure the frontier farmers against attacks from natives. In the meanwhile the strength of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police was to be increased and strong detachments of this force placed along the Colonial border. Communications were to be improved by carrying on railway construction as rapidly as possible; as a first instalment railways would be extended from Wellington to Worcester and from Port Elizabeth to Bushman's River, but as soon as material was available and surveys were complete the Government would frame a more comprehensive scheme.

66. Cape Monthly Magazine, Dec., 1872. Art. Anon. Polity not Party, p. 338.

Telegraphic communications were also to be increased and the chief inland towns connected with Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. The Government further asked Parliament for a sum of £10,000 to devote to the improvement of main roads in the Colony. Finally, in proposing that the University of the Cape of Good Hope should take the place of the Board of Examiners, the Ministry took a step of far-reaching importance.⁶⁷

The introduction of responsible government brought with it the rise of the party system of government in the Cape Colony; the formation of parties is in fact almost imperative, as Keith puts it: "The essential basis of responsible government of the English type is the existence of effective parties".⁶⁸ But it would take many years before sharply defined parties, with party programmes and organisation, made their appearance. Moltano and his colleagues merely had a programme of action containing the administrative measures which they were going to propose to Parliament.⁶⁹ There was no coherent ministerial party on which Moltano could consistently rely, nor was there an organised Opposition ever ready, as a party, to challenge ministerial measures. Moltano could count on a number of disorganised elements for support. Firstly, there was the fairly solid Dutch vote which supported Moltano as long as he did not give Barkly any assistance in his efforts to undermine the independence of the Boer Republics.⁷⁰ The majority of the English in the Colony, especially in the Western Province, who had fought with Moltano for responsible government continued to

67. C. Argus, 25/4/'73. Governor's Speech.

68. Keith: The King and the Imperial Crown, p.65.

69. Supra, p.51.

70. De Kiewiet: The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.25.

support him; among those must be reckoned the two most able men in the House - in debate as well as in statesmanship - namely, Porter and Solomon.⁷¹ The representatives from the Frontier constituencies also supported Molteno but soon they began to take their cue from Gordon Sprigg, member for East London, and an opponent of Molteno's after the constitutional question had been won. The lack of coherence among the ministerial supporters was also reflected in the Ministry. While most of the ministers were in favour of the Voluntary Principle,^{71a} Molteno was an anti-Voluntary. With regard to the Masters and Servants Act, Molteno was in sympathy with the Eastern members who advocated strict treatment of natives. One of his colleagues, Dr. White "werd verdacht van met de phillippijnische ideën van Exeter Hall besmet te zijn". With regard to the abolition of Capital Punishment and the Bill to legalise marriage with one's deceased wife's sister, ministers were also divided. "Natuurlik sal hier ook volkome vrijheid van handelen moeten gegeven en verklaard worden, dat deze geene 'party-question' zijn....en alzoo zal men telkenmale het tooneel aanschouwen van een ministerie welks leden onderling verdeeld zijn!"⁷²

Some vague outline of an Opposition could also be discerned among the disorganised groups that did not support the ministry. The Opposition consisted chiefly of Eastern Province members - the men who had opposed responsible government but who now, since that issue had been decided, continued to propa-

71. Molteno: The Life and Times of Sir John Charles Molteno. Vol. 1, p.207.

72. That is the voluntary support of ministers of religion by their congregations. State aid would be withdrawn. Vide: *Infra*, p.58.

72. *Z.-Afr.* 23/4/'73.

gate Separation. The Separation League was still a vigorous organisation. It was a thorough British organisation, abhorring colonial inheritance and matrimonial laws and determined to see the expansion of British power over Southern Africa, including disputed and undisputed Diamond Fields; all these were matters on which the British Conservatives of the West would give them support. Furthermore, the Opposition could also count on the active sympathy of some Midland divisions by promising to support their railway demands.⁷³ During the session of 1873, the members from the Frontier constituencies also, at times, lent their support to the Opposition and as often as not voted against the Ministry; moreover, Gordon Sprigg, one of their leaders, who had been strongly in favour of responsible government the previous year, was striving at the leadership of the Opposition.⁷⁴ Among those opposed to the Ministry could also be counted such capable men as John X. Merriman, John Paterson and Philip Watermeyr, a great friend of President Burgers. ✓

In 1873, when Parliament assembled for the first session under responsible government, the members from the Eastern Province hoped to work for the separation of their province from the West; but, as the session progressed, they thought it wise to give the new form of government a fair trial. They now strove to get out of the Government as many railways and other benefits for their province as possible. "At present the Eastern Province is not to be drawn aside from its true path

73. 2.-Apr. 23/4/'73.

74. Ibid. 2/7/'73.

even by the voice of such a charmer as Separation. It is determined to obtain if possible from the present Government, the fair treatment it promises to us in the matter of railroads. Give us these, and we shall not fear the ultimate political status of the Province."⁷⁵ Thus early began the competition between East and West for Government expenditure on railway construction. Already in the session of 1873, Paterson from Port Elizabeth hoped to strengthen the political power of the East by trying to win the support of the Midlands against the Western Province by contending that if the Western railways were extended into the interior the Eastern Province should receive two lines, that is, one from Port Elizabeth in the direction of Graaff-Reinet and the other towards Gradoek. If the Ministry refused those lines it might lose the support of those representatives. Should it grant those railways it might lose the support of British Kaffraria unless it agreed to build another eastern line from East London via Kingwilliamstown to Queenstown and northwards. Then Cape Town could justly demand that just as much as was spent on these eastern lines should be devoted to the extension of its line into the interior, and this would be opposed by Port Elizabeth because the real matter at stake was which harbour, Port Elizabeth or Cape Town, was to have the first rapid communication with the Diamond Fields. The Eastern Province merchants well realised that Cape Town would have the best chance if equal sums were spent on the three Eastern Province lines as on one of the Western Province.⁷⁶ The railway question was therefore one of extreme complexity, and

⁷⁵. Journal. 1/5/174.
⁷⁶. Z.-Afr. 16/4/173.

soon displaced constitutional differences between East and West. Paterson made the best use of it to threaten and embarrass the Government. Yet, to the surprise of all, the second reading of the Government Railway Bill was carried without a division ⁷⁷ - the Opposition had lacked coherence. The experience of the first session of Parliament under responsible government as well as Molteno's tour through the Midlands and Eastern districts at the conclusion of the session of 1873, did much to silence the old separation cry. This particular tour of the Premier was a triumphal march; he was everywhere received most heartily: "There is but one man in the Eastern Province at this moment, and it is unnecessary to name him....Mr. Molteno pervades the Province....no governor ever descended upon the Province with the open and overwhelming glory of the Premier."⁷⁸

One can safely conclude therefore, that the first session of Parliament under responsible government witnessed much looseness and confusion of political parties and the absence of party tactics and strategy. Neither Molteno nor Paterson, his chief opponent had a steady following. Motives of regional, racial and personal nature often guided members in their sympathies with the result that one could never safely say what course political events would follow - this was especially the case in such a small Parliament as that of the Cape which consisted of sixty-eight members. Under such circumstances the Government had naturally to a very great extent to depend on Parliament as a whole and it was therefore unwilling to propose

⁷⁷. Z.-Aff. 17/5/'73.

⁷⁸. Journal, 18/8/'73. See also: Z.-Aff. 16/8/'73.

drastic or radical measures without being assured of support from Parliament. Molteno therefore pursued a policy of safety first and proposed measures that were generally imperative or popular such as railways, magistracies and educational reforms.

Towards the end of the Session of 1873, the House of Assembly debated and approved of the so-called "Seven Circles Bill" by 35 to 16 votes.⁷⁹ This was a bill to reform the mode of election of the Legislative Council. Until then, each of the two provinces, Eastern and Western, had formed one huge constituency with the West returning eleven members to ten of the East.⁸⁰ This system had been established in 1853 and in course of time "Cape Town in the West and Port Elisabeth and Grahamstown in the East controlled the Council elections. The result was that the country districts took little interest because they found that they were outvoted by the large towns. The Attorney-General, de Villiers, now proposed a bill which would divide the Colony into seven constituencies each returning three members to sit for ten years. This change would enable the country districts to feel that they were represented by their own representatives and not by the nominees of the large towns. Further, the Bill would abolish by law what the commonsense of the majority of Colonists and their similarity of interests had already abolished the previous year, namely, the distinction between East and West.⁸¹ The Legislative Council however, regarded the "Seven Circles Bill" as an interference in their affairs on the part of the Assembly and hence rejected the Bill. Thereupon, although

79. Z.-Afr. 17/5/'73.

80. C. Argus, 15/6/'72.

81. C. Argus, 13/6/'74, Legis. Cl. Debate 15/6/'74.

the Assembly still had another year to run, the Ministry advised the Governor to dissolve Parliament. This was necessary because if the Upper House, where the obstruction had occurred, were dissolved the constitution demanded that the Lower House should also be dissolved.⁸²

Molteno therefore appealed to the country on the "Seven Circles Bill". The strongest opposition came from Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown. If the Bill were passed they would only return three members to the Council. (The elections for the Council returned a strong majority in favour of the Seven Circles Bill. Then followed the Assembly elections and during these, the electorate paid less and less attention to the Constitution Ordinance Amendment Bill, as the Seven Circles Bill was formally called. The public in some constituencies was more interested in a bill Solomon had already several times proposed to Parliament, namely, a bill withdrawing state aid from the churches of the Colony so that the churches would voluntarily support their own ministers. But even on this matter many constituencies had not clearly made up their minds and returned one member in favour of the Bill and one against it,⁸³ for example, Cape Town, Colesberg, Wodehouse, Grahamstown.⁸⁴ It is clear therefore, that the confusion among political groups also confused the election issues; as the "Zuid-Afrikaan" of 28th January, 1874, put it: "Het is egter gemakkelijker te zeggen dat de electie zal worden betwist, dan wel waarover de twist eigenlyk zal loopen". Many of the electors did not worry much about who their candidates were and

82. G.H. 31/12. Despatch to Sec. of State, No. 83. 17/7/'74.

83. Most of the constituencies at that time returned two members: each; Cape Town returned four.

84. Z.-Afr. 11/2/'74.

what their policies; they were satisfied with the knowledge "dat hij wordt aanbevolen door dozen of dien wolkoper en agent, die zich alweder laat leiden, hetzij door eigen belang, of eene andere en wel allergrilligste, beweegreden".⁸⁵

Moreover, because the Dutch language was not an official language, it could not be used in Parliament, with the result that the Dutch lost interest in elections; many capable Dutch could not speak English and would therefore have been mere dummies if elected.^{85a} In later years this state of affairs underwent a radical change.^{85b}

After the elections the Seven Circles Bill was again brought before Parliament. The passage of this Bill through the two Houses gives an interesting illustration of the confusion that may prevail in a House in which there is no party discipline to ensure that each member votes for the party he supports. In order to meet the objection of the Legislative Council, the Bill was now introduced into that House first. Here it was carried with the proviso that the Council members, then sitting would be regarded as having been elected for five years unless the Governor exercised his power of dissolution; vacancies occurring in the meantime would be filled as formerly; in other words, the Bill should only take effect at the next dissolution of the Council.⁸⁶ In the Assembly the Bill passed the second reading by 41 to 17 votes. When the House went into committee, Sprigg moved that the proviso that the Bill should

85. Z.-Aff. 28/1/74.

85.a. Vide Hofmeyr: op. cit., p.143.

85.b. Infra, p.122.

86. C.Argus, 18/6/74, Parliamentary Notes.

only take effect at the next dissolution of the Council, should be expunged. Such an alteration would have meant the loss of the Bill because only on the addition of this proviso had the Council accepted it.⁸⁷ Merriman and Solomon supported Sprigg and when the motion was put to the vote it was carried by 26 to 25 votes.⁸⁸ Thereupon the House adjourned. The next day, 7th July, the Premier pointed out that the second reading of the Bill had been carried by a large majority and therefore the Government had no reason to think that it would be left in a minority at the committee stage; hence no efforts had been made to have all the Government supporters in the House. Molteno also pointed out that he was not prepared to continue in office while there was any uncertainty as to his position; he then proposed the adjournment of the House till 9th July, by which time the Ministry would have considered the position. Solomon supported the Premier's proposal and stated that the Government was making a mountain out of a molehill; beyond doubt the Government had the majority of the House on its side; he himself had been surprised, when he voted against the Government on the previous day, to find that he (Solomon) was on the side of the majority. In reply Molteno vindicated his action and gave the House his views on the working of parliamentary government; he especially pointed out that those who pretended to be Government supporters owed allegiance to the Ministry and could not whimsically throw off that allegiance leaving the Ministry in a minority. Thereupon the House adjourned.⁸⁹ The outcome of the

87. Molteno: The Life and Times of Sir John Charles Molteno. Vol. II, p. 244.

88. Z.-Afr. 8/7/'74, Assembly Debate, 6/7/'74.

89. Z.-Afr. 8/7/'74, Assembly Debate, 7/7/'74.

matter was that when the House assembled again the proviso in question was reinstated by a majority of 55 to 11 votes.⁹⁰

From the incident described above, it is clear that members were still unaccustomed to the working of party government and that they did not realise the implications to the Government of the day of an adverse vote; under representative government such an adverse vote would have been without effect as the Government continued in office. The incident also shows up the lack of party discipline. "There were no whips, and, indeed, Mr. Molteno was entirely averse to any influence whatever being brought to bear on members; he desired to leave everything to their own sense of what was right and fitting, and in this he erred too far on the side of not influencing members. Human nature needs guidance, and the working of Parliamentary Government necessitates some machinery, to avoid mistakes and confusion".⁹¹

As a result of this crisis Molteno's position was greatly strengthened and the remaining governmental measures were carried with hardly any division: "Instead of a weak, indecisive and tentative Ministry as we had last week we have now a Ministry overwhelmingly and perilously strong confronting a House which appears to have no pluck or confidence or mind of its own whatsoever".⁹²

The year 1875 witnessed at least two serious attempts to form an organised Opposition to the Molteno Ministry. The first emanated from John Paterson. In a letter to John X. Herriman

90. G. ARGUS, 14/7/74, Assembly Debate, 10/7/74.

91. Molteno: The Life and Times of Sir John Charles Molteno. Vol. 1, p. 242.

92. Journal, 17/7/74. See also Z.-Afr. 29/7/74.

before the session of 1875, he suggested that if the Ministry's programme proved to be "disappointing" and a sham they should call a meeting of all members and organise an opposition. Men like Solomon, Sprigg, Manuel, Fairbridge and Watermeyr in the Assembly and de Korte, Hofmeyr (Senior), and Godlonton in the Council could all count on a number of followers. Paterson suggested that these men should be "induced to join an opposition whose policy shall be progressive or onward against a policy which is non-progressive or stagnant". Even if the Opposition should consist of only a dozen reliable men it would be an important power in the House "and party discipline would be inaugurated".⁹³ Further Paterson expressed the opinion that it would not do for their party to help any party which sought a rupture with the Imperial Government; rather should they assist the Imperial Government by allowing Molteno and his followers to be made the tool of the Imperial Government.⁹⁴ Paterson's attempt however, to form a cohesive Opposition bore no fruit.

The next attempt centred round the Natal Criminals Bill. Langalibalele, a petty chief in Natal, and his son were being kept prisoner on Robben Island on account of his rebellion in Natal a few years previous. The Cape Parliament had consented to his imprisonment on this island in 1874. When Parliament met in 1875, the Molteno Ministry introduced a bill to give effect to the wishes of the Secretary of State that Langalibalele should be transferred to the mainland.⁹⁵ Before this Bill was brought up for discussion a number of caucus meetings were held

93. Merriman Papers, No. 12. 1875. Paterson to J.X. Merriman, 17 March.

94. Ibid. No. 14. 1875. Ibid. 30 March.

95. Molteno: The Life and Times of Sir John Charles Molteno, Vol. 1, p. 271.

"Ook wij zouden in de vreugde deelen, zagen wij in, dat de partijon zich naar eenig dagelijk rigtsnoer groepeerden - dat er eenig beginsel was dat haar scheide. Doch wij zien er geen, tensij persoonlijke haat, jaloerschheid of een hongeren naar de brooden en visschen des bewinds dien naam waardig is. Welk beginsel vereenigt de heeren Ross-Johnson en Vincent, - de heeren Sprigg, Paterson en Merriman, of scheidt ze van de heeren Molteno, Smith en Jacobs?¹⁰⁰.... Ja, waarlijk, er rest geene andere verklaring der oppositie tegen de Regering dan bekrompen persoonlijke overwegingen, zocals b.v. 's heeren Spriggs afkeer van den heer Molteno omdat hem, den trouwen Verantwoordelijken luitenant van voorheen, geen, plaats in het ministerie werd toegewezen door den Premier. Eene Oppositie op zulke grondslagen rustende moet uit den aard der zaak minder invloedrijk zijn en minder vertrouwen bezitten, dan eene op eene breedere basis rustende. Maar zelfs zij kan nuttig zijn, door het ministerie te overtuigen dat het nu werkt onder naauwkeurig toezicht, en dat zijne diensten minder onontbeerlijk zijn dan die voorleden jaar nog beschouwd¹⁰¹!"

In July, 1875, Molteno made a very clever move in order to reinforce his ministry; he offered a seat to Gordon Sprigg, one of his chief opponents and a man invariably antagonistic to the Ministry.¹ Sprigg however, turned the offer down. The post was then offered to John X. Merriman and he succeeded C. Abercrombie Smith as Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works.² On many occasions the Molteno Ministry had to face Merriman's caustic criticism but on other occasions, for example, when they took up a firm attitude towards the Carnarvon Federation Despatch,³ he had staunchly supported them.⁴ The fact that Molteno could in the one case offer and in the other persuade such an opponent to join him shows how ill-defined parties were and how shallow their supposed differences ran. Constitutionally the Prime Minister's action was quite justifiable. As

100. Attorney-General in succession to de Villiers.

101. 2.-Afr. 12/5/'75.

1. 2.-Afr. 17/7/'75. Sprigg had a sound knowledge of parliamentary practice, was a keen debater and a man of character and determination.

2. From this time onwards Sprigg and Merriman, each capable in his own way, could never be persuaded to sit in the same cabinet

3. Infra, p. 65.

4. C. Argus, 17/7/'75.

long as members vote for the Government the one day and against it the next, the Premier is entitled to elevate to cabinet rank anyone who will fill that office satisfactorily. As it happened, Merriman's appointment gave strength to the Ministry; if arguments for debate had to be furnished, he furnished them; not only did he counter all attacks on the Ministry but he was also the spearhead of ministerial attacks.

III. THE CARNARVON FEDERATION SCHEME.

During the session of 1875, the famous Carnarvon proposals for a conference in the Cape Colony to consider confederation were also laid before the Cape Parliament. Many thoughtful South Africans admitted the advantages of a federated Southern Africa.⁵ To Carnarvon however, the supreme necessity was the solution of the native problem. Froude had visited South Africa in 1874, and had returned to England to inform Carnarvon of the extreme urgency of solving this problem; further, Froude had been impressed by the unjust annexation of Griqualand West and considered a confederation of South African governments the only way out.⁶

The Dutch Republics did not receive the Carnarvon Confederation Despatch favourably, and in the Cape Ministry, under Molteno, it encountered relentless opposition. The Ministry replied to Carnarvon's Despatch of 4th May, 1875, in a minute dated 7th June, 1875.^{6a} They stated that they did not consider the time ripe for confederation; further they took exception

5. See Walker: De Villiers, p.125.

6. Froude: Two Lectures on South Africa, p.169-174.

6a. P.H. 312. Min. No. 109. 7/6/'75.

to the representatives who were supposed to meet at the proposed conference - one of these being John Paterson, a Separatist from the Eastern Province and Molteno's chief political opponent. Since the Cape had recently been granted responsible government, the Ministry regarded the action of the Colonial Secretary of State as unconstitutional, and interpreted it as an unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of the Colony. One can quite readily understand why Molteno should have felt sensitive on this point. During the Langalibalele affair he had gone out of his way to meet the wishes of the Imperial Government and on that account his opponents had that very session taunted him with subserviency to the Imperial Government; now however, to show his independence, Molteno was not in any way disposed to make any further concessions to Imperial interferences; as the member for George - Lewis Vincent - expressed it:

"It was significant that during this session we had had before us for consideration two despatches from Lord Carnarvon, which had both led to a great deal of discussion in this House, and their tendency must not be overlooked. There was no mistaking the fact that their tendency was to interfere unduly with our Colonial Policy, and therefore we ought to stand firm and back up the Ministry?"

Finally, the ministers resented the distinction made between the Eastern and Western Provinces in the nomination of representatives. "The unfortunate distinction between the Eastern and Western Provinces, which in times past has been productive of so much inconvenience now happily no longer exists and should certainly not in any way be revived"⁸. Under such

⁷ G. Argus, 15/6/'75. Assembly Debate, 9/6/'75.

⁸ P.M. 312. Min.No. 109. 7/6/'75.

circumstances the ministers would go no further than presenting copies of Carnarvon's despatch and their reply to it, to both Houses of Parliament.

It must not be thought that Molteno and his Ministry were insensible to the advantages of a South African federation. They were afraid however, that if the Carnarvon scheme were carried and the Cape should join some other state, then the constitution of the Cape would be cancelled and a new one granted, joining the other state to the Cape. Molteno and his supporters had but recently succeeded in gaining responsible government, and it being human nature to be jealous of newly won power, they were indeed attached to recently acquired privileges. They therefore held that if any state wished to unite with the Cape the latter should retain its constitution and the other state be given representation in the Cape Parliament; this really amounted to the Cape incorporating the other state. This would ensure for the Cape the leading position in any federation, a position to which it, as oldest South African province, and virtually as mother of the other South African states, was fully entitled.⁹

Over and above these considerations there was yet another circumstance that made Molteno shrink from confederation; as de Kiewiet puts it:

"Behind Molteno's resistance to Carnarvon's proposals lurked a profound unwillingness to face those native problems that confederation would reveal for the first time in their full girth and universal urgency....in the event of confederation the principal responsibility of Cape would be to help 'breaking' the power of the Zulus

9. G.H. 6/1. Prime Minister's Minute, No. 68a. 15/3/'77.

and the other powerful tribes of the interior"¹⁰

When the Carnarvon Despatch was laid before Parliament, the Legislative Council carried a resolution by nine to seven votes, thanking Carnarvon for his efforts to promote South African Confederation. In the Assembly, however, the Despatch was greeted with loud laughter and a motion from Gordon Sprigg condemning it as unconstitutional was carried by 32 to 23 votes.¹¹

It was at this stage that Froude arrived at the Cape on a second tour. Although he stated that he had come in a private capacity and that he had no connections with any government, he was everywhere received as a distinguished visitor. It was this second visit of Froude, that whipped up party feeling to an unprecedented state. Immediately on his arrival, Froude was welcomed by the party in favour of confederation and then he proceeded to tour the Cape Colony, Natal and the Republics, making speeches in favour of confederation and attacking the Molteno Ministry.¹² Cleverly enough, he always adapted his utterances to the community among which he was sojourning; thus in the Eastern Province he was a Separatist and in the Free State he praised their Republican institutions. "His sympathy with the successive peoples among whom he travelled or mingled, was so strong that, chameleon-like, his politics assumed the colour of his surroundings, while with exemplary devotion he practised the apostolic precept of being all things to all men, so that by all means he might win some"¹³ Naturally, the

10. De Kiewiet: The Imperial Factor in S.Africa, p.64, and Patriot, 20/7/'77.

11. C.Argus, Supplement, 15/6/'75. Assembly Debate, 11/6/'75.

12. P.M. 312. Minute No. 42A. 14/3/1876.

13. C. Argus, 22/6/'75.

Ministry took strong exception to Froude's activities and during August, September and October, 1875, Barkly had to use all his influence to prevent Molteno from resigning.¹⁴ Froude held that the Federation Question had not been fairly considered in Parliament and publicly demanded that a special session should be held to rediscuss the matter. The situation was most embarrassing to the Government, Molteno had the support of the Governor who consented to Molteno's request to summon Parliament because "it appeared to him (Molteno) to be imperative to take the strongest constitutional step in his power to put an end to an agitation, which was fraught with the most dangerous consequences to the country".¹⁵ Thus, on 10th November, 1875, the Cape Parliament met for one of the very few special sessions held under responsible government.

On the verdict of Parliament on the confederation proposals depended whether the Molteno Ministry, now supported by such influential men as Solomon, Scanlon, Fairbridge, Sprigg, Vincent, Manuel, Hume, Moodie and many others, was to remain in office or whether the administration of the Colony was to be handed over to their opponents - men like Paterson and Cole. Further, Parliament had to settle the question whether the Colonists were to surrender themselves into the hands of Carnarvon and Froude and others who wished to call a conference to plunder the Cape of its Customs Revenues on the one hand and on the other, make the Colony responsible for the results of all the blunders of the native policy of Natal.¹⁶

14. Mitchell: Rhodes, Vol.1, p.111, et Molteno: Life of J.C. Molteno, Vol.1, p.426.

15. Molteno: Op. cit. Vol.1, p.424.

16. C.Argus, 2/11/'75.

On the 11th November, 1875, without discussion the Legislative Council adopted a resolution in favour of the proposed conference by nine votes to six.¹⁷ In the Assembly, Molteno moved a strongly worded resolution condemning the agitation carried on by Proude and reaffirming the decision against confederation taken by the Assembly earlier in the year.¹⁸ Soon afterwards the Governor received a despatch from Carnarvon dated 22nd October, 1875, stating that no conference would be held in South Africa but in London. Thereupon, after debating Molteno's motion for eight days, Solomon proposed a resolution that:

"As it appears from the despatch dated the 22nd October, 1875, that the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies has withdrawn his proposal for a conference of representatives of the several colonies and states of South Africa, this House is of opinion that it is not now called upon to record its continued objection to the holding at the present time of such a conference; or its condemnation of the unconstitutional agitation carried on in this colony in connection with this question. The House desires, however, to express its opinion that the Government and Parliament should, if it be desired by the Imperial Government, give it their counsel and assistance in settling the difficulties which have arisen out of the extension of British jurisdiction to the territory known as Criqualand West."¹⁹

This amended resolution was adopted by the Ministry and carried by 36 votes to 22.²⁰ This second debate on Carnarvon's proposals showed that a minority in the Cape Parliament - the party which favoured Carnarvon's proposals and opposed Molteno - were making use of Proude and Carnarvon for their own purposes, namely, to embarrass or possibly to drive the Molteno Ministry from office.²¹

17. Theal: From 1875 to 1884, Vol.1, p.21.

18. C.Argus, 13/11/'75. Assembly Debate, 10/11/'75.

19. C.Argus, 23/11/'75. Assembly Debate, 19/11/'75.

20. Z.-Aff. 24/11/'75.

21. C.Argus, 25/11/'75.

Throughout this agitation for a conference on confederation Moltene's most reliable support came from some Dutch-Afrikaners who had stood by his side since his assumption of office; they feared that should Moltene fall he would be succeeded by Solomon or Sprigg with whom they had nothing in common. Furthermore, they looked upon the Carnarvon scheme as a camouflage to assist England in getting control over the Dutch Republics as well,²² which was indeed the case.²³ The "Zuid-Afrikaan" was at that time an anti-Moltene paper and its editor, a supporter of Carnarvon's schemes. In its issue of 30th October, 1875, it complained of the support which the Western "Afrikaanders" were giving to Moltene: "Terwille dus van den heer Moltene en diens Ministerie willen sommige Westelĳke Afrikaanders eigenbelang, patriotisme, nationaliteitsgevoel, ja alles, opofferen". It is noteworthy that on the vote on Solomon's motion on 23rd November, 1875,²⁴ out of the eleven Afrikaner names supporting the Ministry eight were from the Western Province two from the Midlands and one from the Eastern Province.²⁵ Ignoring individual exceptions,²⁶ Hofmeyr in his work: "The Life of J.H. Hofmeyr (Onze Jan)" is clearly at fault when he states that the Dutch from the West were against the attitude taken up by the Ministry on this question.²⁷ The "Grahamstown Journal" of 31st March, 1876, saw the position more clearly: "The Dutch in South Africa protested and still protest against the acquisition of Griqualand territory and

22. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.132.

23. The annexation of Transvaal, 1877, was a forceful attempt at confederation under British flag, since Carnarvon's conference had been thwarted by Moltene.

24. Supra, p. 70.

25. C.Argue, Supplement, 25/11/'75. Assembly Debate, 23/11/'75.

26. Such as Hofmeyr and de Villiers. Vide Infra, p.73.

27. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.133.

this question must first be settled before there can be any negotiations on Confederation.”

Opposed to Molteno on the confederation question was a party of most heterogeneous elements. Led by Paterson, it gave Froude a hearty welcome on his second visit and encouraged by that Froude began his famous propaganda tour through the country, advocating Carnarvon's proposals. The elements of this party differed very greatly among themselves on most questions but they found a common platform in the confederation proposals.²⁸ Its leader had been, till very recently, a die-hard Separatist and he and others from the Eastern Province, Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth especially, hoped that their province would enter a federation as a separate unit.²⁹ Further there were a number of influential Dutch members of Parliament who were definitely in favour of the confederation ideal and who believed in Carnarvon's promises that the injustice done to the Orange Free State would be rectified and a more friendly policy followed towards both the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Among these only two, T.D. Barry and his brother C.v.R. Barry, represented Western constituencies.³⁰ In the Midland districts however, there were a few Dutch members of Parliament who favoured confederation such as Jacobus de Wet, Andries Mnadorp and Philip Watermeyer - the latter a personal friend of President Burgers. Even before the confederation

28. Journal, 26/11/'75.

29. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.132.

30. C.Argus, Supplement, 25/11/'75. Assembly Debate, 23/11/'75.

question had been raised some of the Dutch-Afrikaners had turned against Molteno: "Voorleden jaar nog stonden de Afrikaanders als een eenig man aan zijne ((Molteno's)) zijde; nu waren er zes of zeven geschaard onder zijne tegenstanders!"³¹ So it was not merely on account of the confederation question that some Afrikaners had deserted Molteno. This small Afrikaner group in the House had the support of two capable men outside the House, namely, the Chief Justice, John Henry de Villiers and the editor of the "Zuid-Afrikaan", Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr. Both these men realized the constitutional arguments raised by Molteno, but they also saw that a national ideal was at stake and that there were many South African problems crying for solution which could only be solved by a federated South Africa; if these problems were not solved, they knew that war and most likely civil war, would probably be the outcome sooner or later.³² It was especially the hope of arriving at an amicable settlement with the Republics that made these men so enthusiastic about Carnarvon's proposals:

"Het is zoo klaar als de middagson, dat de gansche confederatie-beweging is voortgesproten uit het verlangen der Britsche Regering om, met gemeenschappelijk overleg van al de Zuid-Afrikaansche Staten en Koloniën, de disputen met de Republieken uit de wereld te maken - dat deze de hoofzaak was, en Confederatie, Inboorling-staatkunde, enz., slechts bijzaken waren"³³

Hofmeyr also voiced this sentiment in 1880, when he had become a member of the Assembly and Sprigg had again raised the confederation issue in the Assembly. Hofmeyr said that in 1875 he and others had supported the Carnarvon scheme because they

31. Z.-Aff. 12/5/'75.

32. Walker: De Villiers, p.127.

33. Z.-Aff. 1/4/'76.

were led to believe that no longer would a narrow-minded policy be pursued towards the Republics:

"He (Hofmeyr) was certain also, that a majority of Dutchmen in this Colony were so heartily sick and tired of the endless disputes and wrangling between the British Government and the neighbouring Republics, that they would then have been prepared, had the generous policy indicated been preserved in, to have besought the Republics to come under the British flag"³⁴

The "generous policy" however, soon gave way to the annexation of the Transvaal.³⁵

Carnarvon eventually gave up all hope of holding a conference in South Africa and on 26th October, 1876, an informal conference was held in Downing Street. There a deputation, consisting chiefly of Cape Colonists who had supported Proude when on his visit to South Africa, met Lord Carnarvon. Few of these men were well-known in South Africa and to them Carnarvon announced his intention of submitting a "Permissive Confederation Bill" to the Imperial Parliament.³⁶ This bill was still-born. Throughout the Cape Colony its clumsy details were condemned outright.³⁷

The failure of Carnarvon's confederation scheme had far-reaching results. In the first place it created a constitutional conflict which continued throughout the Molteno Ministry's term of office and eventually resulted in its dismissal; the question was where did Imperial interests cease and those of the Colony commence. Carnarvon regarded confederation as an

34. C.Argus, 26/6/'80, Assembly Debate, 25/6/'80.

35. *Infra*, p. 78.

36. *Fortnightly Review*, 1/4/1900. Art. Dicey, E. Confederation of S.Africa, p. 676.

37. G.H. 6/1. Prime Minister's Minute, No. 68a, 15/5/'77, et vide, Molteno: op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 150.

Imperial concern and taking this view he asked the aid of the Cape government. The Molteno Ministry, however, regarded Carnarvon's suggestions and Froude's activities as incompatible with the spirit of responsible government: "...such proceedings are subversive of the principle of Responsible Government and incompatible with the constitutional privileges bestowed on this Colony"³⁸ In support of their attitude they cited the Canadian example; in this the Ministry were not wholly in the right, for by allowing the Canadian states to take the initiative the Imperial Government did not abrogate its right to give a lead in Colonial policy; they only showed a restraint which might advantageously have been followed in South Africa. One may therefore conclude that in their opposition to Carnarvon's policy the Ministry claimed a degree of Colonial independence which was constitutionally reached only much later. It is clear that Carnarvon and the Molteno Ministry would never see eye to eye with each other; for the success of Carnarvon's policy it was necessary that Molteno should be got rid of and such an opportunity soon presented itself in connection with the Gaika-Galeka War, 1877-78.³⁹ The constitutional conflict however, was the real though not the direct cause of the dismissal of the Molteno Ministry and the succession of Gordon Sprigg to office.

By refusing to give in to Downing Street, Molteno undoubtedly did much to stimulate the growth of the spirit of

38. Cape Blue Book, G.40-'76, p.9.

39. *Infra*, p. 87.

responsible government. In the Cape it served to rouse the interest of the people in the affairs of their own colony. Thus the Governor wrote to the Secretary of State:

"The discussions which took place, towards the close of the ordinary Session of the Legislature, on the subject of a Confederation of the South African Colonies and States, infused new energy however, into political life throughout the Colony, and led to the holding of a Special Session later in the year, during which Party feeling ran higher than it had done since the introduction of Responsible Government"⁴⁰

Not only did Carnarvon's Confederation policy draw him into conflict with Molteno, but also with Sir Henry Barkly. When the Cape Governor received Carnarvon's despatch of 4th May, 1875, he was instructed to publish it at once and send copies to the Presidents of the Transvaal and Orange Free State as well as to the Administrator of Natal and Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West. The Cape Ministry threatened to resign if the Governor should obey Carnarvon. Only after consulting Froude did Barkly, in his capacity as High Commissioner,⁴¹ send copies of the despatch to other governments. Carnarvon did not approve of this action and rebuked Barkly thus:

"I am afraid,.....that it may not at all times have been sufficiently remembered that your duties as High Commissioner cannot be subordinated to the local policy of your advisers, and that even in matters affecting the Cape alone you have obligations to Her Majesty's Government which no Colonial Ministry can expect you to overlook"⁴²

Further Carnarvon also informed Barkly¹⁸⁷⁵ that should the constituents differ from Parliament on the question of a conference on confederation, Barkly need not be reminded that the consti-

40. G.H. 31/13. Desp. to Sec. of State, No.117, 20/9/'76.

41. G.H. 31/13. Ibid. No. 85, 1/7/'75.

42. G.H. 1/23. Desp. from Sec. of State, No.155, 24/1/'75.

tutional course to be followed is a dissolution of Parliament and an appeal to the electorate.⁴³ This was more than Barkly could put up with. He replied that he could not support "any attempt to turn out a Ministry supported by a large and increasing majority for the purpose of dissolving Parliament on a question of Imperial policy".⁴⁴ It therefore became clear to Carnarvon that because of his adherence to constitutional principles Barkly was as great an obstacle to confederation as Holtzner. From Carnarvon's point of view however, it was fortunate that Barkly's term of office was drawing to a close and he would soon get rid of him. His successor would be a man who would not take up a neutral or constitutional stand.

The successor to Sir Henry Barkly was Sir Bartle Frere - Governor and High Commissioner. He had had a military training and had distinguished himself as a capable Indian administrator, being Governor of Bombay prior to his appointment at the Cape.⁴⁵ He was a ready instrument in Carnarvon's hand and in a high-handed manner he was going to try to carry out Carnarvon's policy.

"For which I ((Carnarvon)) have now for two years been steadily labouring, the union of the South African Colonies and States....nominally as Governor, but really as the statesman who seems to me most capable of carrying my scheme of Confederation into effect, and whose long administrative experience and personal character give me the best chances of success"⁴⁶

To this invitation from Carnarvon, Frere gave a reply which was full of meaning:

43. Imp. B.B.C.1399; p.27.

44. Imp. B.B.C.1399, p.52

45. Holtzner; Op. cit. Vol.11, p.130.

46. Ibid. Ibid. et Martineau: Life of Sir B. Frere, Vol.11, p.161-2. (Quoted.)

"I should not have cared for the ordinary current duties of Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, but a special duty I should look upon in a different light, and there are few things which I should personally like better than to be associated in any way with such a great policy as yours in South Africa, entering as I do into the Imperial importance of your masterly scheme."⁴⁷

Frere therefore came to the Cape with a set purpose; he had to carry out Carnarvon's Confederation Scheme and if peaceful methods did not succeed, he would resort to force, declare war if necessary and dismiss a Cape Ministry.⁴⁸ dismiss

Carnarvon's efforts to lure the Cape Government into Confederation had failed and now forceful methods were resorted to. The Transvaal was annexed, very much against its own wishes, and with the Transvaal British territory, a federation with Natal and Griqualand West was a possibility; then the Orange Free State and Cape would soon follow. Moreover, if the Zulu question in Natal were settled the Cape would be more likely to join up with Natal. Thus Froude wrote in November, 1879: "It has been this will-o'-the-wisp of Confederation which tempted Sir Bartle Frere into his Zulu enterprise. Cetewayo and his army being out of the way, he thought the ((Cape)) Colony might at least charge itself with Natal, and a way might be found of dealing with the Transvaal."⁴⁹ With the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Griqualand West federated, pressure could easily be brought to bear on the central Orange Free State.

This policy of forceful confederation had in itself dire results; it led to the Anglo-Transvaal War of 1881, the Zulu

47. Martineau: Op. Cit. Vol. 11, p. 163. (Quoted).

48. Supra, p. 73 et Infra, p. 101.

49. Fortnightly Review, 1/10/'79. Article, Froude: South Africa Once More, p. 453

War of 1879 and so all the bonds which held black and white and also English and Dutch together fairly cordially were torn apart causing political passion to run high. Carnarvon's policy of confederation in the end defeated itself. In order to achieve confederation, the Transvaal was annexed and this roused the sympathy of the Cape Dutch for the Northern Republic. This annexation then caused many Cape Dutch members of Parliament to oppose Sprigg's proposals⁵⁰ for a conference on confederation in 1880. On 22nd June, 1880, Sprigg moved that a conference of delegates be assembled to consider the relations then existing between the British Colonies and native territories in South Africa, with a view to ascertaining the practicability of a legislative and administrative union.⁵¹ By this time Confederation had become very unpopular at the Cape. Moreover, some delegates from the Transvaal, Kruger, Joubert and Jorissen then at the Cape were attending caucus meetings of members of Parliament to persuade them to vote against Sprigg's proposals.⁵² So strong was the opposition to these proposals that the Government with-drew them, a fact which damaged the prestige of the Sprigg Ministry and helped to hasten its fall.⁵³ Without this opposition Sprigg's proposals may have been agreed to by a small parliamentary majority.⁵⁴

50. On assuming office Sprigg had become a confederationist.

C. Argus, 24/7/'80, Assembly Debate, 23/7/'80.

51. C. Argus, 23/6/'80, Assembly Debate, 22/6/'80.

52. Ibid., 26/6/'80, Ibid. 25/6/'80, et Z.-Afr. 26/6/'80.

53. Infra, p.

54. Z.-Afr. 5/8/'80.

CHAPTER 111.THE PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY. (CONTINUED).1. POLITICAL SITUATION DURING SESSIONS OF 1876 AND 1877.

Because the Confederation Question, as far as the Cape was concerned, had been settled, it no longer served as a party rallying cry; opposition to Molteno on that account ceased and the session of 1876 passed off very calmly. In the interests of good government there should be a vigilant and effective Opposition; several parliamentary leaders realised this, notably Sprigg and Paterson. Sprigg had consistently opposed the Molteno Ministry till Carnarvon's Conference proposals were laid before Parliament. He then supported Molteno and for a second time was offered a ministerial seat, but turned it down.¹ In an address to his electors dated 8th August, 1876, Sprigg gave a full explanation why he had again refused office. He had been an advocate of responsible government and to prove that the country was fit for responsible government, he considered it his duty to help in building up an opposition on a sound and well-defined policy. He believed that such an opposition could be formed out of the materials to be found in Parliament; organisation, discipline and confidence however, were lacking. Men should also give up their demands for local benefits if these should clash with party interests; such an opposition should include men from all parts of the Colony and

1. C. Argus, 15/8/'76.

should not be bounded by territorial lines. He had therefore refused the offer because he was against the principle that as soon as a member of Parliament attained prominence he should be offered a seat in the Cabinet. Such a principle would, in his opinion, result in "the destruction of all confidence in public men, and nothing worthy of the name of an Opposition can possibly be formed. Every public man will be distrusted, no leader will have a following, and parliamentary institutions will sink beneath public contempt"².

During the parliamentary recess, following the session of 1876, John Paterson, in a circular to his supporters proposed new party groups; till then his supporters had been known as "Confederationists" and the supporters of the Ministry were "Anti-Confederationists"; this division however, had to pass away with the passing of the question itself. To Paterson's mind the Ministerial supporters were too cautious and laissez faire and to them he gave the somewhat ludicrous name of "Pass-op- Party". His own supporters wanted more initiative and energy in promoting the progress of the Colony; they would be the "Press-on Party". The main plank in their platform would be the solution of three questions, namely, Confederation, Frontier Defence and Finance. He called upon those who were in sympathy with his ideas to meet in Cape Town before the opening of Parliament so that they could elect a leader and decide on united action; they had to sink all individual preferences because "Party cannot otherwise be organised, and without party-

organisation Parliamentary Government, as a beneficent form of rule, is impracticable". Finally he suggested that a vote of want of confidence should challenge the Ministry when Parliament met.³

Paterson's suggestions however, elicited hardly any response beyond the ridicule of the press which pointed out that Paterson had not fully grasped the political situation.⁴ The "Zuid-Afrikaan" put the matter clearly in a dispassionate article:

"Onze partijen groepeeren zich enkel naar den eisch van ééne groote questie. Sedert 1875 was de conferentie die questie. Die daarvoor was behoorde tot de oppositie, die zich daartegen versette tot de ministeriëlen. Over de meeste andere questien hadden de leden vrijheid van handelen. In het volk heeft er vrede mede dat de zaken alzoo bestierd worden...."⁵

When Parliament met for the first time under the governorship of Sir Bartle Frere, there was a general feeling that the fate of the Ministry was in the balance. The opposition to the Molteno Ministry was reinforced by the presence of Richard Southey, formerly Colonial Secretary to the Cape Government and one time Administrator and Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West. He was now one of the representatives for Grahams-town in the House of Assembly. Several newspapers predicted that the Molteno Ministry would soon come to a fall⁶ and one even announced that the opposition had already decided on the members of the new Cabinet.⁷

3. C. Argus, 4/4/'77, Paterson's Circular.

4. Ibid. Ibid. et Journal, 3/4/'77.

5. Z-Afr. 14/4/'77.

6. Ibid. 9/6/'77. C. Argus, 9/6/'77. Notes in Parliament.

7. They would be: Colonial Secretary, R. Southey; Treasurer, J. Paterson; Attorney-General, A. Cole; Commissioner of Crown Lands, J. Sprigg; Secretary for Native Affairs, P. Watermeyer or J. Quin.

Soon after the session had started John Paterson brought in serious charges against the Government's financial administration. Molteno took up the challenge and said that if the House did not approve of his Ministry's measures, it could turn him out.⁸ The arguments of the Opposition however, were very shallow and in the end, knowing that they would be badly defeated, they did not even dare to go to a division; in fact, more than one member got up to protest that he did not wish to turn out the Ministry.⁹ The Opposition had conducted its case against the Ministry so badly that it was actually able to enhance its prestige.

On one other measure however, the Ministry had to encounter very serious opposition, namely, its Frontier Defence Bill. Here Sprigg led the attack. Act. No.16 of 1855, was then still in force. It prevented the Government from ordering a burgher beyond the limits of his own division; the Ministry now wished to have this restriction removed so that burghers might go where their services were required and further they wanted all male inhabitants, European and Coloured to be liable for service in the defence of the Colony.¹⁰ Sprigg and his adherents had no alternative proposal to that of the Government; they were a house divided against itself. Their chief aim and common ground was to turn out the Ministry and to this end they bent all their energies. Sprigg proposed a vote of No-confidence in the Ministry¹¹⁽²⁾⁻⁶⁻⁷⁷⁾ the first under responsible govern-

8. C.Argus, 19/6/'77, Assembly Debate, 18/6/'77.

9. Ibid. 23/6/'77.

10. C.Argus, 21/7/'77 et 5/1/'78.

11. Ibid. 21/6/'77, Notes in Parliament.

ment. His motion, however, after a few days' discussion was rejected by a majority of seven votes.¹² The Opposition did not dispute the principle of the Bill, for all were agreed that the defences of the Colony should be strengthened; but as to how this was to be done the Opposition differed as much among themselves as from the Government. Sprigg did not wish to arm any natives but wished to organise Europeans only in some divisions and make the other divisions pay an extra tax. Southey's views coincided more or less with those of the Ministry and Paterson did not differ much from him.¹³ After the second reading, the Bill was referred to a select committee and now the Opposition succeeded in removing all the names of its supporters from the committee.¹⁴ Their object was clearly a party dodge. Knowing that the committee consisted of members who were not concerned about an efficient Defence Bill, the Opposition, by withdrawing themselves, hoped that a very ineffectual Bill or none at all, would be introduced and that in consequence the Government would be discredited.

With such differences among the leaders it is no wonder that in the end the Opposition was unable to offer very efficient resistance to the Ministry and that the rank and file of their followers became disgusted with obstruction tactics of their leaders.¹⁵

Although the direct attempts to dislodge the Ministry in 1877, failed, the Opposition did in the long run and in an in-

12. C.Argus, 26/6/'77.

13. Ibid. 21/7/'77.

14. Z.-Afr. 7/7/'77.

15. C.Argus, 24/7/'77, Notes in Parliament.

direct way, succeed in displacing the Ministry. In refusing to act on the Committee on the Frontier Defence Bill, and through their attacks on that Bill, they prevented effective measures from being taken for the defence of the Colony. The result was that on the outbreak of the Gaika-Galeka War in 1877-78, the military organisation was inadequate to the occasion and in course of time the troubles on the frontier caused the Molteno Ministry to be dismissed and Sprigg was called to office.

The session of 1877 was, till then, the longest of the Cape Parliament. For the first time in the history of the Cape Parliament under responsible government the Opposition presented a fairly united and firm front and conducted itself as an organised body.¹⁶ At times it was so strong that it seemed that the Ministry would be driven from office. Further, Sprigg and Paterson did everything to obstruct and oppose every measure introduced by the Government, and took up the attitude, typical of most parties when in Opposition, that the Government simply could not introduce a useful measure.

Despite these tactics, the session of 1877 revealed Sprigg as the man of the future; should any unfavourable turn of fortune deprive Molteno of office, Sprigg would no doubt have his chance. During this session it also became clear that the power of the Molteno Ministry was on the wane; formerly, a threat that some action on the part of the House would

16. C. Argus, 5/7/'77, et Patriot, 24/8/'77.

be a vote of No-Confidence, still held terror and rallied to his side wavering supporters, Now it was no longer so. The Ministry still managed to command majorities on great party questions, but these majorities were markedly less than formerly. Moreover, a general election would deprive it of the support of the Border constituencies which then had three Cabinet Ministers,¹⁷ for it was known that the support of the Border electorate had gone over to Sprigg, member for East London, and that the three ministers were out of sympathy with their constituents¹⁸ on account of the Ministry's inadequate defence measures.

The session of 1877 was the last which saw the Molteno Ministry in office. It had been in office for five sessions, initiated parliamentary government and introduced several measures of great importance to the country - railways, education, telegraphs and a new mode of election of the Upper House. Although Molteno was a good minister, he was not a good parliamentary tactician and quick enough as leader of a party; he also showed lack of foresight in controlling the proceedings of Parliament. There was no efficient party organisation, chiefly because of Molteno's dislike of compelling members by external influence to support him. During his term of office * there was no party whip with the result that on important occasions his supporters were not always present in full muster and not prepared to meet sudden attacks from the Opposition

17. They were: Charles Brownlee, J.X. Merriman, Andries Stockenström.

18. Z.-Afr. 11/8/'77, et C.Times, 10/8/'77.

which during the session of 1877 at least, was better organised than the Ministerial Party. Moltano's views on this matter were perhaps not practical enough. If men are to act together there must be organisation, and this Moltano neglected. Moltano did not believe in any intrigue or any intentional influencing of members. He believed that his cause was just and was prepared to defend and advocate it with straight-forward and honest argument; he had sufficient faith in his fellow parliamentarians to believe that a cause, well stated, would receive their support.¹⁹ This did not always prove to be the case.

11. THE MINISTERIAL CRISIS OF 1878.

The ninth in the series of Kaffir Wars broke out in 1877 and indirectly swept the Moltano Ministry from office. As their territories were overstocked and over-populated, the natives were experiencing economic straits. The pasture was not enough to provide food for native stock; the arable land was too small to sustain the dense population especially when the system of cultivation rapidly decreased the fertility of the soil. Add to these hardships periodic droughts, and it is easy to understand that sooner or later the Eastern Frontier had to witness another outbreak.²⁰

During 1876, newspapers published reports of unrest on the Eastern Frontier, but in general, people regarded these reports as the utterances of alarmists.²¹ In official circles

19. C. Argus, 3/7/1877.

20. De Kiewiet: The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.156.

21. Z.-Afr. 5/7/1876.

there was also uneasiness about events on the Eastern Frontier and it was generally supposed that if open warfare broke out in the Transkei there would also be considerable unrest and excitement amongst native tribes within the Colony.²² The scare however, passed over and in the beginning of 1877, Mills, the Under-Secretary wrote to Sargeaunt, The Crown Agent in London that all was calm again and that the panic had been "got up for the promotion of political and private interests amongst the Europeans on the frontier".²³

The uncertain peace on the Frontier was rudely disturbed in August, 1877. On the third of that month fighting broke out between Fingoes and Galekas at a marriage feast in Fingo-land; the former were British subjects, the latter were semi-independent, living beyond the colonial border, East of the Kei River. Soon the disturbance spread to other Transkeian tribes.²⁴ The Governor with his staff and two ministers, Merriman and Brownlee happened to be on the frontier and took up their headquarters at Kingwilliamstown. Merriman and Brownlee now met the Governor and the General Commanding the Imperial Troops - Sir Arthur Cunynghame - in daily council and they together settled the orders to be given; these were then communicated to the other ministers at Cape Town.²⁵ In the beginning this arrangement worked well. The Imperial forces were kept to defend Kingwilliamstown and other points

22. C.O. 5857. Mills to Bowker (Private) 1/8/'76.

23. C.O. 5857. Mills to Sargeaunt, 22/1/'77.

24. Theal, From 1873-1884, Vol.1, p.53 et seq.

25. Martineau: Op. cit. Vol.11, p.195.

along the Border; those forces West of the Kei would be under the direct command of Lieutenant-Colonel R.T.Glynn. Colonial forces were to operate East of the Kei; those forces were placed under the direct command of Commandant Griffith and he was to report to General Gunynghame from whom he would also receive instructions.²⁶

Commandant Griffith's forces, consisting of volunteers, Frontier Armed and Mounted Police and Fingo levies, marched against Krelli and his Galekas who avoided a pitched battle and kept on retreating towards the Bashee River. Griffith crossed this river on 7th November, 1877, and scoured all the land up to the Umtata River. Here and there he found a few Galekas and believed that the enemy had been entirely broken. The general belief was that the war in the Transkei was over and volunteers and burghers returned to their homes.²⁷

The Galeka army, however, had not been defeated; it had merely carried out a clever strategic move and on 2nd December, 1877, it became known that the enemy was approaching the Colony to renew the war. On 9th December, Colonel Glynn was put in command of all the forces that could be mustered to meet Krelli's army in Galekaland, while Colonel W. Bellairs succeeded Colonel Glynn as commander of the forces west of the Kei.²⁸ This arrangement as we shall see later, was one of the points of conflict between the Governor and the Molteno Ministry. On 24th December, Kiva, one of the bravest leaders of the Galeka army crossed the Kei River and entered the Gaika

26. C.H. 32/2. Confid. Desp. to Sec. of State, 30/1/'78.

27. Theal: From 1873 to 1884, Vol.1, p.65 et seq.

28. Ibid.

p.80.

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location. His appeal to Sandile, the Gaika chief, roused these natives to rebellion and they joined the Gcalekas in their war against the Europeans. The war against the natives had now to be conducted across the Kei as well as in the Colony.²⁹

On 13th October, Molteno had visited the Frontier for a few days. On 9th January, he arrived at Kingwilliamstown a second time. At this stage in the war, differences arose between the Governor on the one hand and Molteno and Herriman on the other. These differences which resulted in the compulsory retirement of the Ministry will be discussed later.³⁰

At the beginning of the war, the Governor and members of the Ministry, got on very well.³¹ The energetic Merriman had succeeded in getting a strong force of Colonists together and these were successfully carrying on the war. These Colonial forces were under the command of fellow Colonists and were directed by Merriman. Then suddenly the Governor sent a memorandum to Molteno in which he questioned Molteno's right to take measures of military importance; moreover, he stated that General Cunynghame as Commander-in-Chief should command Colonial troops and direct operations. Molteno took offence at this memorandum and tendered his resignation but the Governor refused to accept it and asked that the memorandum should be submitted to the Attorney - General for his opinion. Before the Attorney-General's reply was received the Governor

29. Theal: From 1873 to 1884, Vol.1, p.81 et seq.

30. *Infra*, p.9/.

31. Kerr. Papers, No.21.1878. Agnes Merriman to Julia Merriman, 19 Feb.

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sent a minute enclosing "a most impudent letter from the General" in which he claimed it as his right to command all forces and objecting to Merriman's actions. Moltene and Merriman replied that they were willing to defend the Colony and put down the rebellion. This they thought could best be done by Colonial troops commanded by Colonists; they refused to put the control of the war into Cunynghame's hands. To this the Governor replied with immediate dismissal and an order that they should hold their office till successors were appointed.³² Three days later Moltene and Merriman received letters from the Governor instructing them to surrender all records and documents to the Civil Commissioner of Kingwilliamstown.³³

What now, were the differences between the Governor and Ministry which led to so sudden a dismissal? There is a vast amount of material on this subject - minutes and memoranda by the Ministry and by the Governor, despatches to the Secretary of State and Parliamentary debates.

The first point at issue was the Ministry's claim to deliberate in secret and the Prime Minister's claim to take the initiative in calling Cabinet meetings. When war broke out Cabinet meetings were held in a slipshod and informal manner. The Governor, the Commander of the Forces, the Secretary for Native Affairs and the Commissioner of Public Works met in daily council - the latter representing the Premier. In this

32. Merr. Papers, No.22.1878. J.X. Merriman to his father, 19 Feb. at G.H. 32/2. Confid. Desp. to Sec. of state, 5/2/78.
 33. Merr. Papers, No.11.1878. Frere to J.X. Merriman, 6 Feb.

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way the Executive carried on its work. Molteno, when he visited Kingwilliamstown in October, joined these daily councils and lodged no objections to them. However, when he arrived at Kingwilliamstown on 9th January, 1878, on his second visit, he was determined that the proceedings should be conducted along constitutional lines. He informed the Governor that all matters of policy and all important measures were to be settled by the Cabinet deliberating in private without the governor being present. Decisions taken by the Cabinet would be conveyed to the Governor through the medium of the Premier; direct communication between Governor and Cabinet ministers being only permissible on matters of departmental detail; the meetings of the Executive Council are only for the formal ratification of decisions taken by the Cabinet and at these meetings "the attendance of the Commander of the Forces is generally unnecessary and inconvenient".³⁴ Frere was prepared to follow this procedure in peace time but now, on account of the exigencies of war, and to secure unity of purpose and prompt action, he wanted to take into their confidence and councils, the Commander of the Forces.³⁴ From a constitutional point of view Frere was entirely in the wrong as the Cabinet undoubtedly has the right to private deliberation.³⁵ Molteno also protested against the manner in which the Governor proposed calling a meeting of the Executive Council. At 6 p.m. on 31st January, 1878, Molteno received a notice from the Governor that a

34. G.H. 32/2 Confid. Desp. to Sec. of State, 30/1/'78.

35. Todd: Parliamentary Government in the Colonies, 2nd Edit. pp.11 et 47.

meetings

- troops

meeting of the Executive Council would be held the following day; Molteno was not informed as to the business to be brought before this meeting and would not have the opportunity of consulting his colleagues should he consider it necessary. In a minute lodging his protest, Molteno also pointed out that that was the first instance, since the introduction of responsible government, of the Governor calling a meeting of the Executive Council without first consulting the Prime Minister.³⁶ Here also Frere was in the wrong; the summoning of the Executive Council rests with the Prime Minister.³⁷

A week after the outbreak of the Gaika rebellion, 24th December, 1877, Frere wrote to Lord Carnarvon asking for more Imperial forces to be sent to the Cape. He deemed the Colonial and Imperial troops, then in the field, entirely insufficient to cope with the situation that had arisen on account of the rebellion.³⁸ This request for troops on the part of the Governor came as a great surprise to the Ministry who regarded Imperial Troops as: "a fearful encumbrance and a monstrous expense".³⁹ Moreover, Molteno wanted to use Colonial troops in order to prove that the Cape was quite able to defend itself and worthy of the responsible government which it had been granted; this would also be a vindication of Molteno's policy of the past ten years or more. He therefore promptly informed the Governor that these troops could be sent to any part of the Empire where they might be necessary, but not retained at

36. Ex. Co. No.10. Minute No.8. 1/2/'78.

37. Todd: Parliamentary Government in England, 2nd Edit. Vol.11, p.13

38. Imp. B.B. C.2000, p.103.

39. Merr. Papers, No.23. 1879. J.K. Merr. to Julia Merr., 25 Feb.

the Cape.⁴⁰ Merriman gives this refusal to accept the aid of Imperial troops as one of the chief reasons for their dismissal.^{40a} This request for troops had not emanated from the Colonial Ministry, but Cunynghame had suggested it.⁴¹ Here again Frere acted independently of the Ministry without their cognisance and therefore unconstitutionally.

After the arrival of Moltene on 9th January, he and Merriman began acting on their own. Between the Ministers and Governor there was no longer the cordiality of former times. The Governor complained that he and the military authorities were "in quarantine" and had no free communication with the ministers, especially Merriman who with his energy and powers of organisation had formerly been a tower of strength to the Governor. Now however, Merriman, without informing the Governor or General Cunynghame what he was doing, began organising military operations in the Gaika location and to the North of it. For those operations he used Colonial troops - Volunteers, Frontier Armed and Mounted Police and Fingo levies. In an interview with Moltene, Frere pointed out the dangers and confusion to which Merriman's assumption of independent military powers might lead and he took strong exception to his acting "in ostentatious disregard of all authority of the Governor and Commander of the Forces as a kind of Minister at War, and General Commanding in the field, issuing orders of every conceivable kind...."⁴² The Governor maintained that the constitu-

40. Journal, 18/3/'78.

40a. Merr. Papers, No. 23.1878. J.X. Merr. to Julia Merr., 25 Feb.

41. Imp. B.B. C.2000, p.103.

42. G.H. 32/2. Confid. Desp. to Sec. of State, 30/1/'78 et 5/2/'78.

tion empowered him to direct military operations through his military officers and that Merriman's assumption of duties as Minister of War was unconstitutional since he held the office of Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works which had nothing to do with military affairs.⁴³

The Ministry took an opposite view. Far from keeping the Governor "in quarantine" they had furnished him "with every scrap of information.... telegrams were sent up as soon as they were received. I ((Molteno)) kept a messenger for the express purpose, who was continually running up and down"⁴⁴ Further Merriman had not "assumed" the duties he was discharging; they had been "assigned" to him by the Colonial Secretary with the approval of the other ministers. Moreover, their interpretation of the constitution was that they were to administer the business of the country as Parliament wished; they regarded the Governor as a figure-head and he acted only on their advice. Should an emergency arise for which the laws of the country made no provision, they acted on their own responsibility and would answer to Parliament for their acts.⁴⁵ The views taken up by the Ministry on the one hand and by the Governor on the other could not be reconciled. The Governor took such a serious view of the matter that he regarded the Ministry's determination to carry on their own military operations as one of the chief reasons for their eventual dismissal.⁴⁶

43. Imp. B.B. C.2079, p.204-5.

44. C.Argue, 30/5/78, Assembly Debate, 28/5/78.

45. Imp. B.B. C.2079, p.202.

46. G.H. 31/14, Desp. to Sec. of State, No.23, 5/2/78.

Was the Governor right in regarding Merriman's direction of operations as ultra vires? No Governor in the British Commonwealth to-day, would venture to interfere if a minister acted as Merriman acted in 1878; yet the position on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony was complicated by the active participation of Imperial troops under General Cunynghame in the same field as Colonial troops, so that technically the Cape had not yet attained to full responsible government and Molteno and Merriman were claiming constitutional rights far in advance of contemporary constitutional development.

The final difference between the Ministry and the Governor centred round the control of Colonial forces. On the outbreak of hostilities the Government issued a notice dated 3rd October, 1877, under the signature of John X. Merriman according to which:

"His excellency the Governor and High Commissioner, with the advice of the Executive Council, has been pleased to direct that His Excellency the Lieut.-General Sir A.T. Cunynghame, should assume the command of all the Colonial Forces - the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, the Volunteers, the Burghers, and the Native Levies"⁴⁷

It was further arranged that Lieutenant-Colonel Glynn should command the Imperial forces West of the Kei, and Commandant Griffith Colonial forces East of the Kei, and both these were to report to General Cunynghame.⁴⁸ This meant that the Colonial Forces were collected, equipped and made ready for the field under the instructions of the Commissioner of Crown Lands;

47. Government Gazette, 5/10/77.

48. Supra, p. 89.

they were then handed over to the military authorities for employment. The two ministers, then on the Eastern frontier, had met the Governor and General Cunynghame in daily council, each knew what action the other was taking or proposed taking and the campaign proceeded smoothly.

When Molteno arrived on the Frontier on 9th January, 1878, things took on a very different shape. He was now determined that all proceedings between him, his Cabinet and the Governor should be placed on a sound constitutional basis. He realised that the forces that had to contend with invasion and rebellion were temporarily inadequate. He believed that the reason why volunteers were so slack in coming forward "was mainly due to a dislike to serve under military control and to a dread of Imperial interference in Colonial affairs".⁴⁹ Molteno felt very strong on this point. He was convinced that to put Colonial forces under military control would be most unsatisfactory, and moreover, the Imperial troops were unacquainted with Kafir warfare which could best be waged by Colonial forces.⁵⁰

To carry out his ideas, Molteno made certain proposals to Frere on 19th January, 1878. These were:

"of a tentative character, subject in all respects to such modification and alterations as may be considered by your Excellency and the General desirable or necessary, the principle not being lost sight of, so far as may be found possible, of separating the command and direction of Colonial forces from that of Her Majesty's troops, the former being under the direction of the Colonial Commandant General."⁵¹

Further Molteno suggested that the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police be placed in Galeskaland and under the command of the

49. G.H. 32/2. Confid. Desp. to Sec. of State, 30/1/'78.

50. C.Argus, 30/5/'78, Assembly Debate, 28/5/'78.

51. Imp. B.B. C.2078, p.138. Underscoring by author.

Imperial General while all Colonial volunteers should be withdrawn from the Transkei to the Colony. All these Colonial forces would be placed under a Commandant-General,⁵² to which post they wished to appoint Commandant Griffith.

On 22nd January, 1878, Molteno followed up these proposals with a memorandum of more peremptory nature:

"Mr. Molteno's proposals to be acted upon at once, and with regard to the future, to continue until alterations may be found necessary.

"For the present, subject, of course, to any alterations Parliament may determine upon, it is proposed that Mr. Griffith, as Commandant-General, shall take command of all Colonial forces, police, burghers and volunteers, and be under the sole control and direction of the Colonial Government.

"Governor has no special powers over Colonial forces as Commander-in-chief, but as Governor of the Colony acts in exactly the same manner with regard to any other Colonial matter."⁵³

This meant that the Ministry was no longer prepared to act in terms of the Government Notice of 5rd October, 1877, that the Cape Government was going to take a larger share in the campaign and that within the Colony military operations would be conducted by the Colonial forces under Colonial officers and these would be under the direction of the Colonial Government and that the Governor was only to have control over Colonial forces in so far as the Ministry advised him. On this point Molteno had the support of the Attorney-General, Stockenström:

"In my opinion Governor's Commission as Commander-in-Chief places under his control all Her Majesty's troops stationed in this Colony, but does not give him any power as Commander-in-Chief over the Frontier Armed and

52. Imp. B.B. C. 2079, p.183. ~~Underlining by author.~~

53. Imp. B.B. C. 2079, p.190, at G.N. 32/2. Confid. Desp. to Sec. of state, 30/1/78.

Mounted Police, the Volunteers or Burghers. Over these colonial forces he has no greater authority than is vested in him by the various Acts of Parliament under which they are embodied; and the powers so vested in him by these acts he cannot now constitutionally exercise except with the concurrence and under the advice of his Ministers. Consequently the Governor cannot, except with the consent of the latter embody the colonial forces with those of Her Majesty"⁵⁴

The Prime Minister's proposals horrified the Governor. He contended that two independent commanders in the same field was a professional and practical impossibility; neither could the field of operations be so divided that each commander could be independent of the other. Moreover, he pointed out that Griffith could only be appointed Commandant-General by a commission issued from the Governor as Commander-in-Chief. Such a commission Frere refused to issue because he considered it both "Absurd" and "illegal" - "absurd", because I had just experienced how admirably operations had been conducted under the General's command, by combined forces of Her Majesty's and Colonial Forces; and illegal, as at variance with the terms no less than the intention of H.M. Commission to the General"⁵⁵ The office of Commandant-General was unknown to and not sanctioned by Parliament so that unless Griffith acted under military command his acts would be "quite illegal, and might involve Mr. Griffith and all who obeyed him in most serious consequences for acts done beyond the law"⁵⁶ Further the Governor maintained that both his commission as Governor and the constitution, placed him in chief command of all military forces - both Colonial and Imperial; under the Gover-

54. Cape B.D. A.4 - '78, p.14.

55. G.H. 32/2. Confid. Desp. to Sec. of State, 30/1/'78.

56. Ibid. 5/2/'78.

nor, Frere continued, was a Commander of the Forces armed with executive power, whose commission gave him control of the Queen's troops and who could also be empowered by the Governor to command those Colonial forces who were on active service. "Such power to command Colonial forces was formally given to his Excellency Sir Arthur Cunynghame, by authority of the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony and has been exercised by him since our first meeting of four members of the Executive Council, after receiving news of the first outbreak"⁵⁷.

The Governor therefore, would under no circumstances agree to the appointment of Griffith as Commandant-General of Colonial forces independent of General Cunynghame and in a memorandum to the ministers dated 26th January, 1878, expressed his refusal in most definite terms,

".... however able and competent might be the officers selected by Mr. Holtzner for the control and command of the Colonial forces, I cannot see that I should be justified in abdicating the powers and duties expressly entrusted to me by Her Majesty's commission and delegating them to anyone else, without the previous sanction of Her Majesty's Government and the Colonial Parliament, and without such sanction I must decline to accede to any proposition of the kind"⁵⁸.

The Ministers were determined to maintain their position. They held that the government of the Colony was by the constitution, vested in a governor and a responsible ministry, and

"to hand over the control of the Colonial forces and the conduct of military operations within or adjacent to the Colony to an officer not accountable to the Government of the country, and not in any way controlled by

57. Imp. B.B. C.2079, p.192.
58. Ibid. p.193.

them, would be giving practical effect to dual government of the worst kind.

"Either the Government of the Colony is responsible for the military operations conducted in the name and at the expense of the Colony, or it is not; if it is, then the officer conducting these operations, be his name what it may, must be under the control of that Government. If the Government of the Colony is not to be held responsible and if the conduct of these operations is to be made over to the officers of the Imperial Government, it is manifest that there must be an entire reversal of the policy of the last few years for which the ministers nor the Colony are prepared."⁵⁹

They therefore refused to entrust operations undertaken by the Colonial forces to General Cunynghame. Should the Governor not see his way clear to act in terms of the Ministers' suggestions, they desired that the Imperial forces "be withdrawn to the position occupied by them before the outbreak", - that is, they should no longer take any active part in the operations on the Eastern Frontier - "leaving the suppression of the rebellion and the occupation of Gcalekaland to the Colonial Government, on whom the main responsibility of defence must rest, and who are prepared to undertake it"⁶⁰

It is clear therefore, that there was a complete deadlock between the Ministry and the Governor; the latter believed that the only way out was to dismiss the Ministry which he accordingly did on 3rd February, 1878. A careful study of all the evidence shows that the basis of this deadlock was the different interpretation of the constitution of the Colony by the Ministers and the Governor. The latter held that he was Commander-in-Chief of all the forces in the Colony by virtue of his commission as Governor and that the General of the

59. Imp. B.B. C.2079, p.202-3.

60. Ibid. p.203.

Imperial forces was his executive officer in military affairs. The Colonial Government, according to Frere, could only prepare troops and these had then to be put under control of the Imperial General - the executive officer:

"It appears to me clear that the intention of the Constitution was, and is, that there should be one person - the Governor and Commander-in-Chief in chief command of all military forces of every kind, colonial as well as Imperial, performing all executive duties through a commander of the forces, whose commission gives him power to command her Majesty's troops, and who may be empowered by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief to command colonial forces, formally declared to be in the field of his military operations.....

"The Governor, it appears to me, is the only person we can find intended by the constitution to be the chief military executive, who can, by simple virtue of his office, command, at the same time, all forces of all kinds in the Colony"⁶¹

The Ministry would not agree to this principle because it would mean that an Imperial Officer had control over forces raised and paid by the Colony; seeing that they would not submit to this principle, they were relieved of office. The Ministers based their arguments on their conception of the meaning of responsible government, namely, that the responsibility of all executive acts rests with the advisers of the Governor; further, that the Governor as Commander-in-Chief had no independent power or right to command the Colonial forces, but that only as Governor acting on the advice of his Ministers he has that power.⁶² The doctrine which the discredited Ministers wished to establish was that the Ministers, acting constitutionally, just as they would in any other Colonial matter, have all the control in their hands; that the privilege

61. Imp. B.B. C.2079, p.192.

62. C. Argus, 30/5/'78, Assembly Debate, 28/5/'78.

of appointing those who command and manage the Colonial forces rests with them; that the Ministry of the Colony, in short, has supreme control. Kerriman put the issue clearly when in the House of Assembly he asked: "Where is your responsible government if your military operations, things paid for by the tax-payers of the country, are controlled by an officer who is not responsible?"⁶³

The question now arises whether the Ministry were right in taking up this attitude. One of the chief motives of the Imperial Government in granting responsible government was to divest itself of the responsibility for Colonial defence. Acting in this spirit the Ministry took what steps they thought necessary and the retention of the Governor's formal title as "Commander-in-Chief" - on which Prere based his claims - was no longer of practical significance. Molteno's views in 1878 proved to be in accord with a development which took place in 1880. The Secretary of State for Colonies sent a telegram to the Cape Governor:

"enquiring - whether Ministers would approve of the Chief Command of Colonial Forces being combined with that of Imperial Forces under general appointed to command Imperial Troops at Cape Town and paid by Imperial Government. All questions of Colonial interest would come to him through Staff Officer paid by Colony"⁶⁴

Strangely enough Molteno was to be vindicated by the very man who had succeeded him and who had supported the Governor. Sprigg's reply put the matter clearly beyond doubt:-

63. C. Argus, 28/5/178, Assembly Debate, 27/5/178.
64. P.N.4, Min. from Governor. No. 869, 27/1/180.

"Ministers desire respectfully to inform H.E. that they are unable to approve of the proposal that the chief command of the Colonial Forces should be vested in the General appointed to command the Imperial Forces.

"Ministers having been informed that the Colony must for the future provide for its own defence they regard it as essential that the Colonial forces should be entirely under the control of the Government of the Colony, and that the officer commanding should receive his instructions directly from the Minister charged with the responsible duties of the Department of War."⁶⁵

The dismissal of the Molteno Ministry had its repercussions in the Cape Parliament. Merriman upon whom rested the chief burden of defending the policy of the retired Ministry proposed three resolutions:

"I. In the opinion of this House the control over Colonial Forces is vested in his Excellency the Governor only acting under the advice of ministers.

"II. That it is not within the constitutional functions of his Excellency the Governor to insist on the control and supply of the Colonial forces being placed under the military authorities, except with the consent of ministers.

"III. That the assumption of the command of the Colonial forces by Sir A. Cunynghame in January last, contrary to the advice of ministers, was not justified or advisable under the existing circumstances"⁶⁶

The debate lasted from 25th May, to 6th June, 1875, and every aspect of the crisis was discussed. Several speeches testified of unusual ability among members of Parliament. As the debate proceeded it became clear that the House had little sympathy with the ex-ministers and it also failed to grasp the real principle at stake - the right of a Governor to dismiss, during recess, a ministry which had in its last session still enjoyed the confidence of the legislature. Merriman's resolutions were rejected by 37 to 22 votes and an amendment moved by

65. P.M.4. Min. from Prime Minister, 31/1/'80.

66. Imp. B.B. C.2144. p.196.

Maasdorp adopted by the same majority.⁶⁷ This amendment confirmed the action of the Governor and postulated that "the removal from office of the late ministry was unavoidable".⁶⁸

Several factors contributed to the defeat of Molteno and those who acted with him. In the first instance between the actual dismissal of the Ministry and the dismissal debate the Secretary of State had approved of the action of the Governor so that their case had already been prejudged.⁶⁹ The Governor and High Commissioner himself also acted suspiciously using his personal influence on members of Parliament.⁷⁰ Moreover, the way in which various documents bearing on the crisis were published, on instructions from the Ministers, contributed to the confusion; some were undated others unsystematically

67. O. Argus, 8/6/'78. Notes in Parliament.

68. The full text was: "The House having before it the papers connected with the late change of ministry, does not see that the doctrine that the Governor controls the Colonial forces under the advice of his ministry has been called in question by the Governor, but, on the contrary, is strongly affirmed; and the House is of opinion that, under all the circumstances of the case, the removal from office of the late ministry was unavoidable". Imp. B.B. C.2144, p.196.

69. "I would observe that I cannot concur with Mr. Molteno if he holds that a minister has a right at any moment to appoint an Officer unknown to the Constitution without the sanction of Parliament and in opposition to the judgment of the Governor and to assign to him functions which would give him paramount authority above that of the Governor himself in all Military matters more especially after Martial Law had been proclaimed." Hicks-Beach held that as High Commissioner Frere was responsible for the peace and tranquillity of the native tribes adjacent to the Cape and "all the Queen's officers and ministers, Civil and Military are commanded and required to aid and assist you". (Quoted in despatch) He continued: "I am therefore surprised that, on the occurrence of any difference of opinion as to the conduct of the War, Your Ministers should have hesitated to subordinate their opinions to yours....." G.H.1/26. Desp. No. 27, Sec of State to Frere, 21/3/'78.

70. Molteno: Op. cit. Vol.11, pp. 372 et 396.

arranged and in different Blue Books. In vain did Merriman and Molteno call for documents that would support their case.⁷¹

The result was that it was very difficult to bring them together to form a connected story, and there could be no impartial investigation of facts so that the whole parliamentary debate degenerated into a personal and party quarrel. All these

factors coupled with the natural swing of the pendulum when a ministry had held office so long - five years - tended to induce members to vote against Merriman's proposed resolutions.

Before the session of 1877, the "Cape Argus" had already written: "There can be no disguising the fact that for various reasons there is a growing desire for a change in the Government or for a reconstruction of the Ministry".⁷²

Merriman and Molteno, however, were also greatly responsible for their own defeat. They followed the wrong parliamentary tactics. Ministers, taking office on the retirement or dismissal of another Ministry, accept the responsibility of that dismissal or the action which resulted in that retirement. In view of this fact Merriman should have moved a vote of want of confidence in the Sprigg Ministry, instead of trying to launch a veiled attack on the Governor in the three resolutions which he tabled.⁷³ By doing so the late Ministry laid itself bare to attacks on the errors of their campaigns on the Frontier, the wisdom of their military policy generally and their negligence in providing efficient defence for the Frontier districts.

71. C. Argus, 26/5/'78 et seq. Dismissal Debate, 25/5/'78 et seq.

72. C. Argus, 14/6/'77. Et vide Journal, 13/3/'78.

73. Supra, p. 104.

Barring the question of control over Colonial forces there is also another aspect of much greater importance. Did Frere have the constitutional right, in view of the differences between him and Molteno to dismiss the Ministry? Constitutionally and under ordinary circumstances he was bound to accept the advice of his Ministers. This limitation was however, modified in two respects. Like the British Crown, the Governor still retained a measure of discretionary power which he could use in exceptional cases. In Great Britain there are precedents⁷⁴ of the Sovereign dispensing with the services of a ministry, but they are few and far between. Harriot puts the position clearly: "...the King has the right of appeal from Parliament to the masters of Parliament... ((but)) an adverse verdict would create a situation almost intolerable. The position of the King would be that of a master who has given notice to servants and has been compelled by circumstances to retain them on their own terms."⁷⁵ At the Cape however, the Governor's prerogative had not yet been curtailed in the same way as that of a British sovereign. Apparently, all unknown to Molteno and Merriman, there was a clause in Frere's instructions which seriously limited responsible government at the Cape and which in spirit was almost a return to the constitutional position prior to 1872, with all the quarrels and deadlocks which had wrecked representative institutions at the Cape. In the instructions to Frere we find the following:

74. George III dismissed Fox in 1784, and William IV, Melbourne in 1834.

75. Harriot: Mechanism of the Modern State, Vol.11, p.32.

"Vlll. And we do authorise Our said Governor, in his discretion, and if it shall, in any case appear right, to act in the exercise of the power committed to him by Our said Letters Patent in opposition to the advice which may, in any such case, be given to him by the members of Our said Executive Council: Provided, nevertheless, that in every such case he shall fully report to Us, by the first convenient opportunity, such proceeding, with the grounds and reasons thereof"⁷⁶

The ex-ministers were not conscious that they were claiming for the Cape constitutional privileges to which it had not yet acceded; as the Secretary of State for Colonies, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach expressed it: "It should be borne in mind that in consequence of the peculiar conditions of the Colony and adjacent territories, Responsible Government as established at the Cape, has necessarily been made subject to a limitation not elsewhere required"⁷⁷

Alpheus Todd, the authority on English constitutional practice, takes the view opposite to that of Marriot, namely that Frere acted constitutionally when he dismissed Molteno. Provided the Governor could find a Ministry to assume responsibility "it is the bounden duty of a governor to dismiss his ministers, if he believes their policy to be injurious to the public interests, or their conduct to be such in their official capacity, that he can no longer act with them harmoniously for the public good."⁷⁸ One may conclude therefore, that although the dismissal of a ministry was a very drastic step to take in the time of Sir Bartle Frere, it was not so drastic as it would appear today. With the public the dismissal of

76. Cape B.B. AS-178, p.6.

77. G.H. 1/26. Desp. from Sec. of State, No. 27, 21/3/78.

78. Todd: Parliamentary Government in the British Empire, p.616.

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Molteno and his Ministers was, in fact, quite a popular action on the part of the Governor.

"We believe without the slightest rancour, that the whole Colony is too much relieved by the fact of their resignation, to care a straw as to the manner in which it was accomplished. Sir Bartle Frere never did a more popular act since he came to the Colony, than when he freed himself from the advisers in whom the country had lost confidence long before he did, and took to himself ministers from whom we reasonably expect an enlightened and patriotic policy"⁷⁹

The fact that Parliament approved of the dismissal of Molteno had an important effect on the constitutional aspect of the question. By its approval of Frere's action Parliament acquiesced in the attack made on the Colony's constitutional liberties and rendered them constitutional. The Sprigg Ministry succeeded in gaining the support of Parliament and was able to continue in office as the Government of the country. Frere's despotic action, therefore, acquired the appearance of constitutionalism and from a practical point of view, Frere had in a state of emergency dismissed a Ministry which would in any case have lost the support of Parliament a few months later.⁸⁰

Ostensibly, Frere dismissed the first Ministry of the Cape Colony on a constitutional issue, but the real reason lay carefully concealed. By refusing additional Imperial troops they had acted in entire disregard of Imperial interests; for the advancement of those interests, Confederation had to be carried and for that purpose the Zulus and other restive native tribes had first to be subjugated, otherwise the Cape Colony would not lift a finger to obtain that goal. Further, with the

⁷⁹ Journal, 11/2/78.

⁸⁰ Lewsen: The First Crisis in Responsible Government in the Cape Colony, p.95.

aid of Imperial soldiers he could overawe the Cape Ministry if it should not obey his behests; he could threaten to withdraw such soldiers and surrender the Cape to the attacks of natives and rather than see this the Ministry would be subservient to him once the troops were in South Africa.⁸¹ Moreover, by dismissing Molteno, ^{Frere} he at the same time removed one of the chief stumbling blocks in the way of Confederation for this Ministry had consistently opposed Confederation and Imperial interference in South African affairs.⁸² At the same time Frere was able to bring into office Sprigg, a man who was willing to work with him in the promotion of the federal idea in South Africa. Hicks-Beach approved of Frere's action,⁸³ but the latter did not reveal his real reasons for dismissing Molteno and if he had, he may have clashed with the Colonial Office. In this way the real significance of this serious crisis in the political and constitutional history of the Cape Colony was purposely obscured and many actors in the drama failed to perceive its true character. In dismissing the Molteno Ministry therefore, Frere brought Carnarvon's confederation policy to its logical conclusion. Molteno and Merriman lost the contest with the Imperial Government, but because Frere's efforts to promote confederation also failed, responsible government at the Cape survived the attack made on it by Imperial authority. The rights which Molteno and Merriman fought for were only granted

81. On the outbreak of the Gaika Rebellion 24th Dec. 1877, the Colonial forces were inadequate to deal with the situation.

See de Kiewiet, op. cit. p. 171.

82. Supra, p. 65. et seq.

83. Supra, p. 105. footnote No. 70. 69.

fifty years later by the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930 and the Statute of Westminster. When South Africa attained Dominion status Imperial control finally came to an end and responsible government was at last granted.⁸⁴

EFFECTS OF CRISIS OF 1878.

The ministerial crisis of 1878, had important effects on South Africa and on the Cape Colony in particular. On the Confederation issue the Western Province had already shown its dislike of British interference. The Sprigg Cabinet consisted entirely of Easterners and this had the effect of turning the Western Province even more resolutely against the Imperial Factor in South Africa.⁸⁵ This opposition increased and became more sharply defined when Sprigg levied an excise on brandy to help pay for his defence measures.⁸⁶

The dismissal of the Holtzmann Ministry also made it clear to all and sundry that the principle of responsible government, as far as the Cape was concerned, had been diluted and that the personal rule of the Governor had acquired a new ascendancy.

"Doze gebeurtenis, in 't begin van onze geschiedenis als een Kolonie met verantwoordelijk bestuur, heeft ongetwijfeld een zeer verlamdenden invloed op onze constitutie uitgeoefend".⁸⁷

In Bombay, where Frere had been Governor prior to holding the Cape appointment, he had exerted considerable influence by entertaining and fêtering men of note. The Cape Legislature was also to feel this influence. The Cape House was small,

84. See Lewsen: Op. cit. p.99.

85. Walker: De Villiers, pl 136.

86. Infra, p.130.

87. Ons land, 21/7/'04, et vide C. Times, 17/10/'93, Report, Sauer's meeting at Woodstock, 16/10/'93.

having sixty-eight members and the Council twenty-two. It was easy therefore, to flatter and influence individual members - although the majority would not be susceptible - by personal attention and consideration on the part of the Queen's representative. Moreover, responsible government had only been in operation for a little more than five years and the Governor's influence was still such that if he favoured one political party it completely overshadowed its opponents.⁸⁸ This did away with the safeguards of responsible government, "for it is manifest that a Governor who can dismiss his ministers at will and in a huff is much less controlled than if those Ministers were honest Executive officers."⁸⁹

The Sprigg Ministry, which succeeded Molteno, was indeed a puppet ministry. Although Sprigg held the Premiership no less than four times he did not once come to power by popular vote. The first time he took office was by the autocratic will of the Governor who selected him to carry out his own projects; Sprigg himself confessed in Parliament that the policy which he was pursuing was one which he had "accepted" from Sir Bartle Frere and not one which he and his colleagues had evolved. Frere also affirmed that this was the position. In reply to an address presented to him on his arrival in England he stated that the Cape Ministers had "concurred" in his policy.⁹⁰ Soon after Sprigg had taken office the "Zuid-Afrikaan" bore eloquent testimony of the Ministry's submissiveness to

88. C. Argus, 11/6/'78. Ass. Debate, 6/6/'78.

89. Merr. Papers, No. 22, 1878. J.X. Merr. to his father, 19th Feb.

90. C. Argus, 6/12/'80.

the Governor.

"Er is nu geene botsing en geene oneenigheid meer tusschen Gouverneur en Ministerie. Zijne Excellentie gebiedt en het is or. De heer Sprigg verschaft rooden band zonder mate:....maar de vruchten van die echt constitutionele praktijk - waar zijn zij ? vraagt de koloniale belastingbetaler,...."

"De vruchten ? Er zijn geene....."

"Het publiek meent te vreezen dat de heer Sprigg met al zijn vertoon van onbuigsame gehochtheid aan Constitutionele beginselen, al te buigzaam is geworden in de handen des Gouverneurs"⁹¹

Seeing that the Sprigg Ministry was entirely an Eastern one, the old quarrel between East and West again raised its head, and this distinction remained the mainspring of the Colony's preferences. In almost jubilant phrases the "Grahamstown Journal" wrote:

"....the Colony, thanks to Mr. Sprigg, is at last being ruled by Eastern ideas and politics; and those who have so long complained of the stagnation and favouritism of Western Governments, ought now to give credit to the Premier for the success with which he has inaugurated a new order of things"⁹²

Finally, had the Cape Parliament supported Molteno's view, Frere would have been obliged to retire and South Africa would probably have been spared the horrors of three wars: the Zulu War of 1879, the Basuto War of 1880 and the Anglo-Transvaal War of 1881. To Frere the Cause of all the native disturbances in South Africa was the military power of Cetywayo and if this were destroyed peace would be secured in South Africa,⁹³ and moreover, the Cape would be more amenable to Confederation ideas. One of the causes of the Basuto War was Sprigg's efforts to disarm them; this was also an idea

91. Z.-Afr. 9/3/'78.

92. Journal, 5/7/'78.

93. C. Times, 29/4/'78.

which had originated with Frere⁹⁴ and which Sprigg had determined to carry out at all costs in obedience to the man to whom he owed so much. If Frere had retired, he would not have misrepresented the facts concerning the Transvaal, especially their feeling against annexation as being limited to a few supposed malcontents; nor would the representative institutions promised to the Transvaal have been denied them.

IV. FIRST YEARS OF THE SPRIGG MINISTRY.

In the new Ministry John Gordon Sprigg was Prime Minister and also held the portfolio of Colonial Secretary; the Treasurer was John Miller, member of the Legislative Council; the Attorney-General was Thomas Uppington, the Commissioner for Crown Lands and Public Works, John Laing, and William Ayliff the Secretary for Native Affairs.⁹⁵ Sprigg's assumption of office was in many respects a courageous act. He had to face not only the native hordes in the Eastern Province, but also knew that soon he would have to face a Parliament in which Molteno had till the end of the previous session enjoyed a strong majority. Moreover, elections, for both the Upper and Lower Houses were due at the conclusion of the following session. In Parliament also the dismissal of the Molteno Ministry, with all its constitutional implications, requiring a balanced mind to appreciate, would have to be defended. Finally, he would have to carry some bold measures such as the organisation of defence and an exceedingly unpopular tax - the Excise Duty. This latter measure met with stiff opposition

94. C. Argus, 1/1/'78. Art. from Kaffrarian Watchman 24/12/'77
et vide infra p. 150.

95. C. Argus, 9/2/'78.

from the wine-farming centres, Paarl and Stellenbosch.⁹⁶ This opposition, for their own party purposes, was cleverly stimulated by Molteno and his friends who by means foul or fair tried to embarrass the Ministry and bring it to a fall.⁹⁷

In general terms, the key-stone of the policy of the Sprigg Ministry was subserviency to Sir Bartle Frere.⁹⁸ Its more specific policy included measures for securing protection for the Frontier, and the disarmament of the natives within Colonial jurisdiction.⁹⁹ Further they embarked on a vigorous yet economic programme of public works and education; they also proposed supporting Carnarvon's policy of federation in South Africa as highly desirable; in fact, they attached so much importance to this that it was to be the "test question" at the elections of 1878-9.¹⁰⁰ In this matter of federation Sprigg played the rôle of a turn coat; when he was called to office in 1878, he was an opponent of Carnarvon's confederation schemes, but within a few weeks he had become an enthusiastic convert.

At the opening of the Parliamentary Session of 1878, Molteno was the leader of the Opposition in the Lower House. The great question before the House was, of course, the dismissal of the Molteno Ministry but after that question had been settled there was little to provoke party spirit.¹ The new

96. See Chapter IV, p.119.

97. C. Argus, 25/6/78.

98. This has been discussed at length, supra, p.117 vide Imp. B.B. C.2079, p.101. Sprigg's Manifesto in C. Argus, 12/2/78.

99. Government Gazette, 6/8/78.

100. C. Argus, 22/8/78, Premier's speech at Graham's Town, at C. Argus, 30/5/78, Upington to Colesberg electors.

1. C. Argus, 9/5/78.

Ministry found that it could pass measures by substantial majorities. Even the Bill imposing an excise on brandy did not encounter over much opposition in the House, because the electorate of the districts most seriously affected by this tax was as yet poorly organised and poorly represented.² So indistinct was party division and so slack was party organisation that members took their seats anywhere in the House; members opposing the Ministry were not ranged opposite the Ministerialists, as is the custom to-day; it was impossible to gather who was with the "Ins" and who with the "Outs". This would only become evident when a division of the House was taken.³

The absence of party feeling was also evident in the elections of 1878-9. Sprigg appealed to the country on the issue of a United South Africa and asked for "no uncertain sound upon the most important subject that has ever been submitted to its judgement"⁴. But the country had cooled down on the matter. It was no longer regarded as being within the sphere of practical politics on account of the Zulu War and the unsettled state of the Transvaal.⁵ The session of 1879 also passed without a word being said about confederation; it was only at the end of the session that the matter was again referred to in the Governor's prorogation speech.⁶ The electors were more interested in matters which were to them of greater practical interest, namely the Excise Act and railways and

2. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

3. *C. Argus*, 11/5/178; Notes in Parliament.

4. *C. Times*, 5/8/178, Governor's prorogation speech, 2/8/178.

5. P.M. 314, Min. No. 421, 10/7/179.

6. G.H. 31/16. Desp. to Sec. of State, No. 280, 23/9th 178.

these outweighed everything else.⁷ The elections were characterised by intense apathy; out of 44,655 registered voters in the Cape Colony only 18,818 recorded their votes.⁸ One-third of the constituencies returned members for the Assembly unopposed.⁹ With the regard to the elections of the Legislative Council then approaching the "Cape Argus" wrote:

"It may be that the absence of anything like large party questions accounts for the absence of sound and effective party organisation, but it is certain that..... there is a very noteworthy absence of anything which looks like united action in support of certain definite and enduring principles of political conduct. It bids fair, therefore, to be a contest not so much of measures as of men".¹⁰

In as much as the strength of parties was affected by these elections, all the men returned for the Legislative Council were in favour of the Sprigg Ministry and in the Assembly their¹¹ position was also strengthened considerably.¹²

At this time, adherence to some leading personality more than the support of some definite policy formed the basis of party in the Cape Parliament, so that when Molteno temporarily retired from public life towards the end of 1878, his absence¹³ helped to make party disorganisation complete. Merriman became the leader of such opposition as there was, and now received the support of J.W. Sauer, member of the Assembly for Aliwal North. Up to the consummation of Union in 1910, Merriman and Sauer remained political allies and for many years formed

7. Z.-Affr. 11/12/'78.

8. Greswell: Our South African Empire, Vol.11, p.125.

9. Journal, 14/3/'79.

10. C. Argus, 24/10/'78, et vide C. Argus, 21/11/'78.

11. Merr. Papers, No.55, 1878, J. Sivewright to Agnes Merr. 23 Oct.

12. Journal, 14/3/'79 et 28/4/'79.

13. Journal, 20/11/'78.

a counterpoise to the association of Sprigg with Upington. No question of controversial nature was brought before Parliament, except perhaps the Disarmament Bill on which, towards the end of the session, Sprigg was able to challenge a vote of confidence on party lines. The Opposition however, lacked cohesion and was defeated by a majority larger than the Ministers had anticipated.¹⁴ The position was put clearly in a leading article of the "Cape Argus":

"The first essential of Parliamentary Government is an organised and disciplined Opposition, for the want of which, at the present time, our responsible institutions stand in imminent danger of falling into contempt, and becoming little better than a solemn farce. Upon fifty occasions since Parliament has been in session, Ministers have been able to obtain their will, in despite of a general feeling against them, simply through the absence of cohesion and a proper understanding in the ranks of their opponents".¹⁵ ✓

14. G.H. 31/16. Desp. to Sec. of State, No.288, 23/9/179.
15. C. Argus, 6/9/179, et vide Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.152.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFRIKAANER BOND.

"The policies of the two British Colonies ((Cape and Natal)) are wholly determined not by their own needs and necessities, but by the presence of a third state - namely, the Transvaal". -

Markham: South Africa, page 152.

I. CAPE REACTION TO TRANSVAAL EVENTS OF 1877-1881.

From 1877, onwards, events in the Transvaal had their repercussions on the political situation in the southern British Colony. The Cape Dutch were linked with the Transvaal Dutch by many ties of blood and so they retained their sentiment for and sympathy with their kinsmen who had left the Cape Colony and founded the Republic. Any attack on the freedom and independence of the Transvaal was regarded by the Cape Dutch as an attack on themselves and their own liberties. It is no wonder therefore, that when Shepstone carried out his coup d'état, the Cape experienced a violent eruption of sentiment and sympathy for the Dutch kinsmen whose independence had been desecrated, - an eruption which very keenly affected the political situation of the Cape and caused feelings to run as high as they had not been since the Anti-Convict Agitation in 1849. Frere himself, writing to Sir Henry Ponsonby on 3rd April, 1880, felt the position to be critical:

"Whatever Sir Garnet Wolseley may say or think of the general feeling up in the Transvaal, the Dutch population down here who have relations up there, is seriously uneasy and angry, and a feeling has been created here about the Transvaal and its annexation which certainly did not exist a few months ago; and reacts in a manner very prejudicial to the present Ministry here who are Englishmen and known to be thoroughly loyal to the English Crown....the most

obvious evidence is to be found in the Radical and Republican Press in the Colony, which tries to ally itself with the Dutch Afrikaner party and has some success with the Dutch Republican section....

"These Dutch are slow to move, but bitter and obstinate when roused, and apt to move in an angry crowd. If any number of them join the Republican faction there will be serious trouble in South Africa, and the drifting may end by these colonies drifting away from the empire"¹.

At the Colonial Office, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, who had succeeded Lord Carnarvon, refused to undo what his predecessor had confirmed and thus turned down the requests of the Second Transvaal Deputation - Kruger and Joubert. At this stage public opinion began to make itself felt more keenly, as Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr wrote: "The annexation of the Transvaalhas taught the people of South Africa, that blood is thicker than water. It has filled the Afrikaners....with a national glow of sympathy for the brothers across the Vaal, which we look upon as one of the most hopeful signs for the future"².

When the Cape Colonists saw how Transvaal affairs were misrepresented, they determined to show the British authorities what the position really was. A deputation of nineteen members of Parliament went to interview the Governor. It is noteworthy that there was a large representation of English Colonists on this deputation led by Saul Solomon, J.X. Merriman and J.H. Hofmeyr. In reporting this interview to Hicks-Beach, Frere pointed out the sympathetic feeling of the Cape

1. Martineau: Op. cit. Vol.11, p.374.
2. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.164.

Dutch for the Transvaal and its effect on party politics:

"The meeting illustrated the strong and intimate connexion in feeling which exists between the Transvaal Dutch farmers and their relatives, who form so large a portion of the conservative country party in this Colony.

"It also shows how such feelings and sympathies may be used for purposes of party politics by those who in general have little in common with that section of the Dutch conservatives"³

Those in the Cape who sympathised with the Transvalers did what they could to avert war. Indignation was general when hostilities broke out. A stormy meeting at Stellenbosch adopted the following resolution: "Dat ons met verontwaardiging vervuld is teen die Britse Regering o'er die onregvaardige oorlog teen die Transvaal en dat ons Engeland aansprakelyk hou ver al die onheile wat ver Suid Afrika daaruit kan voorkom"⁴

When eventually peace was restored, after the British defeats at Bronkhorstspuit, Laing's Nek and Majuba, the Afrikaners throughout the country rejoiced: "Niets greep sedert Slagtersnek het Afrikansche gevoel zoo diep aan als de Transvaalache oorlog. Niets heeft zoo algemeene vreugde, van Knappunt tot naar Harrismith toe, onder Afrikaanders verwekt als het feit, dat....de vrede is hersteld"⁵

It had been the policy of the British Government during the nineteenth century to anglicise the Dutch-Afrikaner. This process had reached its peak during the middle of the century. But now, several factors made the Afrikaners rebel against the suppression of their language and the uprooting of their own

3. Imp. B.B. C.2482, p. 444.

4. Pat. 4/3/'81.

5. Z.-Affr. 14/4/'81.

culture. Events connected with the annexation of the Diamond Fields made them realise that all was not well but it needed⁶ the annexation of the Transvaal to rouse them to the full consciousness of their danger:

"Moreover, there have been special political causes, notably the annexation of the Transvaal, which have called forth feelings in the Dutch portion of the colonists which were rapidly dying out. The last year or two, for instance, has witnessed a remarkable increase of support to newspapers printed in Dutch, one new journal in that language having already acquired a large circulation and influence. The Dutch are further stipulating for the teaching of their own language in schools which they support; so that, unless some new counter movement arises in the colony, we are not likely soon to see an extinction of the distinctively Dutch side of colonial life".

The events in the Transvaal gave an impetus not only to the language of the Afrikaners, but also to their national consciousness. These two, in fact, always go hand in hand, the former promoting the latter:

"The rise and decline of nationalities and tribes have always been closely paralleled by the rise and decline of their respective languages, and both processes still go on together....Uniformity of language tends to promote like-mindedness, to provide an inclusive set of ideas as well as words, and like-minded persons tend to develop group-consciousness, to experience a sense of common interest, to constitute a tribe or nationality".⁸

Before the annexation of the Transvaal there was little national consciousness among the Afrikaners in South Africa and least of all in the Cape Colony; slowly but surely they were losing their language and imbibing the national sentiments and outlook of their English fellow colonists. If no startling

6. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.74.

7. C.Argus, 6/4/'80, et vide Z.-Afr. 17/11/'81.

8. Hayes: Essays on Nationalism, p.p.14, 16, et vide J.D. du Toit: Ds. S.J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, p.128.

event took place in South Africa to rouse Cape Afrikaners to political and national consciousness, they would have fallen victims to the anglicising policy of the English and they would have been bereft of all sense of national identity. The annexation, the war and the eventual retrocession of the Transvaal in 1881, awoke the dormant sense of national identity:

"....de selfstandige houding,....door den Kolonial en Boer aangenomen, heeft men te danken aan den Transvaalschen oorlog. De nationale zin van den Boer is ontwikkeld".⁹ The success of Transvaal arms filled the Colonial Dutch with pride and taught them that in political and social affairs they need not, as formerly, give way to their English follow-colonists. They were now determined to fight tooth and nail for their own national interests: "Men strijde voor het recht der Afrikaners om zich in de staatkunde te laten gelden, men zy onversetlijk in zijn eisch, dat zijne taal niet onder de voeten zal worden vertreden, men kome met alle kracht die men bezit op voor de regten van zijne stamverwanten over Oranje- en Vaalrivier".¹⁰ Nor was this awakening of national consciousness limited to the Cape Colony; it soon took on the deeper meaning of South African nationalism. This idea was strikingly evident in the motto of the Afrikaner Bond: "Afrika voor de Afrikaners", the aim of "Di Patriot" - official Bond organ- "Om te staan ver ons taal, ons nasie en ons land".¹¹ and also

9. Z.-Afr. 20/6/'81, et vide Pat, 15/4/'81.

10. Z.-Afr. 17/11/'81.

11. Pat. 15/1/'76.

12

in the appeal of the Transvaal to the Orange Free State in February, 1881, asking them to come to their aid.

The editor of the "Natal Witness", Reginald Statham, put the matter clearly in an editorial to his paper dated 18th September, 1882: "...this Dutch movement in the Cape Colony is by no means local, or limited to the Cape Colony alone. It is a symptom, and a very remarkable symptom, of that general Dutch reaction which was certain to arise out of the events that have recently passed in the Transvaal".¹³

The realisation of an own national identity among the Afrikaners, naturally evoked from them a revulsion to all things British and divided the Cape Colony into two camps. Previously, a fusion of the two races had slowly been taking place in the Cape Colony; such a phenomenon as race hatred on the part of the British hardly existed beyond occasional impatience of Dutch conservatism and lack of a sympathetic attitude towards their habits and manners.¹⁴ Now however, a breach which had not previously existed was formed between the two peoples and brought about an intense feeling of antagonism. Thus Reginald Statham wrote in the "Natal Witness", 18th September, 1882, that by the annexation of the Transvaal "every hostile feeling of the South African Dutchman towards the British Government was roused into activity. The feeling of hostility waxed stronger as the appeals for justice from the

12. This read: "To our companions and fellow-countrymen in the Orange Free State....Come and help us. Consider our case. God rules, and is with us. It is His will to unite us as a free people, to make a United South Africa, free from British authority. The future brightens for us. His will be done". Quoted by Vinder: C. Rhodes, p.17.

13. G.H. 34/46. Enclos. to Desp. to Sec. of State, No. 367, 10/10/'82.

14. Maclear Papers No. 23 Miscellaneous. England's Rule in S. Africa.

Transvaal were disregarded".¹⁵ In a letter of the same date Statham also appealed to Sir. Hercules Robinson, the Cape Governor, and warned him that "there is under present circumstances, very grave risk that the Dutch reaction now going on will, unless disarmed and met by generous concession, produce a strong tendency to exclude British influence, and - what is worse - will bring about a condition of pronounced antagonism between the Dutch and English populations".¹⁶ This anti-British feeling was not limited to the Afrikaner colonists only; many English colonists fully and sensibly realised that Britain's treatment of the Transvaal was unjust. They took up a "colonial" attitude, that is, the Colony first and Britain second and therefore co-operated with the Afrikaners.¹⁷

Sir Bartle Frere was sent to South Africa to sponsor Carnarvon's Permissive Federation Act. He arrived in Cape Town on 4th April, and eight days later Shepstone issued his Transvaal Annexation Proclamation. Some Cape Afrikaners, had, till then, been not unfavourably disposed towards federation;^{17a} soon, because they could not stomach the extinction of a free republic closely allied to them by bonds of kinship, they became determined opponents. The annexation of the Transvaal was therefore damaging to the cause of confederation. The final overthrow of the Carnarvon Confederation Scheme came, when in June, 1880, Sprigg brought it up for consideration in

15. G.H. 34/46. Enclos. to Desp. to Sec. of State, No.367, 10/10/'82.

16. Ibid.

17. Walker: De Villiers, p.145, et Z.-Aff. 20/8/'81.

17a. Supra, p.72.

the House of Assembly. After some debate it became clear that if he continued to press for federation resolutions he would be defeated chiefly because many Afrikaners who supported the domestic policy of the Government would have nothing to do with any measure leading up to confederation, under circumstances then existing;¹⁸ he therefore withdrew it from parliamentary consideration.¹⁹ The effect of the Transvaal annexation "was to make every Dutchman in the Cape Colony, as well as in the republics a suspicious distrustful man and thus at once put an end to the growing feeling of unity and fellowship which is a primary necessity of any scheme of confederation".²⁰ Thus the forceful annexation of the Transvaal which was intended to accelerate confederation, in the end turned out to be the very thing that caused the scheme to fail dismally.

The cumulative effect of Colonial sympathy for Transvaal burghers, the impetus to the Dutch language, the stimulation of national and anti-British feeling and the opposition to the Carnarvon federal idea was to rouse a keen interest among the Cape Afrikaner Colonists in the politics of their own country. Political life however, was quickened not only by Transvaal events. Faint signs of life could already be perceived at the time when Carnarvon's Confederation proposals

18. C. Times, 10/9/'80, et vide C.H. 34/46. Enclos. to Sec. of State, No.367, 10/10/'82.

19. Merr. Papers, No. 39, 1880, J.X. Merr. to G. Smith, 9 July.

20. Ibid. No.16, 1879, Ibid. 3 Feb. et vide: Z.-Afr. 10/2/'85.

and Froude's agitation held the attention of the country. But it cannot be doubted that the interest of the Dutch colonists in the affairs of state was at a very low ebb at this time. The Afrikaner population was content to let British-born colonists lead in public affairs and they good humouredly ignored Dutch grievances. The chief reason for this was the fact that English was the official language, so that the most capable representatives of an Afrikaner constituency were often unable to seek election as members of Parliament on account of the fact that they did not understand and could not speak English; they therefore lost interest in elections and became apathetic towards the affairs of state. Their attitude is aptly illustrated by a brief extract from "Di Patriot" of 30th January, 1885:

"Ons boermense, wat eintlik di kern van ons Afrikaanse bevolking uitmaak, is stil en rustig van aard.

"Di Hollandse Afrikaanse boer is di meeste tevrede as hy stil en ongestoord syn plaas kan bewerk en syn affêre behartig....

"Publieke vergaderings vir politieke doeleindes te gaan bywoon, het hy 'n hekkel an. Selfs by di stembus het hy sig ni 'at gelê ni".

When elections took place the English shopkeepers and traders, through their hold on country commerce, were able to influence elections in favour of English candidates. The situation bordered on the farcical:

"Hoe het dit tot nog toe meesal in ons land gegaan? 'n Klompie raddraaiers op die dorpe, veelal Engelse kooplui, Jode en Jodegenote, ontvang 'n rekwisisie van een of ander hoge meneer, 'n koopman, of advokaat of so, wat

21. Supra, p. 68.

22. Scholtz: Die Afrikaner en sy Taal, p. 119 et Smit: Afrikanerbond, p. 5.

graag die eer wil hê van in die Parlement te sit, en wat dan ook 'n paar duitte daarvoor orig het. Dan wort so 'n rekvisisie deur die raddraaiers geteken, en andere wat onder hulle plak staat word onder allerhande voorwensels oorgehaal om dit te teken! dan kom daar 'n mooie antwoord op! Dit word dan gepubliseer in een of ander plasclike blad wat daar goed voor betaal word en dit moet dan die trompet blaas....En onse Afrikaanse boerebevolking sit stil; hulle nomineer gen eie kandidate nie; met stomdag blyf hulle tuis; of moet stem ver een van die selfopgeworpe erebejagers; on daardeur was ons Parlement so miserawel samegesteld. Mar daaran kom nou 'n end"²³

Soon the Afrikaners were to show that the politics of their country was a serious matter to them. In 1881, for example, Herman van der Spuy was elected for the Oudtshoorn constituency. His opponent was a Mr. Melville who refused to subscribe to the principles of the South African Farmers' Protection Association.²⁴ The result was that Melville was defeated, v.d. Spuy gaining three times the number of votes of his opponent.²⁵ In gleeful terms the "Zuid-Afrikaan" of 26th April, 1881, wrote: "Ja, de Oudtshoornsche electie is van groot betekenis, en wel omdat onze Boerenbevolking hare magt begint te kennen". Some time after this election Hofmeyr visited Oudtshoorn and George in the interests of the F.P.A. He was received enthusiastically everywhere, not only by the Afrikaner but also by the English

23. Pat. 31/1/'79, et vide Z.-Afr. 13/9/'81.

H.P. de Waal in an address to the S.A. Liberal Association, 7/12/'06, told an interesting anecdote bearing on this point. So great was the indifference of the Afrikaners to politics that when for the first time, Sir Thomas Upington as representative of Colesberg wanted to address his Hiddelburg electors, he found that the meeting consisted of seven men and a boy - despite the fact that the town crier had gone round the town announcing the meeting in the Town House that evening. Upington postponed his remarks to a later occasion and invited the party - the boy excepted - to his hotel for a drink. S.A. News, 8/12/'06.

24. Zuidafrikaanse Boeren Beschermings Vereniging. In the rest of the text abbreviated to F.P.A. or Association. Vide infra.²⁵

25. Z.9Afr. 16/4/'81.

Colonists. The War of 1881, had not only stimulated the Afrikaners but also the English who, realising the political power of the Dutch Colonists, tried to enlist it on their own behalf and lent support to the F.P.A.:

"Het is de Transvaalsche oorlog, die dit wonder heeft gewerkt. De wonderbaarlijke wijze, waarop de Transvaalsche Boeren vchten, heeft ook den Kolonialen Boer met vierheid vervuld, heeft hem zelfrespect geleerd zelfs tegenover den Engelschen made-kolonist, voor wien hy gewoon was geworden, in het politieke en in het maatschappelijke te wijken. In het zelfrespect van den Boer heeft teruggewerkt op den Engelschman. Deze heeft de kracht van den Boer nog duidelijker leeren kennen dan de Boer zelf. En nu hij begrijpt, geen kans te hebben, de overwinning te behalen in den politieken strijd tegen den Boer, is hij er op gesteld, beschouwd te worden als zamen te strijden met den Boer"²⁶

11. THE FARMERS' PROTECTION ASSOCIATION.

Prior to the establishment of the F.P.A. there were certain "Farmers' Associations" in the Eastern Province. The first of these, modelled on societies formed by English Settlers, was founded at Middelburg in October, 1873.²⁷ The most successful was the "Albert Protection Association" organised by the energetic D.P. van den Heever.²⁸ About the same time an Association of Wine-farmers was founded in the Western Province. Its object was to improve the quality of wine produced and find better markets in England; this association however, came to grief on account of overspeculation by the directors.²⁹ It is important to note that there was some desire for organisation among the Dutch population, but the factor which would lead to an efficient, permanent and general organisation was still

26. Z.-Afr. 20/8/'81.

27. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.144.

28. Smit: Afrikanerbond, p.11.

29. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.125.

lacking. "Di Patriot", suggested an association which should embrace the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Western Province and which should hold congresses off and on to discuss matters of farming interest:

"So's die Vereeniging van 'n Wynmaatskappy nou; mar dan op 'n groter skaal ver alle boere, wynboere, korenboere, ens. Kyk wat is die swakheid van ons boere? Juls dat nulle nie verstaat, en dus nie eensgesind is; terwyl die Engelse handelaars afsprake maak onder mekaar, en so is die boere altyd an die kortste end. Kyk wynkopers, slagters, spekulatours, ens, alger het 'n soort van verstandhouding en die boere nie"^{29a}.

The ground was prepared; public opinion had been roused by the annexation of the Transvaal but it required an attack on the economic interests of the Afrikaner Wine-farmers to galvanise them into action. On account of the Gaika-Galeka War of 1877-8, Sprigg found it difficult to balance his budget and therefore proposed raising an excise of two shillings per gallon on all brandy distilled from grapes. The Wine and Brandy farmers were up in arms and although the proposed excise was reduced to one shilling per gallon during debate, the farmers remained discontented. The Excise Act passed the Assembly by 37 votes to 17 and the Council by 11 to 9.³⁰ This tax was destined to change the entire character of Cape politics. To many it had a racial as well as a provincial aspect; it was a tax imposed by English ministers, all of whom hailed from the Eastern Province, on a product of the Dutch farming population of the Western Province. So great was the opposition to the Excise Act that some farmers at Worcester decided to uproot

^{29a}. Pat. 15/6/'77.

³⁰. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.147.

their vineyards rather than produce a taxable product; others⁵¹ decided not to distill any brandy.

Soon the Afrikaners realised that if the excise were to be abolished and the interests of the farmers not trampled under foot, the farming population must have better representation in Parliament; to secure this they had to be organised. Some of the directors of the Association of Wine Farmers, already referred to, approached J.H. Hofmeyr as editor of "De Zuid-Afrikaan", suggesting a deputation to the Governor requesting him not to assent to the Excise Act. Hofmeyr however, had a different plan - a plan to organise for election purposes. The Afrikaner had to use his political power to protect his interests. On the same day, 30th July, 1878, several members of Parliament met to discuss the scheme; it received general support. The following day a meeting of twelve members of Parliament appointed a committee to draw up rules. This was done by Hofmeyr and a Cape Town attorney, H.P. du Preez, and a few days later the rules were agreed to at a third private meeting. This was followed up by a meeting at Stellenbosch on 12th August, where the rules were almost unanimously accepted and a provisional committee appointed. During the succeeding months the "South African Farmers' Protection Association" was placed on a sound basis. Hofmeyr visited many country districts to explain the objects of the Association. The movement received general support and on 31st October there were sufficient branches to hold the first

general meeting.³² At this meeting the constitution was ratified and the Association definitely constituted.³³

Thus was founded a strong organisation of which the chief aim was the removal of the Excise. It was also prepared however, to take a wider view of farming interests and promote the welfare of all farmers in the Colony, whether they be wine-farmers, wool, ostrich or grain farmers.³⁴ This would be done by supporting the candidature of members of the Legislature who opposed legislation oppressive to the farming community; further it would see to the registration of all who had interests in agriculture and it would try to prevent the abuse of the franchise. Finally, it would give timely warning to all farmers when any measures detrimental to their interests were proposed in Parliament. This organisation was not interested in party politics as such:

"The S.A. Farmers' Protection Association shall not interfere with party politics as such, but shall steadily and persistently pursue the objects set forth in the second and third sections of their rules and regulations, regardless of any effect such course of conduct may have on the state of Parliamentary parties"³⁵

Although the F.P.A. was supposed to eschew party politics it soon became a party weapon of great importance.³⁶ In 1879, in fact, a meeting at Stellenbosch declared that the clause

32. Out of about 60 members present, the following office-bearers were elected: President: G.J. de Korte; Vice-President: J.S. Marais; Secretary: H.P. du Preez; Treasurer: J.C. Hofmeyr; Committee: T. Louw (Malmesbury), P.J. Bosman (Stellenbosch), D. Korkel (Somerset West), F.J. Joubert (French Hoek), J.H. Coaton (Wellington), D.F. du Toit (Paarl), L.H. Goldschmidt (Calvinia), H. Wilman (Deaumont West), G. de Kock (Wynberg), M.J. Douw (Moubray), W.J. van de Ven, P.J. Marais, and J.H. Hofmeyr (Cape Town). Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.149.

33. Appendix, B.

34. C. Argus, 14/9/'78, Report F.P.A. meeting at Worcester.

35. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.645, Rules and Regulations of F.P.A.

36. Infra, p.133.

prohibiting participation in politics should be abolished or changed and in 1881, lack of time prevented the discussion of the proposed change.³⁷ This particular point received no further attention because amalgamation with the Afrikaner Bond then under consideration.

The success of the F.P.A. was immediate. Lack of time prevented it from throwing in its full weight into the Legislative Council elections of 1878, but in the Assembly elections which followed those of the Council, it sent up men determined to bring about, if not the abolition, then at least relief of the Excise on brandy.³⁸ The success of the F.P.A. is also shown in the spirit which it and the elections of 1878-9, engendered among Afrikaners:

"In Maart 1.1. hadden wij het gansche land door Parlementsverkiezingen en soowel daarbij als in het daarop vergaderde Parlement kwam de herleefde geest duidelijk aan het licht. De Afrikaansche leden vormden een magt in het Parlement, werkten althans te samen, openbaarden een geest de corps, soosals zij in geen jaren hadden gedaan. Het is onmiskenbaar dat daartoe in groot mate werd bijgedragen door de Boerenbeschermingsvereniging. Geboren uit de accijnsacte heeft die vereeniging haar invloed uitgestrekt ook verre in distrikten welke met die acte niets te maken hebben. Zij is zowat een organiserende kracht geworden voor de groote massa der Hollandsche Afrikaanders, niet alleen te Malmesbury en te Caledon, maar ook te Cradock, Burgersdorp, Maraisburg en Petrusville zikt men naar haar. Als Afrikaanders hebben wij dus reden te over om het jaar 1879 gemoedigd te besluiten"³⁹

Success however, appears to have been short-lived. The "Zuid-Afrikaan" of 23rd November, 1880, had to complain that the annual meeting of the F.P.A. had been most unsatisfactory⁴⁰

37. Smit: Afrikaner Bond, p.14, et Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.201.

38. Hofmeyr: op. cit. p.150.

39. T.-Afr. 31/12/179.

40. Although special efforts had been made and ample notice given only 40 out of 800 members attended and its funds amounted to £10 !

and that the opposition against the Excise had waned despite the original outcry against it. The Anglo-Transvaal War of 1881, however, gave the F.P.A. fresh vigour and the "Zuid-Afrikaner" could report that the annual general meeting was well attended and that the discussion on the Excise question took up almost all the time at the disposal of the delegates.⁴¹ In October, 1881, Hofmeyr and P.L. v.d. Byl, M.L.C., undertook a tour through the South Western districts in the interests of the F.P.A.⁴² Hofmeyr realised that his association would have to be placed on a broader basis and he might have pursued this object if another movement, the Afrikaner Bond, under S.J. du Toit, had not anticipated Hofmeyr.⁴³ The Bond, had in fact by this time eclipsed the F.P.A.; at the end of 1881, the former had already twice as many branches as the Association. Many regarded the Association merely as a body to fight the Excise Act, hence it lacked the broader basis of the Bond with its wider appeal.⁴⁴

111. THE AFRIKANER BOND.

The newly awakened Afrikaner consciousness manifested itself not only in organising the F.P.A. but also in creating another body founded on a broad national basis - the Afrikaner Bond. The roots of this organisation can be traced back to the time when in the early 'seventies political life was quickened by the discovery of diamonds. Agriculture, education, the

41. Z.-Afr. 22/9/'81.

42. Pat. 28/10/'81.

43. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.195.

44. Ibid. p.201.

building of public works, the construction of roads, railways, and telegraphs were all stimulated by this economic boom which reacted favourably on the country's political life.⁴⁵ Politically the annexation of the Diamond Fields had very much the same effect on the Afrikaner population as the annexation of the Transvaal: "The Dutch took the injury of their kindred as an injury to themselves, and it was found that no ministry could stand which proposed to take charge of the Diamond Fields".⁴⁶

The Afrikaner people of the Cape did not know their strength, nor could they use it until the grant of Responsible Government made them conscious of their political power and gave them the opportunity of using it. They realised that the parliamentary representation then in existence was not representative of the real interests of South Africa nor of its people: "The grant of cabinet government tended to stimulate political life among the Dutch farmers, hitherto the more backward part of the population".⁴⁷ Therefore, they founded the Afrikaner Bond with its elaborate organisation; as Hofmeyr expressed it at a dinner given in his honour at Graaff-Reinet on 14th November, 1889:

"From what had the movement (in the direction of the establishment of the Bond) arisen? He thought in the first place from the desire to make proper use of our Constitution, of our political rights and privileges, so that our Parliament should in truth represent the people, should consist out of men out of the people itself, who know the needs of the people, men who felt those needs together with the people; and as desirous as the people themselves of satisfying those needs. No

45. Walker: De Villiers, p.122.

46. Froude: Two Lectures on S. Africa, p.24, et vide, Z.-Afr. 28/4/'75, et De Villiers: Hollandse Taalbeweging, p.91.

47. Bryce: Impressions of S. Africa, p.140.

longer did they wish to give their votes at the Parliamentary elections to every Tom, Dick or Harry, that asked for it. That gave rise to the Afrikaner movement in the Colony, and the conception that that movement could bear no practical fruit without proper organization, produced the Afrikaner Bond"⁴⁸

This interest in politics was furthered when the Seven Circles Act was passed. It gave to the ordinary country voter a greater share in the election of the members for the Legislative Council.⁴⁹

In the newspaper "Di Patriot", we find another root of the Afrikaner Bond. It started publication on 15th January, 1876, By that time the Dutch of South Africa had lost so much contact with the Netherlands, that the language of Holland was spoken and written only by the educated Dutch of the land. In South Africa there had grown up a vigorous vernacular language, closely related to the parent Dutch, called "Afrikaans". It was in this vernacular that the Rev. Mr. S.J. du Toit published his paper, "Di Patriot". He appealed to the Afrikaners in their own language to take a greater share in the affairs of their own state, made them conscious of their own power and taught them how to use it.

It was however, the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, and subsequent events there, that evoked from the Cape the violent reaction of sympathy⁵⁰ that finally gave birth to the Afrikaner Bond. The successful resistance to the British arms by the Transvalers especially made the Afrikaner movement irresistible. Revd Mr. S.J. du Toit is reported to have said: "Die Transvaalse Anneksasie het indirek veel bygedra tot be-

48. Hofmoyr: Op. Cit. p.367.

49. Supra, p. 57.

50. Supra, p. 119.

vordering van onse taal en nasionaliteit in die parlement sodat ik meer dan eens geseg het: 'die Bond het wortel gevat op Amajuba!'⁵¹

Barring the F.P.A. and prior to the founding of the Bond there was one other organisation among the Afrikaners namely, "Di Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners", founded 14th August, 1875. In this society the later editor of "Di Patriot", Revd. Mr. S.J. du Toit played a leading rôle. The object was "om te staan ver ons Taal, ons nasie en ons Land"⁵². Although du Toit regarded it as having political objects - because language and nation are a unity⁵³ - its objects were primarily linguistic and cultural. Soon it became evident that these two societies - F.P.A. and Genootskap - were too limited in scope and could not care for all the varied interests of the Afrikaner population. The first to realise this was Revd. Mr. S.J. du Toit and he now bent all his energies to establish some organisation that would accomodate the Afrikaner language enthusiast, the opponent of the Excise, the parliamentary reformer and all those who wished the Afrikaner well, socially, economically and politically.

In "Di Patriot" of 20th June, 1879, du Toit made the first definite suggestion to establish an "Afrikaner Bond"; he also printed numerous pamphlets explaining his ideas.⁵⁴ In this manifesto he advocated an Afrikaner Bond in which everyone who is an "Afrikaner" would be welcome and in which all

51. Du Toit: Op. cit. p.222, et vide Pat. 31/3/'82 et 1/9/'82.

52. Pat. 24/10/'79.

53. Ibid.

54. P.M. 304. Copies of Confid. Mins. to H.E. the Governor, 8/5/'82.

would co-operate for the welfare of a United South Africa; all, of whatever nationality, would be acceptable provided that they acknowledged South Africa as their Fatherland. This Bond would watch over the politics of the country and keep traitors out of the legislature; it would see to the education of all classes of society and to their language rights. Trade, commerce and industries were to be promoted in the interests of all Colonists. This Bond would include the Transvaal and Orange Free State and have a central committee to look after the interests of all. "We have need of such a Bond and every day makes us feel the need of it more and more. Such a Bond will be welcomed by thousands and is absolutely necessary for the advantage of Africa"⁵⁵

It took some time before the first branches of the Bond were founded. Du Toit published his suggestions on the 20th June, 1879, and the first branch of the Bond was established in Hope Town district, 16th June, 1880.⁵⁶ Some other centres followed suit - Calvinia, Petrusville - but despite the fact that du Toit bent all his editorial energies to the task, the end of 1880, saw only fifteen branches in the Cape and one in the Orange Free State.⁵⁷ A great need was co-ordination among the various branches; each one followed its own course, more or less, without sufficient regard of the other branches. The wave of national consciousness which spread over the country after the War of 1881, brought about the establishment of many

55. P.M.304. Et vide Pat. 20/6/'79. The full text is given in Appendix, A.

56. Pat. 16/7/'80.

57. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.197. The O.F.S. branch was Kroonstad. Vide: Pat. 4/5/'81.

new branches. "Di Patriot" of 1880, had reports of meetings of Bond branches only off and on, but during 1881, there was a remarkable increase. At the end of 1881, there were thirty-three branches in the Cape Colony and twenty-two in the Orange Free State.⁵⁸ "Gegronde op onse nasionaliteit, het hy ((Afrikaner Bond)) wortel geskote in die hart van ons volk. Met ons volk moet hy dus voor of agteruitgaan, staan of val".⁵⁹

Although there were Farmers' Associations in the Eastern Districts, especially in the division of Albert, these were not affiliated to the F.P.A. so that the latter remained a predominantly Western organisation. In the beginning the Bond found strong support in the Eastern Districts, but soon it began to extend its influence to the West as well. Clashes between the two organisations soon became inevitable. Thus "Di Patriot" of 26th July, 1881, warned: "Dit word tyd dat daar 'n verstandhouding kom tussen die twee liggame, anders ry hulle makear nog in die wiele. Ons het opsettelik tot nog toe die oprigting van Takke van die Afrikaner Bond nie aanbeveel in die distrikte waar reeds die B.B. Vereeniging bestaan, juis om botsing te voorkom...." In many places both organisations existed side by side and supported rival candidates at elections.⁶⁰ The Afrikaner cause could not be promoted in this way and the leaders felt that the two bodies should amalgamate.⁶¹ A step in the right direction was taken when in March, 1882, about twenty representatives of the Eastern and Midland branches of

58. Pat. 4/11/'81.

59. Pat. 28/10/'81.

60. Hofmeyr: Op. Cit. p.201-202.

61. Pat. 24/2/'82.

the Bond assembled at Graaff-Reinet under the chairmanship of R.P. Botha. This was the first congress of the first political party in South Africa. At this meeting it was resolved that Hofmeyr should lead the Afrikaners in Parliament. The meeting further resolved that an amalgamation of the South African Farmers' Protection Association and Afrikaner Bond was very necessary. To lay the foundation of such a united body, J.H. Hofmeyr, M.L.A., D. du Toit, D. de Waal and H. du Preez would be invited to attend a general meeting to be held in September.⁶² Further, a commission⁶³ was appointed to call a "National Congress" at Cradock.

Meanwhile, in August, 1882, the Central Committee of the F.P.A. had decided in favour of fusion with the Bond.⁶⁴ In July, 1882, the Secretary to the commission, T.P. Theron, on behalf of the Graaff-Reinet Congress, invited all branches of the Bond and F.P.A. to send at least one delegate to the Cradock Congress; to send all points for discussion to the Secretary; to pay expenses of the delegates and contribute £1 to the general expenses; to report through their delegates the names of the committee members and the number of members in each branch.⁶⁵

On 12th September, 1882, some 96 delegates representing a large number of Bond and F.P.A. branches assembled at Cradock.⁶⁶

62. Pat. 17/3/'82, Report Graaff-Reinet Meeting, 9/3/'82.

63. Names of the members of the commission: M.J. Herholdt, Murraysburg; J.J. Jansen van Rensburg, M.L.A., Cradock; R.P. Botha, M.L.C., Graaff-Reinet; D.P. v.d. Hoeve, Albert; J.J. Bouwer, Bedford; T.P. Theron, Britstown, - Pat. 14/7/'82.

64. Z.-Afr. 26/8/'82. Report of Meeting.

65. Pat. 14/7/'82.

66. Pat. 15/9/'82. Report Cradock Meeting, 12/9/'82.

There were also several members of Parliament, inter alia, J.H. Hofmeyr. Just previous to the Cradock Congress the F.P.A. had held its annual general meeting and it had resolved in favour of amalgamation with the Bond. When this point was raised at Cradock there was some opposition from the more extreme supporters of the ideas which S.J. du Toit had propagated in "Di Patriot". But the former editor of this paper had become Director of Education in the Transvaal and moreover, Hofmeyr's influence was too strong; he was already an acknowledged leader and had already been minister in Scanlen's Cabinet. Eventually, the following resolution moved by G.F. Joubert and seconded by Marais of Beaufort West was adopted:

"That this meeting, considering it advisable that the Africander Bond and the Boeren Reunings Vereniging should be united, resolves to appoint a Committee to take the rules of the two bodies, and from them to form a constitution and to lay it before the various branches of both bodies, and that after this a congress of representatives of all branches with full powers be held to bring about a final union".⁶⁷

It was also decided that the Congress should meet at Richmond in May, 1883. The members of the committee were J.H. Hofmeyr, D.F. du Toit and Dr. Hoffman.⁶⁸ Reginald Statham, editor of the "Natal Witness" saw the true significance of this Cradock Congress clearly, when he wrote on 18th September, 1882:

"This is the meaning of the Congress which has been held at Cradock. It has been a Congress held for the purpose of expressing the views of the Dutch party, and gaining power to carry those views into effect. The fact that it was attended by Mr. Hofmeyr and that his speeches gave the tone to its proceedings, lends it all the greater signi-

67. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.203, et Pat.29/9/'82, Supplement.

68. Ibid.

fiance.... In fact, Mr. Hofmeyr was credited with the intention of forming a distinct Dutch party, which should act together in the Cape Parliament on behalf of Dutch interests. It would seem that this intention has been fulfilled. The Congress at Cradock has resulted in the adoption of a distinct Dutch programme, for the carrying out of which Mr. Hofmeyr will fight to the utmost in the Cape Legislature"⁶⁹

Before the commission appointed at Cradock had drawn up a constitution, a notice appeared from the Bond branches of Bedford. It invited delegates of the Bond to assemble at Richmond on 23th November, 1882, to constitute an Afrikaner Bond and did not mention the F.P.A. Hofmeyr founded a branch of the Bond in Cape Town, was chosen a delegate to Richmond and there, largely on account of his persuasion, it was decided by fifteen votes to five not to establish a separate Bond but to amalgamate with the F.P.A.⁷⁰

In February, 1883, the Cradock Commission had completed its work.⁷¹ The Provincial Committee of the Afrikaner Bond however, had not yet been formally constituted. To this end, on Tuesday afternoon at 2 p.m. on 22nd May, 1883, delegates from the Cape Bond branches met at Richmond. Two delegates from the Provincial Committee of the Orange Free State were also present, namely, Chief Justice F.W. Peitz and C. Visser. A message from the Transvaal calling for amalgamation was also read. At Cradock a "Working Commission" had also been appointed with D.P. v.d. Hoeve as chairman and T.P. Theron as secretary. Van den Hoeve now again took the chair, Revd. Moorrees opened

69. G.H. 34/46. Enclos. to Desp. to Sec. of State, No. 367, 10/10/1882.

70. Hofmeyr: Op. Cit. p. 205.

71. Pat. 2/2/1883.

the proceedings with prayer and then T.P. Theron explained the purpose of the meeting.⁷² Delegates from the branches of the F.P.A. met those of the Bond on 24th May. J.J. Jansen van Rensburg M.L.A., who had presided over the Cradock Congress was again elected chairman. The Constitution drawn up by the Cradock Commission for the amalgamation was then adopted and the delegates of the F.P.A. were then welcomed as members of the Provincial Committee (Congress) of the "Afrikaner Bond en Boeren Bëschermings Vereniging", as the new organisation was now formally called.⁷³ This constitution was divided into two parts, namely, a general constitution for the whole of South Africa and a provincial constitution for the Cape Colony.⁷⁴ The Congress formulated the aim of the Bond as follows: "To foster a true patriotism as a preparation for its final aim, 'A United South Africa', and it believes that this final aim can be attained by encouraging South Africans politically as well as socially to come forward as a nation".⁷⁵

At the conclusion of this historic congress many delegates expressed their joy that the work of amalgamation had been successfully achieved. Hofmeyr expressed himself thus: "Deur di vereeniging is di vyand di mond gestop. Verdeeldheid sou ons gevoel het, selfs in di Parlement. Men sou ons Afrikaners ni meer gevrees het. Was di vereeniging misluk dan was hy miskien uit di politieke lewe terruggetre, want dan het dit gelyk of syn werk hopeloos was".⁷⁶

72. Pat. 1/6/'83.

73. Pat. 15/6/'83, Supplement.

74. Vide Appendices, C and D.

75. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.206.

76. Pat. 15/6/'83, Report Richmond Congress.

A few days later, 30th May, 1883, the last annual general meeting of the F.P.A. gathered at Beaufort West. The following proposal was adopted: "Dat al de bestaande regulatiën worden herroepen en de constitutie door den Afrikaner Bond en de Boerenvereniging te Richmond aangenomen in de plaats daarvan wordt gesteld".⁷⁷ In this way the F.P.A. surrendering its political influence to the Bond, disappeared from the South African scene. From now on the Bond began to build up an organisation which in course of time dominated the parliamentary elections of the Cape Colony and which became the basis of the party organisation of the Afrikaners.⁷⁸ In the course of its career it was destined to make and unmake many ministries.⁷⁹

The Richmond Congress was undoubtedly an event of great political importance to the Cape Colony; so much so that the Scanlen Ministry, which was supported by the Afrikaners, sent to the Governor a translation of part of a report of the proceedings at Richmond. In a confidential minute Ministers

77. Z.-Afr. 2/6/'83.

78. The original constitution made no provision for parliamentary elections. In 1885, a committee was appointed with vague powers. The result was that Bond candidates sometimes opposed each other in the same constituencies. This was especially so in the elections of 1888-9. The Bond Congress of Middelburg 1889, decided to institute a Committee of Supervision over Elections (Kommissie van Toezicht op Elekties). This was a sort of judicial committee consisting of three members of the Bond elected every two years by the Provincial Congress. It had to encourage Bond candidates, organise meetings for candidates and secure their election. It also had the thankless task of settling all disputes about elections among rival Bond candidates and in this matter its decision was final. The first members of this committee were; Hofmeyr, N.P. de Waal and R.P. Botha. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.319, et S.A. News, 8/12/'06, De Waal et S.A. Liberal Association, 7/12/'06.

79. One year after the formation of the Bond there was a general election. The Bond returned twenty-five members out of a House of seventy-nine. S.A. News, 8/12/'06, Report de Waal's speech to S.A. Liberal Association, 7/12/'06.

further considered:

"that the radical alteration made in the constitution of the two associations marks a new departure in the history of what may be termed the Dutch question in South Africa....

"The meeting at Richmond is undoubtedly a landmark in the onward progress of the work undertaken by the Afrikaner Bond; and Ministers have in consequence, felt it incumbent on them to forward the report of these proceedings for the information of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies"⁸⁰

Before concluding this chapter it is necessary to note a few facts concerning the constitution and principles of the Board.

✓ The constitution of the Afrikaner Bond was thoroughly democratic; it was born in the hearts of the people and therefore had to be built up from below. In "Di Patriot" of 9th September, 1881, S.J. du Toit explained how people should set about establishing branches of the Bond. Two or three persons in a ward and those who wished to co-operate chose a Ward Committee. As soon as there were a number of such committees in a district or division, representatives could come together and from among themselves choose a Divisional Committee. If ten or more districts in the Cape Colony, Transvaal or Orange Free State have chosen Divisional Committees then representatives from these could assemble to choose a Provincial Committee. This Provincial Committee was really a congress of delegates chosen by District Committees. There was no permanent body serving as an Executive Committee. This defect was later

⁸⁰. C.O. 3691, No. 45.

supplied by the appointment of a Commission of Supervision⁸¹ over Elections. When two Provincial Committees had been chosen they need not wait but could meet to choose a Central⁸² Committee:

"Ons Bond moet wees soos die piramiede van Egypte, breed van fondament, maar altoos nouer oplopende totdat dit in één punt uitloop, dis die Centrale Bestuur. Maar daarby kan ons nie begin nie, daar moet ons eindig....Die mag van ons Bond klim dus op, sodat die lagere telkens die hogere laag draag, en gen hogere bestuur het enige mag nie as wat hy van die lagere ontleen"⁸³

Each Ward, District or Provincial Committee was free to have its own local regulations but had to insert one article in which it agreed with the general principles of the Bond. Each Committee managed its own financial affairs but each sent one-third of its income to the Committee just above.⁸⁴

The Revd Mr. du Toit also drew up a concept "Programme of Principles" for the Afrikaner Bond. These were first published in "Di Patriot" of 3rd March, 1882. It was based on the programme of the Anti-Revolutionary Party in Holland where it had been published on 1st January, 1878, to serve as a basis for elections of the Second Chamber. The various

81. Vide Footnote 78, p. 144.

82. The Central Committee assembled once only, viz., at Bloemfontein 17th February, 1886. The Cape was represented by D.F. du Toit and T.P. Theron; the Transvaal by Genl. P.J. Joubert and Revd Mr. S.J. du Toit and O.F.S. by J.G. Grabe and C.J. Visser. It was on this occasion that it was decided to leave the question of "an own flag" for a United S. Africa in abeyance. Vide Pat. 26/2/'06. This was a point for which S.J. du Toit had consistently agitated from the time he suggested an Afrikaner Bond. On this point he differed widely from Hofmeyr, the leader of the F.P.A. Infra, p. 147.

83. Pat. 9/3/'81.

84. Ibid. Et vide Appendices C. and D. The final constitution of the Bond was adopted at the Richmond Congress, 1883. Vide Infra, p. 143.

branches of the Bond and Association were asked to consider this programme, and lay suggested alterations before a Congress that was to meet at Graaff-Reinet. The Afrikaner Party would then have clearly expressed political principles and all would know exactly what it stood for and what to expect from it.⁸⁵ Thus the first political programme of its kind was published in South Africa. The other great leader of the Afrikaners, J.H. Hofmeyr, did not support du Toit's programme entirely. He thought it too anti-English in spirit and this spirit manifested itself in no uncertain way in du Toit's "Patriot". Du Toit also advocated the entire withdrawal of the English flag from South Africa; this Hofmeyr considered too revolutionary and unstatesmanlike as South Africa was too weak to stand alone.⁸⁶

It was some years before the Afrikaner Bond adopted any programme of principles. The consideration of du Toit's programme was postponed from one Provincial Bond Congress to another.⁸⁷ At the Annual Bond Congress held at Uitenhage, March, 1887, a rival programme, drawn up by the Cape Town branch of the Bond, made its appearance. Both programmes were referred to the District Committees for consideration and report.⁸⁸ Very little action seems to have been taken in the matter because at the next Annual Congress held at Paarl, a commission was appointed to draw up one programme based on the two concepts. This would then be laid before the next Annual

85. Pat. 3/3/'82.

86. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.193.

87. Pat. 1/5/'85.

88. Pat.15/4/'87.

Congress for approval. Accordingly, the programme of principles drawn up by the commission was brought before the Annual Bond Congress at Hiddelsburg, March, 1889. There it was unanimously adopted without discussion and became known as: "Programme of Principles of the Afrikaner National Party".⁹⁰

89. Pat. 25/8/'88. The commission consisted of J.H. Hofmeyr, M.L.A., D.F. du Toit (Lokomotief), Dr. Hoffman.

90. Pat. 14/3/'89. For full text see Appendix, E.

CHAPTER V.

THE BEGINNING OF PARTY SYSTEM.

I. UNDER FIRST SPRIGG MINISTRY.

We have noticed that the F.P.A. was organised during the tenure of office of the first Sprigg Ministry. This organisation together with the awakening of a national spirit among the Afrikaners now became factors in Cape politics. A number of men under Hofmeyr's leadership formed a party of limited solidarity in Parliament, in opposition to the Sprigg Ministry. Their ranks were swelled by the addition of men opposed to Sprigg's (or more correctly Prere's) policy of disarmament in Basutoland - with the consequent Basuto War - and of men who also opposed Sprigg's railway and confederation proposals.

After the Gaika-Galeka War of 1877-8, the Colonial Government, with Sprigg at its head initiated a new native policy. All the Native Territories between the Cape Frontier and Natal were to be annexed; moreover, all the natives were to be disarmed. Thus the Cape Parliament passed the Peace Preservation Act of 1878 - better known as the "Disarmament Act". Previous governments had allowed natives to carry arms. They were especially fond of carrying a rifle and there were no legal restrictions, outside the Republics, which could prevent them from obtaining as many fire-arms as they wished. With the development of the Diamond Mines and the construction of railways there was a great demand for native labour. These native labourers usually

returned home with one or more rifles.¹ The result was that, because of the numerous native wars of the seventh decade of the Nineteenth Century, men began to believe that the only way of permanently securing peace was to disarm the natives and place them under European control. This policy was really initiated by Frere during the War of 1877-8, when he announced to a deputation from Kingwilliamstown:

"I hope the members of the Executive Government will forgive me if I make a departure from constitutional usage, and at a time such as this will excuse my making remarks without previous consultation with them,....As regards the terms of peace, you may be sure that if my influence can have any weight you will have a permanent peace made for you. One of the measures to that end must be the entire disarmament of the natives"²

This policy of disarmament became the main plank of the Sprigg Ministry.³ The Fingos and Tambookies were disarmed,⁴ and now the Ministry determined to disarm the Basutos as well:

"Until convinced by facts to the contrary, and supported by the results of what has been done in the past towards disarming, the Government cannot but hold firmly to the view on which its policy is based, namely that disarmament wisely carried out will in every way conduce to the welfare of all peoples of this country and prove the best means that can be adopted of preventing wars in the future."⁵

When it became known that the Government intended to disarm the Basuto, Thomas Fuller (later Sir), supported by Solomon, Orpen, Morrisman, Sauer and even some of the Eastern members, proposed a motion against the wholesale and indiscriminate disarming of natives. This protest however, was rejected by 38 to

1. P.M. 4. Confid. Min. from Governor and High Commissioner, 15/3/'80.

2. C. Argus, 1/1/'78, reprint of article in Kaffrarian Watchman, 24/12/'77, et vide, Supra, p. 114.

3. Supra, p. 115, et vide C. Argus, 30/3/'78, Sprigg at Grahamstown and Upington to Colesberg electors.

4. G.H. 34/36. Enclos. to Desp. to Sec. of State, No. 389, 16/12/'79.

5. P.M. 314. Min. No. 625, 18/9/'79.

to 17 votes.⁶ Despite this warning however, the Ministry persisted. On 16th and 17th October, 1879, Sprigg attended a Basuto Pitso and addressing the natives he informed them that it was the government's intention to disarm them. At this meeting it became clear that the Basuto were in no mood to be disarmed. Repeatedly the press warned the Ministry of lurking danger.⁸ With good intentions but in blissful ignorance of the trouble they were drawing down on their heads, the Ministry proclaimed the Disarmament Act in Basutoland on 6th April, 1880.⁹

When Parliament assembled in May, 1880, feelings were running high. Different elements of the Opposition were now drawn together. The confederation proposals of the Ministry, their attitude towards the Transvaal and the Excise law had estranged many of the Afrikaner Colonists. Further the Opposition seized the disarmament policy of the Ministry as a party cry with which to assail the Government. It was indeed a very motley Opposition; it included such genuine Afrikaners as Maraïis and Hofmeyr - who thought disarmament unwise - natural opponents of the Government, such as Herriman, ultra-British such as Fuller and negrophiles such as Solomon, Sauer and Irvine.¹⁰ On 20th May, fourteen days after the opening of Parliament, Fuller again moved a vote of No.-Confidence, worded:

"That this House is of opinion that the recent action of the Government in proclaiming a law requiring the Basutos to surrender their arms weapons and ammunition, and promising compensation for the same within one month,

6. C.Argus, 30/8/'79 at Z.-Afr., 30/8/'79.

8. C.Argus, ~~25/2/80~~ 20/1/'80, 6/4/'80, 9/3/'80.

9. C.Argus, 6/4/'80, at P.M.804. Copies of Confid. Mins. to H.E. the Gov. 16/6/'80.

10. Z.-Afr. 25/3/'84, C.Argus, 9/3/'80, G.H.32/2. Confid. Desp. to Sec. of State, 2/2/'80.

on the eve of the meeting of Parliament, and without any emergency having arisen necessitating the same, is arbitrary and unconstitutional, involving as it does the expenditure of a large amount of public money unauthorised by Parliament, and committing the Colony to a policy which, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, required the very gravest consideration at the hands of the Legislature¹¹

During the debate which lasted till 2nd June, 1880, many eloquent and well-reasoned speeches were made, especially by Fuller, Sauer, Merriman and Hofmeyr. They argued that the act could not be made to apply to Basutoland as no act passed by the Cape Parliament was applicable to Basutoland unless it was expressly so stated in terms of the Act. Furthermore, any proclamation issued with regard to Basutoland had to be laid before Parliament within fourteen days of its meeting in session after the issuing of such proclamation; this the Government had neglected to do. Moreover, the Ministry had acted unconstitutionally as it had compromised the Government to the unauthorised expenditure of £100,000 as compensation for surrendered arms.¹² In reply the Government held that since the Disarmament Act might be applied to any district and as Basutoland had been annexed to the Cape Colony it might be applied there at the will of the Executive; further, since the surrendered arms would have to be paid for, Parliament would simply have to find the money.¹³ The outcome of the debate was a government victory of 37 votes to 28. The Ministerial supporters consisted of 26 men from the Eastern Province

11. C.Argus, 21/5/'80, Assembly Debate, 20/5/'80 et seq.

12. C.Argus, 21/5/'80, Assembly Debate, 20/5/'80 et seq.

13. C.Argus, 3/6/'80.

Province and 11 from the Western, while in the Opposition the Western members predominated with 22 votes to which were added 6 Easterners.¹⁴ It was clear that the tide had strongly turned against the Ministry. Nine months previous it had had a majority of more than twenty votes for its native policy,¹⁵ and this had now shrunk to less than half.

In 1880, its railway proposals also very nearly brought the Sprigg Government to a fall. John Laing, the Commissioner of Public Works, in his Railway Extension Bill asked for a vote of seven million pounds. In order to gain the favour of as many districts as possible the Government proposed to construct no less than ten lines.¹⁶ Opposition to these proposals was general and Sprigg set the whole country by the ears except those centres that would benefit by his proposals.¹⁷ During the course of the debate the Ministry had to give way on many points and it soon became evident that it could no longer command its supposed followers. Seven out of the ten lines proposed were rejected in committee. The opposition to the Government's bill increased steadily as members from the areas of which the lines had been rejected turned against the Government.¹⁸ On 14th July, the Government adopted a private member's amendment for a junction¹⁹ between the Western and Midland lines. The House however, rejected the amendment by a very substantial majority - 40 to 23 votes.²⁰ Thereupon the

14. Journal, 4/6/'80.

15. Supra, p. 151.

16. C.Argus, 6/7/'80, Assembly Debate, 5/7/'80.

17. C.Argus, 13/7/'80.

18. Z.-Afr. 17/7/'80.

19. Kelpoort to Aberdeen Road.

20. C.Argus, 15/7/'80, Assembly Debate, 14/7/'80.

Government withdrew the whole Railway Extension Bill. Merriman seized upon the opportunity to move that "the action of the Ministry with regard to Railway Extension is not such as to merit the confidence of the House".²² Two days later however, Merriman withdrew his motion in view of the Basutoland disturbances then threatening the peace of the country. As soon as Merriman had withdrawn his motion of No-Confidence, Sprigg threw down the challenge that the Ministry was quite prepared to meet Merriman's motion and defend the action of the Government in introducing the Railway Bill and subsequently withdrawing it. Thereupon, with leave of the House, Merriman gave notice that he would move "that the Ministry no longer possesses the confidence of the House".²³ There was a short debate on Merriman's motion which was eventually negatived by 32 to 24 votes.²⁴ This was the third time during that session that Sprigg's Ministry was very nearly defeated; the two previous occasions were during the debates on the proposals for a conference on Confederation and the Disarmament of the Basuto. Sprigg's position was therefore very precarious; the rejection of Merriman's motion "leaves the direction of public business in the hands of an Administration so weak that another vote or two would turn the scale against them, and compel that administration to face war on our borders, discontent at home, growing financial embarrassments, and

21. C. Argus, 20/7/'80.

22. C. Argus, 20/7/'80, Assembly Debate, 19/7/'80.

23. Ibid. 22/7/'80, Ibid. 21/7/'80.

24. Ibid. 24/7/'80,

unknown diplomatic complications with the Imperial Government".²⁵

All the elements for the formation of a cohesive opposition were present. Moreover, numerous disasters which befell the Sprigg Ministry - especially in the pursuit of its native policy - helped to strengthen the Opposition in which there were several capable men such as Solomon, Merriman, Hofmeyr, Sauer, Vincent and Fuller. They were further strengthened when Molteno returned to Parliament in 1880, as member for Victoria West. His presence helped to consolidate the Opposition and drew into the Opposition camp many waverers since Molteno had the reputation of being a "safe man".²⁶ Moreover, Sprigg's Ministry was considerably weakened by the resignation of Uppington on account of poor health; he was a very capable man and one of the leading men in the Government.²⁷ Sprigg was becoming increasingly unpopular; in his own constituency a public meeting passed motions of censure on him.²⁸ Sprigg had in fact, become a Premier who "van de onbuigszaamsten puritein is bekeerd tot den meest knipmesachtigen hoveling, en zijn eer er in stelt een dienaar te zijn der Kroon en in harmonie te werken met den Goeverneur".²⁹ A section of the English press in Cape Town could not pour enough scorn on the Sprigg Ministry: for example, the "Argus" of 20th October, 1880, wrote:

25. C.Argus, 24/7/'80.

26. C.Argus, 10/4/'80, et Z.-Afr. 22/4/'80.

27. Ibid. 18/1/'82.

28. Ibid. 22/7/'80, Report from East London, 21/7/'80. Two days previous Sprigg's effigy had been burnt; but before it was set on fire a native was ordered to throw assegais at it. The "C.Argus" commented: "That native ought surely to be disarmed".

29. Z.-Afr. 22/4/'80.

"The fact is that in whatever quarter we look, at home or abroad, the fingers of the fates seem to be pointing in mockery and scorn at the pitiable and discredited statesmanship of Mr. J. Gordon Sprigg". On 5th November, 1880, the same paper wrote: "It is high time now for the people to assemble in hundreds and thousands in their public meetings to tell Mr. Sprigg that the patience of the country is exhausted, and that he must resign".

+ The session of 1880, had also seen a considerable development in power of the Afrikaner Party in the House. Because he had supported Frere in his Transvaal policy in 1878, Sprigg could not rely on this element in the House. The Premier had become the champion of the English and of English views. This is clearly illustrated in the following incident: To gain the support of a few English merchants he laid an embargo on the sending of arms and ammunition to the Orange Free State. Some munitions had been sold to the Transvaal but were detained in the Orange Free State till the Transvaal made payment. When war broke out the Transvaal wished to pay for these munitions but President Brand refused to allow the munitions to cross the Vaal River. The merchants realised that if an embargo were placed on the sending of further munitions to the Orange Free State, they would realise a good price for those already there. Hence, to please these people Sprigg advised the Governor to prohibit the sending of arms and ammunition to the Orange Free State. By doing this he irritated the Dutch-

Afrikaners at the Cape and incurred the displeasure of the otherwise friendly Orange Free State.³⁰ That Sprigg was mainly interested in the welfare of the English is also illustrated by the following extract from the "Zuid-Afrikaan", 10th February, 1885: "Er is geen twijfel aan of het ministerie Sprigg had, in de latere dagen van zijn bestaan, een deel van den steun die het genoot daaraan te danken dat men het een Engelsch bewind achtte, dat aan het Afrikaanderisme niet zou toegeven".

In the meantime, the Basuto were becoming more and more restless and it was clear that if the Disarmament Act were enforced, they would resist. Further the hut-tax of ten shillings which had been introduced when the country was annexed to the Cape was to be doubled.³¹ The Government seemed to act on the theory that the natives were the natural enemies of the Europeans. All, good and bad, loyal or disloyal should be treated with equal severity and all had to surrender their arms.³² There was much truth in Hofmeyr's assertion that the Government's native policy "has tended to drive Kafir races to the despairing conclusion that it is almost better to be disloyal than loyal".³³

The Basuto restlessness culminated in war breaking out in the Guthing district in September, 1880. Colonial opinion was strongly divided. Throughout the Colony those out of office clamoured for the reversal of everything Frere and

30. Z-Afr. 5/2/'81.

31. G.H. 34/36. Enclos. to Desp. to Sec. of State, No. 389, 16/12/'79.

32. C. Argus, 2/12/'80, Letter by J.X. Merriman.

33. Ibid. 29/5/'80.

and Sprigg had inaugurated. To the Opposition the war presented a God-sent opportunity of making political capital and they did so with all means at their disposal. To quell the insurrection the Government called out the Yeomanry and Volunteers but when those sources were exhausted an appeal was made to the burghers; their forces failed to effect anything in Basutoland. The Colonial forces in the field were ridiculed, the Volunteers laughed at, the burghers derided and all efforts to enforce the Disarmament Act were disparaged.³⁴ Public opinion had turned strongly against the originator of the Basuto War and the policy that led up to it.³⁵ The War supplied the Opposition with all the appliances for sapping the strength of the Government which had to bear all the blame: "Onze tegenwoordige moeilijkheden zijn het regtstreeksch gevolg van de zelfverheffende dwaasheid, de schaamteloze verwaandheid en het roekeloos wanbestuur van het Goewernement dezer Kolonie".³⁶

Frere's recall coincided with the outbreak of the Basuto War. Grave differences had arisen between Frere and the Imperial Government. Kimberley, Secretary of State, did not approve of the Governor's action in Pondoland, the proposed annexation of the chief Korozi's lands in the Guthing district of Basutoland; but the culminating difference was the disarmament of the Basuto, "the attempt to enforce which has led

34. C.Times, 3/5/'81, et Groswell: Our S.African Empire, Vol.II, p.91.

35. C.Argus, 1/2/'81.

36. Z.-Afr. 17/3/'81.

to such lamentable results".³⁷ Sprigg was the creature of Frere and to him he owed his accession to office.³⁸ Frere's departure made the fall of the Sprigg Ministry inevitable. Without Frere, Sprigg was entirely at a loss: "He has been absolutely incapable of shaping himself to new conditions, but flounders about, evidently unable to frame any definite plan for himself, and therefore, like all uncertain teachers, unable to impress himself upon others".³⁹ Small wonder then that when Parliament met for the first session of 1881, - the first session held after Frere's departure - Sprigg was defeated.

Many members of Parliament began to realise the necessity of better organisation and a good whip. Thus a member of Parliament wrote to Merriman: "Without organisation, earnestness, and downright determination to succeed we are not likely to inspire the country with confidence in our ability to do better than the Jingoos. ((Sprigg and his Ministers))"⁴⁰ Parliament assembled on 25th March, for the session of 1881. On the 31st, a caucus meeting was held to form an opposition on the British model. All those who were opposed to the Sprigg Ministry for whatever reason, attended this meeting.⁴¹ It was not easy to form a solid opposition because of the different elements; for example, there was Saul Solomon whose quarrels with Sprigg were of a personal nature. Then there were also

37. G.H. 1/33. Desp. No.121. Sec. of State to Sir.G.Strahan, 14/10

38. Supra, p. 112.

39. C.Argus, 25/7/'83.

40. Merr. Papers, No. 4, 1881, (Member of Parliament?) to J.X. Merr. 19 Feb.

41. Ons Land, 19/4/'04, Article, 1854-1904.

such influential men as Irvine and Hofmeyr; the former was a large native trader from Kingwilliamstown, who saw in the native a client who would buy his goods and whose purchasing power and material needs should be increased. Hofmeyr and the Afrikaners saw in the native a source of useful cheap farm labour. Yet, the Opposition succeeded in taking both these groups to its bosom. As leader it chose Thomas Scanlon, member of the Assembly for Graaff-Reinet; he had been a successful attorney but an insignificant politician.⁴² Two weeks later, 11th April, 1881, Scanlon proposed a motion of No-Confidence, worded:

"This House is of opinion that the conduct of the business of the country by the present Administration, especially in regard to Basutoland and the Transkeian Territories before and after the outbreak of hostilities, has been such as to imperil its best interests"⁴³

By straining every nerve the Ministry gained a very bare majority, 37 votes to 34.⁴⁴ Parliamentary practice in England would have demanded that the Government should either resign or appeal to the country, but Sprigg did neither. He had in fact been saved from defeat by the Diamond Fields vote. This was the first session in which members from Griqualand West held seats in the Cape House and C.J. Rhodes and Dr. J.W. Matthews voted with the Government.⁴⁵

The Basuto War lingered on without a decisive victory for either side. Eventually the Basuto also grew war-weary and agreed to Sir Hercules Robinson, the new Governor, being appointed

42. *Ons Land*, 19/4/'04, Article, 1854-1904, at Z.-Afr. 2/4/'81.

43. *C. Argus*, 12/4/'81, Assembly Debate, 11/4/'81.

44. *Ibid.*, 28/4/'81.

45. *Z.-Afr.*, 28/4/'81, at *C. Argus*, 2/10/'88, Rhodes on Politics, 1/10/'88.

arbiter to lay down the peace terms. On 29th April, the Governor's award was published. The Basuto had to pay a fine of 5,000 cattle, compensate European traders for pillaged stores, surrender their rifles but these could again be obtained on paying a licensing fee of £1 per annum.⁴⁶ This decision of the Governor and its acceptance by the Ministry meant a departure from the disarmament policy and this turned many supporters away from the Government.

Throughout the debate on Scanlon's No-Confidence motion, Sprigg had had in his pocket the resignation of James W. Leonard who had succeeded Upington as Attorney-General. He had in fact, handed in his resignation on 4th April, but Sprigg had failed to announce it.⁴⁷ Sprigg was afraid that the public announcement of Leonard's resignation would hasten the fall of his Ministry; it placed Leonard in an awkward position as he was compelled, against his convictions to vote against Scanlon's motion. Leonard had originally approved of the Government policy of disarmament and believed that it could be carried out successfully. However, when war broke out there was considerable mismanagement and the Government appeared to be paralysed. He advocated that 4,000 burghers should be called out to put down the Basuto, yet his colleagues did not approve. He felt that when Parliament met he as Minister would have to defend the policy of the Government, and its actions and as he could not truthfully do

46. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.183.

47. C. Argus, 12/5/'81, Leonard's Letter to Electors, 7/5/'81.

this he resigned. The Government's policy of disarming Basutoland,

"was the prime cause of the disasters which had overtaken us, and unless it could be defended, I could see no defence for the Ministry. It could only be defended by proving either that it was necessary or that it had been successful. In my opinion it would be idle to argue that any absolute necessity ever existed for peremptorily ordering a universal surrender of guns at all hazards". Leonard held that "the disarmament policy as applied to Basutoland was a gross mistake, and stated that I could not conscientiously defend it....The policy was rashly resolved upon; it was feebly carried out; it has ended in humiliation"⁴⁸

The day after Leonard's resignation was announced, Scanlen again moved "that this House is of opinion that under existing circumstances the present Administration can no longer carry on the Government with advantage to the country"⁴⁹ Sprigg accepted the challenge and appointed 10th May for the forthcoming debate; thereupon the House adjourned. Rhodes and Dr. Matthews who had supported Sprigg on the previous No-Confidence motion now told him that they thought it best for him to retire leaving the peace settlement to the Opposition which had always been against the Basuto War.⁵⁰ Rhodes and his friends were determined to have a railway built to Kimberley and if Sprigg could not build it they told him he would have to make way for a Ministry that would.⁵¹ This, together with Leonard's defection, made it certain that Sprigg would be defeated. The Prime Minister held a Cabinet meeting; he was in favour of holding out against Scanlen's motion, feeling that the crisis

48. C.Argus, 12/5/'81, Leonard's Letter to Electors, 7/5/'81.

49. C.Argus, 5/5/'81, Assembly Debate, 4/5/'81.

50. C.Argus, 2/10/'88, Rhodes on Politics, 1/10/'88.

51. Walker: De Villiers, p.157.

could be tided over and that he was at least justified in trying. The majority in the Cabinet however, went against him and he decided to resign.⁵² On 5th May, Sprigg tendered his resignation and that of his colleagues. The deputy Governor, Leicester Smyth, then sent for Scanlen; he agreed to adhere to the terms of the Governor's award in the Basutoland settlement. On 9th May, Scanlen had his Cabinet ready and it was duly sworn in.⁵³

II. PARTY DEVELOPMENT UNDER SCANLEN ADMINISTRATION.

In the new Ministry, T.C. Scanlen was Premier and Attorney-General. Further he took into his Ministry as Colonial Secretary, J.C. Moltene who, after an absence of two years, had returned to Parliament in 1880; the Treasurer was C.W. Hutton, M.L.C.; the Commissioner, J.X. Kerriman; Secretary for Native Affairs, J.W. Sauer and Minister without Portfolio, J.H. Hofmeyr.⁵⁴

Soon after assuming office the Ministry had to meet its first attack. At that time there were only three barristers in the House and all opposed the Government. Scanlen, though not an advocate took the portfolio of Attorney-General. Uppington introduced a motion questioning the legality of appointing as Attorney-General, a man who was not a qualified barrister and not entitled to address the Supreme Court. After a long debate Uppington's motion was negatived by 37 to 31 votes.⁵⁵ Thus, in the first division, taken after their accession to office, the Scanlen Ministry had a fair working majority in a House which

52. C.Argus, 6/5/'81.

53. C.H. 31/17. Desp. to Sec. of State, No.325, 10/5/'81.

54. Hofmeyr, Op. cit. p.187.

55. C.Argus, 21/5/'81.

had been elected to support Sprigg.

The inclusion of Hofmeyr as Minister without Portfolio needs some comment. The unseated Sprigg Administration could count on the support of very few Afrikaners; but the Afrikaner movement had by this time become a force of no mean importance and it was greatly due to the Afrikaner movement and the way in which Afrikaners were making themselves felt in Parliament that Scanlon had come to office. One of the members, Schermbrucker, said in the House that the Scanlon Ministry had stepped onto the Treasury Benches "on the broad back of the hon. member for Stellenbosch", that is Hofmeyr.⁵⁶ Seeing that the Ministry was so dependant on the Afrikaners, in Parliament, it was of great importance to the Ministry that they, the Afrikaners, should be represented in the Cabinet. The one man who could do this effectively was their leader, Hofmeyr. Much pressure was brought to bear on him and, realising that without a leading Afrikaner representative, the Ministry would be unbalanced, he reluctantly agreed to join but without portfolio.⁵⁷ Thus came into existence a Ministry supported by moderate English and Afrikaners. In its creation we have the origin in practice of the policy later so successfully followed by the Afrikaner Bond, namely of not forming its own ministry, but supporting that formed by other men on condition that such ministries complied with the demands of the Bond.

56. Hansard, p.323, et vide, Z.-Aff. 2/8/'83.

57. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.188.

Hofmeyr did not remain in the Scanlon Cabinet very long. Soon after the Ministry had assumed office Hofmeyr proposed the optional use of the Dutch language in both Houses of Parliament. Merriman opposed the motion very strongly, declaring that it might lead to misunderstanding and cause friction between the Dutch and English.⁵⁸ This led to estrangement between the Commissioner and Hofmeyr, an estrangement which was greatly accentuated by Merriman's Graaff-Reinet Speech, 26th October, 1881. The Bond branch of Graaff-Reinet presented Merriman a very moderately worded address, to which he replied:

"I regret, that it should have been thought necessary in founding this society to draw a division between the classes of which our population is composed, and to perpetuate the unhappy differences which have existed among them.

"As a Minister of the Crown, I can draw no distinction, and as a private individual, I shall try as long as possible to avoid them.

"In the present circumstances of the Colony, any division among the European population is especially to be regretted, and cannot fail to be most prejudicial and ruinous in its effects on our future prosperity, but nothing can more certainly tend to the creation of such divisions than the attempt to force moderate men, who have hitherto tried to avoid such unworthy prejudices, to take sides on questions of race and nationality. Nothing but the dismay, with which I contemplate that bare possibility of an embittered political strife between the two sections of the European population, based not upon legitimate differences of opinion, but upon race differences, would have emboldened me to say what I have done, but I did not consider that my duty would allow me to return a merely formal reply to an address which seeks to embody the political principles of your Association, without pointing out some of the great and imminent dangers, which I believe may result from the institution in this Colony of a political society, based upon differences of race and not of opinion"⁵⁹

This unprovoked condemnation and outspoken criticism of the Bond was very distasteful to the party led by Hofmeyr who was,

58. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.223.

59. Ibid. p.191, et C.Times, 28/10/'81. Merriman's written reply to Afrikaner Bond at Graaff-Reinet, 26/10/'81.

just at that time, trying to put fresh vigour into the P.P.A., which had much in common with the Bond. Differences with the rest of the Cabinet on the policy to be pursued in Basutoland however, led to Hofmeyr's decision to resign from the Scanlon Cabinet. Affairs in Basutoland needed immediate and decisive action. Several Cabinet meetings were held. Hofmeyr suggested that the Cabinet should not pledge itself to pursue any definite or decided course of action; he wished the Prime Minister to inform the House of the various courses open to the Government, should the Basuto not act on the Award. The Prime Minister should obtain authority to pursue any particular course best suited to circumstances.⁶⁰ Hofmeyr's colleagues did not agree with him; so at the next sitting of the House Scanlon said that if the Basutoland Award were not accepted by the natives, "the opinion of the Government was that the Award must be enforced (loud cheers). It would be disastrous if it were not....They thought, further, that the Award should be enforced by means of Colonial forces, as the Imperial Government had stated that they did not intend to interfere".⁶² In view of this statement Hofmeyr held that the Cabinet could not pursue a course suggested by Merriman or any other course for that matter; if it should it would be exposing itself to a very serious attack on the score of breach of faith. Hofmeyr

60. Supra, p. 161.

61. Hofmeyr Papers, Vol. No. 23. Scrap Book, p. 69.

62. C. Argus, 28/5/'81, Assembly Debate, 27/5/'81. Scanlon's reputation for being a cautious man had secured him the Premiership. His caution sometimes bordered on timidity and he was often taunted on that account. To give the lie to this accusation of timidity he tried to pursue a "manly" policy and went to the opposite extreme, making rash statements and promises.

also held that the war could not be resumed by Colonial troops only:

"In either case I would find myself placed in a false position. In the one case I would have to share with the Cabinet in the odium of violating a most emphatic pledge - a pledge most enthusiastically cheered by the House, but one which went against my convictions, while, in the other case I would have to advocate the reopening of the war with the aid of burghers among whom the war is most unpopular and from which, I, therefore, anticipate only a fresh accumulation of debt and disgrace without a satisfactory settlement of the Basuto Question. Under these circumstances I find no alternative open for me but to tender my resignation as a member of the Cabinet". Further he stated: "Possibly I might have preferred to either subordinate my own views to those of my colleagues or even to share in the disgrace of a violated pledge. But even such a step would not now promote the harmony of the Cabinet, seeing that one of my colleagues has not hesitated to communicate to the editor of a public newspaper intelligence which is calculated to brand me as unworthy of a seat in the cabinet, and which, even if well founded, would constitute a serious breach of constitutional practice, but which being without the slightest foundation in fact, is of a character I shall not venture to describe. I hold that it is impossible for both of us to remain in the Cabinet, and as he is one of the members who endorsed the Premier's utterance in the House of Assembly which I did not, I hold that for the homogeneity of the Cabinet it is desirable that I and not he should resign".⁶³

Although he had left the Cabinet, Hofmeyr and his party still continued to lend support to the Seaton Ministry.⁶⁵ The public seems to have been kept in the dark as to the real reason of Hofmeyr's resignation. Thus the "Cape Times" of 3rd December, 1881, complained: "The public have some reason to complain of the mysterious avoidance of the light shown by the Ministers and by their late colleague in respect of the cause of separation. Mr. Hofmeyr has a newspaper of his own...."

63. Kerriman. Vide Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.192.

64. Hofmeyr Papers, Vol. No. 23. Scrap Book, p.69-70.

65. Z.-Afr. 2/8/'83.

and yet Mr. Hofmeyr....declines to say how or wherefore the disagreement arose".

Despite Sauer's visit to disaffected Basutoland, it soon became clear that the Basuto were not going to comply with the terms of the Award; no more rifles were being surrendered and the idea of obtaining compensation for traders was given up.⁶⁶ If Scanlen were to adhere to his statement in Parliament, Colonial troops would have to be called out to enforce the Award. An ultimatum to the Basuto demanding compliance with the Award had no effect. Everyone knew that it was impossible to renew the war with Colonial troops. Scanlen then adopted Hofmeyr's suggestion which aimed at gaining time in the hope that the Basuto would submit; if that policy did not succeed the aid of the Orange Free State might be enlisted for combined action against the Basuto.⁶⁷ This policy really boiled down to a revocation of the Award as well as of the Disarmament Proclamation. A force would however, have to be kept in the country for the support of magistrates and protection of "loyal" Basuto in the hope that eventually the natives would submit. -On 27th March, 1882, Scanlen laid a four point policy before Parliament: (i) Revocation of Disarmament Proclamations. (ii) Appointment of a commission to consider claims of wronged persons. (iii) a small military force was to support the administration of the magistrates. (iv) An understanding with Orange Free State.⁶⁸

66. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.219.

67. Ons Land, 19/4/1904, Article, 1854-1904.

68. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.220.

The Opposition was ready to launch an attack on the Ministry's policy. Laing moved that the repeal of the Disarmament Act as applied to Basutoland was detrimental to the Colony's interests; his motion was defeated by 79 to 37 votes. A similar fate, on 12th April, met Uppington's bill to recall the Annexation Proclamation.⁶⁹ The Government was therefore in a strong position. In both these divisions Hofmeyr voted with the Ministry as did almost all the Afrikaner members.

In the meanwhile matters were going from bad to worse in Basutoland. Scanlen's four point policy failed entirely; the policy of alliance with the Orange Free State was not carried out; financially the Colony was at a low ebb; the country was not prepared to resume hostilities and there was clearly no other means of subduing the Basuto. Under such circumstances the Government summoned Parliament for a special session, 19th January, 1883.⁷⁰ It was clear that there had to be a reversal of the Government's policy but no one knew exactly what to substitute in its place. The Ministry intended to propose the withdrawal from the internal control of Basutoland of all magistrates, but a Resident was to be appointed to supervise the territory's external relations, especially the maintenance of order on the Orange Free State border. Hofmeyr did not approve of this policy.⁷¹ The House however, rejected Hofmeyr's amendment and adopted by 34 votes to 27 an amendment

69. C.Argus, 19/4/'82.

70. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.230. It was during this session that a large meeting of members of the Assembly was held and Uppington elected leader of the Opposition. C.Times, 24/1/'83.

71. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.231.

moved by Vincent accepting the policy of the Ministry with regard to Basutoland - the Resident plan - but forbidding the Ministry to carry out any definite settlement until details⁷² of such arrangements had been laid before Parliament. The decisive division on Vincent's amendment was of a strictly party character; all, or nearly all, the usual Ministerial followers voted in the affirmative and the supporters of the late Sprigg Ministry in the negative.⁷³ The Resident plan turned out to be a dismal failure. To the native mind it had every appearance of abandonment of their territory. This was naturally regarded as a sign of weakness and they became more and more unmanageable. Scanlen and Sauer visited Basutoland and attempted to pacify the country, but of no avail. The Colony had neither the men nor the money nor the enthusiasm to carry out this policy, as Merriman expressed it: "The House and the country was ((were)) in utter weariness of the native question. From year to year, it was blocking the whole of our domestic legislation. Year by year they had come down to that House for the last three or four years to wrangle about native affairs".⁷⁴ The Ministry made a volte face; they decided to ask the British Government on what terms it would assume control of Basutoland and for this purpose Merriman went to England.⁷⁵

The ordinary session of Parliament opened on 27th June, 1883. The Government immediately announced its intention of

72. Journal, 6/2/'83.

73. Ibid, 7/2/'83, Current Topics.

74. C. Argus, 14/7/'83, Assembly Debate, 13/7/'83.

75. Pat. 29/6/'83, Report Assembling of Parliament.

making Basutoland over to the Imperial Government. Hofmeyr and the "Zuid-Afrikaan" launched a determined attack on the policy of the Ministry. The Ministry had changed its Basuto policy so often that Hofmeyr deemed a clear expression of the voice of the country on the question imperative. He therefore moved that before the Government policy be carried out an appeal should be made to the country. The motion was negatived by 43 votes to 21 - the Opposition voting with the Government.⁷⁶ Thereupon, Upington moved a resolution approving of the abandonment of Basutoland but condemning the cession to the Imperial Government. This motion was also lost by 27 to 37 votes and immediately afterwards the Disannexation Bill was passed by 36 to 28 votes.⁷⁷

The debate on the Basutoland question revealed some interesting facts. It showed clearly that Scanlon was no longer trusted by the Afrikaners. Many Afrikaner members of the Assembly who had formerly supported Scanlon, voted against him because the Government was pursuing a policy, with regard to Basutoland, which it had formerly condemned; the Government admitted having done this because it did not wish the Colonial public, in which the Afrikaners were growing very strong, to have any say in the settling of the Colonial question - namely native policy. It preferred bringing the Imperial Government

76. C. Argus, 19/7/'83, Assembly Debate, 18/7/'83.

77. C. Argus, 26/7/'83, Ibid. 25/7/'82. The Imperial Government decided to take over Basutoland on condition: (i) Basuto desire it. (ii) Orange Free State takes measures to prevent attacks on Basutoland. (iii) The Cape pays High Commissioner import duties on goods imported into Basutoland Pat. 29/7/'83.

in to settle a matter in which the Afrikaners should have had some voice. The English section envisaged a struggle against the Afrikaner party and hence wished to canvass the support of the Imperial Government which would be more easily obtained if Basutoland and other native territories were transferred to the Imperial Government. The Scanlen Ministry had not only separated from the Afrikaners but had also put itself at the head of the English colonists because of its fear of Afrikaner influence and had moreover, on account of this, limited the political influence and liberty of the Colony. The Basutoland Disannexation Bill was therefore passed because of a coalition of ultra-English, who viewed the progress of Afrikanerism with suspicion, with a group of negrophiles and those who through short-sightedness and fear wished to have done with Basutoland.⁷⁸ The debate also revealed some similarity of political outlook between Hofmeyr's followers and the Uppington-Sprigg faction; this similarity of outlook later developed into a coalition between the Bond and Uppington - a member of the Ministry⁷⁹ which Hofmeyr had helped to turn out two years previous. During this, the ordinary session of 1885, the power of the Afrikaner Party under Hofmeyr's leadership became even more strikingly evident; the whole country realised that in the determination of future political combinations the Afrikaner Party would be a deciding factor. It also became clear that Scanlen's position was becoming daily more insecure manifestly because he had

78. Z.-Affr. 2/8/'83 et 29/9/'83, et vide Z.-Affr. 10/2/'85 et ons 19/4/'84, Article, 1854-1904. (-Land,

79. Infra, p. 183.

estranged the Afrikaners.

The years 1881-1884, were ones of great confusion in party politics, chiefly on account of Scanlen's vacillating Basuto policy - the main political question. While the Sprigg Ministry had been in office it had succeeded in raising a powerful and eventually successful opposition party consisting to a great extent of moderate men who would have supported any reasonable Government. The reaction in politics consequent on his fall was demoralising and the Colony sank into a coma of indifference.⁸⁰ Sprigg did not even have the consolation of ex-premiers, namely of leading an opposition. Such vestige of opposition, then in existence, would have nothing to do with him; he failed to organise a party, to present a consistent attitude to the House and he humiliated himself by acting with men whose views he had formerly consistently denounced.⁸¹ Parties lacked the old established dividing lines of English politics and no one saw clearly on what grounds future political struggles were to rest. The seating arrangement of parties in the House of Assembly also revealed a confused state. There were two groups of benches facing each other and on benches on one of these groups the Ministers took their seats. For the rest, the political groups were more or less mixed up. The suggestion had been made that Opposition and Ministerialists should confront each other like two opposing armies but the suggestion did not carry approval so that except for the seats

80. C. Argue, 4/1/'83.

81. Ibid., 22/6/'82.

occupied by the Ministers, places were taken according to taste or convenience and not according to political adherence. "This arrangement of amicable confusion may be taken as symbolizing the present aspect of party politics. Parties may exist; indeed they do exist, but it would be no easy task to determine where the distinction between them is to be found, or on what conflicting principles their policies are severally moulded".⁸²

Matters did not improve as the period of office of Scanlen continued. In the country there was no definite set of political opinions. Pessimistically the "Cape Argus" of 25th June, 1882, wrote: "It is a little difficult to say what are party politics in this country where we have as many parties as honourable members". Some of the English followed Scanlen others Upington so that they were "divided into two jarring sections".⁸³ There was really no important question before the country and in harmony with this fact there was no solidarity of parties. The result was confusion instead of orderliness and method; the Ministry lacked firmness of purpose and the Opposition resorted to "random assaults and guerilla warfare".⁸⁴ The situation in 1882, may be summed up as follows:

"We suppose that it will be a long time before our Parliament is divided into two compact well-drilled camps, and we do not know that it would suit the peculiar circumstances of this country that our Parliamentary organisation should take exactly this form; but that is no reason why organisation for the carrying out of specific ends should take place to a much greater extent than at present....."⁸⁵

82. C. Times, 8/6/'81.

83. Journal, 2/3/'83.

84. C. Argus, 15/5/'82. Letter from "Graaff-Reinet Advertiser" entitled, Political Parties.

85. C. Argus, 19/5/'82.

Even in 1883, just before the session, the Cape Times could still write:

"It may be safely said, that there are no political parties inexistence just now. The old lines have been wiped out. Men of strong convictions against the confidence which is to be reposed in the members who form the Cabinet, find that the policy they advocate is likely to become Ministerial policy; men, who by their votes, kept the Ministry in office, find their former allegiance is to be sorely strained in the demand that they should sacrifice their previous convictions, and nullify their arguments of last year. So strange a development of party Government, has never before been known in this Colony, or anywhere else"⁸⁶

The session of 1883, saw a considerable change in the position. It was in May of that year that the Afrikaner Bond and F.P.A. amalgamated at Richmond; this amalgamated force was soon to make itself evident in Parliament. The Afrikaner members, under Hofmeyr's leadership, acted with an appreciable amount of solidarity. The English were divided; some followed Sprigg, others Scanlen, each fighting for his own advantage. The result was that with its increased solidarity the Afrikaner Party was able to hold the balance. The Government knew that if the Afrikaners united with the Opposition, it might be defeated, whereas, if the Afrikaners supported the Government its position was ensured.⁸⁷ The Afrikaner Party would therefore lend its support to the highest bidder.

After the session of 1883, a new House of Assembly had to be elected. In the Lower House Scanlen's position was none too strong, while the Legislative Council was definitely hostile to him. Although the Council still had two years to run the

⁸⁶. C. Times, 27/6/'83.

⁸⁷. Z.-Afr. 4/10/'83 et C. Times, 20/2/'84.

Ministry advised that it should also be dissolved. Since the last election of the Council, 1878-9, many questions then of importance had lost their significance while others had gained prominence and required prompt settlement, for example, the government of the Transkei, the adjustment of the finances of the Colony by fresh taxation to meet increased expenditure. It was therefore necessary that there should be harmony between the two legislative chambers and consequently the Ministry advised the dissolution of both Houses of Parliament.⁸⁸

The elections for the Legislative Council passed off very unobtrusively and the Council resembled the House of Lords in as much as its members were not bound by election pledges.⁸⁹ In the elections for the Assembly financial matters loomed large. The credit of the country had been badly shaken by the blunders in Basutoland and it was necessary to build up a new economic structure.⁹⁰ The question which received most attention however, was the transfer of the Transkei to the Imperial Government. The Scanlen Ministry advocated this measure because the Cape would then get rid of its defence forces and thus effect considerable economy which was highly desirable especially in view of the burdened condition of Cape finances.⁹¹ Over and above the commercial depression the Cape finances had, through Sprigg's disarmament policy, been brought to a pitiable state. For this reason Scanlen was then

88. P.M. 266. Min. to Governor, No. 13/304, 27/9/'83.

89. C.Argus, 7/11/'83.

90. C.Argus, 29/12/'83, et vide C.Argus, 24/11/'83, Merriman's Simonstown speech.

91. C.Argus, 2/10/'88. Rhodes on politics at Kimberly, 1/10/'88. The Administration of the Transkei cost the Cape Colony £250,000, annually. Journal, 23/6/'84.

forced to advocate abandonment of the Transkei. Sprigg was therefore largely the real author of the proposal, unacceptable as it later proved to be, to abandon the Transkei.

The position in the Transkei was briefly as follows:
During the ninth Kafir War, 1877-8, and a subsequent rebellion in 1880,⁹² the Sprigg Ministry had cleaned up large sections of the Transkei, for example, Bomevanaland, along the Transkeian coast, and also an area stretching from Queenstown north-eastwards, including Barkly-East and Griqualand East.⁹³ Both the Sprigg and the Scanlen Ministries left this territory vacant until Dutch colonists especially moved into it on their own accord.⁹⁴ Just as in Basutoland, the Scanlen Ministry was unable to maintain order,⁹⁵ and the trek of Europeans into vacant Transkei areas further unsettled the natives. The Ministry therefore decided to continue the policy endorsed by the previous Parliament and initiated when Basutoland was transferred to the Imperial Government.

The Bond Congresses at Graaff-Reinet and Richmond condemned withdrawal from the Transkei.⁹⁶ In the elections the Transkei question gained prominence on the Bond platform. If the Transkei became a British Crown Colony the "Tembuland Squatters" would be ejected. The Imperial Government would then be firmly established on the north-eastern boundary of the Colony. This would strengthen the hold of the Imperial

92. Theal: From 1873 to 1884, Vol. 1, p.148 et seq.

93. Z.-Afr. 6/5/'84.

94. Merr. Papers, No. 81, 1882. J.X. Merr. to Chas. Mills, 3 Aug.

95. Ibid. No.156, 1883. J.X. Merr. to Julia Merr. 14 Aug.

96. Z.-Afr. 25/3/'84.

authorities on South Africa to the detriment of the Colonial view point.⁹⁷ This the Bond would prevent if it could and therefore turned against Scanlon. So decided was the verdict of the country on this question that the "Cape Times" of 8th May, 1884, - two days after Scanlon's resignation - wrote: "No Ministry that can now take office....will think of submitting to Parliament Mr. Scanlon's Transkeian resolutions". In support of its policy the Bond had the aid of Sprigg and Uppington and a few of their supporters who, just as in the case of Encutoland, remained faithful to the policy that the sphere of activity of Colonial self-government should not be curtailed. Further the East London and Border constituencies were also averse to the cession of the Transkei. It had to be retained otherwise the balance of political power between East and West might be upset. The Transkei had to be used to reinforce the East by a number of constituencies created in it which would support an Eastern policy.⁹⁸ Trade considerations also had their influence; the Border constituencies feared that should the Transkei be taken over by the Imperial Government, Port St. John's would be opened up and a port established for Transkeian trade which would rival East London and other Border towns.

It was during these elections that "Di Patriot" formally announced the policy to be followed by the Bond with regard to its relationships with other parties and also its attitude towards ministerial office:

97. C.Argus, 28/1/'44 et 1/1/'85, Z.-Afr. 1/4/'84.

98. C.Times, 12/3/'84 et vide Kerr. Papers No.6, 1884, C.J. Rhodes to J.X. Morriman, 13 Jan.

"Verder, in di Parlement het ons party nou alles te win, mar in di ministeri alles te verlies. As ons party nou sorg dat ons goed verteenwoordig is in di Parlement, lat Scanlen en Sprigg, Merriman en Upington dan mar veg om di vette Ministeriele baantjies; wi ook al di twe Engelse partye, as hulle iets voerbrenge strydig met onse belange, dan stem ons party dit af, en as hulle ons stem wil hê, dan moet hulle na ons pyppe dans en doen wat ons begeer. As ons in di midde tussen di twee partye staan kan ons altyd di skaal lat deurslaan na ons sin. Lat hulle dan mar gerus di votte baantjies bekke, solang as hulle mar godwonge is om ons belange te behartig.

"Mar omgekeer, as ons party in di Ministeri gaat, dan moet ons ni alleen onsuivere elemente daarin opneem ni, mar dan span di twee Engelse partye dadelik saam teen ons. Wil ons dan di skande ni hê om dadelik uit di saal gelig te wordo ni, dan sal ons weer van ons kant mooi broedjies roet bak, en on hulle moet toege, tot skade van ons party."⁹⁹

The Bond organisation functioned well, whereas the other parliamentary groups were without party organisation or definite policy and consequently disorganised and demoralised.¹⁰⁰ The election results proved a victory for Scanlen's opponents. In the Council his supporters were further reduced while in the Assembly his opponents gained a comfortable victory. It all depended on the attitude of the Bond whether he would continue in office. The number of Afrikaner members had increased from twenty-five to thirty-five; moreover, in the old House Hofmeyr had the regular support of only about twenty members, but in the new House thirty-three, on most questions. With the aid of a few votes from the Upington-Sprigg group he would be able to force Scanlen's resignation seeing that the latter could rely on the regular support of only about twenty members in a House of seventy-four.¹

⁹⁹ Pat. 12/10/'83.

¹⁰⁰ C. Argus, 9/2/'84 et C. Times, 10/1/'84.

¹ Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.242-3.

Already, before the meeting of Parliament, there was a general conviction that the days of the Scanlen Ministry were numbered and that a Ministry would be formed of "echt Koloniaal gezinde Engelachen en Afrikaners".² Scanlen himself although not entirely without hope, was of the same conviction:

"I observe that you dwell upon the fact that feeling is strong against the Ministry, and I confess that I am not surprised to hear it after the persistent abuse to which we have been subjected during the last 2½ years. I shall be prepared to surrender the seals of office without regret should the new Parliament be hostile to us. I am however disposed to think that undue importance must not be attached to what appears in the newspapers...."³

It was however, a matter of trivial importance that led to the actual resignation of Scanlen. The dreaded vineyard disease, Phylloxera, had already done great damage to vineyards in most parts of the world. In 1881, Sprigg had carried an act prohibiting the introduction of plants on account of the danger of simultaneously introducing Phylloxera. A month before the meeting of Parliament, Scanlen had repealed the Act. When Parliament met Myburgh moved a resolution that the Premier in repealing the act had endangered the interests of the Colony and he asked for an explanation as he considered that the progress of the Colony jeopardised.⁴ In reply, Scanlen stated that under circumstances then existing no plant or seed whatever could be brought into the Colony. A cargo of potatoes from New Zealand had had to be thrown overboard. It had been proved that Phylloxera could only be introduced by vine plants and he

2. E.-Afr. 23/2/1884.

3. Herr. Papers, No. 283. 1883, T. Scanlen to J.X. Herr. 27 Dec.

4. Hansard, 1884, p.12.

(Scanlen) was for prohibiting their introduction. He was prepared to introduce a more satisfactory measure. A select committee could be appointed and in the meanwhile no plants would be introduced.⁵ Sprigg moved an amendment to Myburgh's resolution, namely, that the proclamation prohibiting the introduction of plants should be revived. This was carried by forty-seven to ten votes.⁶ Thereupon Scanlen moved the adjournment of the House. He felt that the Government had been placed in a difficult position as he had distinctly stated that the operation of the Proclamation would be suspended until the House had expressed its opinion on what measures should be taken for the protection of vineyards. In consequence he could only regard the passing of the resolution as a vote of censure and was taking it as such.⁷ Scanlen's resignation was in the Governor's hands soon afterwards.⁸ No one had expected anything so sudden and dramatic. Fearing defeat on the Transkei question, the Ministry had simply brought matters to a premature close, as Rhodes who had become Scanlen's Treasurer six weeks previously expressed it: "I retired on a 'bug' whose nasty legs entirely covered the Transkeian map, which question really put us out".⁹ Moreover, the finances of the Colony were in such a miserable state that Scanlen believed that no other Ministry would be able to maintain itself and he would be in office soon again without incurring unpopularity because of taxation measures.¹⁰ Further he chose

5. Hansard, 1884, p.13.

6. Ibid. p.17.

7. Ibid. p.17.

8. G.H. 31/18, Desp. to Sec. of State, No.140, 13/5/'84.

9. C.Argus, 2/10/'88, Rhodes on Politics at Kimberly, 1/10/'88.

10. Oms Land, 19/4/'04, Art. 1854-1904, et Journal, 7/5/'84.

to resign on the Phylloxera motion and not on the Transkei question because he hoped to be able to return to power more easily, than if he were defeated on the Transkei issue.¹¹ Another factor which contributed to Scanlen's fall was the unpopularity of Sauer, who held the portfolio for Native Affairs - the question most prominent in the public eye. Certain sections of the press notably the "Cape Argus" and "Grahamstown Journal", in their leading articles in 1883-84, could not pour enough abuse on Sauer because they held him responsible for much of the unrest in native areas. They would have liked to see the Ministry reformed without Sauer.

Despite the weakness and vacillation of its native policy the Scanlen Ministry had a good record as an administrative body. "We make bold to say that never has the hard, daily business of departmental administration been carried on in this country with more honesty, ability and assiduity combined than by the Ministers who now relinquish the task".¹²

On Scanlen's resignation the Governor sent for Hofmeyr, he being the leader with the strongest following in the House. Hofmeyr consulted his friends but refused for personal reasons to form a Ministry. He recommended that Uppington should be sent for.¹³ Two days after Scanlen's decision to resign, thirty-eight Bond supporters had met and had unanimously elected Uppington leader and it was with this aid that Uppington was able to form a Ministry.¹⁴

11. Z.-Afr. 12/6/'84.

12. C.Argus, 8/5/'84. Et vide Hofmeyr: Op.Cit. p.216.

13. G.H. 31/18. Desp. to Sec. of State, No.140, 13/5/'84.

14. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.247.

III. UPINGTON - HOFMEYR CO-OPERATION.

That there was some sympathy between the followers of Upington and those of Hofmeyr was already evident in 1882; the "Grahamstown Journal" of 15th May, 1882, pointed out that a coalition of these two parties would be able to defeat the Government. The "Cape Argus" of the same date, reported a caucus meeting attended by Hofmeyr, Sprigg and Upington. At this meeting it was decided that one of their followers - Thomas Barry - should move that because of financial depression, there should be no special increases in the salaries of civil servants. A few days later the Upington-Sprigg followers made common cause with the Hofmeyr followers against the Government on this point and succeeded in imposing their views on the Ministry.¹⁵ At first sight a coalition between the Upington, Sprigg and Hofmeyr followers would appear strange, but it must be remembered that political parties were still in a very unsettled state. Ministries very easily and without qualms of conscience, often adopted the policies of their opponents. Moreover, Hofmeyr had separated from Sprigg on account of the latter's attitude towards the Transvaal. Hofmeyr disapproved of the Annexation and Sprigg's Confederation proposals and had therefore to attack the Sprigg Ministry, but, Hofmeyr had never differed from Sprigg on the principles of his native policy and that was the question now at issue. Further, Upington and Sprigg agreed with Hofmeyr's policy of putting Colonial interests first and excluding unnecessary Imperial interference in South African affairs. The

15. C. Argus, 27/5/'82, Assembly Debate, 26/5/'82.

co-operation between these two groups was furthered by Sprigg's speech in the Assembly on 27th July, 1883.¹⁶ Sprigg pointed the way to co-operation between Afrikaners and English under the difficulties then encumbering the Colony. Of this speech the "Zuid-Afrikaan" wrote: "Al die denkbeelden die hy hier ontwikkelde zijn van dien aard dat niet alleen een Afrikaner er zich mee kan vereenigen, maar dat ieder Engelsch Kolonist er mee sou instemmen als er niet dat misverstand tusschen Engelsen en Afrikaners bestond wat hier zoo veel kwaad sticht".¹⁷ But it was the Scanlen policy of calling in the Imperial Government that finally brought the Upington-Sprigg group and the Hofmeyr followers into line: "Het gevolg der Scanlensche politiek was dan ook een toenadering tusschen Sir Bartle Frere's raadgevers ((Sprigg and Upington)) en de Afrikaner party".¹⁸

The new Ministry consisted of: Thomas Upington, Premier and Attorney-General; J. Gordon Sprigg, Treasurer; J. Ayliff, Colonial Secretary; Col. Schermbrucker, Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works; J. A. de Wet, Secretary for Native Affairs.¹⁹ It was not easy to persuade the Bond to the inclusion of Sprigg in the Ministry. Despite his protestations of friendship, Afrikaners had not forgotten that Sprigg had imposed the Excise, that he had been Frere's tool and had approved of the Transvaal annexation. Upington however, declared that he would not be able to go on without Sprigg and the Bond had to yield.²⁰

16. C. Argus, 28/7/'83, Assembly Debate, 27/7/'83.

17. Z.-Afr. 2/8/'83, et vide Morr. Papers, No. 156.1883, J.X. Morr. to Julia Morr. 14 Aug.

18. Z.-Afr. 15/5/'86, et Supra, p. 112.

19. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p. 247.

20. C. Argus, 14/6/'84, et Z.-Afr. 12/7/'90.

Thus the so-called "Warming-pan Ministry" took office; it was felt on all sides that Upington was merely to hold office till such time as the feeling against Sprigg had died down and he would then again become Prime Minister.²¹

Seeing that the country had, at the elections of 1884, declared itself emphatically against Scanlen's native policy, Upington on meeting the House as Prime Minister announced a "Colonial" policy. The cession of Colonial territory was not contemplated. The Colony had to undertake a de jure control of the dependencies on the border which the Colony had in reality been governing without having the authority of Parliament. The Ministry would therefore propose the annexation of these territories. Upington also stated:

"We further think that the Responsible Ministry of this Colony should be permitted to manage the affairs of the Colony without interference - interference which may be dictated by political considerations in the Imperial, or by pressure brought to bear upon political parties elsewhere, by irresponsible bodies or individuals". The Responsible Government in the Colony ought to have the right "to manage the internal affairs of the country free from external control"²²

Such a policy could not but carry the approval of the Afrikaners and the Dutch press with its Colonial outlook. Thus the "Zuid-Afrikaan" of 24th July, 1884, wrote:

"Slechts een Ministerie dat het algemeen belang der Kolonisten voorstond tegenover de strekking om de Ryks-regering hier binnen te halen, kon met goed gevolg het bewind aanvaarden - wij wenschen Regering en Kolonie geluk dat een eerste poging van een meerendeels uit Engelschen bestaand Ministerie om met hulp der Afrikaners

21. C. Argus, 10/12/'98. Report of death of Upington. A month after Upington had taken office the "Cape Argus" of 11th June, 1884, wrote: "Mr. Sprigg is the Government, as much as he was four or five years ago. The leadership of Mr. Upington is but a pretence, and a very hollow one too".

22. Hansard, 1884, p.20.

on in echt kolonialen zin het bestuur te voeren, voorlopig zoo goed geslaagd is".

Further Upington announced a stringent economic policy. There would have to be unsparing retrenchment, and if that did not suffice, fresh taxation would have to be levied. He was determined to maintain the credit of the Colony.²³ It was on this policy of economy that the Government met its first challenge. Upington informed the House that owing to economic straits the Government did not see its way clear to proceed with the extension of the railway to Kimberley.²⁴ Thereupon, Merriman moved that the Government be asked to continue the extension of the railway to Kimberley.²⁵ Upington replied that he regarded Merriman's motion, in the face of the Government statement as to the financial state of the country, as one of No-Confidence and should it be carried he would not keep his ministerial seat.²⁶ The voting on Merriman's motion showed the Government in a strong position as it gained a majority of 30 votes.²⁷

About two weeks later, 12th June, an incident took place which throws remarkable light on the instability of parties at the time, and the Ministry's dependence on the Bond. On the previous day, when the House was in committee, Arthur Douglass, member for Grahamstown and an ardent Protectionist, moved that some sixteen articles should be protected. The Afrikaner Party favoured Protection as it would enable the farmers to

23. Hansard, 1884, p.21.

24. Ibid. p.42.

25. Ibid. p.50.

26. Ibid. p.53.

27. Ibid. p.63.

meet foreign competition more successfully. This was one of the matters on which the Bond differed from the Ministry. The outcome was that the Bond members and even such firm ministerial supporters as the Government whip, J. Wood,²⁸ voted for Douglass's motion, the Ministry being defeated by thirty-four to thirty-three votes.²⁹ Thereupon Sprigg in a ministerial statement said that if the House held to its view on Protection as expressed in Douglass's motion, Ministers would regard it as a vote of No-Confidence.³⁰ An amendment was drawn up by Hofmeyr which permitted the House to bark back on the decision taken on Protection and this was carried by 41 to 30 votes.³¹

The other matter on which the Bond differed from the Ministry was on the Excise question. To make ends meet, Sprigg was compelled to reintroduce an Excise on brandy. This naturally incurred the stiff opposition of the wine farmers and consequently of the Bond. The second reading of the Excise Bill was carried by thirty-four to twenty-seven votes but in the committee stage the Government maintained very slight majorities and it had eventually to reduce the scale of taxation by half - much to the indignation of the English members from the Eastern Province.³²

This however, was not the end of the Excise quarrel. The Bond continued to demand the repeal of the Excise. On 7th May, 1886, J.S. Marais of Paarl moved the second reading of the Bill to repeal the Excise on brandy. A short debate followed and the vote taken on the same day. The Bill was carried by thirty-

28. C. Argus, 13/6/'84.

29. Hansard, 1884, p.169.

30. Ibid. p.170.

31. Ibid. p.184.

32. Hofmeyr: Op cit. p.234, et C.Argus, 1/1/'85, The Session.

seven to thirty-one votes against the wishes of the Government. With the Ministry voted the Opposition except Cecil Rhodes and J.W. Leonard. All the Afrikaner members, and even those who had no direct interests in the wine and brandy industry voted with Rhodes and Leonard for the Bill.³³ Concerning this incident Hofmeyr writes:

"Well might the opponents of Mr. Upington declaim against the strange position of a Cabinet, which had seen the passing, against its wish, of a percentage reduction of salaries and of the abolition of the Excise, while in both cases the majority of the Ministerialists had voted against the Ministry, and the Opposition in its favour"³⁴

In the Eastern Province especially, there was much ill-feeling on account of the abolition of the Excise and great blame was laid on the Ministry which was regarded as being too ineffective and weak-kneed to carry out a strong policy; it "was below contempt or criticism; it rolled in the dust at Mr. Hofmeyr's feet, or anybody's feet who liked to kick it, provided they would not kick it out!"³⁵

The policy of the Bond and Hofmeyr of ruling the country without accepting the responsibility of office was much criticised at the time; so also was the Upington Ministry which had agreed to this position.³⁶ It made the position of the Opposition unenviable because any group of English members who may have wished to secure power would have had to bid higher for Bond support than those in office. Hence the position of the Afrikaner Party in the Cape Parliament became not unlike that of the Irish in the Imperial Parliament. They themselves could

33. Farnard, 1886, p.160, et Z.Afr. 8/5/86.

34. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.280-1.

35. Journal, 28/6/'86.

36. Journal, 2/9/'85.

not hold office but whoever wished to hold office could hardly do so without their aid. The Irish Party in the Imperial Parliament however, was small and only made itself really felt on close divisions - their power disappeared when the two great English parties were united or did not disagree violently. In the Cape Parliament however, the Afrikaner Party was the largest single party in the House and it gave support to that English section which it chose to favour and in that way it enforced its views in most matters. The greater part of the Colonial English press attacked this arrangement relentlessly; thus the "Grahamstown Journal" wrote in 1885:-

"What we need is a union of all right-minded colonists to form a strong government, strong enough to be honest and to administer colonial affairs efficiently. Instead of this we are presented with the spectacle of two paltry little squads, quarrelling with each other and invoking the aid of the Dutch to help them to win office"³⁷ In 1886, the criticism of the "Grahamstown Journal" was even more severe: "Responsible Government has become a corrupt and disgraceful sham, in which those ((Bond)) who really rule are not those who hold the position of official responsibility"³⁸ The "Cape Times" was also dissatisfied with the position. On 22nd October, 1886, it wrote: "The position now held by Mr. Hofmeyr is damaging to the character of the Ministry, and by no means conducive to his own self-respect. To his own followers, also, there is a certain humiliation in this attempt at ruling without risking the vicissitudes of a normal parliamentary career. It is humiliating to confess that they have brute force to control others, and perhaps to compel others to dishonest courses, but not the intellectual or moral power which would fit themselves to accept the responsibility of administering the affairs of the State".

Similar sentiments had already been expressed by the "Cape Argus" soon after the Upington Ministry took office. It held that the Ministry and the Opposition should unite, cast differences aside

37. Journal, 26/6/'85.

38. Journal, 15/6/'86.

and declare "That if Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond are determined to force the Government of this country into the Bondsman's mould, they shall do so in office, and not as the wirepullers of a nominally strong Ministry that has had to lead a dog's life for them from the day it entered upon office".³⁹

Events in Bechuanaland now created considerable excitement in South Africa and eventually led to the founding of the Imperial League which had political objects. Along the western boundary of the Transvaal there dwelt certain restless native tribes. There were the Barolong near Mafeking, amongst whom two leaders Montsion and Moshotte both claimed paramountcy. Further south near Vryburg, Mankoroane, the Batlapin chief, fell upon the Koranna headman, Massouw. The land belonging to these chiefs was, till the London Convention of 1884, placed outside the south-western boundary of the Transvaal.⁴⁰ In their quarrels they relied for aid on Europeans who were paid in cattle or land. In the south, the Pretoria Government mediated and secured peace and J.C. van Niekerk founded the Stellaland Republic with Vryburg as its capital, August, 1882.⁴¹ In the north there was fierce fighting. In October, 1882, however, a treaty was made by which Montsion became a Transvaal vassal and surrendered his best lands. Here Gey van Pittius who had been Moshotte's agent founded the Republic of Goshon.⁴²

At first these events attracted little attention. It was Cecil Rhodes who realised the importance of these republics.

39. C. Argus, 13/6/1884.

40. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.250.

41. Walker: History, p.401.

42. Ibid.

They lay right across the "Missionaries' Road" into the interior, and it was up this road that trade from the Cape into the interior of Africa had to pass. Rhodes knew that in the natural course of events these republics would be incorporated with the Transvaal and the Cape cut off from the interior and his great schemes for a vast British Colony in the African hinterland foiled.

Rhodes urged Scanlen to buy farms just beyond the Griqualand border which Mankoroane offered to sell.⁴³ Scanlen however, feared Hofmeyr and the Afrikaner Party who looked upon the interior as the natural heritage of their kinsmen, the Transvaalers. Thus Scanlen had, on a previous occasion, informed Rhodes:

"I need not point out that there is a very strong feeling of sympathy with the Transvaal in parts of the Colony, and that it would be hopeless to expect the assent of Parliament to any arrangement supposed to be adverse to the interests of the Transvaal. To ensure acceptance there would need to be either an almost unanimous desire upon the part of the people, or a friendly arrangement with the Transvaal or both these conditions concurring"⁴⁴

Van Niekerk of Stellaland now asked the Transvaal for protection.⁴⁵ But that state was now negotiating a revision of the Pretoria convention with the British Government and the reply to van Niekerk depended on the outcome of these negotiations. Amongst other things the London Convention which superseded that of Pretoria, fixed the western boundary of the Transvaal in such a way that it included only part of Stellaland and Goshen with the Republic.⁴⁶ In August, 1884, the Transvaal Volksraad

43. Walker: History, p.401, et Rhodes Papers: Proposed Annexation of Stellaland. Teleg. Rhodes to Premier, 15/7/'83.

44. Rhodes Papers: Proposed Annex. of Stellaland. Teleg. Scanlen to Rhodes, 5/6/'85.

45. Walker: History, p.403.

46. Eybers: Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating S.A. History, p.469.

after which Germany ratified the London Convention. Great Britain and the Transvaal had now to appoint commissioners to maintain order on the Bechuanaland-Transvaal border. On Sir Hercules Robinson's recommendation the Imperial Government appointed Revd John Mackenzie, Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland. This was a mistake. Mackenzie had already expressed his opinions on the Bechuanaland question in terms not flattering to the Transvaal; moreover, his views on the native question differed widely from those of the Transvaalers.⁴⁷ He was therefore no persona grata with the persons with whom he had to co-operate.

In Stollaland, Mackenzie found a large number of men in favour of annexation to the Cape. He had a measure of success in appointing van Nickerk his assistant-commissioner, and persuaded the people to accept the British flag.⁴⁸ In the land of Goshen, van Pittius and Montsion were again at war and the latter had seized Rooi Grond on the Transvaal border, the headquarters of the Goshonites. Mackenzie declared a British protectorate over Montsion and all his lands.⁴⁹ Mackenzie's acts annoyed the Pretoria Government; the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, was also displeased. On the representations of Upington and Hofmeyr, Robinson removed Mackenzie and appointed Cecil Rhodes to his post.⁵⁰ He was determined to extend the authority of the Cape over Bechuanaland. He persuaded the Stollalanders to accept Cape rule on condition that they retained their land.⁵¹ In

47. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.255.

48. Ibid.

49. Walker: History, p.405.

50. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.255.

51. Walker: History, p.406.

et Walker: History, p.404.

Coshon fighting was still going on and Rhodes and the Transvaal Commissioner, General Joubert, failed to secure peace, but soon afterwards, Moutson asked for Transvaal protection. On 16th September, President Kruger issued a proclamation annexing Coshon provided that the British Government gave its approval; before that approval could be given, Revd S.J. du Toit who had succeeded Joubert as Commissioner foolishly hoisted the Transvaal Vierkleur.

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This was the signal that caused an outburst of all the pent-up feeling engendered by the trouble in the Bechuanaland. In the first instance, Sir Charles Warren was sent out to South Africa with a British force of thousands to eject a few hundred Coshonites. A few days after this had been announced, President Kruger ordered du Toit to remove the Transvaal flag from Coshon and a week later he withdrew his annexation pro-

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clamation. But the mischief had been done and the Warren expedition caused a furious outburst of excitement. Among the English, who had not yet learnt to see things from a South African point of view, feeling ran very high. Thus Charles Southey wrote to his father Richard Southey that all the mischief would not be undone.

"until the Dutch have had a good licking and unlearnt the wretched Transvaal business.

"This is the first time since the Transvaal war that England has shown so much as the teeth and I can at once detect the craven spirit of the Boer - they are beginning to funk already as soon as they see it means business. I can tell you we English are all ready - it only wants a beginning and we will be at them. We are sick and tired

52. Walker: De Villiers, p.182.

53. Walker: De villiers, p.134.

of humiliation and going backwards like a crab to the inevitable ruin and future bloodshed. England has to put her foot down and if the Dutch want a licking, well give it them"⁵⁴

Similar sentiments were also expressed by John Frost, then representing Queenstown in the Legislative Assembly and later to hold ministerial office in Rhodes's Second Ministry and Sprigg's Fourth Ministry:⁵⁵

"We are all anxiously looking for Col. Warren's arrival.... the papers down here are down upon Uppington for trying to arrange matters up there and will have none of it at any price.

"The Dutch are working together and there is to be a great gathering of all the Afrikaner Bond which will take place the papers say in the Free State....and I fancy the people will not move out ((;)) they have got to imagine that they are invincible on their own ground and that England will only bully not fight them....

"My own feelings now is ((are)) that it will be in the interest of the English Colonists that they come to blows because I fear if the thing blows over we shall not settle down to our old groove and I should like to see England show that she is and intends to remain the paramount power in South Africa"⁵⁶

To the Opposition in the Cape Parliament this presented an excellent opportunity of engineering an agitation against the Uppington Ministry and its Bond supporters who sympathised with the Transvaal and wished to exclude the Imperial Government from South Africa. On 24th September, a meeting was held in the Exchange in Cape Town. It was organised by advocate J.W. Leonard, member of the Assembly for Gautschoorn and one time Attorney-General in the Sprigg Ministry. Thus was founded the Imperial League - also called British League - which gained considerable

54. Acc.304. Southey Private Correspondence, C. Southey to his father, 2/12/'84.

55. Infra, p.248.

56. Acc.304. Southey Private Correspondence, J. Frost to R. Southey, 5/12/'84.

support throughout the Colony amongst those who favoured the strengthening of the Imperial element and bonds in South Africa and the avenging of Majuba.⁵⁷

Charles Leonard, brother of J.W. Leonard, in a publication written on instructions from "The Central Committee of the Empire League", put the attitude of the League as follows: "We say emphatically that if the great bulk of the colonists were asked whether they wish to live under any other flag than the British flag they would unhesitatingly say no".⁵⁸ With regard to the Afrikaner movement, and those sympathising with the views of "Di Patriot" he wrote as follows:

"These men are always running down everything British in such sweeping terms that we propose to examine our social and political systems, to see what evils we have to complain of, and to ask whether, if such a thing were possible, we could hope to better ourselves by uniting with the Free State and Transvaal, and pulling down the British flag, and hoisting a republican flag of their own. Do not start. This is what they want, and there can be no harm in plainly facing the issue...."⁵⁹

Barring the Leonards, Nevil John Mackenzie, former Commissioner in Bechuanaland, was one of the chief propagandists of the League. He made speeches throughout the Colony advocating the ideas of the League and defending his actions in Bechuanaland. The Imperial League had but a short life. Mackenzie himself gives us the reasons for its failure:

"Its programme made no local practical appeal to the manhood of a young country. It was like a man looking permanently over his shoulder. They gave their League nothing to do on the soil of South Africa except look over the ocean to England....If they would have their League a permanent, institution, they must give it work

57. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.257, et Walker: De Villiers, p.183.

58. Leonard: Papers on the Political Situation in S.Africa, p.4.

59. Ibid. p.7.

to do in South Africa where the political education of the people of a healthy, practical and broadminded character was certainly a pressing need"⁶⁰

IV. SECOND SPRIGG MINISTRY.

Upington, chiefly on account of poor health, found it difficult to carry out the duties and shoulder the responsibilities of Prime Minister. In 1886, Sprigg represented the Cape at the Colonial Conference in London and returned as Sir Gordon Sprigg, and now for the second time, November, 1886, he became ⁶¹ Premier, Upington retaining his office of Attorney-General. Sprigg's assumption of the Premiership involved no change in the policy of the Ministry or in its personnel. It will be remembered that the Bond Party had grave objections to Sprigg's inclusion in the Upington Ministry.⁶² Sprigg had now however, succeeded in gaining the goodwill of the Bond because he had practised rigid economy in administration and moreover, he and his colleagues were ruling in a genuine colonial spirit with which the Afrikaners could associate themselves:

"....in hem ((Sprigg)) zien wij toch, evenzeer als in den heer Upington en den heer Rhodes, een man van Britschen bloede met wien de Afrikaner party zich verstaan en samenwerken kan, terwijl er tusschen die partij en de geestverwanten van de tegenwoordige aanvoorders der Oppositie een verschil van zin en beginsel bestaat dat zich niet uit den weg laat ruimen...."⁶³

The years of the second Sprigg Ministry were ones of exceeding calm in the history of Cape politics. Economic development, brought about chiefly by the discovery of gold mines

60. Mackenzie: Austral-Africa, Vol.II. p.29.

61. Laurence : Life of Merriman, p.108.

62. Supra, p. 184.

63. Z.-Afr. 30/11/'86.

of the Transvaal helped to drive away the economic depression of the preceding years; there were no conflicts between the Imperial and Colonial authorities and the feelings and passions that were much in evidence during the first years of the decade, had died down. As all public interest was concentrated on the Rand, party feeling at the Cape sank to a very low ebb.

During these years started a remarkable political fraternisation of English and Afrikaners. The "Zuid-Afrikaan" strongly emphasised that there should be a good understanding between the two sections of the European population and that the welfare of the country demanded such co-operation: "...wat wij ten stelligste beworën is vooreerst dat het belang der Kolonie vordert dat er tusschen de Engelsche en Afrikaner Kolonisten goede verstandhouding in plaats van vervroemding en verbittering zal heerschen, en ten tweede dat de tegenwoordige Regering met goed gevolg die verstandhouding bevordert en haar politiek er aan diensbaar gemaakt heeft in plaats van, zoo als haar voorganger van spanning en wantrouwen die er bestonden ((,)) politiek kapitaal to maken"⁶⁴ As time went on this fraternisation between English and Dutch progressed and became more and more evident. Thus the "Zuid-Afrikaan" wrote on 29th January, 1889: "Met regt mag er op gewezen worden dat er tegenwoordig tusschen Engelschen en Hollandsch-sprekende Afrikaners een betere verstandhouding en meer samenwerking bestaat dan vroeger"⁶⁵.

64. Z.-Afr. 26/4/'87.

65. Et vide: C.Times, 1/2/'89.

One reason for this improved English-Afrikaner relationship is the fact that during these years there was nothing to stir up the racial passions of the two sections of European Colonists and with race lines erased, the fusion of the two sections was a comparatively easy matter, seeing that their economic and politic interests converged. Another reason for this good relationship was the "Colonial Party" formed under the Sprigg Ministry and the policy pursued by the Ministry. Its policy was not anti-English but a policy found in all self-governing British Colonies, namely, that the Colony should govern itself and that Colonial interests must come first. Although South Africa was encumbered by circumstances not found elsewhere, as many problems had to be settled by the co-operation of the Imperial and Colonial Governments, yet a solution was always easily and readily found.⁶⁶ The leader of the Afrikaner Bond, J.H. Hofmeyr, firmly believed that the welfare of South Africa lay in the close co-operation of all Europeans; he was always ready to meet the English point of view and try to compromise conflicting ideas. He realised the value of the Imperial connection and was always ready to tune down the hot-headed enthusiasm of some of his more ardent anti-British supporters. On visiting England in 1887, he was offered a Knighthood^d, but because he was convinced that he would not serve either his own or public interests by accepting the offer, he refused it. He himself put it as follows:

66. Z.-Afr. 29/1/'89.

"The relations between British and Dutch sections of our S.A. population which were rather strained some time ago have been rapidly improving of late. Some of my English friends are good enough to say that much of that improvement is owing to my political exertions. Whether they are correct or not in their judgement is not for me to say. But much still remains to be done to promote the unity of S. Africa, and I am convinced that my own share in the work would be much facilitated by my returning to the Cape the same plain J.H. Hofmeyr as I left it"⁶⁷

In Parliament the motto of the Bond continued to be: "In Parliament, but not in the Ministry". The influence of the Bond continued to increase and those holding office were made increasingly dependent on it:

"Er bestaat hier onbetwistbaar in het Parlement een vrij gesloten partij van Hollandsche Afrikaners, boeren of boeren vrienden, die weten wat zij willen en die, zonder naar ministeriële zetels te staan, dien overwegenden invloed op de zaken trachten te oefen waar zij, als de meerderheid en tevens als de kern der Kolonistenbevolking uitmakende, recht te hebben....

"Hier in de Kolonie kan men, zonder een wetgeving die hotzij onderscheid van kleur maakt, hotzij een kunstmatig onderscheid van stand schept, gemakkelijk door samenwerking tusschen Engelschen en Afrikaner boeren een toestand in het leven roepen die het Kolonistendom in allen deele baas maken en bevredigen moet. Dit wordt begrepen door Britsche Kolonisten als Sir Gordon Sprigg, Sir Thomas Uppington en enkele anderen die hen aanhangen, en, onder de leden der Oppositie, door den heer Rhodes; maar de rest der Oppositie sluit er de oogen voor, en geeft liever de magt der Kolonisten prijs dan gemeene saak met het Afrikanendom te maken. Zoolang dit zoo blijft, zoolang er niet van den kant der Britsche Kolonisten erkend wordt dat zij bondgenooten inplaats van bestrijders in den Afrikaner boerenstand moeten zien, zoolang zal men hier een staat van zaken hebben waarin men nooit de rechte partijvorming - die op eenheid van belang gegrond - bekomen kan"⁶⁸

The spirit of cordiality did not emanate from the Afrikaner Colonists only. The English Colonial press took up a very friendly attitude towards the Bond; thus the "Cape Argus" wrote:

67. Hofmeyr Papers. Vol.No.13. J.H. Hofmeyr to Sir H.Holland, 7/4/'87.

68. STRENGTH.Z-Afr. 2/7/'87.

"The Bond has purged itself of many of its earlier mistakes and sinister aims", further it is described as "the only institution in this country that has succeeded in infusing a love of public life into the agricultural population".⁶⁹ We conclude therefore, that, if despite the stimulating example of the Bond, only one unsuccessful - the Imperial League - was founded in seven years'time, the Bond represented more or less the only coherent political opinion in the Cape Colony. The politics of the country just did not allow of a division after the English model which was, after all, a historical accident and which should not necessarily be perpetuated in a new country. Without reviving some burning question for parties to rally upon there just could not be party government; for this reason the "Cape Times" of 10th September, 1888, advocated the following policy:

"We would gladly break up the existing remnants of exhausted parties and by a new combination collect an administration of the men who have exhibited the highest administrative capacity. In this event the excluded politicians would naturally resolve themselves into a sort of Vigilance Committee to guard the public interest against any operation of the part of the Government, and thus,....an Opposition of criticism would evolve itself...."

To put an end to what many thought an anomalous position, the opinion was often expressed that Hofmeyr or some other leading Afrikaner should take office.⁷⁰ This suggestion was

69. C.Argus, 22/5/'88. 2-Afr. of 29/5/'88 also refers to the friendly attitude of the English press.

70. C.Argus, 5/10/'88; Innes at Woodstock. The "Cape Times" of 3rd Feb., 1888, called Hofmeyr "the managing director, without a seat at the board". A few months later, 10th September, 1888, it pointed out that only if Hofmeyr accepted office "shall we get back to the right track of Responsible Government, and to a fair field of political contest."

however, consistently turned down, and even after the elections of 1883 had returned the Bond in yet stronger force,⁷¹ the Bond leaders would not take such a step. At the Bond Congress at Middelburg, 1889, the chairman referred to this question as follows:

"De gedachte is meer dan eens uitgesproken, dat de Bond, met zulk een groot aantal stemgerechtigde burgers, en zoo vele invloedrijke leden, zelve de tougels van het bestuur der Kolonie in handen behoorde te nemen....Toch is het de opinie van diogenen aan wien de vorming van zulk een ministerie zou moeten worden opgedragen dat de tijd daarvoor nog niet gekomen was. Wij zullen dus,....voortgaanhet bestaande Ministerie zooveel mogelijk te ondersteunen,...."⁷²

While the Ministerialists formed a closely knit party, the Opposition presented no united front. There were several very capable men in the Opposition ranks, but there was no common outlook which could bind them together, Merriman was to a great extent a free-lance who was however, usually disposed to act with Sauer and Rose-Innes who were negrophiles, as were also Lewis and Hutton.⁷³ There was also a commercial group led by Lewis Vintcent and another group of die-hard Afrikaner haters, such as Drabant and Palmer.⁷⁴ Further there was Cecil Rhodes, the influential mining magnate who had already shown that he would be able to work with the Afrikaners.⁷⁵ Nominally, Scanlen was the leader of the Opposition but already in 1886, Merriman had refused to act with him.⁷⁶ On such important measures as the abolition of the Excise and Seab Acts, the men of the

71. *Infra*, p. 204.

72. Pat. 7/3/189, Report, Afrikaner Bond Congress at Middelburg, 4/3/189.

73. *Z.-Afr.* 2/7/187.

74. *Ons Land*, 21/4/1904, Article: 1854-1904.

75. *Infra*, p. 210.

76. *Merr. Papers*, No. 16. 1886, J.X. Merr. to Agnes Merr. 16 Jan.

Opposition took opposite sides. "No wonder the Opposition is effaced, when you find their leaders taking opposite sides and voting against each other on such momentous questions".⁷⁷

In 1889, serious efforts were made to remove Scanlen from the head of the Opposition for which position he was entirely unsuited. Innes and Sauer wanted Lewis Vintcent, Merriman's brother-in-law to take his place, but Vintcent lacked experience and moreover, material to form the backbone of a new party was sadly lacking. He also realised fully that their party would be a failure without the support of at least some of the progressive Afrikaner members. Vintcent was more disposed to let the various members of the Opposition act as independent critics of the Ministry until such time as certain incongruous elements of the ministerial supporters broke away.⁷⁸ A few weeks later, Innes and Vintcent had an interview with Scanlen and had a straight talk with him on his lack of ability to lead the Opposition. Scanlen was very angry and a few days later wrote a letter to Innes virtually resigning the leadership. A meeting was then called to consider the matter. At this meeting Scanlen took the chair and proceeded to discuss the Customs Union question - ignoring the point for which the meeting had been called. This convinced Innes that Scanlen was hopeless as a leader.

"We are as you see at sixes and sevens. Scanlen will not lead and he will not abdicate - for my part I am so sick of the whole thing that I often feel inclined to fight simply for my own hand without consultation with anybody.

77. C.Argus, 26/9/'88, Premier at East London.

78. Merr. Papers, No.232, 1886, Lewis Vintcent to J.X. Merr.
9 May.

I am daily trying to urge Sauer to take a more leading part but he is afraid of Scanlen; that is the long and short of it"⁷⁹

The question of the leadership of the Opposition was eventually solved when, towards the end of 1888, Scanlen left⁸⁰ the Cape to take up a lucrative post in the Transvaal and⁸¹ Sauer was chosen leader of the Opposition.

Several attempts had previously been made to establish political associations, for example, the "Frontier Union", the "Midland Political Association" and "Eastern Province Association"; but all of these had become defunct.⁸² Now, during the Assembly elections of 1888, Sprigg launched another attempt, and formed a so-called "Frontier Party". The intention of this party was to make Sprigg less dependent on the Bond. It turned out a failure and Sprigg was again forced to lean even more heavily on the Bond which was returned more strongly than ever.⁸³

At no period since the introduction of Responsible Government, was so little interest taken in a general election at the Cape as in 1888. It was clear that there was no alternative party to take office; there were supposed to be three parties: the Ministerialists led by Sprigg; the Opposition led by Scanlen and the Bond led by Hofmeyr, but none issued a programme, or declared a platform.⁸⁴ It is impossible to state how many

79. Merr. Papers, No. 254, 1889. J. Rose-Innes to J. X. Merr. 7 June.

80. C. Argus, 13/12/'89.

81. Ibid. 3/6/'90, Parliament Sketched.

82. Journal, 11/10/'88.

83. C. Times, 28/9/'88 et Pat. 30/11/'88 et C. Argus, 15/11/'88.

84. Journal, 13/9/'88 et Pat. 2/11/'88.

members were returned in support of each group.⁸⁵ "Party lines have never been very clearly defined in this Colony for permanent distinction, although on occasion they are developed with extraordinary rapidity and vividness.... But at the present moment our rest is undisturbed".⁸⁶ It can however safely be said that the gains lay with the Spriggites and the Bond especially, while the Scanlen Opposition was further weakened.⁸⁷

The Sprigg-Uppington Ministry had governed the country well since 1884. Sprigg was undoubtedly a capable administrator. Its fall was rather sudden, especially when it seemed to have gained strength at the elections of 1888 and at a time when it seemed to be well seated in office. There were some ministers however, with whom the Bond was not on good terms, namely, H.W. Pearson who had succeeded Tudhope as Colonial Secretary and also Schermbrucker, the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works.⁸⁸ Another matter on which the Bond had differences with Sprigg was on the qualification of voters. The Bond wanted a Registration of Voters Bill and so the Sprigg Registration Bill was passed which in effect, raised the voter's qualifications. The Bond however, wanted more and demanded a Franchise Bill as it held that the voters qualifications were too low. About this latter bill Sprigg was squeamish and so another man had to be found. At this stage

85. Leaving out Sir D. Tennant, the Speaker, and the Grahamstown vacancy caused by the death of G. Luke, the C. Argus, 4/12/'88, gave the following: Ministerialists, 84; Hofmeyrite, 34; Scanlen Opposition, 16. The "Zuid-Afrikaan" of 6/12/'88, however, did not agree with this allocation.

86. C. Times, 10/9/'88.

87. Z.-Afr. 24/11/'88, et Journal, 8/12/'88.

88. Z.-Afr. 15/ 7/'90, Historische Overzicht.

Cecil Rhodes became prominent - a man not too squeamish -⁸⁹ and with his aid the Franchise Bill was eventually carried. Hofmeyr appears to have had some differences with Sprigg on account of his speech at a Bloemfontein banquet.⁹⁰ Further the railway question proved to be a thorn in the side of the Government in the session of 1889. Local interests proved too strong for party allegiance.⁹¹ In committee, the Government was repeatedly beaten on its railway proposals,^{on} one occasion by 40 to 27 votes.⁹²

The Government's railway proposals in the session of 1890, proved Sprigg's undoing. He introduced a Bill which was to provide for the construction of a large number of branch lines involving an expenditure of over seven-and-a-half million pounds.⁹³ His proposals were ill-prepared; for example, he laid before the House incomplete surveys and estimates of costs of lines that were ten years old.⁹⁴ "This monster ((Sprigg's Railway Scheme)) sprawls all over the land only because in the Government there was neither the wit nor the courage nor the political honesty to devise railway proposals measured by the need and by the means of the country".⁹⁵ It was clear to all that the economic interests of the country were not the basis of Sprigg's

89. C. Times, 9/1/'93.

90. Merr. Papers, No. 318, 1889. Julia Merriman to J.X. Merr. 5 Dec.

91. The "Patriot" of 1/8/'89 in an article "Volks Opinie" wrote as follows on the influence of local interests on railways:

"Dit gaat so: Jan het een op papier, en as Jan kan kry wil Piet oek hê. Klaas het 'n brug, Paul wil oek 'n brug hê. Adoons het 'n pad; waarom mag Flip dit oek ni hê ni? Mar dan kom di antwoord: Ja jy kan dit kry mar dan moet jy my met jou stem help".

92. C. Argus, 9/7/'89.

93. Pat. 12/6/'90.

94. C. Argus, 9/7/'89.

95. C. Times, 31/5/'90.

proposals but rather that he aimed to gain influence in certain electoral divisions and thus obtain the support of members by his fair promises.⁹⁶ Nor was the Cabinet unanimous on the question of railway proposals; Upington, for example, had stated in a Cabinet meeting that he reserved for himself the right to vote⁹⁷ against the du Toit's Kloof line proposed by the Government. Further Sprigg could not rely on his own followers in the House; at a caucus meeting on 7th July, he was able to secure the support of only eleven followers.⁹⁸ When the Railway Bill was brought before the House the Ministry was further weakened by the indisposition of the Premier who was absent from the House during the greater part of the Railway Debate; moreover, his colleagues were not agreed on who should act in his stead so that the Attorney-General, (Upington), and the Commissioner of Public Works (Schererbrucker) vied with each other in leading the Ministry to defeat.⁹⁹ It was the Bond however, that gave the Second Sprigg Ministry a coup de grâce; to the Afrikaner mind the plan was too daring and ambitious. It had taken the Colony thirty years to obtain 1600 miles of railway and suddenly 60% was to be added to both mileage and debt.¹⁰⁰ On 10th July, 1890, Sprigg announced in the House of Assembly, that in view of the defeats the Government had suffered he and his colleagues had decided to submit their resignations to the Governor.¹

96. Ons Land, 21/4/'04, Art. 1854-1904 et Pat. 19/6/'90.

97. Hansard, 1890, p.55.

98. C.Argus, 8/7/190.

99. C.Argus, 2/7/'90.

100. Hansard, 1890, p.75.

1. Hansard, 1890, p.144.

Thereupon, the House adjourned till 16th July, on which day Rhodes announced that at the Governor's request he was busy forming a Ministry.²

The domineering attitude which Sprigg took up towards Parliament on the railway question was also to a great extent responsible for his fall. He took up the attitude that Parliament had to obey him and had to accept his proposals in toto.³ This later resolved into a question whether Sprigg was to rule the land as a dictator or not. In its rejection of Sprigg's proposals, Parliament made it quite clear that it was not prepared to submit to such bullying. Another feature of Sprigg's objection from office was the fact that the Ministry was not beaten by the Opposition proper, but by the Bond which had till then supported the Sprigg Ministry, but now deserted it and coalesced with the small Opposition party to defeat Sprigg and hoist Cecil Rhodes into office.

2. Mansard, 1890, p.148.
3. Pat. 19/6/90.

CHAPTER VI.THE BOND-RHODES CO-OPERATION.I. RHODES' AIMS.

The policy of the Bond was always to support a predomi-
nantly English Ministry without seeking office for itself. In
 1890, Rhodes took office with strong Bond support. This co-
 operation of the Bond with Rhodes is one of the most interesting
 as well as surprising features of South African political his-
 tory during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The
 Bond, as originally conceived by S.J. du Toit, had a strong
 republican colour - "Africa for the Afrikaners". Rhodes, in
 the last years of his life proved himself the arch-Imperialist;
 he had himself written to Merriman in 1883; - "You may rest
 assured that I cannot have anything to do with the Afrikaner
 Bond"¹. It would indeed seem as though opposites had met.

What exactly were Rhodes's aim in Africa? His first ob-
 ject was to expand British possessions in Africa. Firstly, he
 was going to take possession of as much territory in Southern
 Africa as he possibly could. In 1878, he said to Dr. Jameson:
 "I mean to have the whole unmarked country north of the colony
 for England. And I know I can get it, and develop it at present
 only by the co-operation of the Cape Dutch colonists, and I am
 perfectly willing to pay the price"². Rhodes regarded the
 British as God's chosen people: "Only one race, so it seemed

1. Merr. Papers, No.204, 1883. C.J. Rhodes to J.X.Merr. 25 Oct.
 2. I-Miller: Lord Milner and S.Africa, p.359.

to him, ((Rhodes)) approached God's ideal type, his own Anglo-Saxon race; God's purpose then was to make the Anglo-Saxon race predominant, and the best way to help God's work and fulfil this purpose in the world was to contribute to the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon race and so bring nearer the reign of justice liberty and peace".³

Rhodes's second object was the unification of South Africa under the flag of Great Britain. The mistake which had been made previously, was not to be made again, that is, of allowing states to separate themselves from the parent colony. Moreover, independent republics were to be compelled, by means foul or fair, to accept British rule. He also saw clearly how this end was to be achieved, namely, through the Afrikaners of the Cape Colony; he realised that they held the key to the political situation in the Colony, and their organisation - the Bond - was the most powerful political party. It had, in fact, become so strong that the most important government measures were usually published before the Annual Bond Congress in order to secure its approval or if they were rejected, to arrive at an agreement with the Bond.⁴ The Cape Colony had to become the predominant factor in South African politics; it had to control the railways, control the interior, dominate the trade of the interior and hem in the republics,⁵ so that when union came, the Cape with its Afrikaner population under his (Rhodes's) influence would be the predominant

3. Williams: Cecil Rhodes, p.50.

4. Hofmeyr : Op. cit. p.618.

5. Colvin: Cecil Rhodes, p. 31.

partner. To achieve these objects Rhodes with his immense wealth obtained from the Diamond Fields now set to work.

II. BOND-RHODES RAPPROCHMENT.

It took several years before the Bond-Rhodes co-operation led to the consummation of the First Rhodes Ministry. Already in 1884, there were indications of some sympathetic feeling between the two. The "Cape Argus" of 7th August, 1884, wrote: "Mr. Rhodes is known to be a politician in good repute with the Boers; while of his loyal British sympathies it would be superfluous to speak".⁶ Soon his sympathy became more marked and in 1886, J.X. Merriman wrote to his wife that Rhodes has been "posing as a Dutch advocate, Currey will have it that he is going to try to ride that horse - if he does I venture to predict that he will have a severe fall".⁷ Further, the Bond was showing signs of annoyance with Sprigg and was looking around for someone else with whom it could co-operate and Rhodes was the only alternative.⁸ In 1888, certain papers ventured to predict a Rhodes Ministry and at Barkly West Rhodes declared that for party purposes he belonged to a party called "the National, Country of Afrikaner Party", as opposed to the "Imperial Party".⁹ During the session of 1889, the relations between the Sprigg Ministry and Hofmeyr became less friendly and the rapprochement between the Bond and Rhodes-became more and more marked.¹⁰ Thus the "Cape Argus" of 13th May, 1889, wrote that for some time past Rhodes

6. Synonymous with "Afrikaners".

7. Merr. Papers, No.16, 1886. J.X. Merr. to Agnes Merr. 16 Jan.

8. Ibid. No.14, 1887. Ibid. 15 Jan.

9. C.Times, 31/7/'88, et Pat. 12/10/'88.

10. Journal, 6/10/'88.

"has been running in double harness with Mr. Hofmeyr".

III. BASIS OF BOND RHODES CO-OPERATION.

The question immediately arises: What had the Bond and Hofmeyr in common with Rhodes and what made such co-operation possible? Firstly, there was the personal factor. Rhodes was undoubtedly a much liked man with a pleasant personality. He did not stand on ceremony and his free and easy manner won him the friendship of the Afrikaners who came to regard him as a sort of Afrikaner friend, half Bondman and general benefactor.¹¹ But it was with the leader of the Bond with whom Rhodes was on terms of most intimate friendship: "Each had discovered something in the other to respect and admire, and as the years went on, the bonds grew tighter, till at length, when the breach came, Mr. Hofmeyr was led to exclaim, that he felt as though the wife of his bosom had been torn from his side".¹² Moreover, Rhodes was always anxious to discuss with Hofmeyr any problem of state because he valued his opinion. As Rhodes expressed it in the House during the session of 1891: "He would take the House into his secrets. He did consult the hon. member for Stellenbosch. He consulted him in the first place, because he represented a large section of the people of this country; in the second place, because he found his sound judgement was of enormous assistance to him. On a purely trivial little question they had had a couple of hours' discussion".¹³

11. Pat. 5/6/190.

12. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.377.

13. Ibid. p.439, et vide Hansard, 1892, p.287.

Rhodes possessed in a very high degree the singular gift of management. On the Diamond Fields his powers of management and organisation had brought him fabulous wealth and now he brought his powers of organisation and amalgamation to bear on the Cape Parliament so that he "gathered about him elements which seemed to have no affinity until his chemical touch bade them leap together".¹⁴ Rhodes not only had wealth, but also considerable influence and power in other spheres; as J.T. Molteno expressed it: "...he had the Cape Colony Parliament, Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond, the British Government, the Irish Party, the son-in-law of the Prince of Wales. He was at that time the most powerful man in the British Empire, perhaps in the whole world".¹⁵ No doubt, with this immense power, Rhodes was able to command the respect of parliamentarians who would otherwise ignore him.¹⁶

Further, Rhodes' persuasive powers of a high order, enabled him to win over to his point of view and to his policy, not only the individual members of the Bond but also its leader, J.H. Hofmeyr. Thus Barney Barnato testified of Cecil Rhodes:

"....when you have been with him half an hour you not only agree with him, but come to believe you have always held his opinion....No one else in the world could have induced me to go into this partnership. But Rhodes has an extraordinary ascendancy over men: he tied me up as he ties up everybody. It is his way. You can't resist him: you must be with him...."¹⁷

The Bond found that it had the support of Rhodes in its

14. According to Williams: Cecil Rhodes, p.114, it was £1,000,000 per year.

15. C.Times, 3/6/'92.

16. Molteno: Dominion of Afrikanerdom, p.25.

17. Williams: Cecil Rhodes, p.103.

internal policy. On such a question as the Excise which had caused so much ill-feeling, we find Rhodes voting for its abolition in 1886:

"He wished to give his reasons for supporting the Bill, and to reply to those who had imputed motives to him in regard to his vote....He would point out to the House that this tax was most inconvenient, to the taxpayer.... What was affecting the Cape farmer was that the consumption had become limited, and the tax fell back on the producer instead of on the consumer....He believed the tax unfair and that it pressed on the producer".¹⁸

Further Rhodes identified himself with the Protectionist ideal of the Bond. Thus he expressed himself in Parliament in 1886:

"The true protection lay in the encouragement of our grain and wine....He was prepared to state candidly that he was in favour of a slight Protection of corn if by the slight additional tax they could create such a development of the agricultural industry of this country as to grow their own grain....The real protection was to encourage the growth of cereals".¹⁹

Rhodes also won the favour of the Afrikaners by supporting the movement to secure the use of Dutch in Parliament. He said in 1881: "If the country really desires it, the House was as willing to give it as anything else".²⁰ In 1882, Rhodes gave his wholehearted support: "He had just looked up the constitution of Canada and he found that it was ordained that the English or the French language should be used. They would therefore be following the Canadian precedent".²¹ In 1886, Revd W.P. de Villiers and sixty-two landowners from Carnarvon pro-

18. Hansard, 1886, p.221.

19. Hansard, 1886, p.151.

20. E. Argus, 22/6/'81, Assembly Debate, 21/6/'81.

21. Ibid. 30/4/'82, Ibid. 29/6/'82.

tested against the running of trains on Sunday and brought in a petition against Sunday trains. Rhodes also expressed himself against such trains and thereby gained the favour of the Bond. Thus he said: "The running of the trains between Kimberley and the Modderriver had become a real scandal and he would be glad to hear from one of the Ministers that those trains had been stopped".²² Rhodes supported Hofmeyr's motion to provide for religious instruction during ordinary school hours; "He was in favour of a state system of education, not, perhaps, from a religious point of view, but his opinion rested on the feeling that in the education of this colony lay their only hope of killing their race differences....As he took it, the position of those opposed to State education was that they considered State education should be coupled with religious instruction. Now if that was the position, he said, by all means let them introduce religious instruction, because if there was that growing feeling it might sweep away State education altogether."²³ State education therefore, had to erase racial differences and if religious instruction had to be an appendage to State education, well, give the people religious instruction in the schools. Rhodes' great object, quite obviously, was to reconcile the Afrikaners to British rule, and he was prepared to make any concession provided it was done under British dominion and for the benefit of British rule.

²². Hansard, 1886, p.149.
²³. Ibid. p.113.

Rhodes did much to further farming interests in South Africa, so that in this matter he had much in common with the Afrikaner Farming population. In the Western Province he bought many fruit farms in the Drakenstein Valley. To combat phylloxera, Rhodes recommended trying American Vines and he himself studied the question in France, putting the results of his enquiries at the disposal of the wine farmers. To encourage and develop the export of fruit he introduced more modern methods of growing and packing. He also encouraged growing oranges by irrigation. To improve the breed of Angora goats, Rhodes went to Constantinople and obtained the purest Angora blood in the world to improve the breed of goats in South Africa.²⁴ In 1893, he created a Ministry of Agriculture. So deeply did he identify himself with the farming community that even after the Jameson Raid, many of the Bond who had been deeply shocked by that event, still continued to remember him for his services in the interests of agriculture.²⁵

The co-operation of Rhodes and the Bond could only be a success if they could see eye to eye with each other on that very delicate question in South Africa - the native problem. The Bond was most decided in its objections to extending the franchise to the natives whereas it did not object to Cape Coloureds having the vote. This attitude was no doubt due to the fact that in the Western Province many Bond candidates - Hofmeyr himself - had the support of the Coloured vote, whereas,

²⁴. Vindex: Cecil Rhodes, p.399.

²⁵. Hansard, 1896, p.136.

in the Eastern Province the native vote was usually cast in favour of Bond opponents. Any attempt to restrict the native franchise evoked a protest from the English press, so that the opinion, that the English and natives were in political alliance, was general.²⁶ The Bond native policy to some extent aimed at the exploitation of native labour - on farms especially - and generally "keeping" the native in his place". There had to be no equality with Europeans who by virtue of their higher civilization had to be the ruling race. But the Bond native policy should not be construed as one of oppression; it was prepared to uplift the natives and give them fair treatment; they were however, to remain servants and not masters.²⁷

Before he decided to angle for Bond support, Rhodes' view on the native vote was far more liberal than that of the Bond. Thus Kerriman wrote to his wife in 1886: "I remember when Rhodes used to propose to maintain British influence by using the native vote. Now he descants on the theme of the integral race difference between black and white and I shall not be surprised to find him an ardent advocate for the restriction of the franchise".²⁸ Soon however, he veered round to a policy acceptable to the Bond and thereby gained its support.²⁹ Rhodes was against the raw native having a vote, but if he became civilised then he was granted that privilege. Rhodes was in favour of a property and educational qualification for the

26. Coetzee: *Politieke Groepering in die woorde van die Afrikaners*, p.162.

27. *Our Land*, 9/4/'95, Report, Theron's speech at Port Elizabeth.

28. *Kerr. Papers*, No.16, 1886. J.K. Kerr, to Agnes Kerr.16 Jan.

29. *Mansard*, 1886, p.114.

enfranchisement of natives. Rhodes' native policy

"was to keep them apart from the white man; to encourage them to work; to give them control over their own affairs under the guidance of the magistrate; to give them primogeniture in land; to educate them gradually in work and civilisation....they must be helped along the road, but they must not be thrust into a position for which they were not yet fitted"³⁰

The Sprigg Government, dependant on the Bond, in 1887, introduced a bill to raise the franchise qualifications of natives. Rhodes declared himself whole-heartedly in favour of higher qualifications and entirely in sympathy with Afrikaner sentiment:

"He had much respect for the Dutchmen, while his own country accused him of landjobbing....He said this that as long as the natives remained in a state of barbarism we must treat them as a subject race and be lords of them....Hon. members need not be so jealous of the Dutchman's treatment of the natives. After the natives had rebelled in the Transkei, the Dutch gave them back their land, and the natives had received land from the Dutch where it would have been taken from them by any other nation....but for some reason or other some Dutchmen and Englishmen would never mingle well. He had been told this native question was the secret of it all. Well, as an Englishman he joined the member for Stellenbosch on this vote"³¹

This similarity of views led to the passing of the Franchise Bill 1892, which helped to strengthen the confidence of the Bond in the Premier.³² This Bill raised the occupation qualification from £25 to £75, the voter had to be able to write his name, address and occupation or profession; those who already had the vote would not be affected by these qualifications. The Bill also introduced the ballot.³³ Rhodes further met the demands of the Bond and promoted the co-operation of English and

30. Colvin: Op. Cit. P.61, et vide Ons Land. 28/4/194.

31. Hansard, 1887, p.102-104.

32. Ons Land, 31/12/'92.

33. Hansard, 1892, p.152.

Afrikaners, when he passed the Glen Grey Act of 1894. Its provisions were highly satisfactory to the Bond for it provided "for individual titles, requires unemployed natives to pay a labour tax, restricts the sale of liquor, and gives the natives in those districts where it is adopted, a simple system of municipal self-government".³⁴

Cecil Rhodes' chief aim was the expansion of British possessions in Southern Africa. The idea of gaining the "hinterland" had become an obsession to him and moreover, he was continually representing expansion into the interior as an expansion of the Cape Colony. He therefore appealed to the self-interests of the Cape Colonists to assist him in this expansion. Moreover, he held before them the ideal of the Voortrekker, a wide expanse of wild country to be taken possession of. "Geef den Afrikaner het vooruitzicht een mooie groote plaats goedkoop te kunnen koopen en hij is gereed eene onderneming te wagen".³⁵

To the Afrikaner, the territory to the north of the Limpopo was as much the heritage of the Cape Colony as the South African Republic, and Hofmeyr, for instance, favoured a policy by which the Cape and Republic would go hand in hand into the hinterland of Southern Africa.³⁶ But it was the unfriendly attitude later adopted by the Transvaal, that neutralised the sympathy of the Cape for their kinsmen across the Vaal³⁷ and induced them to support Rhodes in his ideas of expansion.

34. Journal, 3/9/1899.

35. Ons Land, 25/2/1896.

36. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.333.

37. Infra, p.221.

Rhodes' first step in the way of expansion secured for Britain, Bechuanaland - the "Suez Canal of the Interior". He increased his political influence among the Afrikaners when he made a stand against the Jingoism of Sir Charles Warren and Revd Mackenzie and when he protested against Warren's policy of excluding Dutch farmers from Bechuanaland.⁵⁸ Rhodes' policy with regard to Bechuanaland is clearly put in a letter to the Under-Secretary for India, Lord Harris, which throws very interesting light on Rhodes' outlook and aims:

"My main object in the whole question ((Annexation of Bechuanaland)) has been to retain the interior and shut the Transvaal in, and I felt that England would not stand permanently the cost of a crown colony in the interior. A protectorate is liable to be abandoned at any moment so I worked throughout for annexation to the Cape Colony. Once made English territory it could not be abandoned....I am so afraid the British public will get sick of it and clear out and then it will drift back to the Transvaal. If Warren had worked with the Governor we could have carried Annexation to the Colony. As it is, nothing has been done. Do not be led away by the assertion that I am pro-Dutch in my sympathies. I had to consider the best mode of permanently checking the expansion of the Boer Republics in the interior. The only solution I can see is to enclose them by the Cape Colony....my instructions have always been that after asserting British supremacy the course desired was Colonial annexation. Against this Warren, has agitated ever since we went into the country and I feel I have been placed in a false position"⁵⁹

But the acquisition of British Bechuanaland was merely the first step. In the interior still lay Matabeleland and Mashonaland and vast stretches of country beyond the Zambesi. To acquire this territory Rhodes was convinced that he should

58. Colvin: Cecil Rhodes, p.57, et Journal, 8/7/'85.

59. Rhodes Papers. Advisability of Annexing Bechuanaland 1883, C.J. Rhodes to Lord Harris, 7/6/'85.

work through the Cape Afrikaners and not make use of the Imperial Government as a less far-sighted British Imperialist would have done. The Imperial Factor had to be kept in the background and moreover, it was too unreliable - it had a few years previously abandoned the Transvaal in spite of promises of retention to British subjects who settled there.⁴⁰ Rhodes looked upon the Imperial Factor as a last resort, so that to a great extent he was at one with the Afrikaners in that he disliked the intervention of Downing Street in South African politics.⁴¹ Merriman put it as follows to Leonard Courtney:

"The Dutchman in South Africa 'resented the constant appeals by a section of the British to Great Britain for assistance in their own quarrels, and welcomed Mr. Rhodes because that politician professed to be of the same mind with South Africans on that point. The 'Political ambition' of the Dutchman at least in the Cape Colony, was to obtain the same independence of Downing Street - which stands to all colonists of every race as the embodiment of all evil - as that so freely granted to other self-governing colonies. His political 'ideals' were drawn from English history and from English text books"⁴²

Several years before he had succeeded to the Ministry, Rhodes, on the question of Colonial expansion, expressed himself in terms acceptable to the Bond. He addressed a meeting at Kimberley in 1888, and said: "I have held, gentlemen, but one view, that is, the Government of South Africa by the people of South Africa, whilst keeping the Imperial tie for self-defence; and that Government, I am proud to feel, can rule Natalaland equally with Bechuanaland". Then after re-

40. Vindex: Op. cit. p.30.

41. Mitchell: Rhodes, Vol.I, p.144.

42. Merr. Papers, No.282, 1901, J.X. Merr. to L.Courtney, 17 Oct.

viewing his whole political career he summed up his South African policy as follows:

"Here are the politics of South Africa in a nutshell. Let us leave the Free State and the Transvaal to their own destiny. We must adopt the whole responsibility of the interior. Let us consider that as an inheritance of the Cape Colony, and let us be prepared to take that responsibility at all hazards. As for neighbouring states, we must take responsibility as to the railway communication, if they desire it. We must propose a Customs Union on every suitable occasion; but we must always remember that the gist of the South African question lies in the extension of the Cape Colony to the Zambesi. If you, gentlemen, are prepared to take that, there is no difficulty in the future. We must endeavour to make those who live with us feel that there is no race distinction between us; whether Dutch or English, we are combined in one object; and that is the union of the States of South Africa, without abandoning the Imperial tie. And what do we mean by the Imperial tie is this, that we have the most perfect self-government internally, whilst retaining to ourselves the obligation of mutual defence against the outside world"⁴³

Rhodes successfully weaned the Cape Afrikaners from the idea that the expansion into the interior was the rightful heritage of their kinsmen, the Transvaalers. This fact is revealed by his speech in the Cape House in 1888:

"Instead of the feeling prevailing four years ago that the Transvaal should have the expansion of the interior, and then that we should join with them, hon. members of this House now saw clearly that if they allowed the Transvaal to take the interior they would never join with us. And hon. members now also felt most distinctly that the interior is the one thing we must hold, and that no one is to be allowed to take the interior, and to be the dominant State in South Africa, except the Cape Colonythat being the English and the Afrikaner sentiment of the Cape Colony"⁴⁴

After Bechuanaland had become a protectorate, Rhodes knew very well that the Cape Colony could hardly be induced to take

43. C. Argus, 5/10/'88. Rhodes on Politics at Kimberley, at Vindex: Op. cit. p.221 et 226.

44. Hansard, 1888, p.357.

over the northern territories; further he had no faith that the Imperial Government would undertake further annexation as it was unwilling to face the cost of administration and development of new territories. Realising that a private enterprise was necessary, he developed the idea of a chartered company.⁴⁵ The British Government granted the British South Africa Company its charter on 29th October, 1889, with full powers in administrative matters in Matabeleland and Mashonaland.⁴⁶ Although the administration of the interior was not undertaken by the Cape Government, the development of these territories was dependent on Cape support and on the Afrikaners. Rhodes knew that the best pioneer was the Dutch-Afrikaner, hence his motto: "Dutch colonization under the British flag".⁴⁷ Further the Afrikaners feared that if Rhodes did not take possession of the unclaimed interior some other European power would - especially Germany as it had already shown much interest in southern Africa when it annexed South West Africa. Such a development would further complicate the South African political stage. Moreover, Rhodes always held out a promise that Rhodesia would become a Cape Colony heritage.⁴⁸ Rhodes was also permitted to propagate his ideas within the Bond. In 1891, it held its Annual Congress at Kimberley and there he addressed the assembly explaining that "the development of the North is Cape Colony development. I have undertaken this Northern

45. Imperialist: Cecil Rhodes, p.28.

46. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.382.

47. Ibid. p.407.

48. One Land, 25/2/'96.

development as a Cape Colonist....The future rests with you. I say it rests with you because I look on the Afrikaner Bond as a party I can work cordially with. Your ideas are the same as mine"⁴⁹.

Rhodes had clearly hoodwinked the Bond. The Dutch-Afrikaner press gave him its full support and advocated his ideas in its columns; to them Mashonaland was "het land der belofte"⁵⁰. Thus the "Zuid-Afrikaan", some two months after the formation of the first Rhodes Ministry, wrote:

"De Bond wil geen eigen verheffing, geen verdeeling van brooden en visschen onder zijn leden, maar hij wil bevestiging en uitbreiding van de magt der Kolonisten in het algemeen, en daarom voegt hij die staatsmannen die, al zijn zij geen geboren Afrikaners, toch waarborgen bieden dat zij met goed gevolg naar het vermelde doel zullen streven"⁵¹.

When the British Government made a treaty with Lobengula, the Afrikaner Party was powerless to interfere, yet the "Zuid-Afrikaan" approved of this contract:

"Toen het echter bleek dat de man die van die politiek toen zij haar doel bereikt had, dacht te profiteeren de heer Rhodes was, toen zagen die Afrikaners die den heer Rhodes en diens politieke loopbaan en inzichten kenden, terstond in dat, als kolonisatie van het Noorden onder het gezag van Engeland's Koningin moest plaats hebben, er niemand te vinden was die ze meer in Afrikaner zin zou vinden dan de heer Rhodes"⁵².

Further, "Di Patriot", originally an anti-British paper with strong republican tendencies had also fallen under Rhodes' spell and on 7th July, 1892, wrote: "...di Koloni en di hele Suid-Afrika is Meneer Rhodes dank verskuldig ver wat hy gedaan het

49. C. Argus, 1/4/'91, Rhodes at Bond Congress Kimberley, 30/3/'91.

50. Z.-Afr. 27/1/'91.

51. Ibid. 13/9/'90.

52. Ibid. 31/10/'91.

tot behoud en opening van di binnelande vor ons Afrikaners".

The following year it followed this up by quoting with approval a leader from "De Paarl":

"Meer dan eens vonden we gelegenheid er op te wyzen hoe Rhodes juist in der daad de machtigste tegenstander is van Imperialisme, en dat het plicht is van elkeen die de vrye ontwikkeling onzer Zuid-Afrikaansche nationaliteit is ((?)) zich te scharen aan de zijde van de heer Rhodes ten einde juist in dezen stryd onoverwinnelijk te makenRhodes gedooft zijne ((Imperialism's)) heerschappij in Zuid-Afrika niet lango, - en hy heeft thans de meeste macht tot tegenweer"⁵³

Rhodes and Hofmeyr could also co-operate because both wished to avoid, if possible, any unwelcome interference of the British Government in South African affairs. In the Assembly Hofmeyr declared that independence might easily come to South Africa, if the British were defeated at sea:

"When independence did come, unless there were a cordial understanding between Dutch and English, it would come, not as a blessing, but as a curse....He said this at Richmond, Cradock and Bacoemfontein and would repeat it as often as the occasion arose. There was ill-feeling and misunderstanding between Dutch and English, and this had been brought about by the interference of certain British representatives in South Africa. Knowing this bitterness of feeling which had brought about collisions in the past, and no one regretted it more than he did, he would not stir hand or foot to establish another Crown Colony ((Basutoland)) in South Africa in close contact with the Dutch Republics. He believed that if the Bill were passed it would lead to complications, not perhaps immediately, but in a very few years"⁵⁴

This must have set Rhodes thinking, for soon afterwards he raised the motto: "Eliminate the Imperial Factor".⁵⁵

The Unification of the Federation of the South African states and colonies had claimed the attention of South African

53. Pat. 26/10/'93.

54. C.Argus, 20/7/'83, Assembly Debate, 19/7/'83.

55. Williams: Cecil Rhodes, p.80.

statesmen since the time of Sir George Grey. It was on this question also that we find that the views of the Bond and Rhodes approximated. The ideal of a United South Africa occupied a prominent place in the Bond constitution. When S.J. du Toit suggested the founding of an Afrikaner Bond he put the achievement of this ideal as the main object of the Bond and he wished it to be "under its own flag".⁵⁶ In the general Bond constitution as adopted at Richmond in 1883, a United South Africa was regarded the country's "final destiny",⁵⁷ and the words "under its own flag" were deleted.⁵⁸ This ideal was again repeated in the Programme of Principles adopted in 1889.⁵⁹ It was also the ideal of the leader of the Bond, J.H. Hofmeyr, who believed that a British South Africa was the only possible constitutional position for a United South Africa; to him the question of a united country "under its own flag" was still very far removed from the sphere of practical politics.⁶⁰ To Rhodes with his great schemes for British expansion it was only natural that a United South Africa should be included in his ideals.

Very early in his political career Rhodes stated his views on the question of a United South Africa. Addressing the House of Assembly on 18th July, 1883, he said that he believed in a "United States of South Africa" as part of the British Empire. If all the states united under a system of Responsible

56. du Toit: S.J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, p.187.

57. Vide Appendix, C.

58. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.377.

59. Vide Appendix, E.

60. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.377, et vide Ons Land, 23/4/'92.

government, it would be very much like a republic; he thought however, that it would be advantageous if the Imperial bond were maintained.⁶¹ On announcing his policy to the House on the formation of his first Ministry in 1890, Rhodes stated that the Ministerial policy would be "a purely South African" one.⁶² What he meant by such a policy he explained at Kimberley a few months later, namely:

"that they would do all in their power, whilst looking after the interests of the Cape Colony, to draw closer and closer the various interests of the neighbouring states.... They were doing everything in their power to allay the feeling of estrangement which formerly existed between this colony and the neighbouring states and they trusted there would be no repetition of the disaster of Majuba Hill....he ((Rhodes)) believed that ultimately the states would be united"⁶³

Rhodes made another striking speech, on this question at the Bond Congress at Kimberley in 1891. In most flattering terms and amid applause he went out of his way to show how completely he was at sympathy with the Bond on this treasured ideal of the Afrikaners:

"I look upon your organisation as an expression of the desire of the people in the Country to claim their share in the politics of the country, and to express their views upon public questions....as Prime Minister of the Colony, I know, when I am dealing with the representatives of the people....

"The principles of the Bond, instead of creating a diversity of States or parties, instead of, inducing antagonism, have the opposite effect; they aim at working quietly, year after year, to bring South Africa into one system as to its railways, as to its Customs, and trade in the various products of the country....I recognise that the Afrikaner Bond's policy is to remove difficulties and obstructions from the way of union (hear,hear). Your ideas are the same as mine. It is not for us to interfere

61. C.Argus; 19/7/'83, Assembly Debate, 18/7/'83.

62. Hansard, 1890, p.149.

63. C.Argus, 5/9/'90, Premier at Kimberley.

with the independence of the States that are neighbouring to us; it is for us to obtain Customs relations, railway communications, and Free Trade in products with them, but never to interfere with their independence.... there is no difference between my policy and yours, because when you founded your Society you founded it not on a basis of a local idea but on a basis of a broad United South Africa"64

During the last years of the 'eighties the Pretoria Government in the interests of its own state started to follow a policy of exclusiveness which in the Cape and by the Bond was construed as one of hostility. Thereby the South African Republic played into the hands of Cecil Rhodes and made his task of conciliating the Cape Afrikaner an easy one. This estrangement between the Bond and S.A. Republic created among Afrikaners an openmindedness towards Englishmen and the Imperial Government which lasted till the Jameson Raid. The S.A. Republic levied heavy duties on products imported into the Transvaal and this evoked a strong protest from the Cape press:

"Men heeft welgemeende pogingen der Afrikaner party om de republiek van dienst te zijn óf bespot óf volkomen geïgnoreerd. Men heeft sedert de laatste jaren zooveel mogelijk zijn best gedaan om Kolonialen invloed uit de republiek te weren. Men heeft stelselmatig den invoer van Koloniale produkten bemoeilijkt, en dat nog wel van produkten die noch de republiek zelf noch hare zuster-republiek kon voortbrengen. Men heeft samenwerking met de Kolonie op welk gebied ook zooveel mogelijk vermeden. De aan de regeering bevriende bladen hebben een gerogel- 65 den veldtocht geopend tegen alles wat uit de Kolonie komt".

In the new country, opened up by Rhodes, the produce and wagons of the Cape Afrikaners were received untaxed and this treatment when contrasted by the Cape Afrikaners with that of the S.A.

XXX 64. C.Argus, 1/4/'91. Rhodes at Bond Congress Kimberley.
65. Ons Land, 24/1/'95.

Republic, increased their satisfaction with Rhodes, who although an Englishman, was developing Rhodesia to their advantage. ⁶⁶

A very sore point was also the introduction of a large number of Hollander officials into the S.A. Republic to the exclusion of Cape Dutch. These men were as much foreigners, except for some affinity of language, as Germans or Frenchmen; in the Cape the Republic could have found plenty of capable men who spoke the same language as the Transvalers, who were allied to them by ties of blood and moreover knew the ways of the country. But Kruger did not trust the Cape Afrikaners. To him they were "Ver-Engelschte" who would endanger the independence of the S.A. Republic. ⁶⁷ This treatment of the Cape Afrikaner was a matter of sincere regret to them. Thus the "Zuid-Afrikaan" of 15th December, 1891, wrote: "Er bestaat een spanning tusschen Hollanders en Afrikaners in de Z.A. Republiek, een spanning die niets dan kwaad kan stichten, en die daarom elk die het wel meent met het land zal willen verhelpen". So also "Pi Patriot" of 11th May, 1893, wrote:

"In Transvaal, weet alger, bestaat 'n sterke antipatie teen koloniste. 'n Afrikaner uit di Koloni het net min te sê, en moet op sy staan as 'n betrekking ope is en dit an 'n sekere party gelaat is om dit toe te staan. 'n Afrikaner uit di Koloni word daar baie ni anders as 'n volslage Imperialist en Jingoe beskou. Of dit is uit dankbaarheid omdat di koloniste so fluke met Transvaal gesimpatiseer het en stoum verleen het in di vryheidsoorlog, laat ons nou mar op syn plek...."

66. Bryce: Impressions of S. Africa, p.402, et Vindex: Op. cit. p.400. Merr. Papers, No. 2, 1896. A critical account of the circumstances attending the Jameson Raid. 8 Jan.

67. C. Argus, 14/9/'92.

This attitude of the S.A. Republic gave Rhodes an excellent opportunity to appeal to the Cape Colonists to go to Matabeleland and Mashonaland where they would find ample scope for their ability.⁶⁸

But it was the attitude of the S.A. Republic towards the extension of the Cape railways to the Gold Mines and a Customs Union with the Cape that brought about the greatest estrangement between the two territories. In July, 1885, and again in 1886, the Republic made friendly overtures to the Cape Government for a Customs Union and also urged the Cape Government to extend its railways to Pretoria. The S.A. Republic was experiencing an acute economic depression and such a development as it suggested, would help to promote its welfare. The Uppington Ministry, however, found it impossible to accede to the request and a golden opportunity was lost.⁶⁹ From now on the S.A. Republic in order to maintain its political and economic independence would have little to do with the coastal British Colonies and the Cape in particular. To restore the prosperity of their country, the Transvaalers revived the railway scheme of President Burgers and sought to secure communication with the Portuguese harbour of Lourenco Marques, their natural outlet to the sea. All subsequent attempts on the part of the Cape to secure either a Customs Union or railway communication with the Transvaal

68. Vindex: Op. cit. p.206. et seq.

69. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.324-5.

were wrecked on Kruger's preference for the Delagoa Bay railway connection.⁷⁰ This was a matter of intense regret among Cape Colonists especially after the development of the gold mining industry on the Rand.

Rightly or wrongly the policy of exclusiveness of the S.A. Republic evoked the bitter feelings of the Cape Colonists. Merriman writing in January, 1896, put it as follows: "....Certainly in this part of the Colony, in the districts of the Paarl and Stellenbosch which in the war of 1880-81 gave their absolute and cordial support to the Transvaal cause, the dislike and distrust of President Kruger and his policy were very marked and found widespread expression".⁷¹ The Cape Town branch of the Bond on 11th August, 1887, decided that a committee consisting of Hofmeyr, Regter, de Waal and van Oordt should draw up a memorial to the Pretoria branch of the Bond and to President Kruger.⁷² This document pointed out that the Cape had tried to prevent the attack on the independence of the Transvaal in 1877; public meetings had been held and petitions sent to England; it thwarted Carnarvon's Confederation Scheme. Piet Joubert, who came to seek help in the Cape Colony, was received with open arms, Frere's Conference proposals were rejected in order to aid the Transvaal; Frere lost the support of Colonial Afrikaners because they disapproved of his support of the annexation of Transvaal.

70. Coetzee: Spoorweg Ontwikkeling in die S.A. Republiek, p.165, et Dilke: Problems of Greater Britain, p.287, et Hofmeyr Papers; Vol. No.13, Fraser to J.H. Hofmeyr M.L.A., 1/7/'89.
71. Merr. Papers, No.8, 1896. Notes on present political situation in South Africa, 22 Jan.
72. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.330.

The Bond sent messages to England exposing the Transvaal cause. The then F.P.A. collected money for medical aid for commando's⁷³ and to help the widows and children of the Transvaal burgers.

In his reply to this memorial Kruger pointed out that the Maintenance of the independence of the Republic was at stake. Further, he acknowledged the debt owing to the Cape:

"Met dankbaarheid blijf ek steeds gedenken de simpatie, de hulp en den steun, ons tijdens de annexatie en den daarop gevolgden Vrijheidsoorlog door onze Zuid Afrikaansche broeders der Kaapkolonie geschonken. Ik zal het nooit vergeten, hoe zij ons geholpen hebben om onze onafhankelijkheid te herkrijgen; hoe daarop hun streven was gericht.....

"Het doet my leed uit uw schrijven te moeten vernemen, dat die handelingen verkoeling aan uwe zijde hebben teweeggebracht. Van onze zijde bestaat die niet"⁷⁴

Although the S.A. Republic may have been justified in taking up this attitude it undoubtedly had a detrimental effect on the relations between that state and the Bond-Afrikaners of the Cape. "Di Patriot", the Bond organ, and formerly the foremost champion of the cause of the Republic, repeatedly expressed its regret at the ostranged relations and put the blame on the S.A. Republic. It urged the Cape Colony to annex everything up to the Zambesi. "Dit wil Mr. Rhodes en ons wil dit ook....en dit sou tienmaal beter wees om dit an Transvaal o'er te laant, mar daar is weinig kans op. Di Transvaalse Hegering vervreemd di harte van hulle vrinde in di Koloni, en werk di Jingoos in di hand"⁷⁵ Some time later it wrote in a similar spirit but with more resentment: "Ieder keer as daar 'n kans is om met

⁷³C.Argus, 16/9/'87.

⁷⁴Quoted by Coetzee: Politieke Groepering in die wording van die Afrikanernasie, p.151, from Volkstem, 29/9/'87.

⁷⁵Pat. 12/10/'88.

di Koloni saam te werk vind ons by di Transvalers 'n sekere wedervil....'n sekere agteruitstaan, waardeur duidelik blyk dat hulle in Transvaal so min mo'ontlik met di Koloni wil saamgaan".⁷⁶ On 8th August, 1889, it wrote that railway connection with the Transvaal should be encouraged so that the unification of South Africa might be encouraged and Afrikaner nationality promoted:

"Di Transvaal werk dit altyd te'en, en meen te gelykertyd syn onafhanklikheid te kan bewaar. Dwasor gedagte is daar seker ni....ons (Transvaal) kan sonder di Koloni klaar kom, en ons is mans genoeg om ons self te regeer en te bestuur. So ver goed; mar ongelukkig het ons as Afrikaners groot belang daarin, dat di Transvaal ni Engels word ni, dat di Afrikaanse nasionaliteit daar bewaar blyf en dit is het huis wat ons doet spreek. As ons bloot as Koloniste o'er di saak denk, dan weet ons goed genoeg, wat ons moet doen, en in plaas van Spoorweg uitbreiding van Kimberley te'en te werk, sou ons di sterk bevorder; mar ons kan ni, omdat ons ons oie huis dan afbreek".⁷⁷

The Cape farmers, mostly Afrikaners, in 1890, therefore, felt that they were being unjustly treated by the Republic and by President Paul Kruger. They grew dissatisfied with this humiliating position. At the critical moment Rhodes, with his British South Africa Company, aided by the Imperial and Cape Governments was able to decide on the construction of a railway line from Kimberley to Mafeking and Rhodesia. Thus Kruger was outflanked and the Cape farmers saw a future for them and their

76. Pat. 13/3/'90.

77. Et vide Pat. 14/11/'89 et 5/6/'90. The virulence of "Di Patriot's" attacks on Transvaal may partially be explained by the fact that in 1889, Revd S.J. du Toit, after coming into conflict with the "Hollander-klied", as he called it, resigned the post of Superintendent of Education and settled at Paarl where he again took up his interests in "Di Patriot" - the paper he had founded. Pat. 21/8/'90.

children not in the Transvaal but in the vast lands beyond the Limpopo, and therefore they willingly supported Rhodes.

Since the Bond was not desirous of taking office but lent its support to other minority groups, it stands to reason that in seeking a modus operandi the Bond would have to water down its principles.⁷⁸ "Ons Land" of 12th March, 1892, answered the question why Afrikaners have effected so much during recent years in Parliament, as follows:

"The Africander National Party has effected much in Parliament, in the first place, because it is something more than a 'Bond Party', consisting solely of Bondsmen and elected solely by Bondsmen,....and in the second place, because that party has ever been ready to give as well as to take, because it has learnt to be patient and to make the best use of its opportunities, and has never tried to break iron with the hand."^{78a}

Bearing in mind that Rhodes was a man gifted with strong persuasive powers,⁷⁹ the Bond and Bond leaders were at a distinct disadvantage when dealing with him.

In course of time the Bond indentified itself with British ideals and aspirations to such an extent that there was hardly any difference between its views and those of Rhodes. As early as 1888, "Di Patriot" wrote that the English papers were no longer so hostile towards the Bond as formerly. The reason was that some papers had become better acquainted with the Bond, "mar 'n ander oorsaak is seker ook dat di Bond nou baing moor Engelsgesind is as vro'er....en sterke Jingo gevoelens word nou partykeer op Bonds vergaderings uitgespreek en nogal met

78.Vide Coetzee: Op. cit. p.133.

78a. At that time "Ons Land" also published an English translation of its leading articles.

79.Supra, p.212.

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gejuig ontvang". At Kimberley in a speech at a Bond Congress dinner, Rhodes amid loud cheers declared that he "felt most completely and entirely that the objects and aspirations of the Afrikaner Bond were in complete touch and concert with a fervent loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen".⁸¹

Not only was there a strong British tendency noticeable within the ranks of the Bond, but also Hofmeyr welcomed Englishmen to the Bond, on one occasion he stated that he preferred to see five Englishmen rather than a hundred Cape Dutch join the Bond. In a speech at Stellenbosch towards the end of 1888, he said that

"he felt more and more, that the Afrikaner Party would never become a truly national party, as long as it could not gain the confidence and the co-operation of enlightened Englishmen, who were prepared to gather at our side. In that way he would attempt to strengthen his party, where he could, by means of men, who were attached to it in principle, irrespective of their birth or descent"⁸²

IV. PARLIAMENTARY COALITION.

82a

On Sprigg's resignation in 1890, Sir Henry Loch offered the Premiership to J.W. Sauer, the leader of the Opposition who had the support of Merriman and Innes. Sauer realised that it

80. Pat. 1/6/'88. This article was no doubt written in consequence of an incident which took place at Paarl at the Provincial meeting of the Bond 24/5/'88, of which there is an account in the same paper: "De Voorzitter trad nu op en zeide dat het besloten was om om 11 uur een heildronk in te stellen op den 69ste verjaardag van Hare Majesteit de Koningin (luide en aanhoudende toejuiching.) Hij zou de leden nu verzoeken om hunne glazen te vullen.....

"De glazen worden gevuld en de heildronk gedronken met een geestdrift, die alleen Bondsmannen kunnen toonen -ja, de warmste Engelschen kon die niet met meer geestdrift gedronken hebben. Men dronk het staande. Prof. Jan de Villiers sprong naar het harmonium en als een man ging het Engelsche volkslied op".

81. C.Argus 1/4/'91, Rhodes at Bond Congress Kimberley.

82. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.374.

82.a. Supra, p.207.

would be impossible for him to maintain his position seeing that he, Herriman and Innes were regarded as negrophiles by the Bond, and would therefore not have its support. Sauer therefore advised Loch to send for Rhodes who could count on the support of the Bond.⁸³

On the resignation of Sprigg, Hofmeyr was in Pretoria on his Swaziland mission. Rhodes resolved to meet the Bond members and ask their support. On Wednesday, 16th July, 1890, the Bond members of Parliament held a caucus meeting in No.13 Committee Room. T.P. Theron proposed and A.S. du Plessis seconded: "This meeting is of opinion that Mr. Rhodes and his Government should be given 'fair play' in the administration of the country and its interests". This was carried unanimously. Then de Waal proposed and Venter seconded: "This meeting approves of Mr. Hofmeyr, M.L.A., becoming a Local Director of the Chartered Company to watch the interests of the Colony". This was also carried unanimously.⁸⁴ On the same day Rhodes wired to Hofmeyr that both he and Sauer would be willing to serve under him, but Hofmeyr refused and promised to support Rhodes.⁸⁵ On the 17th the new ministry was sworn in. Rhodes was Premier and Commis-

83. Millin: Rhodes, p.126.

84. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.388. The original minutes, in Dutch, are to be found in Hofmeyr papers, Vol.I. On this memorable occasion there were present: Messrs. Botha (Chairman), Theron, v.d. Walt, H. du Plessis, Jan du Plessis, Jotham Joubert, Imelman, le Roux, Faure, Siverwright, P. du Toit, A. du Toit, van Zijl, Wege, J.I. de Villiers, van der Heever, van der Bijl, Krige, Venter, Morholdt, du Plessis M.L.C., Bowker Weeber, Luttig, van Rensburg, de Waal, D.F. du Toit ("Patriot") Horton, Nixon.

Hofmeyr refused this directorship. Lovell: The Struggle for S.Africa, p.135.

85. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.389.

sioner of Public Works; Merriman was Treasurer; P.H. Faure, M.L.A., (later Sir Pieter Faure) Secretary for Native Affairs; Rose-Innes, Attorney-General; Sauer, Colonial Secretary and Sivewright Minister without portfolio. Rhodes's acceptance of the portfolio of Commissioner of Public Works was a temporary measure as there were technical objections to the Premier not holding a portfolio. A few months later however, Sivewright⁸⁶ became Commissioner.

When the Rhodes Ministry succeeded to office, the country was prosperous; for the time being the Imperial factor was eliminated.⁸⁷ In the House of Assembly the Ministry had a two to one majority.⁸⁸ The Ministry contained men of undoubted ability - Merriman, Innes, Sauer, Sivewright, Rhodes himself - and moreover it could rely on the Bond and Hofmeyr who was constantly consulted. Despite these favourable circumstances it contained elements of disruption. Merriman was not very happy. He wrote to his sister, Charlotte Barry:

"We have settled down in our ministerial nests with our noses in the Treasury crib, but I cannot say that I feel either proud or pleased and both Sauer, Innes and I have a good many things to gulp down. I therefore hardly like to predict a very long life for our craft, but I am quite sure that Rhodes will be quite as happy with Sprigg and Upington"⁸⁹

A few months later he wrote to his wife in a similar strain:

"....I cannot conceal the feeling that Rhodes is jealous of me personally and that he would throw over all his colleagues if he thought he could do better and I am one of those ((,)) I confess it with sorrow ((,)) who are never at hearts ease ((")) while they behold a greater

86. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p. 583. Sivewright and Faure were members of the Bond.

87. Moltenc: Dominion of Afrikanerdom, p. 23.

88. C. Argus, 17/7/'90.

89. Merr. Papers. No. 121, 1890. J.X. Merr. to C. Barry, 1 Oct.

than themselves". I confess that open hostility would be more pleasant than subservience but this is a mean feeling for "if two men ride on a horse one must ride in front" and I do not see any way of getting there just yet. Probably R. ((hodes)) may count the cost and not drive ⁹⁰ matters to extremes but we are fore warned at any rate".

Rose-Innes made a similar confession of differences among the ministers at a political meeting at Woodstock, some months after he, Sauer and Merriman had left office on account of the Logan affair: They had known that there were many points of difference among them, but they had to choose between sinking their differences and carrying on the government of the Colony or else see that Sprigg should come back and carry out a railway scheme which all thought not to be in the interests of the Colony.⁹¹

When the first Rhodes Ministry took office there was no opposition worthy of the name. Rhodes had included in his Ministry all the capable men in Parliament - with the exception of Sprigg who had just vacated office, and Hofmeyr who consistently refused office.^{after 1881} Moreover, the Bond had become such an all-embracing organisation working for the benefit of all Colonists that no other party could be formed to differ in any fundamental way from the Bond. Thus the "Zuid-Afrikaan" wrote: "De beweging ((Bond)) strekt niet ten gunste van een deel der Kolonisten, maar haar doel is de heerschappy van het Kolonistendom in ons werelddeel, en dit wordt door de Regeringen die in haar politiek den steun der Bondsleden plegen te genieten,

90. Merr. Papers, No. 65, 1891. J.X. Merr. to Agnes Merr. 18 March.

91. C. Times, 17/10/'93. Report Political Meeting at Woodstock, 16/10/'93, et vide C. Argus, 12/1/'94. Sprigg's East London Speech, 12/1/'94.

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wel dogelyk ingesien". During the session of 1892, the
"Zuid-Afrikaner" could point to only four men as belonging to
the Opposition, namely Sir Gordon Sprigg and Messrs. Scherm-
brucker, O'Reilly and Douglass.⁹³ The situation simply resolved
itself into a position in which the Bond dominated all and those
who did not fall under its influence were divided into a number
of insignificant groups:

"If a stranger were to inquire about the composition of our
political parties, the only answer would be that there is
a party calling itself Afrikaner, practically identical
with the Bond, and no party besides - only a fortuitous⁹⁴
concourse of atoms. We are a pattern and law unto ourselves!"

V. LOGAN CRISIS.

The first Rhodes Ministry, although capable, lacked soli-
darity and it was broken up chiefly on account of Sivewright's
action. He was Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works
and therefore, the railways also fell under his care. Sivewright
gave a contract for the supply of refreshments to the Government
Railways, to a personal friend of his, J.D. Logan who already⁹⁵
had a share of the refreshment trade. This contract gave Logan
the monopoly of the catering trade along all the Colonial Rail-
ways for nearly eighteen years.⁹⁶ Granting such a huge monopoly
to one person, and especially in South Africa where there was
very strong feeling against monopolies was very unwise because
it conferred considerable political power into the hands of the
holder. Objections were also raised against this contract

92. Z.-Afr. 2/2/'92, et vide C.Argus 26/2/'92.

93. Z.-Afr. 28/6/'92.

94. C.Times, 13/7/'92.

95. C.Argus, 21/6/'93.

96. Cape B.E. A.4-'93, p.iv.

because Logan, a troublesome political agitator, was the holder, and he, by using his position at Matjesfontein, already controlled the Worcester vote. With this contract his canteens would spread over 2,000 miles of railway and 9,000 railway officials would all be indebted to him; his influence would be great especially in view of the approaching general elections.⁹⁷ Sivewright had also committed a few errors; in the first instance he had not called for tenders for the contract, and in the second instance he had concealed it from his colleagues as the matter was never brought up for Cabinet discussion. The other Ministers only heard about it through the press.⁹⁸ Further, Sivewright had neglected to send the contract to the office of the Attorney-General for perusal as was customary.⁹⁹ Sivewright admitted that he had never even seen the contract but had authorised the proposed arrangements because the railway experts had unanimously recommended it.¹⁰⁰

The magnitude of Sivewright's offence was entirely out of proportion to the storm of protest that it raised. Public opinion was outraged and three of the Ministers - Sauer, Innes and Herriman - were determined to have the matter looked into. A cabinet meeting was held and the following cable sent to Rhodes, then in England, with Sivewright:

97. Cape B.B. A.4-'93, p.iv. Questions 552-4 et 660, et vide Hansard, 1893, p.p.5,16.

98. Hansard, 1893, p.5

99. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.443.

100. Hofmeyr: Papers, Vol. 20. Sivewright to Hon. Mr. Ross, 22/11/'92.

"All refreshment rooms on Railways under our control leased to Logan without tenders called for ((;)) ten years right renewal five years. Much feeling ((?)) on the matter. Cabinet think steps should be taken cancel Contract. Reported Company to be floated. Immediate action necessary. See Sivewright wire"¹

On the same day Rhodes and Sivewright replied:

"Railway refreshment arrangements((t)) authorised after recommendation strongly urged by all departmental heads see Elliott and others we confirm what you on spot consider best ((.)) Rhodes Sivewright"²

The Ministers at the Cape were determined that the contract should be cancelled and on 19th November 1892, cabled to Rhodes and Sivewright asking the latter to inform Logan to that effect.³ The two Ministers in England agreed to this proposal.⁴ At the same time some pressure was brought to bear from Bond quarters and Hofmeyr and Graaff sent the following communication to Sivewright: "Logan contract causes great dissatisfaction weakens ministry places friends in false position. Retreat in time show Rhodes"⁵. When Logan found that the contract was cancelled he sued the Cape Government for fifty thousand pounds damages for breach of contract.⁶

Herriman and his supporters - Gauer and Innes - were not satisfied with merely the cancellation of the Logan Contract. They brought other charges against Sivewright. The Contract had been cancelled with his consent and yet he afterwards claimed

1. P.M. 261, 18/11/'92.

2. Ibid. Ibid.

3. Ibid. 19/11/'92.

4. P.M. 261, 19/11/'92.

5. Hofmeyr Papers, Vol. No. 9H. Copy of telegram Hofmeyr and Graaff to Sivewright 18/11/'92. It later transpired that Sivewright had neglected to show Rhodes this telegram. - Hansard, 1893, p.5.

6. P.M. 261. 29/11/'92.

the liberty of supporting it on his own. This was subversive to the principle of cabinet unanimity. Further they complained that he had flagrantly broken the principle of cabinet secrecy by disclosing confidential cabinet cablegrams to Hon. Mr. Ross who showed their contents to men in Cape Town and published them in the "Cape Argus".⁷ That the Government's position was critical was revealed in a cablegram from Hofmeyr to Rhodes, dated 14th March, 1893: "Do not wish ever to appear to dictate; but in your own even more than in ministerial interest it is imperatively necessary to return soon as possible. Allegiance of many of even your best friends severely strained by continued absence".⁸

On Sivewright's return from England on 24th April, 1893, Merriman and his supporters made it clear to Rhodes that they would no longer sit in the same cabinet as Sivewright; as Merriman put it his mother:

"This Logan business ofcourse renders it quite impossible for me to sit in the same cabinet with a man who could do such a thing as well as others which have come to my notice. And as soon as Rhodes returns an explanation must take place which will probably end in my resignation..... Surely we have seen the wicked in great power and flourishing like green bay trees with our Sivewrights and our Barnatons!"⁹

From this letter it is clear that Merriman - and his friends for that matter - were not at variance with Sivewright on account of the Logan Contract only. After all, the contract had been cancelled and with it all cause for a rupture, if

7. Merr. Papers, No. 69, 1893. Diary by Agnes Merr. 7 May.

8. Hofmeyr Papers, Vol. No. 20. Hofmeyr to Rhodes pro Sivewright, 14/3/'93.

9. Merr. Papers, No. 30, 1893. J.X. Merriman. to Julia Merr. 18 Feb.

some other bitterness had not been at the root of everything. In the first instance, Merriman and Sivewright had been at daggers drawn for a long time; they had not been on speaking terms with each other for fifteen years prior to joining the Ministry and yet it was largely because Merriman had beseeched him to join the Ministry that Sivewright had condescended to do so. From the start therefore, it was evident that there was not much sympathy between them.¹⁰ Merriman also suspected Sivewright of dishonesty and for that reason had no faith in him. Writing to his mother Merriman said: "I do not misjudge the man but I know too much add to overlook what I do know would certainly not do much to improve morality".¹¹ Apparently Merriman's suspicions were well founded. After his resignation, his brother-in-law, J.D. Barry, wrote to him stating that he should have retained office if Sivewright had erred in the matter of the Logan Contract only, "but as you had before you the evidece ((evidence)) supplied by Sauer verifying all your suspicions of his dishonesty, you would have retained office at the expense of your own self-respect".¹² That the confidence between individual Ministers had been destroyed is also borne out by statements made by Rose-Innes at a political meeting at Woodstock. He stated that he had left the Rhodes Ministry "because that confidence, that personal confidence which it

10. Hansard, 1893, p.26-27, at Ons Land, 4/5/'93.

11. Merr. Papers, No. 36, 1893. J.X. Merr. to Julia Merr. 28 Feb.

12. Ibid. No.108, 1893. J.D. Barry to J.X. Merr. 20 Aug., et Hansard, 1893, p.14.

was essential for the public interest should exist between colleagues, no longer existed, so far as he was concerned, towards Sir James Sivewright. He was glad to leave the Rhodes Ministry, because his position had not been a bad of roses...."¹³

It appears the Sivewright was for along time connected with certain private companies, the affairs of which were often adversely discussed by press editors. For example, in May, 1891, the affairs of the Johannesburg Waterworks Company were publicly discussed and allegations made against the Company of which Sivewright was director. If these allegations were true they could cast a reflection on the Ministry.¹⁴ Then there was also the so-called "Canevan Case". Sivewright was a director of the Jamieson Gas Company and he arranged with Jamieson and a certain Canevan that he would receive a certain commission upon work done for the Company. Letters that came into the possession of the Ministry from Jamieson to Canevan mentioning the whole transaction, proved this fact. There was also the evidence of a Mr. Hay, executor in the estate of Julius Jamieson. He found an entry of the commission paid to Sivewright in Jamieson's books; moreover, Jamieson had told Hay that Sivewright had once refused goods for gas works to be landed at East London, until his share of the commission had been promised.¹⁵

Although Rhodes thought out great plans and was the originator of great schemes, he left the details of such schemes

13. C. Times, 17/10/'93. Report Political Meeting at Woodstock, 16/10/'93.

14. Michell's Rhodes, Vol. II, p. 67.

15. Merr. Papers, No. 69, 1893. Diary by Agnes Merr. 7 May.

to others, especially Sivewright - the "brain-carrier" of the Ministry.¹⁶ This brought about intimate contact between Rhodes and Sivewright and many considered the latter to be Rhodes' special lieutenant. This fact fired the jealousy of Merriman who always had Sauer and Innes on his side.¹⁷ This jealousy was further egged on by Sivewright's great success in concluding the Transvaal Railway Convention and more so because the other ministers had not been consulted on the matter beforehand. By this Convention the S.A. Republic agreed to the construction of the Vaal River - Johannesburg extension and gave the Cape partial control over this line. For this service Sivewright was awarded a knighthood; the Cape press praised him lavishly; This success "is highly creditable to the diplomatic skill of the Commissioner of Public Works".¹⁸ A few months later the same paper stated that "to him belongs the credit of the diplomatic success resulting in this material approach to South African union".¹⁹ This was too much for Merriman and his friends: "Ieder lofgalm over Sir James Sivewright aangehoeven was een verdere droppel gal gomengd in den beker die de heer Merriman en consorten te drinken hadden".²⁰

This lack of sympathy between Merriman and Sivewright was further aggravated by the question of the appointment of a successor to Sir Charles Mills, the Agent-General in London. The matter was discussed in the Cabinet and it appeared that

16. Walker: De Villiers, p.222.

17. *Ons Land*, 19/10/'93, et *C. Argus*, 6/7/'92.

18. *C. Times*, 9/12/'91.

19. *Ibid.* 3/9/'92.

20. *Ons Land*, 19/10/'93.

both Merriman and Sivewright desired to be appointed in succession to Mills and there were nasty squabbles, each threatening to leave the Cabinet if the other were appointed. Mills however, continued as Agent-General, but the relation between the two Ministers at the Cape was not improved by what took place.²¹ For a long time, there had been a strong movement afoot to bring Sprigg into the Cabinet. This would not have made Sauer any happier as he was Sprigg's inveterate enemy and it would further have decreased Merriman's chances of being appointed to the post of Agent-General.²²

There were also differences among the Ministers on native policy. Innes especially, was averse to the Franchise Bill of 1892: "I have told Rhodes that I would much rather go out if I consulted my own feelings, and have nothing to do with an innovation of which I don't see the necessity, and which is really introduced at the instance and for the benefit of the Bond".²³ The question of native property rights also increased the disharmony in the Cabinet. Sivewright supported the ideas of the Bond, but Innes went to the Eastern districts in 1892, and declared himself in favour of a sort of quasi-individual land tenure which would have given the native the franchise of a European as well as the advantages of native tribal tenure. This made it clear that the question of property rights would never be settled without a ministerial split and it was clear

21. Ons Land, 19/10/'93.

22. Ons Land, 19/10/'93.

23. Merr. Papers, No. 48, 1892. J.R.-Innes to J.X. Merr. 3 Feb. et vide C.Argus, 31/1/'94, Rhodes' Klipdam Speech, 30/1/'94.

that Innes would have to leave. His successor would have to be one who was in sympathy with Rhodes and Siverwright. Sauer and Merriman would then have been in a hopeless minority in the cabinet.²⁴

The Ministry therefore, consisted of men holding most divergent views on matters of policy. Innes and Sauer were noted negrophiles who had in the past often shown dislike of Bond views on the native question; Merriman had often attacked the Bond and yet these three men were now sitting in the same cabinet with members of the Afrikaner Bond - Faure and Siverwright. Often matters touching the Bond were brought before the Ministry and when Siverwright faithfully defended the Bond and tried to compromise, the three dissatisfied ministers would oppose the Bond. So in the Bamberger affair, Siverwright supported Bamberger and had almost settled the matter when he was overthrown by Innes.²⁵ After the first Rhodes Ministry had fallen, "Ons Land"²⁶ wrote that Merriman and his associates had made a victim

24. Ons Land, 19/10/'93.

25. Supra, p. 165.

26. In 1888-9, a magistrate in Hanover district, Mr. Bamberger, was charged with undue severity in the administration of justice. Sauer denounced him strongly and in view of the representations made, Bamberger was given an appointment on the railways where he had worked formerly. A counter-Agitation was raised to have Bamberger reinstated. The Dutch did not think he was too severe and thought he knew how to deal with natives. Sprigg had refused to reinstate Bamberger. After Sprigg had left office the Bamberger affair was raised again, and while Innes was away in England the Colonial Secretary (Sauer) although he had previously denounced Bamberger, agreed to reappoint him on the Bench. However, when Innes returned he would not consent and Sauer had to give in. C. Argus, 12/1/'94, Sprigg's East London Speech, 12/1/'94.

27. Ons Land, 19/10/'93.

of Sivewright "wegens zijn gehechtheid aan de Afrikaner-politiek en zijne ondersteuning aan den Bond geschonken".²⁸

It is clear therefore, that when the Logan Contract was brought up the three Ministers saw a fine opportunity of turning the tables on Sivewright. Especially, when they saw how much the Logan Contract agitated the Colony, they thought the right moment had arrived to make a firm stand and Rhodes would have to dismiss Sivewright and retain them: "Their virtue seems over-acted;....they seized upon his ((Sivewright's)) mismanagement of this affair, as an occasion to feed fat some ancient grudge they bore him".²⁹

On Sivewright's return from England in April, 1893, the "three mutineers" informed Rhodes that they would no longer sit with Sivewright in the same Cabinet.³⁰ In some respects Rhodes would not have been unwilling to be relieved of office as many affairs were claiming his attention and matters were not going well with the British South Africa Company; Mashonaland had become an irksome liability.³¹ Merriman and his friends urged Rhodes to resign and reform his cabinet, but Rhodes turned down the suggestion.³² Rhodes was undoubtedly in a difficult position. If he dismissed Sivewright, it would mean that he acquiesced in all the charges brought against him and this Rhodes was loathe to do because he was very much indebted

28. Oms Land, 19/10/'93.

29. Journal, 18/7/'93, et vide C.Times, 17/10/'93, Innes' speech at Political Meeting, Woodstock, 16/10/'93.

30. Merr. Papers, No. 69, 1893. Diary by Agnes Merr. 29 April.

31. Walker: De Villiers, p.223 et seq.

32. Merr. Papers, no. 69, 1893. Diary by Agnes Merr. 30 April.

to Sivewright for various services rendered and moreover, Sivewright shared Rhodes' confidence in his financial schemes and was "a dangerous man to antagonize".³³ Further, if he dismissed Sivewright and retained the other three Ministers it would have been a slap in the face of the Bond and, seeing that Sivewright was one of the Bond representatives in the Cabinet, a triumph for Bond enemies. On the other hand, if he retained Sivewright he would be driving three excellent parliamentarians into opposition against him - Sauer was an excellent debater, Morriam a caustic critic and Rose-Innes one of the best advocates at the Cape Bar. This would weaken his cabinet and strengthen the Opposition and this Rhodes certainly did not want. Moreover, with Sivewright still a member of the Cabinet he would expose it to much adverse criticism as the Logan Contract was very, very unpopular indeed and Sivewright had been responsible for it.³⁴ Rhodes now sought someone under whom he could serve. He asked Hofmeyr to form a ministry but he declined and advised Rhodes to consult the Chief Justice, Sir Henry de Villiers. Rhodes offered to serve under de Villiers, but even while de Villiers was still considering whether he could form a ministry with or without Sauer, Rhodes, without informing de Villiers decided to form a new cabinet excluding the four men who had caused the crisis and also omitting de Villiers.³⁵

33. Walker: De Villiers, p.222.

34. C.-Afr. 19/10/'93.

35. For negotiations between Rhodes and de Villiers see: Walker: De Villiers, p.225.

On 4th May, 1893, the second Rhodes Ministry was sworn in: Premier, C.J. Rhodes; Colonial Secretary, P.H. Faure; Treasurer, J.G. Sprigg; Attorney-General, W.P. Schreiner; Commissioner, J. Laing; Secretary for Native Affairs, J. Frost. Schreiner was not a member of Parliament then, and a seat was found for him at Kimberley.³⁶ According to Sprigg's testimony he himself had much say in the formation of this Cabinet. When Rhodes asked him to join the Cabinet he demanded that Rhodes should resign for he (Sprigg) did not wish to have anything to do with the previous administration. Rhodes agreed to this and gave Sprigg the right to select his colleagues.³⁷

This crisis had an important effect on Rhodes. From the negotiations with the Chief Justice, it appears that he realised which course he should take, but he deliberately chose another and this was the turning point in his career. Merriman and his associates did not work in harmony with the rest of the Cabinet, but they were upright and honest and checked Rhodes' hasty temperament. In the new Ministry, there was no one who could stand up to Rhodes and check any hasty action and force him to be patient. Outside the Ministry there were Loch and Hofmeyr but the former laid down his office and Hofmeyr resigned his parliamentary seat in 1895; Rhodes, uncontrolled, followed a course which led to his destruction.³⁸

36. Hofmeyr: *Op. cit.* p.445.

37. C.Argus, 12/1/'94. Sprigg's East London Speech, 12/1/'94.

38. Walker; De Villiers, p.238-9.

When Parliament met on 16th June, 1893, Innes defended his action and that of his friends in l'affaire Logan. A long debate followed and eventually a Select Committee was appointed to investigate the matter. The report, adopted unanimously by the House, stated that the contract had had flaws, and it justified the action of the "Three Mutineers" but also stated that nothing had been proved against Sivewright's integrity of character.³⁹

The new Ministry, although it contained no Afrikaner except Faure, continued to have the support of the Bond. Laing and Schreiner found favour with the Afrikaners; the latter especially, because of the views he then held on native affairs. Frost also got on well with the Afrikaners in Parliament.⁴⁰

V. AFTER LOGAN CRISIS.

After the Logan crisis, Rhodes with his new Ministers carried on without difficulty. Sauer, Innes and Merriman crossed over to the Opposition benches and the public witnessed a spectacle, unique in parliamentary history, of a Premier having to face an Opposition composed of men who a few weeks previously had been his colleagues and who had parted with him on no political issue, but on a question of political honesty. Public opinion was strongly in sympathy with the three men who had caused the crisis; moreover, the combination between Rhodes and Sprigg was felt to be an attack on the system of party government which had been of slow growth since the introduction

39. Cape B.B. A.4-'93, p.iv.

40. One Land, 6/5/'93.

of Responsible Government; this was especially the case as Sprigg had but ten months previously launched a fierce attack on Rhodes on account of his dual position. "For the rest I can say that C.J. Rs' ((Rhodes)) course has been pitiful and shameful. To take in the avowed leader of the opposition with three of his associates goes far to destroy the last belief in party government...."⁴¹

The fact that Rhodes had to go to the Opposition to get men to complete his second Ministry and took in such neutral men as Laing and Frost as well as an avowed opponent as Sir Gordon Sprigg, shows that there were no political parties at the Cape in the sense that there were such parties in England. Thus, "Oms Land" of 26th June, 1893, pointed out:

"Het feit kan niet ontkend worden dat wij geen duidelik verdeelde politieke partijen hebben. De Afrikaner partij is eigenlijk de eenige die vaste beginselen is toegedaan, die haar eigen zin weet en durft volgen, waar het de groote kwesties der naturellen-politiek en de belangen van den Afrikaner boerenstand betreft".

The break up of Rhodes' first Ministry had a profound effect on public opinion, in that it stimulated the idea of forming another strong political party in opposition to the Bond. Some felt that Responsible Government was not working well at the Cape, that this system of government was being abused by the Bond to the detriment of those outside the Bond. This truth therefore, prepared the public mind for the growth of the Progressive Party. But the roots of the Progressive Party can be traced far back to the years immediately succeeding

41. Merr. Papers, No. 82, 1893. J.E. Curry to J.X. Merr. 16 May, et vide C.Times, 5/5/'93.

the establishment of Responsible government. Just as one of the roots of the Bond was the F.P.A. so also the Progressive Party could trace its ancestry back to "Farmers' Associations" founded in the Eastern Province. The first of such Associations was founded at Queenstown and the second at Graaff-Reinet in January, 1874. Originally these Associations were independent of one another, the main object being to provide for mutual aid among the farmers in defending themselves against the natives. They declared that they would promote party politics and political machinery, but the main object was the promotion of legislation ⁴² beneficial to farming interests. In August, 1874, there were already nine such Farmers' Associations. ^{42a} In general, farmers had shown little interest in politics but the scarcity of labour - due to railway construction - and measures of interest to farmers such as a Scab Act and Fencing Bill, had made such organisations as Farmers' Associations necessary. ⁴³

The first Congress of these Eastern Province Farmers' Associations promoted by the Upper Albany Farmers' Association, was held at Grahamstown in 1883. ⁴⁴ The years of the second Sprigg Ministry, 1886-1890, were not of much political interest and we find that some Farmers' Associations grew slack while others that did good work on their inauguration, had ceased to exist. ⁴⁵ These Associations do not seem to have held Congresses regularly. The next congress took place at Graaff-Reinet, 1889.

42. Journal, 26/1/'74.

42a. These were: Queenstown, Middelburg, Graaff-Reinet, Dordrecht, Fort Beaufort, Kaffraria, Alexandria, Albany and Bedford.

43. Journal, 14/8/'74.

44. Journal, 17/5/'98.

45. Ibid. 1/2/'87.

This was a rather important Congress because on this occasion a Mr. G.M. King moved:

"That this Congress adopts the following as its Declaration of Principles: That we shall earnestly endeavour, by our individual and collective influence to retain unimpaired the connection at present subsisting between this Colony and the British Empire. We shall constantly strive to secure entire harmony and goodwill among ourselves, to suppress personal and national prejudices, and act together for our mutual protection and advancement"⁴⁶

Although the Congress did not adopt this motion it shows that some of its members were animated by a spirit closely allied to that breathed by the Imperial League of J.W. Leonard.⁴⁷

In 1891, the Eastern Province Farmers' Associations held a congress at Queenstown.⁴⁸ Because they did not represent a strong union and were, at first, averse to becoming a political body, not much importance was attached to the deliberations of these congresses. The result was that they did not have the political means of backing up their resolutions and did not attain to the influence which the Bond, for example, had with the Government. Before these Associations could become a power in the land, they needed greater unity, permanent officials, a political programme and above all, active and enthusiastic leaders.

Apparently the Eastern Province Farmers' Associations realised their limitations and in April, 1892, the Farmers' Congress meeting at Graaff-Reinet, decided to form a political association,⁴⁹ but this was never carried into effect.⁵⁰

46. Journal, 30/3/'89.

47. Supra, p. 195-6.

48. Journal, 31/3/'91.

49. Ibid. 21/4/'92.

50. Ibid. 14/3/'93.

"Di Patriot" of 16th June, 1892, refers to the Parliamentary Opposition organising itself into a "Progressive Party". This movement was further stimulated by Arthur Douglass, member of the Assembly for Grahamstown and a leading politician on the Opposition benches. In September, 1892, at a political meeting at Grahamstown he launched a "Progressive Party" of which the⁵¹ chief aim was resistance to the Bond. These early attempts in the Eastern Province to found a Progressive Party - in opposition to the Afrikaner Bond, which those British, whose spiritual home was still Great Britain and whose outlook Imperialistic, considered retrogressive - floundered on the same rock which had wrecked the Separatists, namely, disunion in their own ranks. Such centres as Port Elizabeth, East London, Kingwilliams-town and Grahamstown sent men to Parliament more or less pledged to their own particular local interest - a road, a bridge, a gaol, a railway or a harbour. This prevented them from combining and forming a definite party.⁵²

General elections for the Assembly followed the session of 1893. It was an excellent opportunity of testing the possibility of a Progressive Party. The cry was now taken up by the Congress of the Farmers' Associations assembled at Bedford, September, 1893. The Congress issued a "Platform of the 'Progressive' Party" dated Bedford, 13th September, 1893, and signed by Captain E.Y. Drabant as "Sessional Chairman". It contained the following nine points:

51. C. Times, 7/9/92.

52. C. Times, 15/9/93.

I. Poor Whites should be dealt with by a system of industrial education gradually approaching compulsory. Cost to be defrayed partly by a local rate or voluntary contributions.

II. Labour Question is purely a matter of supply and demand, but is to a certain extent influenced by the Liquor Question.

III. Liquor. The present law should be maintained, with further restrictions of sale to natives where practicable.

IV. Excise. A tax on Colonial spirits, so adjusted as to fall on the consumer.

V. Maintenance of the constitution. The constitution to be preserved intact.

VI. Native Land Tenure. Approval of individual title to natives with safeguards.

VII. Scab. That a General Scab Act is desirable.

VIII. Native Policy. In favour of a policy of firmness coupled with justice. 53

IX. United South Africa. In favour of a United South Africa!"

There seems however, to have been some confusion - typically English - in the organisation of this Progressive Party because 54
 Innes and Herriman were supposed to lead it but soon afterwards 55
 refused to have any share in the matter. Moreover, the flaws in the above programme are obvious. It lacks breadth and precision. Many subjects of importance such as railway extension, Customs Union, irrigation and immigration are not mentioned at all while those that are mentioned are put in such a vague manner that men of most divergent views can subscribe to them. No wonder then that the "Cape Times" of 4th October, 1893, reported that this Progressive Party did not receive much support.

Two months later, a political Association of Queenstown also issued a political programme in which the main plank was 56
 resistance to the Bond. These two programmes from the Eastern Province differed more from each other than either differed

53. C. Times, 16/6/93, Platform of 'Progressive' Party.

54. Oms Land, 19/9/93;

55. Ibid. 11/11/93.

56. Ibid. Ibid.

from the Bond programme. The Queenstown programme contained seventeen articles of which only three agreed with those held by the Progressive programme, namely, an Excise Tax, Scab Act, and native land tenure.⁵⁷ These efforts to establish a Progressive Party in opposition to the Bond, did impose upon the electorate for some time,⁵⁸ but soon it became evident that it was merely a trick devised in the hope of damaging the Bond cause at the elections: "Het moet echter in het oog worden gehouden dat dit zoogenaamde partij-program niets is dan een verkiezings-manifest en het dus dienst moet doen om zooveel mogelijk stemmen aan den Bond te ontnemen".⁵⁹

Although there was no sharp line of party cleavage, the contests of the general election of 1894, were fought more clearly on party lines and were more warmly contested than any previous election since the establishment of Responsible Government in 1872.⁶⁰ Despite this fact it is difficult to range members according to parties, because, barring the Bond there was no other party organisation. Reviewing the election as a whole, the Bond strengthened its position by the acquisition of a few more seats⁶¹ and in general the results were regarded as "an emphatic pronouncement in favour of Mr. Rhodes's Government".⁶² The Opposition however, had much force as a debating power, at a time when such power still carried weight. The "Cape Argus" of 21st February, 1894, put the number of the Opposition at not more than twenty-four and "Ons Land" of 24th February,

57. C. Argus, 15/1/'94, Hofmeyr's Somerset West Speech, 13/1/'94.

58. Ibid. 22/1/'94.

59. Ons Land, 19/9/'93.

60. C. Times, 14/2/'94 et Ons Land, 24/2/'94.

61. C. Argus, 21/2/'94.

62. C. Argus, 31/12/'94.

1894, at about nineteen.

It is interesting to note that, although the suggestion had often been made, party organisation at the Cape had not yet provided for a Parliamentary Whip. The Prime Minister, himself was not in favour of such a functionary and did not, in fact, see its necessity:

"It is an extraordinary position, I admit; but at any rate, my experience of the Cape Parliament is, that if a fair proposition is submitted to the House, you need not deal with the sections of the House, but you can win the ear of the whole House, and ensure the success of your proposition, if you can produce facts to support it"⁶³

During 1895, two more attempts were made to organise political parties apart from the Bond. The first was the "South African Political Association" of Cape Town of which Rose-Innes was the president. The bread and meat taxes and the appointment of Sir Hercules Robinson as Governor and High Commissioner had drawn small groups of men together to protest against such things.⁶⁴ On 20th June, 1895, the S.A. Political Association held its first public meeting. The chairman, Mr. Brydone, stated that "the main object of the formation of the Association had been to secure a body that would arouse public interest in the land in which they lived with a view to promoting fit and just legislation, and opposing what was contrary thereto, whether it emanated from the Government benches or from the Opposition".⁶⁵ Thereupon, Innes addressed the meeting and pointed out that men

63. Vindex: Cecil Rhodes, p.404.

64. Schreiner, C. and C.S.C.--The Political Situation, p.98 et seq.

65. C.Argus, 21/6/'95, Report Meeting S.A. Political Association.

of liberal opinions, "Broad and progressive views" will usually come to the same conclusions on the political questions of the day. The Association would strive to gain compulsory education for Europeans, readjustment of taxation to cheapen the necessities of life, a moderate and just native policy. The Association decided to make increased representation in Parliament an important point in its programme - this matter need not be a fight between town and country. Further it hoped to encourage the wool industry by means of a more drastic Scab Act, to amend and improve the irrigation laws, to construct railways cheaply for the development of agricultural districts.⁶⁶ Innes however, was not a man by nature suited to lead a political party and the movement broke down.

The other attempt to organise a political party in 1895, was that launched by S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner, husband of the authoress, Olive Schreiner. He had taken a prominent part in the activities of the E.P. Farmers' Associations and till 1895, had tried to form a "Progressive Party" in conjunction with these Associations.⁶⁷ In a speech held in the Town Hall, Kimberley, 20th August, 1895, on "The Political Situation" he advocated a political organisation to unite all men holding progressive views on South African affairs. He mentioned three principles which would hold progressive men together:

"Firstly, the Labour Question with which the Native Question was intimately associated. Europeans were under obligation to the native and had to look to his welfare

66. C. Argus, 21/8/95, Report Meeting S.A. Political Association at Oms Land, 8/8/95, Programme S.A. Political Association.

67. Cronwright-Schreiner: The Land of Free Speech, p.xxiv.

and raise him in the scale of existence. Secondly, Taxation. Taxation should rather fall on the luxuries and not on the necessities of life and should not be heavier on the poor than on the rich. Thirdly, Franchise. As the state developed the franchise had to be extended so that unrepresented classes were not ignored and their welfare subordinated to the interests of the represented classes. Such an organisation had to exclude all racial and class distinction⁶⁸

The aim of this party would not be to swell its ranks by men whose views were not genuinely progressive. Its strength could not rest on mere numbers, it "must lie in the enthusiasm, in the superior intelligence, in the unwavering adhesion to impersonal aims, and in the close-knit union of our members".⁶⁹ Such a Progressive Party would, for many years, no doubt, have to play the part of a small but united and intelligent party of which the members were absolutely unpurchasable in their political allegiance. Such a firm and unbendable party would be a thorn in the side of any Government which tried to carry measures at variance with the party's views.⁷⁰

These efforts to form a Progressive Party prior to the Jameson Raid were not successful. It needed an attack by Jameson and his "filibusters" on the independence of the South African Republic before a successful party in opposition to the Afrikaner Bond could be founded.⁷¹ The question now arises: Why could no other successful political party be formed, before 1896, other than the Bond? The explanation lies firstly in the fact that no great question upon which a new party could be formed,

68. Schreiner, O. and C.S.C. -: The Political Situation, p.108 on seq.

69. Ibid.

Ibid.

p.118

70. Ibid.

Ibid.

p.137-8

71. Infra, p.286.

agitated public opinion. This was in truth the mistake made by the F.A. Political Association; it tried to stimulate party divisions where none existed. With much truth and justification the "Cape Argus" of 15th February, 1895, wrote: "...great political movements are not initiated by agitators, but by the sure and irresistible progress of public opinion in a certain direction". A further explanation lies in the fact that it was futile trying to form a party in opposition to the Bond because no party could be formed which would differ very widely from the Bond in its principles. When the Bond held its Congress at Port Elizabeth in 1895, the members were entertained to a banquet and one of the leading Port Elizabeth merchants remarked to T.P. Theron, Secretary of the Bond, that "Met sulk een programma ((of the Bond)) ieder verstandig mensch kon samengaan".⁷³ So wide and all-embracing was the Bond and so anglicised had its principles become that the "Grahamstown Journal" of 8th February, 1894, wrote: "We think the English section would be far more disposed at this juncture than formerly, to form a solid alliance with the Africander section. The Bond has become less narrow, and its discipline is no longer so stringent as to coerce intelligent action".

Summing up the position of political parties in the Cape Colony, prior to the Jameson Raid, one can safely state that there was no classification into two parties as one saw in England

72. C. Argus, 17/9/'95.

73. Ons Land, 26/3/'95.

during the nineteenth century. There were the Government supporters and an ever-present Opposition, but there was no sharp party division in the ordinary sense. For instance, on the native question - the most crucial question in the Colony - there was never one solid party which advocated one definite policy and another which advocated another policy so that the native question could provide a line of cleavage. In the House of Assembly with its seventy-six members there was only one homogeneous and coherent party which commanded the situation, namely the Afrikaner Bond. Those who did not belong to the Bond divided into a number of groups all having less members than the Bond; for example, the Opposition of about twelve members was led by Rose-Innes and formed a coherent party. Excluding this group and the Bond, there were a large number of independent members in the House.

Differences between town and country also made themselves felt in party associations, - the town or city representatives, more or less, found themselves in Opposition ranks and the country supported the Ministry. Town and country differed on fiscal policy. The products of the soil were protected because the Government wished to encourage the production of foodstuffs in the country itself; the towns however, being consumers were against such a policy. There was also a difference between town and country on liquor policy. Many members of the Assembly came from wine producing districts, hence the country did not want an Excise Tax which the towns favoured. On all these questions of

domestic policy there was a cleavage between town and country, dependent not on racial differences but on the different interests of town and country. Yet, these differences did not run so deeply and were not so fundamental as to warrant the establishment of a Country Party and a Town Party.⁷⁴

74. See Imp. B.B. S.Africa, 1897. Questions 3406-3408; 3372; 3410.

CHAPTER. VII.THE PERIOD OF STRIFE, 1895 TO JULY, 1900.

"Everywhere do I perceive a certain conspiracy of rich men seeking their private advantage under the name and pretext of the commonwealth".

-Sir Thomas More.

I. RHODES PREPARES JAMESON RAID.

"Ik hoop uwe burgers zullen zich kwijten als helden tegen Jameson's filibusters"¹. With these words to President Kruger, Hofmeyr, on Tuesday 31st December, 1895, expressed his disapproval of the attack which Jameson had launched on the independence of the South African Republic on Sunday evening, 29th December. Jameson was then administrator of the Chartered British South Africa Company's territories in Rhodesia, and most intimate friend of Cecil Rhodes. The man behind the whole plot which included a rising of the Uitlanders on the Rand was Cecil Rhodes, a leading Rand multi-millionaire, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, Managing Director of the Chartered Company, Chairman of the de Beers Company and Member of Her Majesty's Privy Council. Truly a man with great responsibilities, but also one who had almost unlimited resources - politically, financially, and personally.

Rhodes's great aim was to see the British flag flying over all the territory from the Cape to Cairo and a start had to be made by uniting all the states south of the Zambesi.² While the

1. Hofmeyr Papers, Vol. No.11, Telegram Hofmeyr to Pres. Kruger, 31/12/'95.

2. Supra, p.208.

Transvaal remained an independent Boer state, these aims would be greatly imperilled, if not made impossible. Rhodes was for ever at loggerheads with Paul Kruger, the President of the South African Republic. Firstly, they had clashed on the Bechuanaland question, then Swaziland, and the Adendorff Trek and for many years railway construction and customs tariffs had caused friction between them. Behind these difficulties there was a vast difference of outlook best illustrated by different attitudes on the Uitlander question. Kruger's life's aim was to keep the Republic free of British influence and ideas, and, above all, maintain its independence at all costs. With the discovery of gold on the Rand thousands of foreigners (Uitlanders) had flocked to the Republic. It is difficult to obtain exact figures for the number of Uitlanders and Transvaal Burgers. Williams states that in 1895 there were 80,000 of them on the Rand and outnumbered the burghers by four to one³. These Uitlanders complained of the high taxes, obstacles in the way of obtaining the franchise and that they had no control over the affairs of Johannesburg. Further they complained of the lack of educational facilities in the English language, corruption in the civil service and the inefficiency and brutality of the "Zarps" (South African Republican Police). A great grievance was the concession policy of the Kruger Government which granted favoured persons monopolies for the manufacture

3. Williams: Cecil Rhodes, p.246, Vulliarny in his work "Outlanders", p.155, states that in 1889 it is estimated there were 100,000 Uitlanders and 60,000 Boers in the Transvaal.

of dynamite, the transport of coal and the trade in liquor.⁴ All these alleged grievances were greatly exaggerated and shamelessly exploited by the press and interested politicians; this added to the general unrest and excitement on the Rand. To secure constitutional reforms and redress of grievances the Uitlanders organised the Transvaal National Union in 1892. At the time of the Raid, Charles Leonard was its chairman and was largely responsible for inciting and organising the Uitlanders to take up arms against the Republic at the end of December, 1895.⁵ According to this plan, Jameson would then ride in with a strong force from the Bechuanaland border in support of the Johannesburg rising.

As it would substantially advance his aims for a United South Africa, south of the Zambesi, Rhodes took a leading part in the attempted overthrow of Kruger's Republican Government. Towards this great goal he had worked with infinite patience for many years. Addressing a meeting in Cape Town on 6th January, 1894, after his success in Matabeleland, he recalled a warning of Sir Bartle Frere: "You must never hurry anything. You must take step by step, in accordance with feeling and sentiment of the people as a whole.... We can work slowly and gradually for those results which may come beyond our temporary existence".⁶ But it was soon after this that a great change came over Rhodes. Formerly, he possessed himself of patience and self-control, but

4. For Uitlander grievances and their refutation see: Botha: *Die Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van die Transvaal onder Kruger en Leyds*, Chapters, XX et XXI.

5. Lovell: *The Struggle for South Africa*, p.293.

6. Vindex: *Cecil Rhodes*, p.396.

now his turbulent and volcanic nature got the better of him and the natural man would break forth. Rhodes knew that, on account of a weak heart, he did not have much longer to live; he always gave himself a life of forty-five years.⁷ He lived to be forty-eight; at this time, 1895, he was forty-one. He realised that time was against him and that there was so much that still had to be done and only a few years in which to achieve his ideals. The result was that in a few months he had to do work that would otherwise have taken years to accomplish. He could no longer go step by step, he had to leap. When Kruger refused to join the other states to solve the railway question, Rhodes angrily declared that Kruger was hopeless and irreconcilable, that there was still ten years' fight in him and that he could not wait till Kruger had disappeared as South Africa was developing too rapidly. Something had to be done to put the Government of the Transvaal into more progressive hands.⁸ With much justice Dormer, sometime editor of the "Cape Argus" (Cape Town) and the "Star" (Johannesburg), could write about Rhodes in 1895:

"He is peremptory where he used to be open to reason, impatient where he was formerly content to accommodate his pace to that of the most halting and hesitating old Boer, and has clearly become possessed of the idea that, if there are conceivably some whom money cannot "square", there are none who are able to withstand its might when brought to bear upon them by a genius such as his..... you have only to scratch this darling of the Bond and you will find a rampant Jingo underneath"⁹

After the Logan crisis, Rhodes cut himself adrift from Merriman, Sauer and Innes, and thereby lost wise and honest

⁷ Williams: Op. cit. p.251.

⁸ Stead: Joseph Chamberlain, Conspirator of Statesman, p.16.

⁹ Dormer: Vengeance as a Policy in Afrikanerland, p.216-7.

councillors who had had the power to restrain him and influence him to choose the good and spurn the evil.¹⁰ From that day, although the procession of his triumphs was not yet over, Rhodes' fall began. True, there were still Hofmeyr, W.P. Schreiner and Sir Henry Loch. But Hofmeyr resigned his seat in Parliament in 1895, he was in poor health and had lost some of his hold on the Bond.¹¹ Schreiner's friendship with Rhodes was not of long standing and he was a great admirer of Rhodes' aims.¹² With Sir Henry Loch, Rhodes was not on very good terms on matters of policy. Rhodes did not like the vigilant eye Loch, as High Commissioner, kept on the Chartered Company and on the future of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.¹³ In 1895, Loch retired. To succeed him, although over seventy years of age, Sir Hercules Robinson who had been Governor and High Commissioner 1881-89, was reappointed. Sir Hercules had favoured, as much as Rhodes, the elimination of the Imperial Factor in South Africa. He had been associated with Rhodes in conciliating the Dutch and, moreover, he was trusted by the Transvaal Republicans.¹⁴ Lovell, Williams and Botha, maintain that Rhodes had demanded Robinson's reappointment, but in a speech at Queenstown in April, 1895, Rhodes denied that he had had anything to do with the appointment.¹⁵ Be that as it may, the fact remains that Robinson as High Commissioner suited Rhodes' book; it gave him a freer hand than he had had during

20. Merr. Papers, No.33, 1896, Julia Merr. to Agnes Merr. 16 May.

11. Walker: De Villiers, p.256.

12. Walker: Schreiner, p.87.

13. Walker: De Villiers, p.224, et Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.386.

14. Lovell: Op. cit. p.303 et Botha: Op. cit. p.365.

15. Lovell: Op. cit. p.301, et Williams: Op. cit. p.252, et Botha: Op. cit. p.365, et C. Argus, 4/4/'95.

the office of Sir Henry Loch. To mature his plans a sympathetic Governor and High Commissioner was essential.

Apart from being freed from all bonds of restraint, Rhodes was now under the delusion that he was able to overcome all opposition offered to his schemes. He had had success in most directions; he had amalgamated the Diamond Companies, procured an important interest in the Gold Mines, established a new state bearing his name, crushed a Matabele rebellion in that state and gained for his schemes of British expansion the support of the Cape Dutch who had formerly been suspicious of Great Britain:

But, "power, too, and success had begun to spoil him. He became strangely arrogant: old friends noted with pain the change from his former simple and boyish good-fellowship to the almost pompous and over-weening attitude of the later Rhodes....He was beginning to say in his heart that he was not as other men, but like a god, and that he had only to say, it shall be so, and it was so"¹⁶

There was only one great obstacle, Kruger, the old President, whom he had not yet brought under his influence and power. He now set about doing by force what he believed could not be done by diplomacy.

Rhodes, at first, took no overt step in support of the Witlander cause. He advised patience; Kruger was an old man and would not be able to hold out much longer.¹⁷ But we have noticed that about 1895, Rhodes himself had become impatient. On a visit to Johannesburg in 1894, he had seen the immense progress and development which Johannesburg had made since the proclamation of the Rand goldfields in 1886. As Director and

16. Williams: Op. cit. p.251.

17. Botha: Op. cit. p.364. As it happened, Rhodes died 26th March, 1902, more than two years before Kruger, 14th July, 1904.

shareholder in the Consolidated Gold Fields he was financially interested, not only in the development of the gold mines, but also in the taxes the mines contributed to the Republican State coffers. He realised the future and possibilities of deep-level mining; he realised that the S.A. Republic was growing stronger and stronger day by day and saw the aim of his life - a United British South Africa - threatened by a state too strong for him to handle. He therefore had to act before the Transvaal became an intractable proposition. He was afraid that if the Pond Uitlanders and malcontents were to succeed in overthrowing the Kruger régime they might use their newly begotten power to pursue a policy disadvantageous to the Cape and Great Britain and perhaps separatist and isolationist; therefore, he reasoned that if his own plans in South Africa were to succeed he had to have some say in the organisation and possible revolt of the Uitlanders, so that if they should succeed he would still be able to direct their policy and perhaps use it to his own advantage.¹⁸ Moreover, the shares of the B.S.A. Company at this time stood very low on the share market. Rhodes believed that if the Transvaal would be made British the B.S.A. Company would be able to secure a share of the spoils and that would save the shares of the B.S.A. Company.^{18a.}

The railway line from Delagoa Bay to Pretoria had been completed and began service on 1st January, 1895 - it was officially opened only in June, 1895.¹⁹ The Netherlands Railway

¹⁸. Garrett: The Story of an African Crisis, p.36.

¹⁹. Coetzee: Spoorwegontwikkeling in die S.A.Republiek, p.106-7.

^{18a}. Butler: an autobiography, p.396.

Company in order to force traffic along this newly completed line raised the rates on that section of its line from the Free State border to Johannesburg. The Cape merchants replied by detrainning their goods at the Vaal River and transporting them by ox wagon fifty miles to Johannesburg. To counter this move Kruger issued a proclamation on 28th August, declaring that from 1st October, the Vaal River drifts would be closed to the importation of overseas goods. Throughout the Cape Colony there was a storm of protest and even the Free State considered it an unfriendly act.²⁰ Thus "Ons Land" of 31st August, 1895, wrote that if Kruger's proclamation were carried out, "sal natuurlik niet alleen de regeering, doch het Afrikaansche volk der Kolonie zich gekwetst gevoelen door deze beslist vijandigen stap door president Kruger tegen hen genomen, ten voordeele van de buitenlandse aandeelhouders eener partikuliere onderneming". (Netherlands Railway Company). Rhodes thought that he had an excellent casus belli against the S.A. Republic. The Ministry used the unanimity of the country to appeal to the Imperial Government on the ground that Kruger's action would be a breach of article twelve of the London Convention. Joseph Chamberlain, new Secretary of State for Colonies, agreed to send a "strong remonstrance" to President Kruger, and should Kruger not withdraw, the Imperial Government was prepared to resort to arms on condition that the Cape Government paid half the cost. The Cape Ministry which included two Bond representatives, Faure and

20. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.485.

Schroiner, agreed. Fortunately, no force was needed as Kruger withdrew his proclamation on 5th November, the day after Chamberlain's "strong remonstrance" had been delivered.²¹ Rhodes had hoped that the Drifts Question and the grievances and discontent of the Uitlanders on the Rand would result in an outburst causing the downfall of the Kruger Administration, and would force the Transvaal from its isolationist policy into closer co-operation with the other South African states and so bring his dream of a South African Union into clearer reality.

However, when Kruger retreated on the Drifts question, Rhodes found that he had lost a most useful weapon and he now concentrated on dishonest ways and means of destroying the Kruger Government. Already in November, 1895, Jameson and his police occupied Pitsoani Potluge on the border of the S.A. Republic, ready to invade the territory of that state.

Rhodes always had great esteem for the "producer" whether it be of wine, wheat, wool, gold or diamonds. When the gold producers of the Transvaal, in his opinion, were being badly treated he decided to interfere on their behalf.²² With Jameson he had already arranged in November, 1894, that the forces of the Chartered Company should "be made as efficient as possible in order to be prepared for eventualities". If a revolt did occur in Johannesburg and help were required, "I ((Jameson)) should be in a position at once to use my discretion as to how,

21. Lovell: *Op. cit.* p.208, et Williams: *Op. cit.* p.259, et Hofmeyr: *Op. cit.* p.485.
 22. Dormer: *Op. cit.* p.181.

when, and where, if at all, the police and volunteers should be used".²³ A successful rising they believed, could easily be organised. Jameson was convinced that Johannesburg was "seething with rebellion" and "ripe for anything" while the Boers' fighting qualities were "the biggest bubble of the century" and they were less to be feared than Lobengula's warriors.²⁴

Early in 1895, Rhodes, keeping his ministerial colleagues at the Cape in ignorance of what was afoot,²⁵ decided to organise a rising in Johannesburg, and an armed invasion under Jameson.²⁶ A few men on the Rand such as his brother Frank Rhodes, Lionel Phillips and Charles Leonard were let into the secret. He arranged with Beit to share expenses. In London he confided in Hawkesley - the Chartered Company's attorney - and an old friend, Maguire. Further, Rutherford Harris, the Cape Town Secretary of the Chartered Company, was to take an active part.²⁷ The Johannesburg insurrectionists required four things for a successful rising: enthusiasm for the scheme, arms in the city, outside support if there were a struggle and some influence to neutralise the sympathy of the Afrikaners in the Cape Colony.²⁸ Rhodes could not supply the Rand masses with enthusiasm for a rising but certainly the other three factors. Large quantities of arms were smuggled from the property of De Beers at Kimberley to Simmer and Jack Mines in Johannesburg.²⁹ A strip of territory of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and also the Crown Colony of

23. Imp. B.B. 511. S.Africa, 1897, Question 4513.

24. *Dormer: Op. cit.* p.209.

25. P.M.290. Min to H.E. the Governor, No.1/7, 14/1/96.

26. See Cape B.D. A.C.- '96, p.xxii et seq., et Imp. B.B.511, S. Afr. p. xli et seq.

27. Williams: *Op. cit.* p.255.

28. Garrett: *Op. cit.* p.37.

29. Botha: *Op. cit.* p.371.

British Bechuanaland, just south, bordering on the Transvaal, had specially been obtained from the Imperial Government ostensibly for the Chartered Company to have control over the land through which the railway line from Kimberley ran, but really as a base for the attack on the Transvaal.³⁰

At two places on the Bechuanaland border of the Transvaal, Pitsani Potlugo and Mafeking, the Bechuanaland Border Police, Mashonaland Mounted Police and a number of volunteers were assembled. All were under the direction of Dr. Jameson, Rhodes' trusted friend.³¹ Rhodes was the one man who could neutralise the influence of the Afrikaner Bond of the Cape Colony. Had he not co-operated with it since 1884 and had it not put him on the ministerial benches in 1890 ?

It is not necessary to go into the actual details of the Raid. Jameson left Pitsani Potlugo on Sunday night, 29th December, 1895. On the Monday morning they met another column from Mafeking at Malmani within the Transvaal border. From there the force - five hundred strong - continued its forlorn march to Johannesburg. President Kruger however, was prepared; Jameson was forced to surrender after some fighting at Doornkop on Thursday morning, 2nd January, 1896. The rising which was supposed to take place in Johannesburg and in support of which Jameson was to invade the Transvaal turned out to be a "damp squib". Arms - quite insufficient - had been distributed, many

30. Lovell: Op. cit. p.318 et seq.

31. Colvin: The Life of Jameson, Vol.II, p.58.

people evacuated the city, but the incipient rebellion had been crushed.

At the Cape, Rhodes was under the impression, on the fateful Sunday night, that he had stopped Jameson but when it became known that Jameson had "bolted", Rhodes was a broken man and he resigned as Prime Minister. Hofmeyr came forward and unsuccessfully demanded from Rhodes that he should repudiate Jameson's action; he persuaded Sir Hercules Robinson, however, to issue a proclamation, which Hofmeyr himself dictated. In this proclamation the British Government disavowed the Raiders. The immediate outcome of this attempt on the independence of the Transvaal was that the Rand Reformers were punished to varying degrees of imprisonment and fines; Jameson and his 32 Raiders were handed over to the British Government for trial.

II. GENERAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE RAID.

Into the general effects of the Jameson Raid, the Kruger telegram,³³ and the damage to British prestige and influence in the eyes of the world, it is unnecessary to enter here. The effects on South African politics and Cape party politics, more especially, are of greater relevancy.

Immediately the news, that Jameson was on his way to Johannesburg with an armed force, flashed across South Africa, inter-state relations were badly strained and mutual confidence among the various states shattered. The South African Republic looked askance at their Colonial kinsmen because they had

32. Vide Hofmeyr; Op. cit. Lovell; Op. cit. Colvin; Op. cit. Williams; Op. cit. Garrett; Op. cit. Hofmeyr; N.J. De Afrikaner-Boer en de Jameson Inval. Imp. B.B. 311, S.Africa, 1897, Cape B.B. A.6.-'96. Report of the Select Committee on the Jameson Raid.

33. Lovell; Op. cit. p.342.

been in league with Rhodes and Rhodes was the hero, of the Jingoos, especially of the Cape ports, as is proved by the enthusiastic receptions accorded him when he visited the Cape about a year after the Raid. The Republics therefore, meted the Afrikaners of the Cape and Jingoos by the same measure, for, to them it was as though the evil communications with Rhodes had corrupted the good manners of the Cape Afrikaners. As Merriman put it:

"There is a renewal throughout South Africa of all the old suspicion and distrust that had been allayed by the gradual withdrawal of the Imperial Government from interference with South African internal affairs, nothing could have been more ingeniously contrived, than the Raid by Dr. Jameson, and the plot that preceded, and led up to it, to throw all the internal affairs of South Africa into a confusion from which it will take a generation to recover. The situation is full of the elements of future danger".³⁴

The sense of common danger drew the Orange Free State and the S.A. Republic together and created a feeling of solidarity that made them a very powerful factor in South African politics. The Cape lost a strong position because it lost the control of trade right up to the Transvaal border. The Cape was then administering the Free State railways and took half the profits. The Cape would still have controlled this trade for a number of years as the Orange Free State was not anxious to incur a debt of several millions on its railways. After the Raid however, the Free State Raad gave the Cape notice - as it was legally entitled to do - that it would take over the railways within its borders from 1st January, 1897.³⁵

34. Nerr. Papers, No. 8, 1896. Notes on Present Political Situation in S. Africa, 22 Jan, et vide: Imp. B.B. 311, S. Africa, 1897, Question 3333.

35. Imp. B.B. 311, S. Africa, 1897, Question 3327-8.

The Raid inevitably brought with it the end of the alliance between Rhodes and the Bond. One of the dominant factors in the affairs of South Africa in January, 1896, was the enormous revulsion of feeling that events had brought about among Afrikaners. They resented the thought that they had been hoodwinked so long by a man who had courted their favour for more than ten years and whom they had trusted and supported even against their kindred. They would now no longer have anything to do with Rhodes. In a letter to T.N. de Villiers, a member of the Transvaal Volkeraad, Hofmeyr wrote that he - and therefore the Bond - broke with Rhodes because of

"de vaste oortuiging....dat de heer Rhodes in verband met den Jameson-inval, zich niet zoo heeft gedragen als men had mogen verwachten van een Premier der Knapkolonie - een Premier nog al die het volle vertrouwen bezat van de groot meerderheid der Koloniale Afrikaander bevolking. Hij moet tamelijk lang vooruit hebben geweten - neen hy heeft geweten - dat een sterke en weluitgeruste kolonne der troepen van de Gekharterde Maatschappij op de Transvaalsche grens en gedeeltelijk op koloniaal gebied geconcentreerd lag, met het doel om op een geschikt tijdstip de republiek in te trekken....hoewel ik wel wil gelooven dat hij Jameson geen order had gegeven om juis den 29sten December in te trekken"³⁶

The Afrikaner Bond, naturally, was sorely disillusioned, yet, at its Congress at Burgersdorp in March, 1896, adopted a comparatively mild resolution. The Congress condemned the Raid but was prepared to give Rhodes an opportunity of justifying himself; should he not do so, it refused further political co-operation with him;

"De vergadering betreur het dat de Jameson tocht werd voorbereid en doorgezet, terwijl de heer Cecil Rhodes

³⁶ Pat. 5/3/'96, Corresp. Hofmeyr to T.N. de Villiers, et vide Ons Land, 7/1/'96, Allerlei.

....de door Afrikaners vertrouwde en ondersteunde Premier van de Kaapkolonie was, - dat hij bijna drie maanden sedert het gebeurde heeft laten voorbij gaan zonder een duidelijke verklaring van zijn gedrag in verband daarmee....

"De vergadering wenscht met den meesten nadruk haar gevoelen te uiten, dat, tenzij de heer Rhodes er in slaagt zich te zuiveren van deze beschuldigingen en van alle deelneming aan, voor kennis en begunstiging van het komplot on van daarop volgende bescherming der hoofdaanleggers en uitvoerders, het voor de Nationale Afrikaander Partij onmogelijk zal zijn met hem op staatkundig gebied samen te werken"⁵⁷

In 1897, on his way to be examined by the Committee of Inquiry appointed by the Imperial Government, Rhodes was received like a hero in certain centres of South Africa. Soon afterwards the Bond held its Annual Congress at Malmesbury. It now decided against Rhodes in no uncertain terms. W.P. Schreiner, in the course of his evidence before the Committee of Inquiry read the following reuter telegram reporting the resolution of the Bond Congress:

"The Africander Bond sitting in Congress at Malmesbury, has unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that all considerations of national self-respect, political honesty and good faith, make it impossible for the Africander Party to give Mr. Rhodes the least support, whether in politics, in the public press, in Parliamentary elections, or anywhere else. The Congress further declares itself to be decidedly opposed to any demonstration or agitation in favour of Mr. Rhodes, and expresses the opinion that he should never again have a seat in Parliament"⁵⁸

Rhodes at the Cape realised at once that he had to resign; he was at the head of the plot and all the ministers were implicated through him because they had been associated with him in the Ministry.⁵⁹ When the Cabinet met on Tuesday 31st December, 1895, it was unanimous on its vacating office, but the time at

57. Ons Land, 17/3/'96, Bond resolution 14/3/'96.

58. Imp. B.B.311, S.Africa, 1897, Question 3347.

59. Ibid. Ibid. Question 3278-3280.

which it was to take effect was left open.⁴⁰

At Doornkop a section of Afrikanerdom reported the success of Majuba. In many respects the surrender of Jameson and the collapse of the rising on the Rand had the same effect on another section of Afrikanerdom - those at the Cape - as the Anglo-Transvaal War of 1880-1. During the Rhodes régime the Republics especially the S.A. Republic, distrusted the Cape Colony, but the treacherous attack on its independence gave the Cape the opportunity of rehabilitating itself in the eyes of the Boer Republics. It did so in unmistakable terms. The Raid united all Afrikaners on the side of Kruger and they were prepared to support him and his policy to any length. Small grievances, such as the exclusion of Cape products from the markets of the South African Republic sunk into entire insignificance and were forgotten and forgiven over against the insult directed at their kinsmen:

"It ((the Raid)) has united all sections of the Dutch speaking community in determined opposition to what they consider, with some justice as a treacherous plot aimed at their nationality and undertaken with the object of stamping out their existence as a separate factor in South Africa. It has completely and absolutely rehabilitated President Kruger who now occupies without dispute the leading position in South Africa. His faults are forgotten in admiration at his success and in the conviction that both in diplomacy and in war he is more than a match for the English. His leaning to German support is condoned in consideration that the result has shown that he was fully justified in his suspicion of British aims and British policy. His refusal of political rights and privileges to men who stand convicted of treacherously plotting to destroy the independence of the state under the specious plea of reform will certainly meet the approval of his Volksraad"⁴¹

40. Cape B.B. A.6-'96, Questions 712-4.

41. Harr. Papers, No. 8, 1896. Notes on the President Political Situation in S.Africa. 22 Jan.

That Merriman, in the above passage, saw the position correctly is also borne out by the proceedings at the Bond Congress at Burghersdorp. F.S. Malan moved that the Republic be congratulated on its successful defence against the Raiders,

"....te meer daar zij den Jameson ival beschouwt als een verraderlijk aanslag niet slechts tegen de Transvaal, maar tegen de geheele Afrikaansche nationaliteit die wij als gemeenschappelijk erfrecht waardeeren en als één volk verdedigen.

"Tegenover den buitenlandschen vijand waren zij allen Transvalers! En aldus, waar het onze nationaliteit geldt zijn wij uit Kolonie, Vrystaters en Transvalers, maar allen Afrikaners!"⁴²

In a leading article in "Ons Land" of 12th March, 1896, written on the eve of the Bond Congress the reaction of Afrikanerdom is aptly described:

"De dolksteek waarmee men het Afrikanerdom eens vooral in de republieken wilde verlammen, heeft een electrischen schok naar het nationale hart gezonden. Het Afrikanerdom is ontwaakt met een ernst en bewustheid die wij niet sedert den roerrijken vrijheidsoorlog van 1880 hadden bespeurd. Van de Limpopo tot aan de Kaapstad heeft het tweede Majuba een nieuwe inspiratie in ons volk een nieuwe beweging gewekt. Door geheel Zuid-Afrika is een nieuw gevoel golvend gegaan. Het flauwe en laffe imperialisme dat reeds begonnen was ons volksbloed te verdunnen en vermageren wijkt allengs voor de versche nieuwe lucht die ons volk bewaait. Velen die.... zich aan het imperialisme hadden overgegeven, zijn tot inkeer gekomen en hebben zich gevraagd wat het imperialisme in "Zuid-Afrika heeft teweeggebracht"⁴³

Without endorsing the view of John Frost, Secretary for Agriculture in the second Rhodes Ministry, that prior to the Raid "the Dutch and English of this country were as one people,"⁴⁴ it must be admitted that the two sections of the European population had drawn together considerably and racial differences

42. Pat. 19/3/'96, Report Bond Congress at Burghersdorp, 14/3/'96.

43. Et vide Ons Land, 15/1/'93, et Ons Land, 29/12/'96, Corresp. from Patriot.

44. Hansard, 1897, p.137.

were according to Schreiner's testimony, "slumbering almost".⁴⁵ Ever since the Great Trek, there had always been a sense of race antagonism in South Africa and it increased or decreased according to the stimulus it received from political events - always, however, it remained alive. Economic needs and the efforts of federalists had contributed much to bringing the races together. By 1895, a British Colony with a strong Dutch population and a Boer Republic (Cape and Orange Free State) were ranged in a customs and railway union against a similar union of a predominantly English Colony and a Boer Republic (Natal and Transvaal).⁴⁶ Cecil Rhodes with his policy of neutralising the Bond,⁴⁷ and Gladstone's retrocession of the Transvaal in 1881, were chiefly responsible for toning down racialism. "In the Cape Colony that act of Justice ((retrocession of the Transvaal)) - so unprecedented in the world's history - awakened a feeling of loyalty to the British flag in those in whom this sentiment had up to that time been dormant, and it accentuated that feeling in those who hitherto had been Her Majesty's faithful subjects".⁴⁸

The Raid put an end to all co-operation and fusion between the European races living in South Africa; this Co-operation had been the object of all political endeavour. The man who was to lead the races to that ideal of co-operation had betrayed the Afrikaner and Jingoism appeared in its most ghastly form. Racialism burst forth again, reviving more intensely

45. Imp. B.B.311, S.Africa, 1897, Question 3344.

46. v.d. Poel: Railways and Customs Policies in S.Africa, p.90.

47. Supra, p.2// et seq.

48. Faure: My life and Times, p.153.

than ever, all the anger, suspicion and bitterness which the Annexation of the Diamond Fields and the Anglo-Transvaal War of 1881 had evoked. J.X. Merriman writing to Professor Goldwin Smith, the editor of the "Toronto Sun", Canada, stated that even a year later "the outburst of race antipathy has been almost incredible and there seems to be no sign of its subsiding".⁴⁹ In consequence, the entire political aspect of South Africa changed and states tended to divide on a racial basis. With some few exceptions Afrikaners and English in South Africa fell into opposite and hostile camps according to the call of blood: "The Raid tore aside the veil which the Rhodes-Kroymoyr alliance had cast over the eyes alike of Dutch and English, and left them free to see the essential antagonism of aim between the two men in its naked truth".⁵⁰ It was in vain that some papers appealed against racialism,⁵¹ it could not be stopped. Merriman wrote to Professor Goldwin Smith: "Dutch sympathy was united in favour of the Transvaal and for all political purposes the European population in South Africa where we are to the natives as 1 to 4, was divided into two hostile camps".⁵² For this state of affairs Rhodes and the English were to blame;⁵³ when Rhodes was on his way to England, there were wild demonstrations in his favour throughout the English centres of the country. The immorality of the dastardly Raid never entered their minds. Moreover, the Cape Afrikaners were being liberally abused by the

49. Merr. Papers, No.66, 1897. J.X. Merr. to G. Smith. *Undated*.

50. Worsfold: *Milner's Work in S.Africa*, p.48, et vide Walker: *De Villiers*, p.278 et 285.

51. *One Land*, 18/1/'96 et 15/2/'96, *C.Times*, 3/1/'96, *C.Affus*, 1/4/'96.

52. Merr. Papers, No.353, 1899. J.X. Merr. to G. Smith, 9 Aug. Private.

53. Cronwright-Schreiner: *The Land of Free Speech*, p.xxviii.

Colonial Jingo press.⁵⁴ The Afrikaners, on the other hand, had had complete faith in Rhodes and had anyone suggested such a treacherous deed, he would have been derided. After the Raid the Afrikaners felt that if they could not have trusted Rhodes, then they could trust no Englishmen. They felt that there were many enemies in sheep's clothing amongst them and that the only way to protect their own future would be to trust those of their own race.⁵⁵

The extent to which racialism had been roused may be gauged from the expression of such men as Merriman,⁵⁶ John Frost⁵⁷ and Rose-Innes, when the Raid came up for discussion in the House of Assembly in May, 1896. Of these we will only give a few quotations from the speech of Rose-Innes:

"Never before in the history of South Africa had there been such discordant elements aroused, or such danger to the peace of South Africa as existed at the present moment. The feeling throughout the country and the neighbouring states, ran high, to a degree that those who sat in that House could perhaps hardly realise....

"They must dissociate themselves not only formally, but entirely, sincerely, and absolutely from the whole of the raid, and in saying this he addressed himself more especially to the English-speaking members of the House and the English section of the population....

"The raid had raised such a race feeling that it would take all their moderation and all their statesmanship to avert a terrible calamity...."⁵⁸

So strongly did Rose-Innes feel on the matter and so strongly was he convinced of imminent danger, that, in October, he wrote to Merriman:

54. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.504.

55. *Vide Ons Land*, 9/1/96 et 16/3/97.

56. Hansard, 1896, p.85.

57. *Ibid.* p.130.

58. Hansard, 1896, p.94-5.

"I have had special opportunities of gauging the intense race feeling which exists not only on the part of the Dutch but also on the part of the English population. It is a striking commentary on the after-dinner platitudes which we so often hear of the wonderful union of hearts which the Young Burgher ((Rhodes)) was said to be bringing about. I hope I am wrong, but I regard civil war among the white people of South Africa as a by no means remote possibility in the near future....

There will be a blow up one of these days and the effect will not be confined to Johannesburg"⁵⁹

In the sphere of party politics, one direct result of the Raid was that many former supporters of the Bond joined the Jin- goes, for example, its spiritual father, Hendr S.J. du Toit, who now became a defender of Rhodes - "the high priest of Imperialism!" Rhodes obtained an interest in "Di Patriot" and this paper was compelled to change front. With Rhodes' assistance du Toit also erected the daily paper "Het Dagblad" which did much to further Rhodes' cause among some Afrikaners.⁶⁰ Others who deserted the Bond were M.M. Venter, member of Assembly for Colesburg, T.A.J. Louw, member for Malmesbury, D.C. de Waal, member for Piquetberg, Thomas Smartt and later Sir James Sivewright. Many of its former opponents also changed sides and acted with the Bond, for example, Richard Solomon, Sauer, Schreiner, Cronwright-Schreiner, J.C. Molteno, J.T. Molteno and last but not least J.X. Merriman who had in former years attacked the Bond most violently,⁶¹ and who had sympathised with the Uitlanders but whose sense of fairplay and justice could not countenance Rhodes' underhand plots. In this co-operation between Bond and leading Englishmen

59. Merr. Papers, No. 52, 1896. J.R.-Imes to J.X. Kerr. 25 Oct.

60. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.514.

61. Supra, p. 165.

we have the foundation of what after the Anglo-Boer War became known as the South African Party.⁶² Many of these English, although they did not wish to become actual members of the Bond were at one with it on the policy of justice to the Republics and now held out for a party which would embrace them as well as the Bond. The idea is evident in a letter from Cronwright-Schreiner in "Oms Land" of 18th January, 1896:

"Speaking not merely for myself, but, as I have reason to believe, for many thousands of Englishmen throughout South Africa, I may say that never before have we felt so identified with the Dutch; and I believe, when the turmoil of the moment has passed, it will be universally allowed that President Kruger and his burghers have fought for the benefit of South Africa as a whole,....When I think of this, I am proud to hold myself neither an Englishman nor a Dutchman, but a South African".

This letter is all the more significant if it is remembered that a few months prior to the Raid, Cronwright-Schreiner had launched an attack on the South African Dutch and advocated the formation of a "Progressive Party", in a speech at Kimberley on the "Political Situation".⁶³

Those English who did not associate themselves with the Bond followed the leadership of Cecil Rhodes who now found support - with exceptions - solely in people of his own race. This added fuel to the fire of racialism especially during the Rhodes demonstrations of 1897. The Afrikaners unanimously and with the greatest firmness, protested against these demonstrations.⁶⁴ To them this was gall and wormwood and in certain parts of South Africa, "the mere mention of Mr. Rhodes' name appears to have the

62. Infra, p. 363.

63. Supra, p. 258.

64. Oms Land, 23/1/1897.

same effect as the proverbial red rag....upon a bull - it drives them mad".⁶⁵ To Rhodes' banner flocked those who had been very bitter against him on account of his co-operation with the Afrikaners and those who had formerly opposed him and had looked coldly on his schemes; now that he was revealed as a traitor and instigator of the plot against the S.A. Republic they rallied to him and he became their great idol.⁶⁶ The commercial classes of the Cape were almost entirely English and were settled mostly at the ports. Because they naturally had commercial interests in Kimberley and ^{on} the Rand, it was amongst them that Rhodes obtained his greatest following: "....out here though Rhodes had betrayed every trust committed to him, deceived his best friends, and dragged the national honour in the mire, the commercial classes almost to a man uphold him and delight to honour him as a 'great Englishman!'"⁶⁷ In this way Rhodes became the leader of the South African Jingoos and the chief adversary of the Afrikaners.

We have noticed the rudimentary growth of the Progressive Party before the Raid and the adoption of a "Platform of the Progressive Party".⁶⁸ Before the Raid there had always been a party in power consisting of the Bond and the personal following of politicians who were temporarily allied to the Bond. The rest were in Opposition, and these, since the growth of the Bond into a political force of the first magnitude in the country,

65. C. Argus, 15/10/1897.

66. Merr. Papers, No. 353, 1899, J.X. Merr. to G. Smith, 9 Aug. Private.

67. Merr. Papers, No. 42, 1898, J.X. Merr. to G. Smith, 18 Aug. *et vide*, Hofmeyr: *Op. cit.* p. 503-4.

68. *Supra*, p. 254.

were usually a number of English. Politically all the English were never united into one party. When however, differences arose between English and Afrikaners, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the "Progressive Party" evolved and the Raid greatly stimulated this evolution.⁶⁹ Gradually, the overwhelming majority of English gravitated into the Progressive camp. These English, fearing that British supremacy was threatened in South Africa, now, for the first time, created a definitely British party in the Cape Colony. This party was intended to be strong enough to be independent of the Bond, and, as such, was a new phenomenon in Cape politics. To the English this was indeed a great improvement on the state of affairs prior to the Raid. They were no longer weakened by division into two parties of almost equal strength contending for Bond support and having to subordinate British interests to Bond demands. These Progressives were mostly drawn from the English population of the towns and cities and at once joined issue with the Bond on its policy of protecting South African produce at the expense of the city consumers. These Progressives were loyal to Rhodes, ultra -imperialistic and racial and for the time being these factors outweighed the local commercial rivalry between East London and Port Elizabeth and both with Cape Town.⁷⁰

Actually, the Progressive Party took on a more definite shape in the session of 1897. The most important element in this party was the "South African League" a branch of which was

69. Merr. Papers, No.40, 1910. R.-Innes to J.X. Merr, 24 Feb.

70. S.-Strydom; Kaapland in die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, p.11-12.

established in Cape Town in July, 1896. Its objects were:

"(1) to resist attacks being made upon the Imperial connection, and to generally uphold the connection unimpaired between this country and the motherland and (2) to promote progressive legislation in Cape Colony and other parts of South Africa, with the object of forming a strong loyal party as soon as practicable. Further, the objects of the League will be mainly directed in working towards the unity of all nationalities comprising the different races of South Africa"⁷¹

The Programme of the Progressive Party, as it crystallized in 1897, was further explained by Rose-Innes in a speech at Simonstown, 10th December, 1897. They wanted to secure the true working of Responsible Government and put an end to what had so often happened in the past, namely, to the real power being wielded by men who were not on the Ministerial Benches but still had all the power and none of the responsibilities of being in office. To achieve this the Progressives wanted parties to be formed on true party lines so that whether Progressives or Bond be in office the Ministry formed would be a united homogeneous ministry with a definite policy. This would make a clear and well-defined Opposition possible and provide opportunity for healthy criticism and debate without which Responsible Government⁷² ceased to be an efficient system of government.

Thus the Raid completely changed the state of political parties at the Cape. They were now almost divided on racial lines and the Progressives stood for the maintenance of the British Empire and paramountcy in South Africa and the Bond for justice, fair treatment of the Republics and a liberal and saner

71. C. Argus, 27/7/'96.

72. Ibid. 11/12/'97, Innes' Simonstown speech, 10/12/'97. Innes was also President of the S.A. Political Association, Supra, p. 257.

South African outlook.

Immediately after the Raid, Rhodes was not really very much at home in Progressive councils; it was not till 1898, that he blossomed forth as a full-blown Progressive.⁷³ When Rhodes openly allied himself with the Progressives the bitterness of party conflict increased tenfold and many men of more moderate views lent their support to the Afrikaner Bond.⁷⁴

III. POLITICAL SITUATION, 1896-1898.

Rhodes did not attend any Cabinet meetings after the Raid. Sprigg as senior member of the Executive Council was the ministerial representative consulting the Governor; this was an arrangement made when the Government was formed, in order to cope with any possible absence of Cecil Rhodes.⁷⁵

On 31st December, 1895, the Cabinet had already decided to retire,⁷⁶ but its resignation was only accepted on 7th January, 1896.⁷⁷ Rhodes had mentioned Sprigg as his successor but he was no longer popular with the Bond. In speaking on the Scab Act, 1895, he had referred to a "demon of ignorance and prejudice"⁷⁸ which was thought to refer to the Dutch farming population, and therefore regarded as an insult to them. Sprigg was certainly not popular in the Republics, and, moreover, he held views on protection not favoured by the Bond.⁷⁹ The Chief Justice, Sir Henry de Villiers, toyed with the idea of forming a ministry. He would have had the support of many Bondsmen, some Eastern

73. S.-Strydom: Kaapland on die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog. p.14.

74. Times History of the War, p.192.

75. Cape B.B. A.G.--'96, Ques. 751.

76. Supra, p.245, 277.

77. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.508.

78. Hansard, 1895, p.221.

79. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p. 508

Province politicians and such friends of his as Sauer and Merri-
man. He promised those who asked him to become Premier that if
Hofmeyr or Sprigg could not form a Ministry, he would descend
from the bench.⁸⁰ Hofmeyr was also asked to assume the Premier-
ship but he refused and contrary to expectations Sprigg after
some difficulty patched up the following Cabinet:⁸¹ Premier and
Treasurer, Sir Gordon Sprigg; Attorney-General, Sir Thomas Uping-
ton; Commissioner, Sir James Sivewright; Colonial Secretary,
Dr. Thomas te Water; Secretary for Agriculture, P.H. Paure.

In order to join the Ministry, Uppington had to resign as
judge. Sivewright had long been allied to the Bond and was a
persona grata with the S.A. Republic. Further, the Bond supplied
two Cabinet ministers, Pieter Paure, a moderate Bondsman and
Dr. te Water, a great friend of Hofmeyr and regarded by many as
his direct representative in the Cabinet. Te Water's presence
ensured the support of extreme Bondsmen for the Ministry as it
was a guarantee that measures of which Hofmeyr did not approve
or were contrary to the interests of the Bond would not be adopt-
ed.⁸² This Ministry relied on the Bond for parliamentary support,
but, in course of time, as we shall see, it drifted more and
more into the newly formed Progressive camp.

The policy of the new Ministry was to regain the friend-
ship of the Republic with the object of improving a situation
that was rapidly becoming critical. Its railway policy was the

80. Walker: De Villiers, p.267-8.

81. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.508.

82. Worsfold: Milner's Work in S. Africa, p.93.

same as that of the previous Ministry - development towards the North and linking up trunk lines; in this connection it was also the policy of the Ministry to develop a Customs Union. Other points in its programme were: compulsory European education, an Excise on brandy to fall on the consumer and not on the producer as formerly, total prohibition of the sale of brandy to natives. Further, the Seab Act, passed by the previous Ministry, would be maintained.⁸³

With such a programme the Sprigg Ministry met Parliament for the session of 1896. It was a Parliament differing vastly from the one dominated by Rhodes in 1895; it was evident that the Raid^{had} brought great confusion in parliamentary alliances. The Bond supported the Ministry; there was no organised Opposition as Sauer had resigned as leader of such Opposition as there was, and no successor was elected so that each member was free to follow his own bent.⁸⁴ Then there was a group which the "Cape Times" called "liberal" consisting of Rose-Innes, the leader, and ten others; there was also a "Frontier Party" under Captain E.Y. Brabant who had twelve followers; there were also some eleven persons not associated with any group or party.⁸⁵ In May, Rose-Innes was chosen leader of the Opposition;^{85a} and during the first half of the session he emerged as the leader of about thirty members. The other leader who came forward during this session was W.P. Schreiner, also at the head of

83. Journal, 18/2/'96 et C.Argus, 1/4/'96.

84. Journal, 7/4/'96.

85. Merr. Papers, No. 34, 1896, Julia Merr. to Agnes Merr. May, et Hansard, 1896, p.99.

85a. C.Times, 11/2/'96.

about thirty Bond Members. Rose-Innes however, does not appear to have been very taken up with his position as "Leader of the Opposition", nor was he able to control his followers; in October he wrote to Merriman: "Things are now so mixed that the only gleam of hope I see is a combination between you and Schreiner. You could work with him; I couldn't. Though I could and would give you both a hearty support on most things".⁸⁷ The Bond Party does not seem to have been united in its support of Schreiner. On 18th February, 1897, "Oms Land" wrote that it would do the Afrikaner Party much good if Hofmeyr again entered the House "al was het maar voor een tijd om het span weder in orde te bringen, nadat het in verwarring is gebracht door den heer Rhodes, die ons vertrouwen op zulk een snoodde wijze heeft verraden".

The session of 1897, saw a clearer grouping of parties. With the exception of a few Rhodes admirers the Afrikaner Bond Party again came together stronger than ever. It was still the strongest single party in the House - anti-Rhodes and anti-Progressive in policy and had the support of such free lances as Merriman and Sauer. During the session Schreiner secured his position still further as Parliamentary leader of this party. Opposed to the Bond stood the "Progressives" divided into groups: the Moderates led by Rose-Innes with a following of thirty⁸⁸ English and two Dutch members; these had the outside support of the S.A. Political Association. The other group of Progressives

86. C.Times, 9/6/'96.

87. Merr. Papers, No. 52, 1896, J.R.-Innes to J.X. Merr. 25 Oct.

88. C.Argus, 27/4/'97.

ives consisted of die-hard Britishers supported by the S.A. League⁸⁹ and manoeuvred by Cecil Rhodes behind the scenes.⁹⁰ Then there was also Sprigg with no following of his own but determined to stick to office and carry on the government of the country with whatever support he could muster. Many regarded the Ministry as merely keeping the ministerial seats warm for Rhodes till he had sufficiently rehabilitated himself to take a more active part in politics.⁹¹ Being without a stable majority, the Government was compelled to steer a timid course for fear of being upset by hostile combinations. For instance, if it condemned the Raid and all those connected with it, one section would accuse it of truckling to the Transvaal. If, on the other hand, it expressed appreciation of the North and its determination to support those carrying civilisation into the interior of Africa, then the Ministry would be accused of unfriendliness towards the Transvaal.⁹²

Although there was a clearer grouping of parties, there was still a certain amount of overlapping. There were three caucuses and part of the Ministry went to one caucus and part to another. In one and the same caucus supporters and opponents of the Ministry were to be found.⁹³ The predominating feature however, was division on racial lines;

"Never in the whole history of representative Government in this country has there been a division so completely on racial lines. A year ago when the facts of the Raid were fresh in men's minds, when helpless consternation prevailed on the one side and unbridled and well-founded

89. Walker: Schreiner, p.97.

90. Merr. Papers, No. 21, 1897, Agnes Merr. to Charlotte Barry, 1 May.

91. Laurence: Life of Merriman, p.180.

92. C.Argus 21/1/97.

93. C.Times, 13/4/97.

indignation on the other....no such frightfully marked division on racial lines happened to awaken the country to the gravity of its future....we have suddenly been compelled to peer into a yawning gulf between the races where it was foolishly dreamt that there was solid ground over which in time both sides might safely pass"⁹⁴

An interesting reflection on the state of parties and their support of the Ministry is revealed by two motions introduced during this session. The first was a motion by P.J. du Toit, member for Richmond and the other a vote of No-Confidence by Herriman. Du Toit's motion was drawn up by Hofmeyr in collaboration with two Ministers. This motion declared that "the occurrence of hostilities ((with the Transvaal)) would be disastrous and expressing the conviction that peace could best be maintained by the faithful observation of treaties and conventions, and by devising means to obtain an amiable settlement of differences in their interpretation". To this Rose-Innes moved an amendment bringing in the justice of Uitlander grievances.⁹⁵ In reality, both the parties for and against du Toit's motion desired peace in South Africa and wished to do what each thought best for the land, but they differed on the policy to be followed. Those for du Toit's motion held that the welfare of South Africa could only be furthered by leaving the Republics to themselves and the natural development of circumstances and refraining from external interference. Those against the Du Toit motion hoped to achieve a peaceful solution to South African affairs by clinging to Imperialism and invoking Imperial aid.

⁹⁴. C.Argus, 27/4/'97.

⁹⁵. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.516.

A long debate followed, the amendment was defeated and the original motion carried by forty-one votes, to thirty-two.⁹⁶ On this division the Ministers, free lances and the Bond voted against the united Progressive groups.⁹⁷ Towards the end of the session, 30th April, 1897, Merriman moved a vote of No-Confidence.⁹⁸ A short debate in which Sprigg put up a lame defence followed. Behind the scenes there was more wire-pulling and party manoeuvring than ever before in the Cape House.⁹⁹ During this debate Innes met his followers and told them that he was going to vote for the motion. They did not agree with him and he resigned his leadership and he and two others took up a back bench as independent members.¹⁰⁰ The outcome of the voting on the division was thirty-six votes for and against the motion. The Speaker gave his casting vote on the side of the Ministry.¹ In this division the Ministry again had to rely for support on the Progressives, among whom there were eight Afrikaners,² and not, as in the previous division, on Bond and free lances. Those voting for the No-Confidence motion were twenty-seven Bondsmen and nine English consisting of Moderates and free lances.³ Despite the fact that he did not have a majority, Sprigg did not resign; in this he acted contrary to the spirit of Responsible government. He was now able to attend the Queen's Diamond Jubilee celebrations in England, 1897, and the co-incident meeting of Colonial

96. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.516.

97. Walker; Schroiner, p.97.

98. Hansard, 1897, p.172.

99. There is an interesting account of all the wire-pulling and "lobbying" in a letter from Agnes Merriman to C. Barry. Merr. Papers, No. 21, 1897, 1 May.

100. Merr. Papers, No.21, 1897. Agnes Merr. to C. Barry, 1 May.

1. Hansard, 1897, p.193.

2. Oms Land, 1/5/97.

3. Pat. 6/5/97.

Premiers. The debate had an important effect on the Bond Party; it recovered from the confusion in its ranks consequent on the betrayal of Rhodes and although a few of its former members had gone over to the Progressives, it was stronger than ever. Thus "Ons Land" of 4th May, 1897, wrote: "Het is waarlijk verkwikkend de Afrikaner-Partij weder eensgezind te zien".

Although the Bond supported the Sprigg Ministry after the raid, Sprigg soon became increasingly unpopular among the Afrikaners. After the session of 1896, he declared at East London: "Now, what I wish to point out is that there is no breach whatever between Mr. Rhodes and myself. (hear, hear.) I have worked in harmony for years with Mr. Rhodes in the administration of the affairs of the country, and you will never find me deserting my friends in their day of adversity"⁴. This clearly showed in which quarter the wind was blowing. In England however, he pulled off the mask and showed himself the defender of Rhodes. He recommended that Rhodes should again be admitted to the Privy Council and expressed his doubt - much to the indignation of the Dutch - whether more than half of them opposed Rhodes.⁵ Finally Sprigg set the Afrikaners and even some Progressives by the ears by promising an "ironclad" - H.M.S. Africander" - to the British navy on the behalf of the Cape Colony, The Cape Parliament had suggested that the Colony should contribute a certain sum to the British Navy. Sprigg was instructed to investigate the matter and report to Parliament. At the Queen's Jubilee he proposed to

4. C. Argus, 6/3/196.

5. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.517.

Mr. Goschen this "ironclad" costing one million pounds. As a result, there were serious Cabinet differences,⁶ which further imperilled Sprigg's position.

The year 1898, was an exceedingly active one in Cape Parliamentary annals. There were two sessions of Parliament and elections of both the Assembly and Council. The election of the Legislative Council took place at the beginning of the year before the first session of Parliament. It resolved itself into a question of Rhodes or anti-Rhodes. The quarrel between Great Britain and the Transvaal, and the attitude of the Cape Colony on that question were referred to the ballot.⁷ Another issue at these elections was the question of Redistribution. If the Progressives were successful in the Council elections one great obstacle in the way of a bill for the redistribution of seats would be removed. The Progressives hoped to carry a bill through the session of 1898, redistributing the seats in the House of Assembly in such a way that the towns which were predominantly Progressive would receive greater representation. If such a bill were carried and a general election followed, the Progressives hoped to have majorities in both Houses. The Cape would then support Rhodes' plans of permissive federation and also any pressure which the new High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, might wish to bring to bear on the South African Republic.⁸

In May, 1897, Sir Alfred Milner a "doctrinaire bureaucrat trained in the school of newspapers and books, rather than that

6. Ons Land, 2/10/'97.

7. Journal, 29/3/'98.

8. Walker: De Villiers, p.321.

of men", - the expression is Merriman's - arrived in South Africa as Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner of South Africa. Ten months later at Graaff-Reinet, while the Council election campaign was in progress, he delivered himself of what the "South African News" of 15th June, 1900, called "a splendid sarcasm". The local branch of the Bond presented an address emphasising its loyalty.¹¹ Milner replied: "Well, gentlemen, of course you are loyal. It would be monstrous if you were not". Further he made pointed references to the S.A. Republic and several disparaging remarks of that state. He pointed out that the British connection carried many advantages and that Great Britain was determined to maintain its supremacy in South Africa, in spite of the Transvaal and its Cape sympathisers.¹² Thus Milner openly associated himself with the objects of the Progressive Party which regarded the High Commissioner's utterances as an indication that he would support them. The Bond, the Moderate English and the Republics regarded this speech as a declaration that the Imperial Government would support Rhodes and the Progressives. Thenceforth, neither party regarded him as a Governor standing outside the arena of party politics.

During these elections Rhodes was very active. He repudiated the principles he had supported during his alliance with the Bond; slowly he ousted Sprigg and became the real leader of the Progressives. With characteristic thoroughness, Rhodes now tried to do "by constitutional means" what he had

20. Merr. Papers, No. 383, 1901. J.K. Merr. to L. Courtney, 17 Oct.

11. Headlam: The Milner Papers, Vol. I. p. 242.

12. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. I, p. 244.

failed to do by force. He left no stone unturned to capture Cape constituencies. Men were specially imported from England to organise elections and a vast amount of money was spent only to lead to "the discovery that poor as he is the Boer cannot be bought when a national question is involved".¹³ All the leading newspapers in the country, except "One Land", supported Rhodes and the Progressives. The Bond candidates had few expenses. Their English friends started a new daily paper at the Cape, "The South African News", where previously they had had no English press at their disposal.¹⁴ The results of the Legislative Council elections showed, for the first time, two well-organised parties and whereas it was in the minority before the dissolution of the Council, the Progressives now returned fourteen members and the Bond nine.¹⁵

Both the Bond and the S.A. League agreed that there should be a redistribution of seats in the Colony. The Bond had raised the matter at its Congresses on several occasions; redistribution was also one of the main planks in the S.A. League platform while it was the raison d'être of the S.A. Political Association,¹⁶ the other wing of the Progressive Party. A commission had been appointed in 1897, to inquire into the matter of redistribution of parliamentary seats. The commission finally submitted a majority and a minority report. The latter was regarded as

13. Merr. Papers, No. 353, 1899. J.X. Merr. to G. Smith, 9 Aug. Private. The Cape Times of 30/3/'98, also admits quite candidly that Rhodes spent large sums of money on party organisation.

14. Laurence: Life of J.X. Merriman, p.163.

15. Journal, 29/3/'98. One Land, 26/3/'98 gives Bond 12 and Progressives 11, but it is clearly in error.

16. C.Times, 8/12/'97.

being more favourable to the Progressives. But Sprigg was not satisfied; he had drifted entirely into the camp of the Imperialists.¹⁷ He submitted a bill to the Assembly extending the principles of the minority report¹⁸ and thereby increasing the strength of the Progressive vote in Parliament.

Sprigg knew that his redistribution measure would not carry Hofmeyr's or the Bond's approval but he was assured of the support of the British members of the Cape Parliament, and therefore decided to introduce his Bill. The Cabinet approved of the Bill on 13th May, and thereupon Dr. de Water resigned. For some time de Water had not been able to get on well with his ministerial colleagues. Already in May, 1897, there were rumours that he was going to resign,¹⁹ but he felt that he served the Afrikaner interests by not resigning. Upington was Attorney-General, nominally, but seldom able to attend Cabinet meetings (on account of ill health) so that de Water, aided by some doubter in the Cabinet was able to have a certain amount of influence on the policy of Government. Now, however, Upington had resigned to be succeeded by Tom Graham an out-and-out Free Trader and Rhodes worshipper. Hence the influence of the minority in the Cabinet was considerably decreased and de Water found it impossible to remain in the Cabinet any longer. The second reason why de Water resigned was the publication of the Government Redistribution Bill which "Oms Land" of 17th May, 1898, described

17. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. I, p.252.

18. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.525-6.

19. Kerr. Papers, No. 21, 1897. Agnes Kerr to C. Barry, 1 May.

as "een brutale poging om de landelike partij geheel en al in de macht der stedelijke over te geven, en wij hebben dan ook reeds vroeger de overtuiging uitgesproken dat dr. te Water niet voor deze bill kon of zal stemmen". Dr. te Water was succeeded²⁰ by Dr. Thomas Smartt, formerly a Bondsmen but with all the enthusiasm of a convert, now an extreme Progressive. Thus, within a week, both Upington and te Water had resigned, and Sprigg had gravitated into the arms of the British and filled up the vacancies with two men who had no sympathy whatever, with the Afrikaner cause. The loss of te Water especially, cut from underneath the ministerial feet all claim which it may still have entertained of Bond support. He was Hofmeyr's confidant, a powerful party man, ministerial whip and was also admitted to ministerial as well as Bond caucuses.²¹

The Cape Parliament met on 28th May, for the first session on 1898. One of the first measures introduced was the Redistribution Bill. This was a very unwise step. Redistribution of seats was an important matter, it was the last session of that Parliament and very little indeed, had been said on the matter at the previous elections. The country therefore, had had no opportunity of expressing itself on the matter and the Opposition was not slow to drive home this fact.²² Sprigg may have been willing to go to the country but Rhodes did all in his power to prevent Sprigg from doing so. Rhodes knew that the

20. Ons Land, 19/5/'98.

21. C. Times, 16/5/'98, et vide Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. I, p. 253.

22. Hansard, 1898, p. 133.

country was not yet ripe for him - the more time lapsed, the more chance was there of grass growing over the Raid, and the more chance would Rhodes and the Progressives have of success at the polls. On 20th June, 1898, Sprigg's Redistribution Bill was carried at the second reading by a majority of seven votes.²⁴ Three weeks previously however, 31st May, Schreiner had given notice of a vote of No-Confidence. This was discussed intermittently till 22nd June. The Bond accused the Ministry of having Imperialist tendencies - this is proved by the suggested gift of a warship to the British Navy - and of lack of sympathy with the S.A. Republic.^{24a} That this was the Ministerial attitude is borne out by Sprigg's own words in his rejoinder to Schreiner's motion: "...no one need ever look forward to his ((Sprigg's)) doing anything other than maintain the connection between this colony and the United Kingdom - (loud cheers) - and holding aloft the standard of England as illustrating the paramount power of the Crown in South Africa. (Prolonged cheers.)" Schreiner's No-Confidence motion was carried by forty-one to thirty-six votes. The voting was practically on racial lines. The minority consisted of English Progressives and one or two Bond "wobblers," and the Bond majority of Afrikaners and a number of English-Boards, Hay, Merriman, Solomon, Sauer, Schreiner, Wioner, J.T. Molteno and J.C. Molteno,²⁵ - men who in the past had generally been associated with Rose-Innes.²⁶ Even after this defeat, Sprigg

23. Merr. Papers, No. 23, 1897. Agnes Merr. to C. Barry, 6 May.

24. Hansard, 1898, (First Session), p. 205.

24a. Worsfold; Milner's Work in S. Africa, p. 117

25. Hansard: Op. cit. p. 234.

26. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. I, p. 258.

refused to resign; he decided to appeal to the electorate and Parliament was dissolved.

The Assembly elections of 1898, were fought with even greater bitterness and intensity than those of the Council earlier in the year. Nominally the leaders were Schreiner and Sprigg but in reality, Hofmeyr and Rhodes, men of vastly different political ideas who had yet for a long time acted in the closest political alliances, but neither of them dared or perhaps dared to come out into the open and lead the forces over which they had control. Behind Hofmeyr stood the Afrikaner population and its political organisation, the Bond; further he was supported by Sauer, Merriman and Schreiner, the parliamentary leader, as well as several men of British descent. On the other side, Rhodes and the capitalists controlled the Progressive organisation which embodied the political outlook of the die-hard British. Throughout the elections, Rhodes' personality was the dominating one, and much rested on his policy of British supremacy. The Progressive Party, as it stood then, was also his creation:

"We have had groups before, and we have had irregular dividing lines, but never before have we had such a broad party cleavage, and that cleavage is directly and indirectly traceable to the influence of the ex-Premier. He has consolidated the various groups which we class under the general term of Progressive as no other statesman in South Africa could have succeeded in doing. His name and personality have supplied the needed stimulus, and the still more needed party amalgamation, and hence it is that to-day we find ourselves for the first time in the history of this Colony in a position to fight the Bond on their own field of battle and with every chance of gaining a decisive victory"²⁷

27. C. Argus, 26/7/1898, et vide Supra, p. 287.

The Progressives raised a number of minor election cries, such as cheap food, that is, the removal of import duties on grain, flour and meat.²⁸ They also demanded an Excise on brandy and restrictions on the sale of liquor to natives and improved educational facilities for Europeans.²⁹ Against these cries the Bond put a policy that would lead up to compulsory education; an annual contribution to the navy and "reasonable" protection of foodstuffs, and towards the natives a "firm and absolutely just policy".³⁰ Over and above these issues, parties appealed to the country on the question which had been smothered on the dissolution of Parliament, namely, redistribution of seats. The Progressives held that with increasing interests and population, they had a just claim to increased parliamentary representation.³¹ This the Progressives regarded as the open door to other reforms; if they could obtain better representation for the towns in Parliament, they would be able to carry all the other measures which they favoured. Redistribution on the basis proposed by the Progressives would be strongly opposed by the Bond as it would mean loss of political power to them.

All these questions however, redistribution, native policy, and protection were overshadowed by the question whether the Cape Colony would support the policy of unjustifiable pressure on the Transvaal, or whether it would insist on peaceful solution of the differences between London and Pretoria. The Pro-

28. *Our Land*, 11/8/'98, Correspondence by "Non-Bondsman".

29. *Vindex*: Op. cit. p. 515.

30. *Talks*: Schreiner, p. 112-113.

31. *C. Argus*, 6/7/'98, J.W. Jagger's Manifesto, et vide *C. Argus*, 8/7/'98, Sprigg's East London Speech, 8/7/'98.

gressives, however, perverted the issue into a cry of British supremacy or Republican domination - Union Jack or Vierkleur. At Klipdam 26th August, 1898, Rhodes put the issue as follows: "The election has been largely fought upon our relations with the Transvaal, and,....I do not think Africa will ever come right....until the position of the newcomers in the Transvaal receives consideration, for that question is at the root of all our troubles".³² Sprigg echoed the same opinion at East London. He contended that during the past few years influences had been at work which endeavoured to diminish and eventually destroy British authority in South Africa. The policy which he submitted to the verdict of the country was that British supremacy should be maintained in South Africa and this was most important. British supremacy had to be something which was a reality and not as the Opposition regarded it namely, that Britain nominally had a shadowy suzerainty in one or other of the Republics. He was against the interference of any other European power in South Africa and Britain had to protect South Africa.³³ The "Cape Argus" of 22nd July, 1898, put the Progressive case and their quarrel with the Afrikaners as follows:

"The question before the constituencies is whether the people will return to power a Parliament which would support British supremacy or whether they will return a Parliament which will support the Transvaal Government. That is the meaning of the British supremacy cry in these elections. The Cape Progressives are all sick and tired of the misgovernment in the Transvaal; they condemn the Transvaal attitude towards the paramount Power; they loathe the spirit of Hollander intrigue embodied in Dr. Leyds and others; and they believe that the best way of

32. Vindox: Op. cit. p.573.

33. C.Argus, 9/7/'98, Sprigg's E.London Speech, 8/7/'98, et vide Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. I. p.246 et 256.

mending the present intolerable situation is not in mincing words, or talking in whispers, or pandering to Republican prejudices, but in a firm, fair, united British Colonial policy, the object of which will be to keep in check and ultimately to diminish the evils we have indicated....the tendency of the Schreiner-Merriman policy is to play into the hands of those who are actively and passively plotting against British supremacy in South Africa!"

If the Progressives could obtain a decisive victory at the elections they would be able to lend strong support to the British Government in its negotiations with the S.A. Republic, and if the British Government could submerge the Republic, Rhodes' dream of a Union of South Africa under British supremacy would be advanced considerably. Over against this issue³⁴ the Bond and its moderate British supporters put justice to and fair treatment of the Republic and resistance to Imperial interference in South African affairs.

Never before had Cape politics been so clearly defined and never before had there been such a sharp difference of opinion. The Progressive Party strengthened its party discipline in the towns, but it lacked contact with the country districts.³⁵ The Party had as its machinery the S.A. Political Association, the S.A. League and the Central Progressive Committee,³⁶ and in the Eastern Province there were the Farmers' Associations which did good work for the Progressive cause.³⁷ To create a new and efficient party organisation, organisers were introduced from England and large sums of money spent.³⁸ Rhodes himself admitted that he devoted large sums to this purpose,³⁹ and at the same time

34. Vide: et Infra, p.363.

35. C. Argus, 10/3/'98.

36. Oms Land, 27/9/'98; Correspondence by T.P. Theron.

37. C. Argus, 12/9/'98, sub-leader.

38. Supra, p.297.

39. Vindex: Op. cit. p.572, et vide Morr. Papers, No. 375, 1899. J.X. Merriman to J. Bryce 9 Oct. Private.

accused Schreiner and his party of having accepted money from a state unfriendly to Her Majesty - the S.A. Republic presumably - with the object of fighting elections in the Cape Colony. This, both Schreiner and Hofmeyr denied most emphatically.⁴⁰

Not only were large sums of money spent, but the ^Progressives also resorted to other measures to secure the names of many people on the voters' rolls, people whose names had no right to be there. For example, large numbers of diggers from Kimberley were registered in the Barkly West area - men who were not bona fide diggers. At Uitenhage a large number of railwaymen were registered ignoring their place of residence. So also numerous unqualified natives and Coloureds were registered. The volunteers and police who took part in suppressing the Langeberg revolt, although dispersed over the whole country were conveyed to Vryburg by special train to outvote the true electors. The Progressives also controlled the leading papers in South Africa.⁴¹

Further the Progressives spent thousands of pounds on cablegrams to the papers in Great Britain where the elections were followed with very keen interest. In fact no general election in British Colonial history had been followed with so much interest by the British public. Speeches were reported in the English press as if they were election speeches in Great Britain.⁴²

40. *Ons Land*, 1/9/'98, Letter from Schreiner. *C. Argus*, 22/7/'98, sub-leader.

41. *Ons Land*, 8/9/'98, cf. vide Walker; Schreiner, p.102.

42. *Fortnightly Review*, 1/11/'98, Art. Lawson; Cape Politics and Colonial Policy, p.756.

The elections resulted in the Bond gaining forty seats and the Progressives thirty-nine, but in reality thirty-eight, as Rhodes had been elected for both Namaqualand and Early West and he chose to sit for the latter; a by-election had therefore to be held in the Namaqualand constituency.⁴³ This success of the Bond and moderate British, made the Progressives an out-and-out warmongering party. The election cry had been "Union Jack or Vierkleur" and as the "Union Jack" had been defeated British supremacy had to be defended by the sword.

Although the verdict of the electorate had, by a narrow majority, gone against Rhodes and the Progressives, Sprigg still clung to office. Rhodes and his friends, Jameson and Siverwright tried to persuade the Governor to delay the meeting of Parliament, hoping that some of the election petitions filed, would unseat some Bondsmen and give the Progressives a majority. But this Milner refused to do.⁴⁴ Rhodes also hoped that he would be able to entice some of the Bondsmen to the Progressive side. Thus, in September, W.T. Stead, an intimate friend of Rhodes and editor of "Review of Reviews", wrote:

"It is expected Mr. Rhodes will return to England before Christmas, after seeing the new Chamber ((Cape Assembly)) through its first session. The hand of the great South African must indeed have lost its cunning if before then he is not able to detach two or three members of the Bond from the party to which they have pledged their allegiance!"⁴⁵

(Parliament met for the second session of 1898, on 7th October. The Progressive minority was further decreased on Dr.

43. C. Argus, 6/9/'98, Election Ladder.

44. Wendland: Op. cit. Vol. I, p.270 et 273.

45. Review of Reviews, 1898, Vol.II, p.226.

Berry's election to the Speaker's chair. Three days later Schreiner moved a vote of No-Confidence. Sprigg made a feeble defeatist attempt to save his party and when the division was called Schreiner's motion was carried by 59 to 37 votes.⁴⁶ The next day Sprigg announced that his Administration had resigned and that Schreiner had been called to form a new Government.⁴⁷

IV. THE SCHREINER ADMINISTRATION.

Schreiner took office on 14th October, 1898. He himself was also Colonial Secretary. His Attorney-General was Richard Solomon, his Treasurer, J.X. Merriman, Commissioner, J.W. Sauer and Secretary for Agriculture, A.J. Herholdt. Then there was also Dr. T. de Water, Minister without portfolio.⁴⁸

The Prime Minister was the son of a German Missionary, who had been in the service of the London Missionary Society. His mother was an English woman who, to her death, was an ardent worshipper of Rhodes. A brother and sister of Schreiner's were strong Imperialists and opponents of the Bond. He himself had married a sister of P.W. Reitz, one time President of the Orange Free State. He had studied at Cambridge, and was a Queen's Councillor. With his judicial training he was inclined to view questions from all angles. He became known as "Golden Mean" Schreiner. He also believed that under the Conventions the Imperial Government had no right to interfere in the affairs of the South African Republic.⁴⁹

46. Hansard, 1898, p.15-16.

47. Ibid. p.17.

48. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.527.

49. Imp. B.B. 311, S.Africa, 1897, Question 4,385.

Richard Solomon, a personal friend of Schreiner's, was also a Cambridge man, nephew of Saul Solomon, and in 1893, leader of the Kimberley Bar. He had sat in the Cape House, but after the Raid, he had broken with Rhodes and at the time of joining the Ministry, was without a parliamentary seat. The following year he was elected for Tzombuland. Solomon did not really fit in with the Ministry. He held views differing vastly from those of the Bond on the native question and fiscal policy; he was a supporter of the Redistribution Bill and had some sympathy with the Uitlanders and their complaints. Further he was loyal to the British connection, not strongly attached to either of the parties in the House, but greatly respected by all and this made him a valuable asset to the Ministry. His inclusion secured for Schreiner a capable colleague and made a bid for the Cape native vote; moreover, it would be difficult for the Opposition to attack the Ministry as being anti-British.⁵⁰

Merriman John X. Merriman now held office for the fourth time. His relations with Schreiner, his junior in years and in experience, had not been very cordial. He was an Englishman born and bred. About 1884, Merriman had been a staunch Imperialist, opponent of the Bond and had, before the Raid, sympathised with the Reform Movement on the Rand.⁵¹ After the Raid, which he condemned,⁵² he took up a firm attitude against Rhodes and allied himself with the Bond as one of its leaders. He might have become Premier

50. Headlam: Milner Papers, Vol. I. p.281.

51. Supra, p. 165.

52. Merr. Papers, No. 50, 1893. J.X. Merr. to Agnes Merr. 4 Aug.

instead of Schreiner had it not been for D.C. de Waal and Danie Wessels, two Bondsmen, who refused to support a Merriman Ministry;⁵³ he therefore had to stand down for Schreiner.

The remaining three Ministers were of Dutch extraction and one of them, J.W. Sauer, was a noted negrophile and liberal; but he was in deep sympathy with the Boer cause and with Merriman abhorred "Capitalism" and "capitalists". Solomon and Herholdt were the only two Ministers who had not previously held office. The latter was a member of the Legislative Council, a Bondsman, a successful farmer, much respected by fellow-farmers and moreover, a man of moderate views. The sixth man in the Ministry was Dr. T. te Water. He was a true Bondsman, and although an intimate friend of Hofmeyr's he was not very influential. He was regarded as a link between the Ministry with its four non-Bond members and the Bond itself.⁵⁴

It will be clear therefore, that the Schreiner Ministry had many elements of incompatibility, but it was the fear of Rhodes and his sinister designs that held it together. It held office on the understanding that it would work for peace in South Africa, and it had been put in office by a party which considered interference, on the part of the British Government, in the affairs of the S.A. Republic, quite indefensible.

The main question that had to be settled at the special session of 1898, was the redistribution of seats. The Schreiner

53. de Waal, J.H.H.: Die lewe van D.C. de Waal, p.253, at Merr. Papers, No. 62, 1900. Agnes to Julia Merr. 20 May.

54. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. I, p.281-2.

Records van
Sch. kabinet

in Schreiner's
kabinet

Ministry had a very scant majority in the Assembly, but in the Council the Progressives had a majority, and threatened to obstruct the Ministry if it did not pass a redistribution measure.⁵⁵ At a meeting of the Afrikaner Party, it was unanimously decided that no member would suggest a compromise with the Progressives. The party "whip" would be recognised; all members were to submit their views to a party meeting so that the Opposition could be faced undivided.⁵⁶ When the question of redistribution was raised in the House, neither party would compromise. The Progressives demanded immediate redistribution and also additional representation for the towns. As the Ministry would not give in the Opposition decided on a course of obstruction, and the business of the country came to a standstill. At that time the Standing Rules and Orders of the Assembly made no provision for a "closure" should the time of the House be wasted on purpose. This was the acknowledged weapon of the minority and Rhodes now made full use of it. Day after day the House talked and talked and Rhodes was determined that this should go on until Schreiner has introduced a redistribution bill. Matters had reached an impasse and on 31 st October, 1898, Schreiner moved that the House should not proceed with the question of redistribution of seats that session but that the Government should be instructed to prepare a measure on that matter and lay it before the House in 1899.⁵⁷ The Progressives would not agree to this

55. C. Argus, 24/10/198.

56. Ons Land, 22/11st 1898.

57. Hansard, 1898, p.146.

and a long and angry debate followed. Neither side would give ground and a deadlock ensued. On 1st November, D.C. de Waal, without the consent of his party, moved that a conference should immediately be held between representatives of the two parties which should arrive at a compromise on this much vexed question. The motion was seconded by Rhodes.⁵⁸ Schreiner would not accept de Waal's amendment, as he and his party adhered to their original motion.⁵⁹ The debate continued till 4th November. When a division on Schreiner's motion was called for, D.C. de Waal crossed over to the Progressive side and the House was equally divided - thirty-nine votes to thirty-nine. The Speaker gave his casting vote with the "noes" and thus defeated Schreiner's motion and kept the question of redistribution open. De Waal's amendment was then agreed to.⁶⁰ On 7th November, Schreiner announced that he and two others would meet Sprigg and two other Opposition members in a conference on Redistribution.

For being unfaithful to his party and his political pledges, D.C. de Waal met with a fair amount of abuse. "Ons Land" of 22nd November, 1898, launched a bitter attack on him. He was boycotted in his business and "treated in a manner without precedent in any period of the history of the House which he ((Sprigg)) could recollect".⁶¹

On 18th November, Schreiner introduced the Bill which had

58. Hansard, 1898, p.159.

59. Ibid. p.167.

60. Ibid. p.194.

61. Ibid. p.263.

been drawn up at the conference with Opposition representatives. The basis of the agreement between the two parties was the majority report of the Commission of 1897.⁶² The Redistribution Bill which also carried additional representation for the larger urban areas, was carried without much opposition.⁶³

As a result of the elections of 1898, election petitions, on charges of corruption, were lodged no less than fourteen members of the Assembly.⁶⁴ Two of these, Haarhoff and Pincham, Progressive members for Vryburg, resigned at the end of the special session of 1898, rather than face the charges of corruption at the elections, brought against them.⁶⁵ The two members for Stellenbosch, Sivewright and Gideon Krige, were unseated as a result of successful petitions against them. In consequence of the Redistribution and Additional Representation Bill - which created sixteen new seats - and the seats vacant as a result of the election petitions, the Cape entered on a miniature general election in April, 1899.⁶⁶ The issues were the same as those at the general elections of 1898, namely, whether there would be peace in South Africa or whether her interests would be surrendered to British Imperialism and the clique controlling the Chartered and allied Companies as well as the Opposition in Parliament. After the elections, the Progressives had forty-three

62. Hansard, 1898, p.257.

63. Ibid. p.p.294,311,321.

64. Journal, 1/11/'98.

65. Ons Land, 15/12/'98.

66. The sixteen new seats were for: Cape Town, Tembuland, Oriskania East, Worcester, Middelburg, Prieska, Jansenville(2), George, Humansdorp, Port Elizabeth(2), Woodstock, Wynberg, Simonstown, Cathcart. The vacant ones were: Stellenbosch(2) and Vryburg(2). Ons Land, 16/2/'99.

members in the Assembly, excluding the Speaker, and the Afrikaner Party fifty-one.⁶⁷

Note.

The Progressives had committed a series of errors. They had defied the Majority Report of the Commission on Redistribution and introduced their own larger measure - this was fatal to the Bill and resulted in a general election. The Progressives then placed themselves in a minority by electing a Speaker from their own ranks. Soon they fell from power and further blundered by insisting that the Bond Ministry should bring in a Redistribution Bill on pain of the Opposition refusing supplies. The first of the above errors united the Bond to oppose any measure for Redistribution and roused strong racial animosity. The second error forced waverers into the Bond camp and caused the fall of the Progressive Ministry. The third error was the most calamitous in its results. It left the Progressives in a minority of eight and brought discouragement and dissent into their ranks. These by-elections of 1899, confirmed the verdict of the country in the Assembly elections of 1898. Fate determined however, that this verdict should not be carried into effect. Soon after the announcement of the election results, Milner penned his infamous telegram to Chamberlain on 4th May, -
 the helot cry.⁶⁸ Six months later "constitutional methods" were replaced by "kanongebulder en het geween van geheel Zuid-Afrika!"⁶⁹

Parliament assembled for the session of 1899, with war clouds gathering in ever growing darkness over South Africa.

67. *Ons Land*, 3/6/'99.

68. Headlam: *Op. cit.* Vol. I, p.349.

69. *Ons Land*, 30/9/'99.

The Progressive Party did nothing to ward off the impending catastrophe; on the contrary, its press and the utterances of its leaders in public continued to abuse the S.A. Republic; this made the task of securing a peaceful solution almost an impossible one, - even if a well-meaning High Commissioner were handling the situation. We cite here just one extract from Sprigg's speech at Simonstown, 1st April, 1899, as an illustration of the spirit which animated the Progressive Party:

"This country belongs to the Crown of England, and it is the inheritance of all the people who live here, no matter what part of the world they were born in as long as they are loyal subjects of Her Majesty (cheers), and it is because I desire that state of things to continue that I belong to the Progressive Party, and am prepared to fight to the very death the party of the Afrikaner Bond (loud cheers). So soon as the Paramount Power of England ceases in South Africa, so soon as the Cape Colony ceases to be Her Majesty's Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, then the sun of South Africa has set...."⁷⁰

As the year 1899, progressed, it became increasingly clear that unless the S.A. Republic submitted to the unjust demands of Great Britain, there would be war. The Afrikaner leaders at the Cape tried to pour oil on troubled waters, hoping that Milner would be removed and the Salisbury Cabinet which was unsympathetic towards the Afrikaners, replaced by a Liberal one.⁷¹ On 11th June, 1899, Schreiner requested Milner to inform Chamberlain that Cape Ministers considered Kruger's franchise proposals "practical, reasonable, and a considerable step in the right direction". Four days later, Schreiner informed the Governor that in the opinion of the Ministry there was nothing

70. C. Argus, 3/4/'99, Sprigg's speech at Simonstown, 1/4/'99.

71. Worsfold; Milner's Work in South Africa, p.195.

to justify "the active interference of the Imperial Government in what were the internal affairs of the Transvaal".⁷² Three weeks before the outbreak of hostilities we find the Schreiner Ministry still straining every nerve in an effort to secure a settlement. On behalf of his Ministers, Schreiner requested Milner to address the following message to the British Government:

"My Ministers unanimously beg Her Majesty's Government to believe that their best efforts have been spent in endeavouring to aid in securing a settlement, peaceful and satisfactory, of the Transvaal crisis, and to weigh well their earnest conviction that the situation is now one in which great efforts should be made by the exercise of a spirit of magnanimous compromise to avoid the calamity which seriously threatens not only the Republics but the British Possessions in South Africa. The issue of a war could only be a victory for the Imperial arms. That matter is not open to doubt. But the evil consequences (affecting alike the European and Native populations) of the perhaps prolonged struggle which would take place would be far-reaching and abiding for generations.

"They desire me to add that this message is an indication that they are deeply persuaded that a large measure of consideration shown by Her Majesty's Government at this present juncture is the main, they fear the only hope of avoiding such a calamity - a consideration which would not only not impair but truly strengthen the foundations of the Empire in South Africa"⁷³

Unhappily, the Ministry did not have the whole-hearted support of the Cape Colony. Some Bond members thought that the position had been made unbearable by the British Government and that the Transvaal would be justified in taking up arms. The majority of the Bond however, were prepared to support the Ministry in its effort to arrive at a peaceful settlement. Unhappily, there was also the powerful Chartered Press of Rhodes which used its enormous power to shout for the revenge of Majuba. This made

⁷² Quoted by Worsfold: Op. cit. p.198.

⁷³ P.M. 291. Confid. Minute to Governor, 21/9/'96, p.34.

Kruger less tractable and stultified the efforts of the peace-makers.⁷⁴

As the Transvaal affairs became more and more critical, the Ministry's position became increasingly difficult. The party which had put Schreiner in office was composed of men who had strong sympathies with the Transvaal and whose sympathy might at any moment be translated into action; moreover, the Ministry had been put in office as opponents of the Chamberlain-Milner policy which would inevitably lead to war to the Republics.

Addressing the House of Assembly on 28th August, 1899, Schreiner said that he did not believe war would break out; but if it did,

*Schreiner would do
Keep neutral
Now not only*

"It is the duty of everyone on either side to endeavour to maintain this colony, at any rate, as a little place of peace - a little port, perhaps, in South Africa that is not to be riddled and rent by storm and thunder". Further he would do his "very best to maintain for this colony the position of standing apart and aloof from the struggle, both with regard to its forces and with regard to its people. (Ministerial cheers). In that alone there will be salvation for the future, because the white races have to live side by side and hand in hand even when all the storms are passed and to do their best to piece up the broken china"⁷⁵

Many took Schreiner's utterance to be a declaration of neutrality. The Cape could however, not have remained neutral in a war between Great Britain and the Republics.⁷⁶ Milner demanded an explanation from Schreiner. The latter said that he had never intended his words to be a declaration of neutrality, and,

74. ~~Hansard, 1899, p. 333.~~ Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p. 531.

75. Hansard, 1899, p. 333.

76. Imp. E.B. Cd. 359, p. 4.

"fully admitted that in case of war between Her Majesty's Government and any other state, this Colony could not be neutral, yet he felt, that in the interests of the Empire itself the two main objects which Colonial Ministers should, in that case, keep in view, would be to prevent civil war breaking out in the Colony and to guard against the dangers of a native rising. Undoubtedly the forces of the Colony should be employed to protect the Colony, and he would regard any Minister as most culpable who ran any risk of damage being done to the Colony either from the South African Republic or the Orange Free State. What he deprecated was use of Colonial forces against Republics outside borders of Colony. If they were so used, he feared it might be impossible to restrain a rising on the other side, and there might be a conflict within the Colony itself."⁷⁷

All his negotiations with Milner, Steyn, Kruger, Hofmeyr and others had been ^{very tedious} futile and in the middle of September, 1899, Schreiner seriously considered resignation. That would have made it clear to the whole world what he and his Ministers thought of the Imperial policy. Just at that time, however, he received a letter from his sister Olive:

"Ultimately, we have nothing to fight the Capitalists with but the guns and forts of the Transvaal. Milner would have turned you all off long ago and put Rhodes and Co. in your places but for that armed shadow in the background....If the English government once gains control of the Transvaal in a military sense as she now has control of the Colony, it seems to me South Africa may and almost must fall into the hands of the Capitalists"⁷⁸

Sch. and the Cape and the struggle
This thought that Rhodes would become Premier, made Schreiner decide to hold on and do what good he could for the Colony.

To the last Schreiner tried to keep the Colony out of the struggle. On 11th October, 1899, - the day on which the Boer ultimatum expired - he telegraphed to President Steyn

⁷⁷ Imp. B.B.Cd. 333, para. 43, p. 34.

⁷⁸ Walker: Schreiner, p. 190-1, et vide Merr. Papers, No. 360, 1899. Julia to Agnes Merr. 13th Sept.

*Sch. put in warning of Kruger
then answer.*

asking for assurance that the Cape Colony would not be invaded by the Orange Free State and its ally the S.A. Republic; the forces on the Colonial border were there for defensive purposes only. On the same day, Steyn replied that such assurance could be given on condition that the Orange Free State and S.A. Republic were not invaded from the Cape and that the Cape were not used as a base for troop movements. Schreiner could not give this assurance, because he had no control over the disposition or movements of Imperial troops; still, he begged Steyn and Kruger to respect the territory of the Cape Colony because "it is my duty although I cannot control the Imperial policy to seek safe-
guards for this Colony against attack".⁷⁹

The following day Schreiner went to the Cape House to close the session of Parliament. To a very empty House he explained that he thought it the duty of the Ministers and all the members of the House "to strain for one great object and that is....to save our colony as much as possible from being involved in the vortex of war into which it is now apparently certain that South Africa has been drawn". Further he exhorted the press, the churches and the public and every individual to remain calm, to avoid party strife, prejudice and racial animosity.⁸⁰ The Ministry did its best to keep the Colony quiet and to prevent acts of insurrection; it appealed to magistrates, field cornets, the Bond Committee and the Moderator of the Dutch Reformed

79. P.M.184. Telegrams received. Enclos. No. 225/1899.

80. Hansard, 1899, p.648.

81

Church. But, especially when the commandos of the Republics crossed the frontiers of the Colony, it was no easy matter to carry out this policy. Schreiner's position was indeed very awkward; he was caught between the upper and the nether millstone. On the one hand he was leader of a party which sympathised with the Republics and at the same time he was Minister of a colony at war with those Republics. In consequence, he had to steer a course between conflicting interests - between the Imperialists who were dissatisfied because the Ministry did not take part in the war, actively enough to suit their ideas, and the sentiments of his own party which was dissatisfied because their own Government was taking part in a war in support of a policy which it had all along condemned. Again Schreiner was quite willing to resign, in fact he wished to do so, but his supporters prevailed on him not to.

82

If he did, the Progressives would succeed to office, the war would have assumed an extremely racial character and there would be no force to restrain a general rising of the Cape Afrikaners. For a long time Schreiner did succeed in keeping the Colony quiet, as Milner himself admitted.

83

As the struggle proceeded, the Cape Colony was inevitably drawn into the "highest point" of war". The invasion of the Cape Colony and the issuing of proclamations which amounted to proclamations of annexation of invaded districts, forced Schreiner to recede

81. Walker; Schreiner, p.199. See also Merr. Papers, Nos. 409, 431, 432a, 1899, for telegrams from Merriman to various persons in areas in which risings seemed imminent.

82. Huisgenoot, 18/6/'37. Art. Malan, F.S.: 'n Oud-Joernalis kyk terug, et vide Walker; De Villiers, p.197.

83. Headlam; Op. cit. Vol. II, p.25.

Sch. Turner 2 were

Kapp's getting to
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from his former attitude:

"The invasion of this Colony, and the annexation of its districts is quite wrong in every way. It is not defence, it is attack. No one would complain in time of war if the Republics take up positions for defence; but to annex the territory of this Colony, and force under threat of expulsion quiet and peaceable subjects to take up arms against their will is a bad policy and a wrong act"⁸⁴

Force of circumstances also compelled Schreiner to render assistance to Imperial authorities in the way of Colonial Volunteers, declaration of Martial Law in certain districts and the use of colonial railways by Imperial authorities. This had its repercussions in the Ministry, and it caused a breach between Solomon and Schreiner on the one hand and on the other to Water, Herriman and Sauer who had strong Bond sympathies and did not approve of all these measures. This breach was widened by "conciliation" meetings held throughout the Colony by Afrikaner sympathisers in support of the peace overtures made by the two Presidents on 5th March, 1900. ⁸⁵ This breach eventually led to a cabinet split in June, 1900.

There had always been small differences amongst the Ministers in Schreiner's Cabinet and as the war progressed the cracks in the ministerial edifice widened. Schreiner's enforced co-operation with the Imperial authorities widened the gulf between him and those Cabinet Ministers and members of Parliament who took their cue from the Afrikaner Bond. Herriman and Sauer often differed strongly from Richard Solomon who had marked Imperialistic tendencies and there were some nasty scenes when

⁸⁴. Walker; Schreiner, p.202.

⁸⁵. Worsfold; Op. cit. p.361.

Merriman and Sauer created the impression that Solomon was guilty of maladministration of justice.⁸⁶ Neither could Solomon put up with Dr to Water whom, in a letter to Merriman, he condemned in very strong language for repeating cabinet discussions to Hofmeyr.⁸⁷ Solomon would not have been at all sorry if he could have relinquished his ministerial post.⁸⁸ The relations between Merriman and Schreiner were also becoming strained. Merriman described Schreiner as "obstinate and self-opinionated to the last degree and a most feeble administrator, but he is a very honest man and he really loves his country and has the strongest devotion to duty as he conceives it".⁸⁹ Merriman's great parliamentary skill, administrative ability and energy were of great value to Schreiner, but he found it hard to bear Merriman's impulsiveness, his sweeping statements and his often sudden change of attitude. Further Schreiner's long ministerial minutes and still longer cabinet speeches wearied the impatient Merriman who with his keen brain had already seen the crux of a question and was yet compelled to listen to Schreiner putting all sides of the question in an endeavour to be fair to everyone.⁹⁰ Merriman and Sauer did not think much of Dr to Water, but they knew that he was a sound Bondman and could be relied on to resist the Imperial policy to the uttermost and "the ambition of that Birmingham Imperialist and the sordid avarice of his stock-jobbing friends".⁹¹ When Schreiner quarrelled with Hofmeyr over some petty affair it had the effect of bringing Herherdt

86. Merr. Papers, No. 56, 1900. R. Solomon to J.X. Merr. 30 March.

87. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

88. Ibid. No. 37, 1900. Ibid.

89. Ibid. No. 187, 1900. J.X. Merr. to Julia Merr. 1 May.

90. Walker: Schreiner, p. 214.

91. Merr. Papers, No. , 1900, J.X. Merr. to G. Smith, 15 May.

Schreiner's followers of Dr to Water, Merriman, Sauer.

definitely onto Schreiner's side. We thus find the Cabinet divided: Schreiner, Solomon and Herholdt pitted against Sauer, Merriman and de Water. A change of Cabinet would not have been unwelcome to Merriman. Just before Parliament met for the session of 1900, he wrote to his wife: "I think that it will be a stormy session, and I hope our Cabinet will not survive, at least not in its present form which is unendurable".⁹²

The actual cause of the disruption of the Ministry, was the difference of opinion among Ministers as to the treatment to be meted out to those thousands of Cape Colonials who had taken up arms against the Imperial Government when their districts were invaded. On 23th March, 1900, Solomon, as Attorney-General, addressed a letter to Schreiner stating that he thought it necessary to put before the Imperial Government the views of the Cape Government as to the manner in which those rebels should be treated. Solomon held that the ringleaders - men of position and influence, members of Parliament, Justices of the Peace, Field Cornets, Attorneys, etc., - should be prosecuted for High Treason. The people could not be tried by jury under conditions then prevailing in South Africa. It would be a judicial farce to try them in their own districts by jurymen sharing their sympathies. It would also be very undesirable to try them in the larger centres - Cape Town and Grahamstown - where strong feelings against rebels had been expressed. There

92. Merr. Papers, No. 187, 1900. J.K. Merr. to Julia Merr. 1 May.
93. The number of Cape Voters eventually disfranchised on convictions for treason was 7072 - Cape B.B.C.1 - '04. Return showing the number of Persons Disqualified from Voting at Parliamentary Elections owing to Convictions for Treason.

was however, no other court competent to try men accused of High Treason. In view of the fact that the Cape Parliament was not due to meet soon, so that such a competent court could be established, ⁽¹⁾ Solomon suggested that the Imperial Parliament should pass a bill empowering the Cape Governor to establish by proclamation, a court consisting of two judges of the Supreme Court and a magistrate. Such a course might be considered an interference in the liberties of the Cape Parliament; against this Solomon argued that the treatment of rebels was an Imperial as well as a Colonial matter and there should be co-operation between the two Governments. With regard to those who were not ringleaders - the rank and file - Solomon was in favour of disfranchisement for a short period. Finally, Solomon urged that the whole question should soon be brought up for Cabinet discussion and settled in conjunction with the Imperial Government. ⁹⁴

Rebels. Solomon via Orbydo, Milner, Ministers several times.

⁽²⁾ Before the question had been settled by the Cabinet, Milner on 14th April, 1900, sent Ministers a dispatch from the Secretary of State for Colonies discussing the course to be adopted with regard to those who had taken up arms against their Government. Should the Cape Government agree, he suggested a special Judicial Commission invested with statutory powers and consisting of three law^{ye}rs of good repute. ⁹⁵

In a minute dated 27th April, ⁽³⁾ the Ministers replied that for obvious reasons trial by jury would be unsatisfactory. They agreed to bring before Parliament a measure appointing by

94. Merr. Papers, No. 35, 1900. R. Solomon to W.P. Schroiner, 28 March, Confid.

95. P.M. 77. Enclosure to Memorandum, 12/13 June, 1900.

hand treatment

Statute, a Judicial Commission to try rebels. It was to consist of two Supreme Court judges and an advocate of good and long standing.⁹⁶

It was not so much the court by which rebels were to be tried that led to the ministerial crisis, as the punishment to be meted out to those found guilty of rebellion. In a minute dated 28th April, Ministers pointed out that Rebellion ^{verdwyn} subsided when the Republican Forces withdrew; there were few cases of "personal outrage or murder" and little damage to private property. Drawing on the ^{BW. p. 654} Canadian Rebellion of 1837-8 as a precedent, the Cabinet pointed out that beneficial results had followed the policy of leniency and now expressed their confidence that the British Government would not

"in any way desire to embrace in a general proscription the majority of those misguided men who have, from one motive or another, been induced to join the ranks of the rebels. The universality of such a punishment would rob it of its deterrent effect by converting the grave sentence of the law into the semblance of a measure of political vengeance.

"Feeling assured, therefore, that those principles of justice tempered with mercy that have marked British policy elsewhere, and that have contributed in so great a measure to the stability of British rule, will on the present occasion be followed in South Africa, Ministers submit that the ends of justice would be served by the selection of a certain limited number of the principal offenders, whose trials would mark the magnitude of their offence, and whose punishment, if found guilty, would act as a deterrent. For the remainder, Ministers believe that the interests both of sound policy and of public morality would be served if Her Gracious Majesty were moved to issue as an act of grace, a Proclamation of amnesty under which, upon giving proper security for their good behaviour, all persons chargeable with High Treason, except those held for trial, might be enlarged and allowed to return to their avocations"⁹⁷

96. P.N. 77. Enclosure to Memorandum, 12/13 June, 1900.

97. This minute was drafted by Merriman. - Merr. Papers, No. 63, 1900. J.X. Merr. to Julia Merr. 21 May.

98. P.N. 263. Minute No. 1/137. 28 April, 1900.

All the Ministers were unanimous in advising the policy set out in this minute.

Milner telegraphed a summary of the above minute to Chamberlain on 1st May, 1900, and forwarded a copy of the minute itself by mail on 2nd May.⁹⁹ On 4th May, before he could have received the latter, Chamberlain replied to the minute of 28th April. He assured the High Commissioner that the British Government was not animated by "^{vengeful/punishment} vindictive feelings" towards those in arms against her forces whether they were enemies or rebels; at the same time however, he pointed out that although

"on the one hand the worst results may be anticipated from any display of a revengeful policy on the part of loyalists not less serious consequences would ensue from the rankling sense of injustice which would follow upon a policy which would actually place rebels in a better position after the struggle was over than those who had risked life and property in the determination to remain loyal to their Queen and flag.

"Clemency to the rebels in a policy which has the hearty sympathy of Her Majesty's Government, but justice to loyalists is an obligation of duty and honour, the question is how can these two policies be harmonised, it is clear that in the interests of future peace it is necessary to show that rebellion cannot be indulged in with impunity and above all that if unsuccessful, it is not a profitable business for the rebels.....And if, as has been suggested, a great many of the Queen's rebellious subjects are the mere tools of those who have deceived them, it is important that these should be made aware, individually, that whatever, their leaders may tell them, rebellion is a punishable offence".

Further, Chamberlain insisted that the leading rebels should be tried by a Judicial Commission and the rest disfranchised. He did not consider the Canadian Revolt of 1837-8 a precedent analogous to the situation at the Cape.¹⁰⁰ Milner firmly supported

99. P.M. 76. No. 335. 7 May, 1900.

100. Ibid.

Ibid.

Chamberlain
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Chamberlain in insisting on more severe punishment:

"The great crux here is the enormous number of rebels (5,000 at least). We cannot try them all for high treason. As a matter of fact I don't want to try too many. Yet we must do something to them. I would rather leave the country than accept Schreiner's proposal for a general whitewashing. Statutory disfranchisement seems to me a possible - it is so far the only suggested - compromise"¹

Thus, the advice given to the Imperial Government by the Cape Government, was turned down and Downing Street was again interfering in the internal affairs of a colony having responsible government. Whose policy would now be followed - that of Downing Street or that of the responsible Ministers at the Cape? This question touched the heart of the constitution of the Cape as a self-governing colony. Was the Cape to be governed by the responsible Ministers according to the constitution or by the Secretary of State for Colonies in Downing Street through his nominee the Governor? The answers to these questions would soon become apparent.

When Chamberlain and Milner insisted on disfranchisement of the rank and file of the rebels, the Schreiner Cabinet split. Solomon, in collaboration with Milner, drew up a minute which satisfied Chamberlain's policy and wishes.² "It does not appear to me", Solomon's report read, "that persons who can show that they acted under compulsion ((i.e. the rank and file)) ought not to suffer any punishment what-ever....-not even disfranchisement". For such persons he advocated disfranchisement for a period of five years. Should the Cape Government

1. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II., p.107.

2. Molteno: Dominion of Afrikanerdom, p.201, et vide Merr. Papers No. 62, 1900. Agnes to Julia Merr. 20 May.

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adopt his suggestions, Solomon held there would be very little difference between their proposals and those of Her Majesty's Government and an agreement between the two Governments could easily be reached.³

To Water, Merriman & Sauer re idel.

The Cabinet however, was not unanimous. Schreiner, Solomon and Herholdt adopted the new policy towards the rank and file; it was virtually the policy of the South African League.⁴ Merriman, Sauer and de Water held to the original minute of 28th April.⁵ De Water wrote that "however criminal this action ((Rebellion)) may have been, I am firmly convinced that the sound and proper policy to adopt now is amnesty".⁶ It was Merriman however, who stood forth most baldly, as the champion of the rebels. Sauer was away in connection with railway business. On 20th May, 1900, Merriman drew up a lengthy memorandum with which Sauer concurred.⁷ Drawing on the Canadian precedent, Merriman pleaded the cause of the rebels and begged that the Dutch of the Cape should not be treated in a way that no other rebels in the British Empire except "the unhappy Irish", have been treated. He pointed out

"there was a time, not many months ago, when it is not too much to say that the British hold upon South Africa lay in the hands of the Dutch speaking colonists, who, if they had risen, might have rendered the military situation almost impossible. At that time the efforts, of their representatives, of their ministers of religion and of leading men of all classes were thrown on the side of the British connection, and, aided by the sound common-sense of the community prevented the effects that might have been produced by a not unnatural sympathy with their blood relations....."

3. Imp. B.B. Cd. 264, p.37-38.

4. S.A. News, 5/6/'00, Merriman's Speech at Stellenbosch, 4/6/'00.

5. Supra, p.325.

6. P.M.76. No. 335, 19th May.

7. Walker: Schreiner, p.220.

"We are asked to deal with a number of men, who have at worst taken up arms in what they, however erroneously, considered to be a righteous war, a war in which they joined the Queen's enemies to resist what prominent men both here and in England have repeatedly spoken of as "a crime". We are agreed that such conduct is reprehensible for society demands that a minority should submit its views to the ruling of a majority, but the degree of moral guilt, that attaches to any but a few leaders in such cases is not great, nor has it been held elsewhere to demand harsh treatment.

"We are asked in fact to create a class of political "holots" in South Africa where we are now waging a bloody and costly war ostensibly for the purpose of putting an end to a similar state of affairs.

"The measure if adopted would create a condition in certain districts of the colony under which the majority, consisting of landholders and producers, would be disenfranchised and put under the power of the townfolk who live from them, and of the natives who may happen to be on the register. Such a state of affairs would be equally favourable to the demagogue, and the patriot, but it would be contrary to the best interests of the country and productive of far reaching evil.

"....any large measure of disfranchisement which is strongly supported, in this country at any rate, as a means of curtailing the legitimate constitutional power that they have never abused, would undoubtedly create the grounds for a permanent and fatal disunion, and that in its bearing upon the native races it would certainly tend to strengthen and accentuate that feeling of hostility and contempt for the Dutch created by current events which has already found such ominous expression in the insulting language, and demeanour of many of the coloured classes, a movement in which there lie the germs of much future trouble.

".....to take away political rights from one section of the community while leaving the other in full enjoyment of constitutional privileges and by so doing to set up the rule of a minority under the specious form of constitutional government would be to court disaster and to create in South Africa a condition of affairs that has, in the past, caused so much misery and trouble in Ireland"^B

Herriman was prompted to follow this course because, apart from other motives, he believed it to be a just one and

"I could never put my hand to the advocacy of a measure to punish indiscriminately those who put me into Parliament without exacting any pledges - 'because I was an

*As voorgestelde wetgewing word
Maurice de la - Ireland*

Englishman and they wished to show that they were not anti-English; and who will look to me as the only person to say a good word in their favour"⁹

For some time the Ministry had been unable to assemble in full strength on account of Sauer's absence on railway business and to Water often wilfully stayed away.¹⁰ Schreiner consulted Hofmeyr who expressed himself strongly against disenfranchisement;

"....should such a vindictive measure of political partisanship be taken as disfranchising hundreds, or it may mean thousands, of Dutch Afrianders, thereby completely changing the Parliamentary balance of power, and creating for many years to come a class of Dutch helots, I would indeed despair of seeing in my lifetime anything like harmony or good feeling restored between the European races of the Colony"¹¹

There was still a possible loop-hole. Chamberlain had not stated definitely whether disenfranchisement was to be for only a number of years or for life. Ministers therefore asked for Chamberlain's view.

Before a reply was received, a special caucus meeting of the party supporting Schreiner was, in accordance with Hofmeyr's wishes,¹² held a week before the Bond held its Annual Congress. The caucus assembled in 8th June, in room No. 18, Parliament House. Barring the five ministers (Sauer was absent) there were forty-four members of both Houses and also J.H. Hofmeyr. Schreiner told the meeting that he proposed submitting three bills to Parliament: An Indemnity Bill, a Tribunal Bill and a Rebel Disfranchisement Bill. On the first two bills all the

9. Merr. Papers, No.63, 1900.J.X. Merr. to Julia Merr. 21 May.

10.Walker: Schreiner, p.225.

11.Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.559.

12.Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.559

Ministers were of one opinion except to Water. The crux however, was the last bill as to Water, Sauer and Merriman disagreed with Schreiner, Herholdt and Solomon. Schreiner explained that he had tried to effect a compromise with the Governor and the Imperial Government and wished to know whether the meeting would support him. If they did not, the law made by the Cape Parliament in 1892, would come into force which meant that anyone found guilty of rebellion or high treason would not only suffer disfranchisement for life but also be punished with imprisonment or even be hanged. The other Ministers also spoke and there were lively debates. On the next day the caucus voted; the Ministers and Hofmeyr abstained from voting. Eight supported Schreiner and twenty-nine went against him.¹³

Two days later, Monday 11th June, the Ministry met again. They now had the Secretary of State's reply to their question on the period of the proposed disfranchisement. Chamberlain's reply dated 10th June, was uncompromising:

"As regards disfranchisement, her Majesty's Government would point out conviction and sentence for High Treason carries with it disfranchisement for life, and, if the offenders are spared the other and severer penalties of rebellion, justice seems to demand that they should suffer the full political penalty. Disfranchisement for life does not seem to Her Majesty's Government to be a very serious punishment for rebellion"¹⁴

Thereupon, Schreiner informed Milner about the differences that there had been in his Cabinet, that "these differences cannot be composed" and that the majority of his Parliamentary supporters

13. Rhodes Papers; Fall of Schreiner Cabinet, 1900. Letter D.C. de Waal to Dahie Wessels 25/6/1900, et Merr. Papers, No. 81, 1900. J.X. Merr. to Agnes Merr. 9 June.

14. F.M. 77. Enclos. to Memorandum 12/13 June, 1900.

declared themselves unable to support his proposals to give effect to disfranchisement for five years for the rank and file of rebels.¹⁵ The following day Milner suggested that Schreiner¹⁶ should reconstruct his Cabinet. Schreiner was quite willing to do so but he had been unable to secure a sufficient number of supporters at the party caucus meeting; he would therefore, have been unable to carry out the Milner-Chamberlain policy. He therefore placed his resignation in the hands of the Governor, 13th June, 1900.¹⁷

Thus Chamberlain and Milner brought about the fall of the Schreiner Ministry - a ministry which had had a large majority in the House of Assembly, but was compelled to resign because of the interference of Downing Street. The breach between Schreiner and the Bond Party¹⁸ was the result not only of a political difference but more largely the result of a radical difference in what each considered to be the constitutional status of the Cape Colony. Schreiner maintained that the Colonial Government could petition the Imperial Government for a concession but not demand it and that if it persistently flouted the Imperial power, it might endanger its constitution. His policy tended to draw South Africa nearer to London and give the British Government more and more opportunities of interfering in South African affairs. The South African Party held the opposite view, namely, that colonies should be given ever increasing autonomy,

15. P.M. 292. Min. to H.E. the Governor, 11/6/'00.

16. P.M. 77. Enclos. to Memorandum 12/13 June 1900, at Ons Land, 7/7/1900.

17. P.M. 292. Min. to H.E. the Governor, 13/6/'00.

18. ~~Dafra, p.~~

and although the Cape could not remain neutral during the Anglo-Boer War, it should be given every opportunity of protesting in and out of Parliament against unsatisfactory affairs. Moreover, these protests should not go unheeded.¹⁹ Merriman, in full sympathy with South ^{and} African Party views, put the situation clearly in a letter to his wife:

"Milner has shown very considerable astuteness in the way in which he has succeeded to wobble Schreiner and Solomon I was anxious not to break on personal grounds even from those with whom I had little in common beyond a desire to see this country at peace. Schreiner is a pronounced imperialist. I believe in self government. Schreiner holds the doctrine that he is the minister of the "crown" i.e. Chamberlain and bound to carry out his behests or go out. I told that I am the Minister of the people bound only to go out when Parliament puts me in a minority. ²⁰ These differences are fundamental and govern all relations"

What now, were Milner's and Chamberlain's motives in insisting on disfranchisement of the rank and file? Obviously to remove the names of so many rebels from the voters' rolls that the Progressives would gain a majority at the next general election of the Cape Parliament. The Afrikaner population of the Cape was to be deprived of its political power and thus secure for the Progressives the political triumph which it had failed to obtain at the elections of 1898. Merriman put it as follows: One of the worst features of the attack on rebels "was that it came from a political Party, and was directed at the rebels not so much because they were rebels as because they had votes".²¹ For some time Milner had been considering the

19. Vide Walker: Schreiner, p.225, et Ons Land, 25/10/'00, et S.A. News, 25/10/'00.

20. Merr. Papers, No.20, 1900. J.X. Merr. to Julia Merr. 14 June.

21. S.A. News, 5/6/'00, Merriman's Speech at Stellenbosch, 4/6/'00.

suspension of the Cape constitution, in order to prevent a possible deadlock.²² This however, was a very drastic step and the only alternative that offered itself was the disfranchisement of rebels:

"The next best thing to suspending the constitution altogether, is to disfranchise the rebels. Without the votes at the polls of the men who have been fighting us, the Bond party would be in a minority in both Houses at the next election. But at present they are in a majority in the Lower House, and unless a certain number of Bond members can be detached from their party to vote with the present Progressive (i.e. Pro-British) Ministry,²³ the necessary measures for dealing with the rebels, including disfranchisement of the rank and file, cannot be passed.... In case the present Ministry cannot get a majority, they will have to worry on somehow without one. The alternative, a Ministry owing its parliamentary majority to the rebel vote, could not be tolerated at any time, much less at this critical moment in the history of South Africa!"²⁴

That the rebels had to be disfranchised at all costs in order to transfer political power to the Progressives is also borne out by a telegram from Thomas Fuller to Rhodes on the day of Schreiner's official resignation. He pointed out the necessity of a Progressive Ministry under Rose-Innes or Sprigg and added that "we are undone if we cannot carry through the Bill".²⁵

The Bond was most persistent in its opposition to Milner and the Imperial policy in South Africa, and therefore Chamberlain and Milner had to devise some means of freeing themselves from its shackles and minimising its influence in the post war settlement. As far back as 24th May, 1899, before the Bloemfontein Conference, Milner toyed with the idea of dismissing the

22. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, p.107 et 113.

23. Written a week after fall of Schreiner and succession of Sprigg to office.

24. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, p.117.

25. The Disfranchisement Bill. Rhodes Papers, Fall of Schreiner Cabinet, 1900. Telegram, T.E. Fuller to Rhodes, 13th June.

the Cape Ministry. A few months later in a telegram to Chamberlain 12th July, 1899, ^{Milner} he again considered the possibility of dismissing the Ministry and dissolving the Cape Parliament:

"In case of extremities I feel sure it would be necessary, as we should require absolute control of the administrative machinery, and Ministers would, I know, hamper us. Besides, Prime Minister has as good as told me that, while regarding himself as responsible for protection of Colony, he could not agree to Colonial forces being under General or used against Republics. This would in my opinion be an impossible compromise. But there are strong reasons for not breaking with Ministry till latest moment. Results of a dissolution, before decisive action on part of H.M. Government, would almost certainly be new House very much like the present. Dissolution after the die was cast might have a more favourable result. In any case time between dismissal of Ministry and reassembling of House would occupy several months".²⁷

*5 prigg word
1st mm
Bond split*

By insisting on their proposals, for disfranchisement, Milner and Chamberlain succeeded in their aim. The Bond split and it took eight years before it could again take control of affairs in the Cape Colony. This division in Bond ranks made the Sprigg Ministry and its tenure of office possible. Without such a split Sprigg could not have succeeded Schreiner and it would have been difficult if not impossible for him to continue in office.

Behind everything there was the hand and mind of Milner. In some respects Milner was Frere, Froude and Shepstone rolled into one. Like Frere, he had to browbeat and break down the constitutional opposition of the Ministry; like Froude, he took part in party propaganda - discriminating between Dutch and English and inflaming racial feeling; like Shepstone, he had been trying to find reasons for dealing "a striking blow" against the Transvaal.

26. Headlam: op. cit. Vol. I, p. 402.

27. Headlam: op. cit. Vol. I, p. 461.

28. Contemporary Review, Oct., 1900. Art. Hobson, J.A.: The Proconsulate of Milner, p. 542.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PERIOD OF STRIFE, JULY, 1900 TO 1903.

"Imagine a wilderness stripped bare, intersected by lines of blockhouses and barbed wire, everything in the shape of live stock driven away, the veldt untilled, roads and drifts often impassable, railways torn up, towns and houses wholly destroyed".

Harkham: The New Era in South Africa,
p.7.

I. "ADULLAMITES", SPRIGG AND REBELS.

With the split of the Bond Party, Schreiner and those who followed him, took up their position on the cross benches. They were a party of about six members and became known as "Adullamites".¹

It was not till 18th June, that Sprigg, now a man of seventy, was able to patch up a ministry. He himself became Premier and Treasurer; Thomas L. Graham, Colonial Secretary; J. Rose-Innes, Attorney-General; Thomas Smartt, Commissioner; Pieter Faure, Secretary for Agriculture. The Cabinet also included John Frost without portfolio.² This Ministry was without strong support in the House. It could however, rely on the support of Schreiner's Adullamites and the less extreme Progressives who refused to follow Jameson and the extremists.³ On the Opposition side of the House, Merriman became the leader, ably assisted by Sauer; these two held the pro-Afrikaner party together.⁴ Thus a Ministry out-and-out British in policy again

1. Moltenc: Dominion of Afrikanerdom, et Ons Land, 27/8/1903. Walker; Schreiner, p.235, gives the number of Adullamites as 8 or 9. This term "Adullamites" is derived from the name of the cave to which the Israelite King, David, fled. I Sam. Chapter, xxii. It is a modern political slang expression indicating seceders from a political party who form an isolated group. - Universal Eng. Dict.
2. Kilpin R.: The Old Cape House, Annexure B.
3. Walker: De Villiers, p.372.
4. Moltenc: Dominion of Afrikanerdom, p.203.

Sprigg & Milner are still in the picture

took over the government of the Cape Colony. This gave Milner a freer hand in South Africa. The Ministry's position however, was not safe. It was faced by a compact Bond Party opposition which was ever ready to criticise its actions in the press and in debate. Moreover, the support from the Adullamites on the cross benches was unsteady, and a factor which Sprigg had to consider in all his proposals.

The Sprigg Ministry now had to carry out the policy which had brought about the fall of the Schreiner Ministry. It agreed to bring before Parliament a bill providing for a "Special Court" to try ⁸ ringleaders in the rebellion. The case of the rank and file of the rebels would be investigated by Commissioners and unless they could prove their innocence they would be disfranchised for five years. ⁸ On 26th July, 1900, Chamberlain informed Milner that Her Majesty's Government had agreed to the proposals of the Sprigg Ministry. ⁶ Thus Sprigg advocated the same policy against rebels as Schreiner had proposed to his party. Sprigg managed to gain the support of both Houses. The question of punishment of rebels had indeed become a party one. If the Afrikaner Party had agreed to Schreiner's proposals, the Progressives would no doubt have opposed them and would have been able to use the Legislative Council, in which they had the majority, to reject the Bill. Thus by adhering to the amnesty policy the Afrikaner Party had already ⁷ gained much.

5. P.M. 77. Enclos. to Confid. Minute, 7th July, 1900.

6. Imp. B.B.Cd. 420, p.12.

7. Ons Land, 24/7/'00.

The session of 1900, was indeed a stormy one, characterised by long, bitter and venomous speeches, but Sprigg managed to carry all his bills. It was a session which marked the eventual success of the capitalist Jingoos. They had first tried to achieve their aim in South Africa by an agitation on the Rand based on exaggerated grievances; when that failed, the Jameson Raid was organised which was also abortive; then the Cape Progressives tried to pass a redistribution bill but were defeated; at the polls of 1898, they strained every nerve, but without success and finally in 1900, they succeeded with their bill for the disfranchisement of rebels.

Parliament was prorogued on 13th October, 1900, and it was twenty-two months before it met again, 20th August, 1902.⁸ On the prorogation, Parliament had provided for the expenditure of the Colony till 30th June, 1901. In order to provide for expenditure beyond that date, Parliament should have assembled on or before 30th June. Ministers however, advised Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, who had succeeded Milner as Governor of the Cape, to prorogue Parliament till 27th August, 1901, and provide for the expenditure of the Colony after 30th June, by the issue of Governor's warrants. Such warrants authorised the Treasurer-General to make payments on the assumption that legislative authority for these acts would be granted when Parliament assembled again. Ministers were compelled to advise this course because it was hardly possible for Parliament to

8. Molteno; Dominion of Afrikanerdom, p.203.

Parliament not met

assemble. Out of the ninety-five seats in the two Houses of the Cape Parliament, there would be nine or ten vacancies if Parliament assembled; some members were in Europe, others were fighting invaders or suppressing rebels. Moreover, in many districts it was unsafe to travel, and members of Parliament were averse to leaving their homes. The constitution also demanded that the Biennial Registration of Parliamentary Voters should have taken place, but the operation of Martial Law compelled its postponement. The register, then in existence, could not be used to fill up parliamentary vacancies as it included men who had been disfranchised and others who were still in rebellion and excluded those who had obtained the vote since the last registration of voters. Finally, it was thought advisable to postpone the meeting of Parliament in view of the excited state of public feeling; it was feared that debates in Parliament would tend to accentuate political differences. The Governor, therefore, on the advice of his Ministers, prorogued Parliament till 27th August, 1901.⁹ On this matter, Chamberlain approved of Hutchinson's action.¹⁰

As the war proceeded, parliamentary affairs became steadily worse. Ministers advised that Parliament should be further prorogued. If the constitution was not to be further subverted, Parliament should have met on or before 12th October, 1901, but it was found impossible to convene Parliament before

9. Imp. B.B. Cd. 903, p. 57 et seq.
10. Ibid. p. 67.

¹¹ that date. By that time there were twelve different commandos south of the Orange River. One member of Parliament was imprisoned for seditious libel. Three were awaiting trial for High Treason. Two seats were virtually vacant as members had been absent without leave during a whole session. Two were said to have welcomed invaders, encouraged rebellion and then fled to Holland. One seat was vacant as the member had accepted an appointment in the Transvaal. Another seat was vacant on account of death of the member, while another was resigning on account of ill-health and was absent in Europe. No elections could take place in these divisions as they were either under Martial Law or in a very disturbed state. Further, some members of Parliament had left their homes "on account of the seditious influences which the Military Authorities allege they were exercising", while others were under "military observation" which made their attendance in Parliament uncertain. Several members were also on active service and they would not be able to attend.¹² The policy of the Ministry was to advise the prorogation of Parliament from time to time. The expenditure was met by Governor's warrants which were to be indemnified when the war was over.¹³

For the twenty months during which Parliament did not meet, the Cape constitution was virtually suspended. Sprigg was absolutely against the formal suspension of the constitution,

11. The last sitting was on 13th October, 1900, and Section 77 of the Constitution Ordinance demanded that there be a session at least once a year and in such a way that twelve months should not lapse between the last sitting of one Parliament and the first sitting of the next session. -P.M.293, p.276.Confid. Minute to H.E. the Governor, No.3/1007, 12 Sept. 1901.

12. P.M. 293, p.276.Confid.Min.to H.E. the Gov.No.3/1007, 12 Sept. 1901.

13. Imp. B.B. Cd. 903, p.119 et seq.

son Milner and Holy-Richinson were content not to let Parliament meet and let the constitution suspend itself, as Milner put it: "All I contend for is that we should fearlessly go on governing without Parliamentary authority, as long as the meeting of Parliament is at all likely to lead to a prolongation of the war or fresh disturbances. We cannot afford to repeat the scandals of the Session of 1900".¹⁴

Sprigg believed that he was working wonders for the Colony. On 1st December, 1901, he made an optimistic speech at a banquet in Cape Town: "...throughout there runs a note of justifiable pride in the military efforts of Cape Government, and in the sacrifices which these efforts have entailed upon the loyalist population".¹⁵ But this was not a true reflection of the position. The financial position was acute and public payments had almost been suspended. Under such circumstances, Lewis Michell wrote to Rhodes urging him to come to the Cape, persuade Sprigg to retire and assume the Premiership:

"Sprigg is old and impracticable and will not see his position. The Governor has lost all confidence in him and would take strong measures to change his chief adviser were you here.

"Meanwhile I am advising him which is quite unconstitutional. There will, I think be a rupture soon, and I should extremely regret to see the earthquake in your absence".¹⁶

Thus, not only had Parliament ceased to function but to a great extent also the Ministry, in whose hands the rights and privi-

14. Headlam: Milner Papers, Vol. II, p.272.

15. Worsfold: Op. cit. p.485.

16. Rhodes Papers. Photostat copy of Confid. letter Michell to Rhodes, 4/12/'01, et Vide Infra, p.346.

loges of Parliament and the people had been entrusted. The actual rulers of the Cape were the Imperial authorities, Milner, Kitchener and Hely-Hutchinson.

II. THE SUSPENSION OF THE CAPE CONSTITUTION.

The punishment of rebel ringleaders and disfranchisement of the bank and file for five years, did not satisfy the die-hard British Imperialists in South Africa. They were not sure that by that means alone, the future of British Supremacy in South Africa would be guaranteed. Hence the agitation for the suspension of the constitution of the Cape Colony. The ultra-Progressives had taken a violent dislike to the Bond because for many years it had been impossible for any government to remain in office without Bond aid and, moreover, they feared that all post-war legislation would bear a Bond stamp and this they wished to prevent:

"I am astonished when I see people of English birth advocate the suspension of the constitution; not that they love liberty less but they hate Dutchmen more, ready ((sic)) to become slaves if by so doing they may gratify their private spite. but ((sic)) the whole business has no single redeeming feature anywhere"¹⁷

But even some time before war was declared, sections of the Progressive press, threatened that if unless the Afrikaner Party submitted to Chamberlain's policy in South Africa, the Cape constitution would be suspended.¹⁸ We have noticed that Milner was also strongly in favour of the idea, and as early as 27th December, 1899, tried to persuade Chamberlain to step in,¹⁹ but

17. Merr. Papers. Ems No. 469, 1899. J.X. Merr. to Charlotte Barry, 24 Dec.

18. Journal, 2/9/99, et vide Oms Land, 22/8/99.

19. Supra, p. 333, et vide Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II. p.p. 33, 56, 107, 113, 117, 122.

Chamberlain would have none of it. It was doubtful whether the British Parliament would assent to take away a colonial constitution and there was danger of rousing opposition in every other self-governing colony in the British Empire.²⁰

At the Cape the idea persisted. A petition from the Vigilance Committee at Graaff-Reinet in June, 1901, was the first formal announcement on this subject by any public body.²¹ The greater part of the Cape press however, notably the "Cape Argus" condemned the petition.²² Despite press opposition, the movement gained ground and petitions praying for suspension, poured in to the Prime Minister's office, from various centres throughout the Colony, praying for suspension of the Cape constitution. The main burden of these petitions was that the constitution of the Cape Colony should be abrogated to prevent endangering British Rule in South Africa, to stop racial politics and the racial spirit much in evidence in the country, and that a parliamentary election was due and it would inflame racial discord which should be avoided. If the constitution were suspended, the Loyal British would no longer have to fear the Afrikaner Bond which for past years had controlled Cape politics and the ministers in office. The movement was therefore really aimed at a political party opposing British policy in South Africa. In forwarding all these petitions to the Governor, the Sprigg Ministry stated that it could not advise the Governor

20. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 123.

21. Hansard: 1902, p. 184.

22. C. Argus, 4/6/'01 et 16/5/'01, et C. Times, 4/6/'01.

to grant the petition as the Ministers were "entirely opposed to the prayer of these Petitions and should regard compliance therewith as a great political blunder".²³

Right from the start Sprigg who thirty years before had fought for the introduction of responsible government, now stood up ~~for~~ its defense against those who would have it removed even though only temporarily. This attitude he maintained to the end of the agitation. Sprigg was a firm believer in the system of responsible government. Although this was the fourth occasion on which he held the Premiership he had never been put into office by the direct vote of Parliament and had never led a party to victory over a party in power. He loved the sweets of office and when in power he wished to remain in power.²⁴ He also feared handing over the Colony to Downing Street and a Kitchener military dictatorship. There was the danger of the Colony being flooded by young men for whom the British Colonial Office wished to find posts. There was also the question of Federation. Should the Cape constitution be abrogated the Colony's influence at a conference table on Federation would be considerably reduced and subordinated to that of Johannesburg.²⁵

At first it seemed as though the suspension movement would come to grief soon. The most influential part of the press did not approve of it and the Ministry roundly condemned it. Under the inspiration of Milner the movement revived with fresh vigour

23. P.M. 79, Min. from Gov. and H.C., 18/7/'01, et vide, P.M. 79, Min. from Gov. and H.C., 12/8/'01, et P.M. 84, Min. from Gov. and H.C. No. 142, 19/3/'02.

24. Fortnightly Review, 1/8/'02, Art. Dicey: The Cape and its Parliament, p. 225.

25. Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 410.

in May, 1902. Milner had for a long time favoured Suspension. Sprigg's position as Premier was not strong. He kept himself in office with aid of less extreme Afrikaners. Milner was convinced that the fall of the Ministry was imminent and it would not be able to appeal successfully to the electorate "as invariably in this extraordinary country, the dice are loaded in favour of our enemies"^{25a}. The Colonists fighting against the Republics would not be able to vote on account of absence from their electoral divisions while the rebels who had been allowed to return to their homes retained the vote till such time as the Commissions on Disfranchisement had done their work.

"It is impracticable to hope to run this Colony as a British Colony under present circumstances, I do not say without formally abrogating the constitution, but without virtually infringing it somewhere or other. And as I have said, I still retain my belief that, when it comes to the push, facts will prove too strong for theories"²⁶

While the Republican forces were having their unbroken success at the beginning of the War, and many rebels from the occupied districts joined them, Milner, in December, 1899, seriously suggested that the constitution should be suspended because "the rebels of to-day cannot surely be allowed just to turn round and become voters of to-morrow"²⁷. Before a month had passed, Milner again put the matter to Chamberlain. His avowed object was to deprive the Afrikaners and their political organisation, the Bond, of all power:

"We cannot go back to the old system of allowing the country to be governed by rebels under constitutional forms. What the Bond is must now be evident to the crassest. In all

25a. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, p.185.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

the revolted districts leading Bondsmen, including in many cases (not in all) the local members, have been foremost in rebellion. Throughout the country the vast majority of the Dutch population - that portion which adheres to the Bond and returns the members who form the majority of the House - have given the enemy the strongest, most unfaltering, moral support. To join them where they appeared, to sympathize with and succour them where they did not, has been their universal policy.....It is out of the question that, whatever may be done about the unrevolted parts of the country, the people of districts which have revolted almost on masse, like Aliwal and Albert, should be allowed as soon as they have done shooting at the Imperial forces, to turn quietly round and resume the game of disloyalty by the old constitutional means"²⁸

In March, 1901, the dual offices of Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner for South Africa were severed and Milner relinquished the former. Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson now²⁹ became Governor of the Cape Colony. Milner still maintained contact with the leading Progressives, T.L. Graham - one of Sprigg's Ministers - Hon. A. Wilmot, Dr. Jameson and Sir Lewis Michell.³⁰ To them he pointed out that the British Government disliked the idea of suspending the constitution, yet he believed that it would act if the Colonists appealed for suspension:

"This ought to proceed from the Govt. ((sic)) backed by you, and supported, if need be, by a popular agitation, in which case no doubt I could wake responsive echoes in England and even in the Colonies. The keynote of all would be, the loyalists must be put in a position to help themselves.....But.....to get anything done at home, there must be a fair degree of unanimity among the loyalists themselves as to what they ask for. They ought to agree on a policy, and go for it solid. In that case I can help a lot. But I can't take the initiative. I can only come in as a backer...."³¹

With the aid of suspension, therefore, the Afrikaners were to be deprived of political power, and the Imperial Government was

²⁸. Headlam; Op. cit. Vol. II, p.56-57.

²⁹. Walker; History, p.457.

³⁰. Headlam; Op. cit. Vol. II, p.406.

³¹. Ibid. p.407

to interfere on behalf of the loyal British - that is, the Progressive Party under Jameson's leadership - and secure for them a victory over their political opponents. Milner expressed himself more clearly on the question and its objects in a letter to Rhodes' political Secretary, Charles Boyd, on 31st January, 1902:

"There is no doubt whatever in my mind that the Dutch will try, for a time at least, to recover by politics what they have lost in arms, and that the Cape Colony will be their base of operations....I have declared myself in favour of a suspension of the Constitution. But I am not prepared to say that suspension pure and simple, especially in the position into which things have now got, would be the best course. It is not an end in itself - rather the contrary. It is only a means to an end; our whole object being that the executive power in the Cape Colony during the next few critical years should be in loyal hands...." It had to be brought home to the British people, "that the political dice in the Colony were long ago loaded against the loyalists, and there is no means of unloading them locally; and....that this being the case, the Imperial Parliament is bound to interfere as trustee of the general interests of the Empire, then I think that when the moment comes, and the choice is put before Great Britain; 'Will you allow the Bond to re-establish its authority in Cape Colony, or take an unusual course to prevent it?' the latter alternative will be chosen...."³²

The Anglo-Boer War lasted much longer than anyone had anticipated. South Africa was exhausted. If the country were either united or federated it would be able to recover more quickly than if it remained governed by four different parliaments. The British Flag flew over all four colonies; why not bring them under one government? Milner believed that if the constitution of the Cape Colony were suspended the cause of federation would be considerably advanced. Considering the Cape constitution

32. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, p.407-8.

defunct, he wrote in March, 1902:

"The great obstacles to Federation are a lot of sovereign local Parliaments. At present we have only one such, - Natal. My idea is now (I have not always held this view, but got to it by experience and reflection. It was always I think, Rhodes's), that it would be mistake to multiply Colonial Parliaments (for the same reason it is a mistake to revive the Cape Parliament) until you can create a Federal Parliament, with very comprehensive powers, to keep what will then be only subordinate provincial Legislatures in order. A number of small sovereign Parliaments, with their little jacks in office of responsible Ministers and their factitious local patriotisms, will delay the big thing. They would do this in any case, even if they were all British and all Imperially minded. They will do it much more - in fact they may perhaps not only delay, but altogether prevent it, if some of them, if one of them, is Afrikaner, and anti-Imperial. Let the re-creation of local self-government at the Cape wait till you have a Federal Parliament for South Africa, which will have a British majority. The Dutch antics, in provincial Legislature will be comparatively innocuous"³³

Moreover, Milner favoured the suspension of the Cape Colony constitution, because he had no belief in the system of responsible government, and especially in the way in which it had worked in South Africa. He wrote to Chamberlain:

"I assume that he ((Milner's successor)) will have that robust faith in self-governing institutions which is the birthright of every soundhearted Briton, but which in my case has been unfortunately dissipated by experiences which I trust are exceptional. What I have seen of the working of "responsible government" in South Africa, makes it totally impossible for me to labour for its extension with any sort of zeal, even if I do not absolutely show the cloven hoof of political heresy in connection with it. Ofcourse I know it must come - and pretty soon. Our own people are as determined to have it, as they will be sorry for themselves when they have got it. But it is surely better that the way should be paved for its establishment by someone who regards it as a desirable thing in itself, and not simply as a deplorable necessity"³⁴

33. Headlam: op. cit. Vol. II, p.409-410.

34. Ibid. p.423.

Honouring these convictions, Milner was prepared to give what support he could to Rhodes and the greater part of the Progressive Party in organising for suspension. On 17th March, 1902, a deputation of Progressive members of Parliament had asked Sprigg to request the Imperial Government to abrogate the constitution of the Cape Colony. Sprigg however, persisted in his attitude against suspension.³⁵

Just before Rhodes' death, he and forty-one Progressives had signed a petition to the Governor praying for the suspension of the constitution. In April, Milner was on a visit to the Cape and he advised the Progressives to present the petition.³⁶ Accordingly, on 10th May, a deputation consisting of Scherbrucker, M.L.A., A. Wilmot, M.L.C. and Amos Bailey presented the petition to Hely-Hutchinson. They maintained that, as Parliament had not met at the constitutionally appointed time and voters had not been registered, the constitution had already been violated; on account of "the passions aroused by the war", Parliament would not be able to legislate impartially and that "bitterness and racial dissent" would be evoked by parliamentary debates. Hence, the constitution should be suspended temporarily.³⁷ In the covering letter to the petition, they asked that a copy of the petition should be sent to Lord Milner for his opinion.³⁸ Sprigg and the majority of his Ministers on 16th May, 1902, again

35. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, p.410.

36. Ibid. p.414-5.

37. P.M. 84. Min from H.E. the Governor and High Com. No.255, 10/5/'02.

38. P.M. 84. Min. No. 255, From H.E. the Gov. and H.C. 10/5/'02. Enclos. covering letter dated 9/5/'02.

expressed themselves strongly against

"the suspension, withdrawal, or abrogation of the constitution of this Colony, which they would regard as an error of the gravest character. So far as it would affect the prospects of present peace and future reconciliation of the different races in the Colony they are firmly of opinion that it would operate adversely. Autocracy or despotism in this Colony, under which the people would have no voice, Ministers regard as the very worst form of government that could be devised for the purpose of securing a satisfactory settlement of South Africa, especially with a view to the future federation of the different Colonies and States." 39

Dr Smartt was not at one with the Ministry on this question, and he did not agree with Sprigg's statement on the country's finances. He favoured suspension and he resigned⁴⁰ to become a staunch Suspensionist and one of the die-hard Progressive leaders of the post-war period. On 19th May, Milner gave his "private and confidential" opinion on the question. He pointed out that he could not discuss the contents of the petition unless Her Majesty's Government asked him to, but he could reply to the "personal appeal" made in the latter. He expressed himself wholeheartedly in favour of the prayer of the petitioners and considered suspension of the constitution not only a benefit to the Cape Colony but the whole of South Africa.⁴¹

The petition for suspension and Milner's letter were published in the Cape press on 30th May, 1902,⁴² - twenty-four hours before the signing of the Peace of Vereeniging. Thus, when the Progressive Party should have shown a conciliatory feeling

39. P.M. 84. Min. No. 255, From H.E. the Gov. and H.C. 10/5/'02. Enclos. covering letter dated 9/5/'02. Enclos. Min. of Ministers dated 16/5/'02.
40. P.M. 84. Min. No. 293, From H.E. the Gov. and H.C. 28/5/'02, et C. Argus, 31/5/'02, Teleg. Smartt to Mayors of Cathcart and Stutterheim, et C. Argus, 9/6/'02, Smartt's Cape T. Speech, 7/6/'02.
41. P.M. 84. Min. No. 255, From H.E. the Gov. and H.C. 10/5/'02, Enclos. Milner to Hely-Hutchinson, 19/5/'02.
42. C. Times, 30/5/'02, Milner to Hely-Hutchinson, 19/5/'02.

and should have held out a brotherly hand to its fellow-countrymen, it raised another bone of contention to add to the already overwrought and war-torn Colony. The Cape press took up the matter with enthusiasm.⁴³ Throughout the Colony meetings were held and resolutions and petitions poured in. To all these the Ministry turned a deaf ear.⁴⁴ There was also a furious antisuspension movement afoot which helped to back up Sprigg and moreover, brought together the more moderate English section and the Bond on this Question.⁴⁵

The final decision rested with the British Government. Chamberlain did not share his subordinates' enthusiasm for suspension. It was the only question on which Milner and Chamberlain did not see eye to eye.⁴⁶ He did not think that affairs at the Cape had reached an impasse that needed such drastic action; only if the Cape Parliament flagrantly abused its power, would he act. "What I want in all these matters is a case. The case is not good enough now to present to the public"⁴⁷ To the Governor at the Cape, Chamberlain secretly telegraphed.

"....Her Majesty's Government could not for a moment entertain such a policy without incontrovertible proof that British interests are seriously threatened, and that this policy is absolutely necessary for their maintenance. The Cape Colonists must not be allowed to think that they can appeal to the Imperial Government merely for the purpose of impressing the views of a minority on a majority."⁴⁸

43. Merr. Papers, No. 39, 1902. J.X. Merr. to J. Morley, 14 June. Cape Argus, 14/7/'02. C. Times, 6/6/'02, and subsequent leaders.

44. For example, P.R. 204. Min to Gov. 1/212, 11/6/'03. P.M. 85. Min from Gov. and H.C. No. 330, 14/6/'02; No. 348, 14/6/'02; No. 374, 30/6/'02; No. 440, 21/7/'02.

45. Walker: De Villiers, p. 398 at Merr. Papers, No. 39, 1902. J.X. Merr. to J. Morley, 14 June, at No. 45, 1902. Julia to Agnes Merr. 7 July.

46. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 408.

47. Ibid. p. 417.

48. Ibid. p. 423.

To the petition of the forty-two members of Parliament Chamberlain replied by telegram on 2nd July, 1902. Her Majesty's Government felt that to suspend the constitution, even temporarily and to reduce the form of government to that of a Crown Colony without giving the representatives of the Colony an opportunity of airing their views was likely to produce discontent and not pacify racial hatred. Her Majesty's Government trusted that the Colonial Parliament would not refuse to pass measures to pacify the country - and it was unjustifiable to assume such beforehand. In his refusal to their petition he also pointed out that

"incontrovertable proof should be produced either that the continuance of the existing constitution is a positive danger to the peace of the Colony, and to the interests of the Empire, or that the great majority of the white population desire a complete transfer of authority to the Imperial Government, a desire which might be expressed in⁴⁹ constitutional form by a resolution of the Cape Parliament."

Little did the petitioners know how much they owed the refusal to the Prime Ministers of Australia and Canada - Dominions which had given Great Britain much assistance during the South African War. They believed that such a step would be a dangerous precedent and carried a threat to their own constitutions and status. At the Premier's Conference in London 1902, Seddon of New Zealand had moved a resolution in favour of suspension as he considered it a matter of Imperial interest. Sir Albert Hime of Natal seconded. When the chairman of the conference asked the views of Canada, Sir Wilfred Laurier replied

49. Imp. B.B. Cd. 1162, p.8.

that should the resolution be carried, Canada would withdraw from the conference. Sprigg and Barton of Australia supported Laurier. There the matter was dropped.⁵⁰ Sprigg however, had to give Chamberlain assurances that he would not introduce "contentious legislation" into the Cape Parliament; any measure to re-enfranchise the rebels was forbidden; amnesty would only be granted to persons not accused of outrages connected with the War. An Indemnity Act had to be passed. Should the Sprigg Government depart from this undertaking Chamberlain would instruct the Governor to dismiss the Ministry.⁵¹

It is interesting to note that on account of Milner's public support of the suspension movement, and Chamberlain's refusal, he felt it incumbent on him to resign his High Commissionership. But Chamberlain would not accept it; he did not consider the difference of opinion sufficient reason to demand such a step. He defended Milner publicly and assured him that his departure from office would be detrimental to the interests of the British Empire.⁵² Milner did not alter his opinion on the desirability of suspension. He now advised these Progressives who had consulted him to do all they could to pass, in Parliament, measures needed for the pacification of the Colony:

"My advice is to rally a loyalist and federationist party, prepared to stay out of office, rather than to, ^{compromise of} principles, and make the best of the situation. Well led, its ultimate triumph is a certainty, and it will be all the stronger for shedding the time-servers".

50. Walker: De Villiers, p.402-3.

51. Worsfold: Reconstruction of the New Colonies under Lord Milner, Vol. I, p.230-1.

52. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol.II, p.416.

Under the leadership of Dr T. Swartt the Progressives now⁵³
reorganised their party.

Parliament met on 20th August, 1902. On 11th September,
Merriman moved:

"This House having learned with surprise and regret that
an agitation has been carried on in this Colony, having
for its object the suppression of the Parliament of the
country desires to put on record

"(1) That this House entirely approves of the action
taken by the Right Honourable the Prime Minister in de-
fence of the rights of selfgovernment of this Colony.

"(2) That this House determines to preserve the
rights and privileges enjoyed by the inhabitants of this
Colony by every means in its power and records its solemn
protest against the agitation that has been carried on
against those rights, and its opinion that the depriva-
tion of the same would be most prejudicial to the peace
and prosperity of South Africa".

In a speech lasting one-and-a-half hours he launched out
against the Progressives for having "run to Great Britain" and
so "geerryander the constituencies", so that a minority might
be put in power. Then he attacked Milner for his support of the
petition of the forty-two Members of Parliament, and accused
him of being at the head of "a conspiracy to destroy the liber-
ties of the country" and of having "placed himself in the midst
of a melée as a partisan". It was in fact Milner's support of
the movement that had induced him to table his motion.⁵⁴ Ex-
cellent speeches were also made by Dr McKring-Bock, J.W. Sauer,
J.C. Holtene and Sprigg. Eventually, Merriman's motion was⁵⁵
carried by forty-three to fifteen votes. It is doubtful whether
Merriman served any useful purpose by his suspension motion.
The matter had been dropped by the Progressives when Parliament

53. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, p.424.

54. Hansard: 1902, p.184 et seq.

55. Ibid. 1902, p.275.

assembled. Chamberlain had given it a coup de grace and raising such a contentious matter, a matter which had so violently agitated public opinion, only served to fan afresh the flames of racialism and party animosity which had begun to subside.

The course of the Sprigg Ministry on the suspension question was unanimously condemned by the British Press in South Africa. Till May, 1902, Sprigg had led a solid Progressive Party, but now he failed to gain the support of the whole of his party for the suspension of the Constitution. The result was a split in the Progressive Party. The Responsible Government section consisted of the Ministers - except Dr. Smartt - and a few "mugwumps", but the overwhelming majority of the Progressives became Suspensionists and followed the lead of Dr Smartt and now set about opposing Sprigg and his Ministers who were obliged to look more to the Bond for support.⁵⁶

III. THE SPRIGG-BOND CONTACT, 1902-1903.

The Parliament which met on 20th August, 1902, differed very much from the one which had adjourned on 13th October, 1900, -twenty-two months previous. Sprigg's fourth Ministry was still in office. Several changes had however, been made and it was now constituted as follows: Gordon Sprigg, Prime Minister and Treasurer; Arthur Douglass, Commissioner of Public Works; Thomas Graham, Attorney-General; Pieter Pauze, Colonial Secretary and John Frost, Secretary for Agriculture.

56. *Infra*, p.358.

In the Assembly there were no less than nine vacant seats.

In the House there were forty-one Bond members and forty Progressives which included the Prime Minister and about a dozen of his personal following.⁵⁸ The Bond therefore, had an absolute majority

and had it wished, it could have turned out the Ministry.

Sprigg had a more or less independent position and was not attached to either of the big parties in the House. In shaping all his measures, he had to take into consideration the wishes of the majority, namely the Bond; this led to a compact between the Ministers and the Bond.⁵⁹

During the session of 1902, Parliament did not spend much time on useful legislation but in the discussion of such contentious matters as Fredericksdahl's motion for a Select Committee on the Afrikaner Bond, the abortive attempt to suspend the constitution, compensation for war losses and indemnity. Throughout the session, Smuts and the Progressives adopted a hostile attitude towards the Afrikaners in order to provoke them to rash acts which would justify suspension and give it fresh life.⁶⁰ In this they did not succeed. Parliament behaved moderately and none of the violence of which the Suspensionists had secretly wished, took place.

It has been noticed that because it opposed suspension,

57. Hansard, 1902, p.16. They were: On account of death, F.Y. St. Leger, J.E. Wood, C.J. Rhodes representing the electoral divisions of Cape Town, Grahamstown and Barkly West respectively; on account of resignations: J. Rose-Innes, T.E. Fuller, R. Solomon, H.J. Raubenheimer, rendering vacant the divisions of Wynburg, Cape Town, Tembuland, George; owing to absence without leave: J. Joubert and I.J. v.d. Walt, rendering vacant Albert and Colesburg. There was also one seat vacant in the Council owing to the death of Jan Faure in 1901. One land, 16/8/'02.

58. Journal, 9/8/'02.

59. Ibid., p.36.

60. One land, 18/11/'02.

the Sprigg Ministry estranged the greater part of the Progressive Party. Shortly before Herriman moved his resolution against the suspension movement,^{60a} the Progressives were prepared to give Sprigg another chance. He attended a Progressive caucus and all efforts were made to arrive at a happier understanding. The Progressives wanted Sprigg to introduce a bill to control trade in arms and ammunition; a bill to suppress sedition and a bill providing for the redistribution of seats before the next general election; he had also to promise a new registration of voters and a general election as soon as possible after the prorogation of Parliament. Sprigg however, "arrogantly refused" to approach the Progressive view and the negotiations between the two reached a deadlock.⁶¹ Sprigg knew that even if he had the full support of all the Progressives he would not be able to muster a majority. Then followed the debate on Herriman's motion condemning the suspension movement and approving of the attitude of the Sprigg Ministry. It was adopted by a majority of twenty-eight votes.⁶² This, in Sprigg's own words, was "the most magnificent vote of confidence accorded to any Ministry". Thenceforth he ignored the opposition he encountered, for to him "constitutional government meant that the Government of the day must be supported by a majority, and so long as it had a majority it was proceeding on strictly constitutional lines".⁶³ Because of his defence of the constitution, the Bond-S.A. Party

^{60a} Supra, p. 354.

⁶¹ O. Argue, 9/9/1902, at 24/11/1902, Progressive Manifesto.

⁶² Supra, p. 354.

⁶³ O. Argue, 3/12/1902, Sprigg's East London Speech, 2/12/1902.

gave Sprigg and his government their support.⁶⁴ Sprigg's position throughout the session of 1902 constituted a peculiar constitutional situation. He was kept in power by a majority, but that majority, was composed, not of the party which had enabled him to take office, or his natural supporters, but of the Opposition. According to the practice of constitutional government he should have resigned or appealed to the country, yet he contrived to obtain a majority. It was a unique situation more especially as Sprigg did not conclude any definite compact with the Bond. The Bond had again resorted to its policy of not assuming office itself, but lending support to an English-speaking Ministry to carry on the Government of the country. The Bond leaders knew that if they took office at that juncture they would cause such a sensation throughout the British Empire which would then realise that what the Suspensionists had wished to avoid had indeed taken place and there would again have been the danger of suspension after all. By taking office, there was also the danger that all the English groups and parties in Parliament would unite against the Bond. So the Bond bided its time.

How dependent the Ministry was on the Bond for its tenure of office is shown by a few significant divisions. On 22nd August, 1902, Sir Henry Juta moved that the Governor be informed of the vacancies in various constituencies.⁶⁵ He was anxious to

⁶⁴ O. Argus, 17/12/02, at one hand, 18/11/02.
⁶⁵ Hansard, 1902, p.16.

have these seats filled because he knew that the Progressive Party would thereby be strengthened considerably. After some discussion Sauer moved the "previous question" which was carried by forty-one to twenty-three votes. On that occasion the Ministers - Sprigg, Douglass, Faure and Frost - crossed from the Ministerial benches on the right of the Speaker, to his left, and took their seats with the Bond members.⁶⁶ Thus the Bond and the Ministry voted against the Progressive Party which had enabled Sprigg to take office in 1900.

Another significant division took place on the Parliamentary Indemnity Bill - one of the most important measures of the session. It indemnified inter alia, for the lapse in registration, which should have taken place in February, 1902, and provided for registration before the end of February, 1903. Smartt wished it to take place before the end of October, 1902.⁶⁷ On the division being taken, the Bond, the Ministry and five Progressives - Kossars Brown, Cartwright, Laing, Gats and Oliver - forty-seven in all, voted for the measure as it stood, while Smartt and seventeen Progressive followers voted against them.⁶⁸

A very interesting situation also arose when the Estimates for the Cape Colonial Forces were brought up for consideration. Sprigg wished to reorganise the Colonial Forces and this would have involved an additional expenditure of some £14,000. F.S. Malan, a prominent Bondsman, moved a reduction on the vote amounting to almost the whole sum Sprigg asked for. When the division of the House was taken, the Ministry and

66. Hannard, 1900, p.22.

67. Ibid. p.53.

68. Ibid. p.129.

Progressives voted against a solid Bond ~~bill~~ and were defeated by five votes - thirty-four against twenty-nine.⁶⁹ Sprigg should have resigned, and Scherbrucker, a Progressive, moved the adjournment of the House for the Government to consider its position. The Bond however, again came to the rescue of the Ministry and now the Bond, the Ministers and five Progressives - J. Searle, Oats, Tamplin, Cloete and Cartwright - forty-two in all, voted against the rest of the Progressives - nineteen in number. Thus Scherbrucker's motion was defeated and soon after a defeat, the Ministers were again assured of a majority.⁷⁰ There was an interesting sequel: Three days later, 6th November, 1902, Sprigg stated that he felt himself very much hampered by the reduction on the vote for the Cape Colonial Forces. He then asked the House to grant him the money. After some discussion by Kalam and Sauer who said that they would waive their objections and by Walton who spoke in favour of the vote, the House assented to Sprigg's request.⁷¹ This called forth the following apt remark from the "Cape Argus" of 7th November, 1902: "So the vote which the Bond threw out on Monday is inserted by the Bond on Thursday. Truly the Bond giveth and the Bond taketh away".

The Bond also had its own axe to grind in keeping Sprigg in office. During the Anglo-Boer War, Parliament had not met at the constitutionally appointed time, there had been no registration of voters and payments had been illegally made by

69. Hansard, 1902, p.618.

70. Ibid. p.627.

71. Ibid. p.640.

Governor's warrants. The Ministry was under obligation to the Imperial Government to pass a General Indemnity Bill.⁷² The Bond was in the majority in the House and not anxious about an indemnity bill till a commission had been appointed to investigate the hardships and grievances suffered during the administration of Martial Law in the Cape Colony. The Bond, if the Martial Law Commission were appointed, agreed to offer no obstruction to Sprigg's Indemnity Bill. Sprigg agreed to the bargain and wrote the following brief note to Merriman: "In moving the Second Reading of the Indemnity Bill this afternoon the Attorney-General will state that Ministers will as soon as the Bill is passed advise the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the administration of Martial Law".⁷³ This letter explains the Sprigg-Bond compact of the two sessions, 1902 and 1903. In order to get their Martial Law Inquiry, the Bond in good faith supported the Sprigg Ministry throughout the session of 1902 and also during part of the session of 1903, but that support was immediately withdrawn when it became clear that Sprigg did not intend to fulfill his pledge and appoint the promised Commission to enquire into the operation of Martial Law.⁷⁴

During the session of 1902, many accusations had been brought against the Bond from which it was clear that the objects of the organisation were misunderstood or misrepresented.

72. Journal, 29/8/103.

73. Merr. Papers, No. 69, 1902. Sir G. Sprigg to J.X. Merr. 25 Aug. Confid.

74. Infra, p. 369.

Before Parliament was prorogued in 1902, Hofmeyr, therefore, called a meeting of the members of Parliament of the Afrikaner Party and all those acting with it. This meeting recommended certain changes in the programme of principles of "The Afrikaner National Party" and the constitution of the Afrikaner Bond.⁷⁵

The first alteration affected the name of the wider political party as distinguished from the Afrikaner Bond which retained its name. According to the programme of principles the name of the Bond Party was "The Afrikaner National Party"⁷⁶ - a name seldom used. The name now recommended for this party was "South African Party", This was a name that had already been in general use, although not official, by both English and Dutch for many years - in fact as far back as 1890, Merriman had written about the formation of "a national S.African Party which will include Dutch and English".^{76a}

Other alterations included the removal of all references to Bond branches in the Republics, so that the Bond became constitutionally, what it had for a long time been in reality, - namely a purely Cape Colonial organisation. The most important change, however, to meet post-war conditions, was in the aim of the Bond. Formerly it had aimed at "the formation of a pure nationality and the preparation of our people for the establishment of a United South Africa". The aim was now put as follows:

⁷⁵. Ons Land, 2/12/'02.

⁷⁶. Vide Appendix, E.

^{76a}. Merr. Papers, No. 20, 1890. J.X. Merr. to Julia Merr. 24 April, et vide Merr. Papers, No. 5, 1901. J.H.M. -Beek to J.X. Merr. ? Jan; Walker: Schreiner. p.113 et Supra, p.305.

"It ((the South African Party)) aims under the guidance of Providence at the development of a feeling of unity between the different nationalities of British South Africa and the Union of the South African Colonies in a Federal Union with due consideration of the mutual interests of the Colony and the supremacy of the British Crown".

In a footnote the aim was further elucidated:

"The Africander Bond declares that it strives inter alia after similar liberties for our population, especially as far as language and education are concerned, as are enjoyed by the French and English Canadians, and after the highest obtainable amount of unrestricted self-government for South Africa, in the Government of its internal and external affairs as possessed for example by the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia".

Before the session of 1903, a well-attended Bond Congress met at Somerset East and accepted the proposed alterations.⁷⁷

The English flank of the South African Party also felt the need for party organisation. The Bond could ill accommodate the English from the cities and towns because it was primarily an organisation of Dutch farmers and had originated as an organisation to fight for the interests of farmers. Cape Town was the only city with a Bond branch; all the other branches were in the country towns and districts. The subjects discussed at the Annual Congress of the Bond were of greater interest to the country than to the cities. It would also have been difficult to adopt an organisation with a country tradition to the needs of a city where the methods of carrying on a campaign are vastly differed to those of the country. There was also the language difficulty. The Bond Congresses conducted its proceedings in the Dutch language and very few of the English members of Parliament were so conversant in Dutch that they would be able to follow the proceedings. Moreover, the Bond

77. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.581. Molteno: S.A. Recollections, p.61, et vide One Land, 2/12/'02.

was so unpopular in the larger cities that it was impossible to hold public meetings in support of its views. For these reasons, Merriman and Sauer decided to form what they called "The South African Liberal Party". This was an organisation for the English members of the South African Party and worked for that party in the cities. Even then, it was thought advisable to grant admission to its meetings by invitation only.⁷⁸

In 1903, therefore, there was the South African Party which embraced and was supported by the Bond and South African Liberal Party. The Bond functioned especially as a country party organisation outside Parliament, while the party in Parliament was the South African Party which included a number of English-speaking men, not Bond Members, but organised for urban party purposes into the South African Liberal Party.

During the recess between the sessions of 1902 and 1903, the Progressive Party also reorganised its ranks. Its political opponent was thoroughly organised and in its splendid organisation lay the strength of the Afrikaner Bond, while "opposed to the magnificent party discipline of the Bond, the Progressives are as a mob with assagais in front of a regiment with rifles".⁷⁹

During the interval between the sessions of 1902 and 1903, Jameson was chosen leader of the Progressive Party while Dr Smartt gave him every assistance he could in organising the party.⁸⁰ What the Bond was to the South African Party, the

78. Huisgenoot, 16/7/1937. Art. Malan; 'n Oud-Journalis Ryk Terug, et S.A. News, 2/3/'04, Ons Land, 23/2/'04.

79. C.Argus, 24/10/'02.

80. Colvin: The Life of Jameson, Vol.II, p.216.

South African League was to the Progressive Party. In the S.A. League, the Progressive Party had a political organisation in good working order. It was strong in the Eastern Districts especially, but it had not taken firm root in the Western Province. To advance the cause of the Progressives in the Western Province, they organised "The South African Progressive Association" which was to work in conjunction with the S.A. League⁸¹ for the advancement of the Progressive interest. Under the chairmanship of Sir Lewis Michell, M.L.A., the Progressive Association was founded in Cape Town towards the end of November, 1902. Its Executive Committee included a number of persons who were prominent Progressives. It issued the following programme of general principles the first two of which were identical to the general principles of the S.A. League:-

"(1) An unalterable resolve to support the existing supremacy of Great Britain in South Africa and the strenuous opposition to any attempts that might be made to weaken or destroy that supremacy.

"(2) The promotion of Progressive Legislation and of good government within and on amicable relation, among the various Colonies of South Africa.

"(3) The establishment of a system of party government in this Colony, under which responsibility and power will be undivided and under which candidates shall pledge themselves to work for and support the policy adopted by the majority of the members of the Progressive Party in Parliament, or in the event of their being unable to do so to take steps to ascertain the views of their constituents"⁸²

These two wings of the Progressive Party worked hand in glove. In 1903, Jameson was elected President of the Congress of the S.A. Progressive Association; he was also Chairman of

81. C. Argus, 25/11/'02.

82. Ibid. 24/11/'02, Report Progressive Association.

the S.A. League and Leader of the Progressive Party in Parliament.⁸³

Coincident with the founding of the S.A. Progressive Association, the Progressive Party issued a manifesto. In it, the Executive Committee of the Party stated that when the session of 1902 had commenced, the Progressives were prepared to accept Chamberlain's decision on the suspension question. They had been prepared to support the Sprigg Ministry on certain conditions,⁸⁴ but Sprigg had refused to comply with these, hence they had refused to support his measures and he was thrown into the arms of the Bond. The Progressive Manifesto demanded that if the Bond was to rule, it should accept office and concomitant responsibility. The Manifesto then set forth the main objects of the Progressive Policy:

- "(a) Maintenance of the British settlement and the support of the High Commissioner in the great task before him.
 - "(b) The removal of fiscal barriers, and the cultivation of friendly relations with the other Colonies with a view to early federation.
 - "(c) Reform of taxation, and cheapening the cost of living.
 - "(d) Fair representation of the people in Parliament.
 - "(e) Development of the country by means of additional railways, well-considered schemes of irrigation and improved methods of agricultural and pastoral farming.
 - "(f) The gradual introduction of compulsory education.
 - "(g) A just and sympathetic native policy including the prohibition of the sale of liquor to aboriginal natives.
 - "(h) Reorganisation of Colonial defence and redemption of the pledges given by Government to Town Guards and Districts Mounted Troops.
- "It is also the intention of the Progressive Party to insist upon the suppression of treason and seditious writing and speaking and the protection of public servants and others who may have incurred the displeasure of the Bond Party by actively assisting His Majesty's Forces during the war....."
- "Let it also be clearly understood that any Progressive voter who supports Sir Gordon Sprigg and his Ministry,

83. C.Argus, 22/8/'03.

84. Supra, p. 357.

not only supports the Bond, but supports the Bond rule in its most dangerous form.....

"Finally your representatives would remind you that in forwarding this policy you will be helping to realise the great ideas to which Mr. Rhodes, South Africa's greatest statesman, devoted his energies and sacrificed his life"⁸⁵

The Progressive Party further increased its hold on its members by introducing a "pledge". It took the form of a promise by each member of the party that he would resign if he should differ from the majority of the caucus.⁸⁶ By this means, therefore, a bare majority of the caucus was able to exert a controlling influence on all the dissentients of the party.

In the ensuing months the Progressives advocated their policy in the press and from political platforms. In essence all their utterances corresponded with the policy laid down in the Progressive Manifesto.⁸⁷

After the elections of 1904, the two Progressive elements decided to unite. At its seventh Annual Congress the S.A. League resolved to amalgamate with the Progressive Association⁸⁸ under the title of "South African Imperial Union". This matter had still to be submitted to the Congress of the S.A. Progressive Association.⁸⁹ On 23rd May, 1904, the "Cape Argus" was able to announce that the S.A. Political Association and

85. C.Argus, 24/11/'02. Progressive Manifesto. The members of the Committee were: T.W. Smartt (Chairman); J.W. Jagger; L.S. Jameson; L.L. Mitchell; V. Sampson; E.H. Walton; A. Wilnot.

86. Molteno; S.A. Recollections, p.67.

87. Vide C.Times, 3/4/'03; C.Argus, 9/9/'02; C.Argus, 5/11/'02, Smartt's Speech in Cape Town, 4/11/'02. C.Argus, 28/5/'03, Jameson's Speech in Grahamstown, 27/5/'03.

88. C.Argus, 31/3/'04.

the S.A. League had united into the S.A. Imperial Union "which is now the only body representing the Progressive Party".

Towards the end of December, 1902, Joseph Chamberlain landed at Durban on his visit to South Africa. He avoided overmuch contact with the die-hard and anti-Afrikaner British and sought especially to come into contact with the leaders of Afrikanerdom. In consequence, a spirit of reconciliation fostered by the Cape political leaders, - Smuts excepted - was born.⁸⁹ As an instance of the new spirit one may cite the remarks made by the Ministry and the Governor on the extension of clemency to William Gabriel Visser. During the Anglo-Boer War, Visser had shot a native, Gert Brood. Although the jury had recommended mercy, the death sentence was passed on him. The Ministers recommended that the death penalty should not be inflicted on Visser because

"there is now a manifest desire on the part of the people generally throughout the Colony to let bygones and to establish friendly relations. The execution of Visser at this juncture would on this account be most impolitic, it would naturally have an unfavourable effect, for it would be regarded by large numbers of people as an indication that the spirit of conciliation was wanting on the part of the Government"⁹⁰

The Governor gave favourable consideration to the ministerial recommendation because of the "remarkable developments in the aspect of public affairs" and "the efforts which are now being

89. *One Land*, 24/2/'03. *C. Argus*, 24/2/'03. Hofmeyr: *Op. cit.* p. 503 et seq.

90. *Ex. Co.* 20. *Min. No.* 6, 1903, 27/3/'03.

made by Mr. J.H. Hofmeyr and others to bring about a better state of feeling amongst Colonists of Dutch extraction in various Districts of the Colony"⁹¹

During the session of 1903, Sprigg was successful in steering a middle course between the S.A. Party and the Progressives and by skilful Parliamentary tactics he brought most of his measures within reach of the final stages.⁹²

We have noticed that the Bond supported Sprigg's measures during the session of 1902, on condition that Parliament appointed a Commission to inquire into the operation of Martial Law.⁹³ The Sprigg Ministry was therefore, allowed to remain in office but it took no steps to appoint the promised commission. In December, 1902, Merriman personally called on Sprigg to remind him of his pledges. Sprigg promised Merriman that he would bring the matter before the Cabinet on the following day. On 10th January, 1903, Merriman again wrote to Sprigg, reminding him of the letter in which he had promised to appoint a commission and also of the Attorney-General's pledges to Parliament to the same effect.⁹⁴ In consequence of the Ministerial promises Merriman and his supporters successfully did their best to minimise the discussion on cases of hardships, which constituents were pressing members to bring to the notice of Parliament, in the belief that such cases would be thoroughly investigated by the Commission of Inquiry. Merriman therefore, urged Sprigg to redeem the promises which

91. Ex.Co.20. Min No.6, 1903, 27/2/'03. Enclos.Gov's reply, 2/3/'03.

92. One Land, 27/8/'03.

93. Supra, p.361.

94. Merr. Papers, No. 8, 1903. J.X. Merr. to Sir G.Sprigg, 10 Jan.

he had made to him and through him to his party. In reply to Merriman, Sprigg stated that with regard to the Commission of Inquiry which had been promised he would soon make a definite statement. There was some difference of opinion he said, on the matter; even a "leading Bond Dutch" member of Parliament had written to him asking that he should not appoint a Commission of Inquiry.⁹⁵ Merriman did not let the matter rest there; he again wrote to Sprigg urging the promised Commission, but Sprigg made no sign that he would comply.⁹⁷ Sprigg of course, knew that he would lose the support of the Bond Party if he divulged the true reason why he had not appointed the Commission of Inquiry. He and his Ministers did not have "the courage to confess the true reason for their breach of faith which was the practical veto of the Imperial authorities and the inadvisability in the interests of this Colony of provoking a rupture with the Imperial Government upon such a subject."⁹⁸

The session dragged on till within sight of prorogation. Sprigg hoped to retain office till the life of Parliament expired. Then he would be absolved from his promise to the S.A. Party to appoint the Commission and he hoped that the elections would return him independent of S.A. Party support. On 25th August, 1903, Henry Burton moved:

"That, inasmuch as many persons in this Colony have paid fines under sentences imposed under Martial Law, and complain of the injustice of such sentences, and inasmuch as considerable dissatisfaction exists with certain of

95. Merr. Papers, No. 8, 1903. J.X. Merr. to Sir G. Sprigg, 10 Jan.
 96. Ibid. No. 15, 1903. J. Gordon Sprigg to J.X. Merr. 14 Jan.
 97. Ibid. No. 16, 1903. J.X. Merr. to Sir G. Sprigg, 16 Jan.
 98. Merr. Papers, No. 210, 1903. J.X. Merr. to Revd J.H. Hofmeyr, 29 Oct (Draft), et vide Journal, 29/8/'03, et Kolbeno: S.A. Recollections, p. 76, et vide ~~Burton~~ Supra p. 353

the recommendations and dismissals of claims made by the War Losses Compensation Commission, with reference to the inadequate payment and non-payment of Compensation for losses alleged to have been actually sustained it is the opinion of this House that the Government should introduce legislation during the present session of Parliament, for the purpose of appointing and authorising one of the judges of the Supreme Court: (a) to investigate and report upon the correctness of the sentences imposed under martial law in any cases in which persons have actually paid fines under such sentences, and in which it is desired by such persons to have the injustice of the sentences inquired into; (b) to constitute a Court of Appeal or Review, before which any person whose claim for compensation has been dismissed, or who may be dissatisfied with the amount awarded him, shall be permitted to bring his case for consideration and report"⁹⁹

Burton pressed his motion to a division and the Government was defeated by thirty-two votes to twenty-two. The Ministry and the Progressive Party voted in the minority against the S.A. Party.¹⁰⁰ The following day Sprigg stated that in consequence of the adverse vote encountered by the Government, on the previous day he had, seeing that the life of Parliament had almost expired and that the country had not had an opportunity of making its voice heard on many important questions since the war, decided to appeal to the country. Parliament however, would have to pass an appropriation bill. He further stated that he would not proceed with four bills then in the Committee stage, namely, Railways Extension Bill, Additional Railway Works Bill, Public Works Loan Bill and Arms Ammunition and Explosives Bill.¹ Sprigg's move took the S.A. Party by surprise; they had hoped that he would resign and leave them to form a ministry, but now he had decided on an appeal to the country.

99. Hansard, 1903, p.656.

100. Ibid. p.666.

1. Hansard, 1903, p.667.

Morrison appealed to Sprigg not to make a cabinet crisis of the question and asked him to reconsider his decision and not withdraw the Railway Bill. When Sprigg moved the second reading of the Appropriation Bill, Sauer stated that the S.A. Party was prepared to vote supplies but it also wished that measures introduced by the Government itself, should be proceeded with, especially the Railway Bill. Sauer then pleaded that this should be discussed. Sauer's motion, that the debate on the Appropriation Bill be adjourned, was then carried and the House adjourned.² When the House met again, on the following day, 28th August, Sprigg pointed out that the House expired by effluxion of time on 15th September. Although the Council still had two years to run, he had intended to advise the Governor to dissolve both the Council and the Assembly. If both Houses were dissolved, Parliament could not meet till February, 1904. Therefore, not to delay the Railway Bill too much only the Assembly need be dissolved and the re-elected Assembly could meet in November and pass the Railway Bill, or an amended one, for which the Bond clamoured. Sprigg hoped that his explanation with regard to the Railway Bill would satisfy the House and that they would pass the Appropriation Bill "because he believed that every member of that House shared his feeling of dislike that the Government should carry on a public service, and spend the money necessary, without the authority of Parliament". On being taunted by J.T. Molteno and Sauer that he would not dare to spend money

2. Hansard, 1903, p.668-9.

without parliamentary sanction, Sprigg amid cheers and laughter from the Progressives replied that he had done it before³ and would do it again if the necessity should arise again.

Personally Sprigg was not very keen on the Railway Extension Bill. If Parliament were dissolved without passing the Bill it would have the effect of suggesting to the country that the S.A. Party was responsible for the wrecking of the Bill. Moreover, the Bill included a line from Kokstad to Riverside (Katal) and Sprigg's constituents were very much against this line. It would link Durban to an area which East London had always regarded as its commercial sphere. By abandoning the Railway Extension Bill and therefore also the Kokstad-Riverside line, Sprigg would be obeying the behests of his constituents who had recently shown no small animosity towards him in the press.⁴ At the same time the Railway Extension Bill was a two-edged sword as it gave Sprigg a further hold on the S.A. Party. It had also been introduced with an eye to the coming elections, as expediency, to retain S.A. Party support.⁵ On the other hand, Sprigg could not legally recommend to the Governor to dissolve Parliament without passing the money bills and these the S.A. Party refused till the Railway Extension Bill had been carried. So the curious crisis lasted for almost a week. The Opposition tried to keep the Ministry in office while the Ministry wished to appeal to the country. During all this time, Sprigg was

3. Hansard, 1905, p. 673.

4. S.A. News, 2/9/'03, et C. Times, 7/9/'03, Report: Sauer's Speech at Freemantle Dinner, 5/9/'03.

5. Journal, 29/8/'03.

trying to come to terms with the Progressives. He wanted Jameson to agree to his standing for his old constituency, East London, where he had recently become very unpopular. Jameson however, refused.⁶

In the end Sprigg cut the Gordian Knot and recommended the Governor to prorogue Parliament till 15th September,⁷ on which date, the Assembly dissolved automatically by effluxion of time; the Council was also dissolved by Governor's decree.⁸ The Appropriation Bill had not been passed and payments had to be made by Governor's warrants. Thus, the very man who had fought in defence of the constitution in 1902, was responsible for violating it in 1903. He trampled on one of the most fundamental principles of constitutional government, namely, that no money should be spent in the country without the consent of Parliament. At the same time, by employing unconstitutional methods, he outmanoeuvred the S.A. Party for it got neither its Commission of Inquiry into the operation of Martial Law, nor its Railway Extension Bill.

With the close of this session of Parliament, an epoch in Cape history also came to an end. Peace had been re-established and the turmoil and memories of the War were slowly beginning to die away. A new era of reconstruction was at hand not only for the Cape Colony, but also for the whole of South Africa. The Parliament, which had been elected in the

6. Colvin: The Life of Jameson, Vol. II, p. 224.

7. Govt. Gazette, 1/9/1903, Proclamation No. 261, d.d. 51/8/1903.

8. Ibid. 11/9/1903, Ibid. No. 271, d.d. 8/9/1903.

the uneasy and stormy days prior to the outbreak of the War and which had with much difficulty weathered, not wholly unscathed, the troublous war years, was now finally dissolved. A new Parliament was elected and the Colony firmly set its foot on the road of post-war reconstruction.

CHAPTER IX.RECONSTRUCTION, 1903 - 1910.

Ex Unitate vires.

I. ELECTIONS, 1903-04.

"Union is strength. But it must be a union of hearts, and not a union forced by any outside pressure....To my mind, South Africa needs no surgical operations, but South Africa needs rest and peace and development, and it is a development that can only be obtained through brotherhood"¹. Thus wisely spoke Sir William Butler in 1898, but his words went unheeded. South Africa had to undergo the very very painful surgical operation of two and a half years of war. Through the country's remarkable recuperative powers, however, the much desired union of the four colonies was achieved eight years after the signing of the peace that concluded the surgical operation of war. Moreover, it was a union achieved by the spontaneous action of the people of South Africa. As far as the Cape Colony however, was concerned, there was still a long road of political strife to be traversed. In consequence of Sprigg's defeat in Parliament, both the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council were dissolved on 8th September, 1903, and the first General Election since 1898, took place.

During the Anglo-Boer War, the Progressives had given their full support to the British cause, and now, during the elections, they made the maintenance of British influence and

1. One Land, 31/12/'98. {Quoted from Sir W. Butler's speech at the opening of the Grahamstown Exhibition. 14/12/'98.

the permanent settlement of South Africa under the British flag an important plank in their platform. South Africa had to be maintained as an integral part of the British Empire; it was a Downing Street ideal - South Africa had forever, to be a dependency in which the British were to be supreme and the Afrikaners subservient to them. This British supremacy had to be retained at all costs so that South African British could always appeal to Great Britain in case things were not going well with them. The Progressive Party favoured state-aided immigration with the avowed object of securing an increased British population on the soil.^{1a} In this the Progressive Party was in full sympathy with Lord Milner who saw the solution of the South African problem only in vast numbers of British Colonists.²

The Progressive Party confirmed its "absolute adherence" to Rhodes' policy that all civilised men should have equal rights; this would imply larger representation, in Parliament,³ for urban areas of the Cape which were Progressive strongholds. Cape Town, for instance, had more than 17,000 voters and returned five members to the House of Assembly, an average of 3,400 votes per member, while Aliwal North - a country constituency - with less than 1,500 votes returned two members - an average of less than 750 per member.⁴ Although many Afrikaners had been disfranchised their strength still lay in the rural

1a. C. Times, 14/9/'03, Jameson's Progressive Manifesto.

2. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 144, 242, 283, etc.

3. C. Times, 14/9/'03, Jameson's Progressive Manifesto.

4. Ibid. 1/10/'03.

areas; for this reason, the Progressives wanted to increase urban representation. This was what Jameson really meant when at Kimberley on 20th November, 1902, he said that the Dutch "must be fought politically",⁵ - a sentiment and expression of which the South African Party made much political capital.⁶

The railway policy of the Progressives showed that the question of union or federation of the South African states was no longer a chimera but inevitable, sooner or later, and most desirable. The Progressive Party advocated extension of the existing railways - to agricultural districts especially - and co-operation with the neighbouring colonies leading to an eventual unification of railway interests.

The cost of living during and after the Anglo-Boer War had risen to an astounding height. The Progressive Party now promised that it would reduce the cost of the necessaries of life. Further the Progressive Manifesto promised an Excise on spirits to fall on the consumer, compensation to loyalists who had suffered financial loss during the war, improvement in the status of the Civil Service, a "vigorous" educational policy and the elevation of the native races by prohibiting the sale of liquor to them and introducing legislation on the lines of the Glen Grey and Native Location Acts. One of the burning questions of the day was the proposed introduction of Chinese labourers to the Rand Mines. The Progressives stated that they were opposed to the introduction of Asiatic labour

5. S.A. News, 1/12/'02.

6. Morr. Papers, No.188, 1903. J.X. Morr. to Agnes Morr. 5 Oct.

into South Africa and that they would adopt "practical measures" to exclude them from the Cape Colony.⁷ It may be noted that if their opposition to Asiatic labour were genuine it would not be necessary to adopt "practical measures". We shall have occasion to refer to this question again.⁸

The South African Party had accepted the Peace of Vereeniging as the basis for the future of South Africa and ever since 31 st May, 1902, had placed conciliation of and co-operation between the European races in the foreground as the main plank in its policy;⁹ there was nothing of the spirit which animated the Progressive Party, namely, of a political fight with its opponents in the late war. The South African Party was only too willing to have English-speaking Colonists as its members and it chose as its leader not an Afrikaner, but an Englishman - who had for years championed the cause of the Afrikaner - J.K. Lorrimer. It did not work for a race but envisaged a South African nation and did not look to the descent or the language of the men who were to constitute that nation as long as those men accepted South Africa as their country and home.¹⁰

The South African Party also worked for the ideal of a United South Africa and was fully prepared to accept the "Union Jack" as the flag of that union. To the South African Party, however, this meant greater freedom than the Progressive Party was prepared to accept: South Africa should be free from undue

7. C. Times, 14/9/'03, Jameson's Progressive Manifesto.

8. Infra, p. 380.

9. Molteno: S.A. Recollections, p. 88.

10. Faure: My Life and Times, p. 186.

Downing Street influence and its unwise leading strings and free from the influence of De Beers and the financiers of Park Lane who, for their selfish purposes, wished to introduce Asiatics into South Africa, and above all

"free to develop a people South African, worthy of the stock from which they came, a people wedded to liberty and all that was noble and true, free to all who came to South Africa with the idea of joining on terms of equality and mutual respect; united not only politically, but united in a common mission, the great mission that had been put before them, and would continue to be before them so long as they were South Africans, and so long as they had got a civilisation left in South Africa"¹¹

With regard to the material interests of South Africa, the South African Party promised "reasonable compensation" to all who had suffered losses on account of war and who had "just demands", and finally there was the usual promise of railway extension.¹²

Milner's proposed introduction of Chinese Coolies to work on the Rand mines was an important factor in the Cape elections of 1903 to 1904. During the Anglo-Boer War the Rand mining industry had come to a standstill. If the reconstruction of South Africa was to be carried out successfully, on lines desired by Milner, it was essential that the economic aid of the gold mines should be called in as soon as was possible. The mines could not obtain enough Native labour to supply the demand and so Milner conceived the plan of importing indentured Asiatics to the Rand.¹³

11. C. Argus, 3/9/'04, Report, F.S. Malan Address to S.A. Liberal Association, 2/9/'04, et vide Ons Land, 15/8/'05, F.S. Malan Speech in District VI, et Ons Land, 3/9/'03.

12. Ons Land, 3/9/'03.

13. Headlam: Op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 461, 463, 482.

This proposal raised a storm of protest throughout the British Empire and nowhere was the storm more violent than at the Cape, then in the midst of its first post-war election. The South African Party took the line that the Progressive Party of which the leaders had financial interests in the Rand Mines and which whole-heartedly supported Hilner, favoured the introduction of Chinese. Thus South Africa was to be ^{piratic-}~~practic-~~ally exploited and no matter what the heritage of succeeding generations. "One Land" of 26th January, 1904, put it as follows:

".....de Zuid-Afrikaansche Partij in de bresse treedt voor de belangen der permanente bevolking van ons land, afgezien van ons ras of kleur; terwijl de Plots Partij ((Progressives)) ten nouwste verbonden is aan de Uitlanders, aan hen die Zuid-Afrika niet als hun vaderland beschouwen, maar het willen gebruiken om schatten te vergaderen om dan die schatten elders te gaan beleggen".

Both the South African Party and the Progressives desired the vote of the Cape Native. In order to win their support, the South African Party told the natives that the introduction of Asiatics would deprive them of work on the Rand and that these Asiatics would soon compete with them in other fields of labour. Moreover, if Chinese were imported they would divert to China £750,000 which would otherwise have been earned by South African natives and spent in this country.¹⁴ The South African Party had the support of that remarkable and influential native Tongo Jabavu, editor of the native paper "Irvu". Jabavu used all his influence to persuade the natives to vote against the Progressives because of the Chinese question.¹⁵ Unfortunately for the

14. S.A. News, 8/1/'04.

15. Colvin; Jameson, Vol. II, p.231.

South African Party, General Louis Botha proposed as an alternative to Chinese importation, that the native reserves, such as Basutoland, Swaziland and Pondoland be broken up and the natives forced on to the labour market. This was very detrimental to the cause of the South African Party; as Merriman put it: "((General)) Botha seems to have made a pretty jackass of himself and to have done us incredible harm - he may possibly lose me and several of us our elections"¹⁶ Botha's proposal was of course a useful weapon in the hands of the Progressives who had naturally found it difficult to reconcile the natives to the introduction of Chinese; as Jameson wrote on 30th September, 1903; "With our Cape elections on it is a pretty difficult job to keep on an even keel on this subject ((introduction of Chinese))..... Merriman has had a pretty nasty knock in Botha's pronouncement on native reserves, which you may be sure we shall use for all it is worth"¹⁷ As the election campaign proceeded, however, the Progressive Party found the proposed introduction of Chinese a very awkward problem. Jameson wrote to his brother Sam, on 9th December, 1903:

"Very busy with these beastly elections. Would win certain if there was no pigtail question - but that makes it uncertain. Don't using it for all it is worth., Doubtful if I can make coloured men see difference between C.C. and the T.V. before the voting. ((i.e. policy of allowing indentured Chinese into the Transvaal and keeping them out of the Cape Colony)) It all depends on that, and it is a somewhat difficult game to play". On 30th December, Jameson again wrote to his brother: "Without this abominable Chinese question we should have swept the floor with them. Now it is very doubtful. I am sticking to the honest line of keeping out of Colony and non-interference

16. Merr. Papers, No.174, 1903. J.X. Merr. to Agnes Merr. 22 Sept.
17. Colvin: Jameson, Vol.II, p.228.

with T.V. Difficult to keep my party together on it, and may go under, but still have good hopes - especially if Milner hurries up and gets them sanctioned before February 10".¹⁸

The attitude of the Progressives on the Chinese question lacked honesty and candour. In their press and in Jameson's Progressive Manifesto they stated that they were averse to the importation of Chinese;¹⁹ at a Progressive conference held in August, 1903, H.B. Holden of Somerset-East, proposed: "That this congress is absolutely opposed to the introduction of Chinese labour into South Africa, whilst desirous of avoiding the appearance of any dictation in the neighbouring colonies".²⁰ This proposal was carried without discussion. Behind the scenes however, there is quite a different story to be told. On 16th December, 1903, Jameson wrote to his brother, Sam:

"Ofcourse they must come, and the sooner the better; but I have to continue the egg dance down here till they do arrive, or at all events are sanctioned. Now I am trying to get Milner to hurry it up so that legislation can be published before our elections. Then I can.....get my coloured brethren to believe that we have been sincere and can help them better than the Bond in keeping them ((the Chinese)) out of the Colony"²¹

At Grahamstown, during the elections Jameson said that he was opposed to the introduction of Chinese into South Africa.²² When in office, however, the Progressives voted against a resolution expressing the Cape's disapproval of such introduction and succeeded in defeating the resolution.²³ In reality, therefore,

18. Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p. 229-230.

19. C.Argus: 14/8/'03, et supra, p. 279.

20. C.Argus: 21/8/'03, Report Progressive Conference.

21. Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p. 230.

22. C.Argus, 7/1/'04, Jameson's Grahamstown Speech, 6/1/'04.

23. S.A. News, 20/9/'03, De Waal's Colesberg Speech, 17/9/'03 et vide Herr. Papers, No. 40, 1904. J.H.H. Bock to J.X. Herr.

24 Jan.

the Progressives were strongly in favour of importing Chinese * into a neighbouring colony, because such introduction would help the mining industry in which many Progressives had financial interests; nor could the Progressive Party, by opposing the introduction of Asiatic labour in all seriousness, afford to offend Milner who was struggling to find a way out of the embarrassing financial muddle of the two newly acquired British Colonies. In justice, it must be stated that Jameson promised to introduce legislation to keep the Chinese out of the Cape Colony. That however, was a selfish attitude to take up; we have noticed throughout this work, that events in one South African state always had repercussions in the others and so the introduction of an undesirable element into the Transvaal would in the long run also have adverse effects on the Cape Colony and the other South African states.

In November, 1903, the election of a new Legislative Council was completed. The Progressive Party had a majority of one only in the small Upper House of twenty-three members. It was a pledged majority, however, and provided it remained faithful, it was enough for practical purposes seeing that there were one or two Independents in the Council as well.²⁴ In spite of this majority however, Jameson's defeat and ejection from office four years later, came from the Legislative Council.²⁵

24. Journal, 19/11/'03, Ons Land, 21/11/'03 et Colvin: Jameson Vol. II, p. 229.

25. Infra, p. 403.

In 1904, followed the election of the Legislative Assembly. Over and above the Progressive and South African Party candidates there were also "Independents", "Labourites" and "Ministerialists" but none of these were returned, so that the real political struggle was carried on between the Progressive Party and Afrikaner Bond, the latter now fighting under the banner of the South African Party. In eight constituencies along the northern and eastern boundaries of the Colony where there had been much disfranchisement, the South African Party lost heavily. The leader of the South African Party, Merriman, representing Wodehouse, and his lieutenant, Gaur, of Aliwal North were both unseated. A few months later Merriman was elected for Victoria West where A.G. Visser resigned in his favour.²⁶ His defeat at Wodehouse had been due largely to the natives of Glen Grey who had been misled and voted for the Progressive candidate.²⁷ Two South African Party candidates, Charles Searle and J.H.P. de Villiers fell out by small minorities.²⁸ Despite these reverses, it was a consolidated South African Party that returned to the House of Assembly. During Merriman's absence J.T. Molteno was chosen leader of the South African Party but H.P. de Waal was to be associated with him. A number of very capable men were to be found in the South African Party ranks: Henry Burton, F.S. Malan, Cronwright-Schreiner, Harry Currey, C.J. Krige, and G.H. Maasdorp.²⁹

26. Laurence: Life of Merriman, p.226.

27. Merr. Papers, No. 68, 1904. T. Jabavu to J.X. Merr. 18 Feb. et

Ibid. No. 197, 1904. Julia Merr. to Agnes Merr. 16 July.

28. One Land: 24/1/'03.

29. Molteno: S.A. Recollections, p.91.

The Progressives carried on a very intensive election campaign and much of their success was due to the hard work of Smartt, Crowe, Walton and Jameson. They decided to rely only on those who were out-and-out Progressives and were prepared to take the Progressive pledge;³⁰ the result was that many moderates supported the South African Party. Smartt and a Progressive colleague, Hellier, were elected for East London and unseated Sprigg who had represented that constituency in 1889 and continuously since 1872. None of Sprigg's ministerial colleagues in his last Cabinet were returned except Faure and Graham who had become Progressives.³¹ Sprigg had indeed fallen between two stools. Grahamstown returned Jameson and a Progressive colleague, Henry Wood, at the top of the poll by a large majority. Crowe beat Sauer at Aliwal North which the latter had represented for twenty-seven years. So evenly balanced were the two parties that on 15th February, 1904, each had forty-five members and there were only five results outstanding. Barkly West, Prieska and Teyateyanan, however, all returned Progressives so that eventually the Progressives had fifty seats in the Assembly and the South African Party forty-five.³²

The Anglo-Boer War and the elections of 1903-1904, showed that friendly co-operation between some English and Afrikaners was possible. During the war the Afrikaners did not stand alone but had the active sympathy of such persons as J.X. Kerriman, J.T. Molteno, his brother J.C. Molteno, Burton, Cartwright - editor of "South African News" - Olive Schreiner, her husband

30. Supra, p. 367.

31. Journal, 15/10/'03.

32. Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p. 231-232, et C. Argus, 15/2/'04.

Cronwright-Schreiner and other English who shared their views. These were people of British descent and outlook but they were not prepared to stand aside when Great Britain trampled right and justice underfoot and decided to uproot the independence of the Dutch Republics. After the war, these British helped the Afrikaners in their political fight against the forces of British exploitation and supremacy as represented in the Progressive Party. To these men who stood by them in their hour of trial, the Afrikaners owe a great debt of gratitude. So also the people of South Africa; if it had not been for these men and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and the Liberal Party in England, it is open to grave doubt whether there would have been any marked racial conciliation between the English and Afrikaners for many generations and without this the consummation of the Union of South Africa would have been long delayed if not made impossible.

The elections of 1903 to 1904, cleared the post-war atmosphere of political uncertainty and confusion. Both the Progressive and South African Parties fully realised that neither would be able to dominate the other. The bitter memories of the pre-war agitation and the war itself were slowly fading away and the two white peoples were being driven together by the economic trials which followed in the wake of the war. These trials did not discriminate between political parties, nor between linguistic or racial differences.

II. JAMESON MINISTRY AND PROGRESSIVES.

When Sprigg saw that the elections were going in favour of Jameson's Progressives, he resigned. The Governor then asked

Jameson to form a ministry. This he did on 22nd February, 1904. Thus the instrument of the Raid took office as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony eight years later. Many regarded him as the one on whom Rhodes' mantle had fallen, and therefore the champion of all Rhodes had stood for; loyalty to Jameson was therefore loyalty to Rhodes. Jameson himself, had, in the previous Parliament taken up a moderate attitude and had thus rehabilitated himself in the eyes of many who after the Raid, would have nothing to do with him.

In his ministry Jameson and Sir Lewis Michell took office without portfolio. Colonel Crewe was Colonial Secretary, Edgar Walton, Treasurer, Dr Smartt, Commissioner of Public Works and Crown Lands, Victor Sampson, Attorney-General, and A.J. Fuller, Secretary for Agriculture. Three of these ministers were directors of De Beers and all the others were connected with the same financial group.³⁴ The strength of the Progressive Party lay in the urban areas and from a party point of view it would have been advantageous to have chosen most of his colleagues from the urban areas. However, he did not do so. Three of his ministers represented rural constituencies.³⁵ Jameson's biographer holds that he followed this course because he wished to conciliate the Afrikaners; if he appointed men from the urban mercantile elements only, their free trade ideas would have tied Jameson's hands. Believing also that a farmer would work

33. Molteno: S.A. Recollections, p.88.

34. S.A. News, 23/2/'04.

35. Sampson (Albany); Crewe (Aliwal North); Fuller (Tembuland).

in greater sympathy with the Opposition - which represented the rural community - he appointed as Minister for Agriculture a man who was a practical farmer.³⁶

So many of his party laid claim to ministerial rank, that it was no easy matter for Jameson to select his ministers. On 24th February, 1904, he wrote to his brother, Sam: "I am in and am worried and bored to the last degree. The Opposition I do not mind, but our own people are the most awful crew; they all want to be ministers, and I am not through my troubles yet, but am sanguine".³⁷

One of the first bills introduced by the Jameson Government was, in accordance with its election promises, an "Additional Parliamentary Representation Bill", which the Opposition dubbed "A Bill for securing the maintenance of the Progressive majority".³⁸ The measure aimed at adding three members from urban areas to the Legislative Council and twelve to the Legislative Assembly of which nine would be allocated to the seaport towns.³⁹ The Progressives held that the recent great increase in the population of the towns justified increased representation for urban areas. A country constituency returned on an average 1161 voters per constituency and the towns 1647 per constituency of the Assembly. Jameson now proposed that every 2,000 urban electors should have one representative and in the country one representative for every 1800 electors.⁴⁰ No census had been taken during

36. Colvin: Jameson, Vol,II, p.236 et 239.

37. Ibid. p.237 et vide p.238.

38. Laurence: Life of Merriman, p.227.

39. C.Argus, 7/3/'04.

40. Colvin: Jameson, Vol,II, p.239-240.

or after the war but the Progressives based the claims of the urban areas to increased representation on the temporary increase in the seaports due to the refugees and men connected with military establishments there.⁴¹ The Progressives knew that the disfranchised rebel Afrikaners would be able to vote at the next general election; hence they wanted to pass measures which would prevent the Afrikaner Party from being returned at a future general election. The "Cape Argus" of 7th March, 1904, openly admitted that the aim of the Additional Representation Bill was to make it impossible for the South African Party to rule the Cape Colony at any future date, so that "the fate of the Bond is assured for all time".⁴² The Progressive Party therefore made use of a temporary majority to make extensive changes in the representation of the country. That the majority was a temporary one is borne out by the fact that if it had not been for the disfranchisement of rebels, several constituencies would not have gone to the Progressive Party. We mention only a few instances: Wodehouse, Vryburg and Prieska were lost to the South African Party by small minorities.⁴³ Actually therefore, Parliament did not represent the will of the people of the Cape Colony and yet this Parliament - under Progressive control - determined to make considerable changes in the representation of the people and attempted to strengthen one political party to the cost of another.

41. Molteno: S.A. Recollections, p.99.

42. Et vide: C. Hansard, 1904, p.62.

43. Ibid.

The S.A. Party opposed the Bill with all the forces at its command and one of the stormiest fights in the history of the Cape Parliament took place. Merriman was again in his seat and he led the attack of the Opposition. Gysbert Maasdorp moved that the House to into committee on the Bill that day six months. The question was discussed from the afternoon of 28th March, through the whole night till the afternoon of 29th March, - twenty-four hours. Then the Speaker, Bisset Berry, intervened and put the question that the Bill be read a second time. The second reading was carried by forty-two votes to thirty-four.⁴⁴

The passing of the Bill had a beneficial effect on the strained relations between the two parties in Parliament. At the beginning of the session there was an acute feeling of animosity, but this feeling however, subsided after the Bill had been passed and inter-party relations became more amiable.⁴⁵ The nett gain to the Progressive Party in the Legislative Council after the by-elections had been held was three members. In the Legislative Assembly they had increased their strength by nine votes so that they had fifty-nine votes against forty-eight of the S.A. Party.⁴⁶

Already, on forming his Ministry, Jameson had found it difficult to satisfy all claimants to ministerial office.⁴⁷ In

44. C. Hansard, 1904, p.205-235. This was the first time in the history of the Cape Parliament that a Speaker curtailed a debate. He acted on the precedent of the Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. Brand, when, after 45 hours he stopped the debate on the first reading of a bill affecting Ireland, a bill which the Irish members of the Imperial Parliament opposed most bitterly. One Land, 31/3/'04.

45. One Land, 31/5/'04.

46. Journal, 16/7/'04, et Meltono: S.A. Recollections, p.109.

47. Supra, p.389.

course of time matters did not improve especially in the Legislative Council where his majority was very small. On 23rd March, 1904, Jameson wrote to his brother Sam:

"By sitting mum and being polite to swine, I am getting on fairly well in this beastly House; but of course the crux has still to come of the Representation Bill..... Your old friend - in the Upper House is one of our troubles. He had the cheek to want to be Treasurer. I had to let him understand that he would probably run off with the till; so naturally he has a tendency to show his teeth"⁴⁸

Cattle
meat
During the session of 1905, the first signs of a coming revolt among Jameson's followers appeared. Cattle were increasing, but the farmers were complaining that there was no market for their stock because of the importation of meat under a trust; to this the townsman replied complaining of dear provisions.

In the party caucus there was a hot discussion on the advisability of reimposing a duty on meat. It was only when Jameson threatened to resign that he managed to rally his party to him.⁴⁹

ferme
The next year the question of free trade versus protection drove the wedge deeper into the Progressive ranks. For years Jameson had been a free trader. According to his biographer⁵⁰ he was keen on reconciling the country constituents; these were not his political supporters but they had to be met if there was to be complete racial reconciliation. He now became a protectionist and his majority in the Assembly steadily decreased as his urban supporters became more and more mutinous.⁵¹

48. Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p.240. This "old friend" was probably Logan who indirectly caused the fall of the Jameson Ministry. Vide Walker: De Villiers, p.423, et Infra, p.403.

49. Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p.250.

50. Ibid. p.248.

51. S.A. News, 16/10/'07.

Jameson's Treasurer, Edgar Walton, also renounced his free trade principles and declared that the Ministry was in favour of moderate protection. This aggravated the party split.⁵² This split became evident to all and sundry when a British Progressive farmer moved an amendment to the effect that when once a meat duty was reimposed it should not be suspended except with the approval of both Houses of Parliament. Jameson supported the amendment. Almost all the town representatives of his party voted against him and his Ministry was only saved by almost the whole S.A. Party voting with Jameson in favour of the amendment.⁵³ At this stage, even the "Cape Times" of which the editor, Waitland Park, was a personal friend of Jameson's, no longer gave him its support in his policy of conciliating the farming community.⁵⁴

By 1906, Jameson's Cabinet was seriously weakened. Sir Lewis Michell retired to England; Fuller and Sampson had differences with Crowe, while Walton and Smartt were having trouble with their constituencies; the latter was unable to obtain a hearing when he went down to address his electors at East London.⁵⁵ In various parts of the Eastern Province and Border, the people had turned against Jameson. Merriman was actually asked to establish a branch of the S.A. Party in East London, as the break between Smartt and his constituents was complete and "the Jingo party is a declining one and can

52. S.A. News, 1/1/'06.

53. Fort, G.S.; Dr. Jameson, p.263.

54. Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p.248.

55. S.A. News: 1/1/'06 et C.Times, 3/7/'05, Smartt's speech at E.London, 1/7/'05.

56
 sway the majority no longer". There was also an invitation to visit the Eastern Province generally and cultivate the S.A. Party there: "I found people more than friendly and ready to welcome those to whom they have been opposed in politics of late years".
 57

The strongholds of the Progressive Party were Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Kimberley, Grahamstown, Kingwilliams-town and the Border British farmers. The sea-port towns were soon at loggerheads with one another because of competition for the Rand traffic. Railway rates were calculated roughly on a mileage basis which gave Delagoa Bay a great advantage over the British ports of Natal and the Cape. Among the sea-port towns of the Cape there was the greatest rivalry and trade competition. The Transvaal made full use of this rivalry and in endeavouring to gain the most favourable terms for its traffic, increased their jealousies. Cape Town was so far away from the Rand that except for light and passenger traffic it had almost fallen out of the competition, but East London and Port Elizabeth carried on the keenest competition, there being no great difference in their respective mileages to the Rand.
 58
 Then there were also the Kimberley miners, ^{who blamed the coastal merchants} for the high cost of living. Railway rates were one of the chief sources of Colonial revenue; to these the Kimberley mining industry and

56. Merr. Papers, No. 121, 1905. P.W. Shingler to J.X. Merr. 8 July
 57. Ibid. No. 97, 1906. Philippson Stow to J.X. Merr. 9 April.

58. According to the present railway distances, East London is approximately 50 miles nearer the Rand than Port Elizabeth but the latter has the advantage of an easier gradient.

not the trade which passed through the ports contributed most. The differences between Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Kimberley were forgotten during the elections because of their common fear of the Bond which they regarded as a hostile power both economically and politically.⁵⁹

The disunity in the Progressive Party was clearly revealed in its attitude towards the proposals Jameson obtained at a railway conference in Johannesburg in January, 1905. These proposals had to be ratified by the different states before they came into operation. If these proposals were carried, more Transvaal trade would flow to the Cape which would receive one-third of the Transvaal trade as did Natal and Portuguese East Africa separately. As far as the Cape trade with the Transvaal was concerned, Jameson further proposed to reduce the slight advantage which East London till then had had over Port Elizabeth.⁶⁰ King Williamstown had the same commercial interests as East London, and when Jameson brought his proposals before the House one of the members for King Williamstown - a Progressive - strongly opposed them, 23rd May, 1905. The Jameson Government's railway agreement was repudiated by thirty-one votes to forty-five.⁶¹ ~~five~~ Jameson was in a minority of fourteen; eleven of his supporters voted against him with the majority.⁶¹ At East London, Smartt, on trying to justify the Government's railway agreement,⁶² met with a stormy reception and was given a vote of No-Confidence.⁶²

59. Vide Colvin; Jameson, Vol. II, p.235-6.

60. Colvin; Jameson, Vol. II, p.251.

61. S.A. News, 3/6/05, et Hansard, 1905, p.705.

62. C.Argus, 17/7/05.

That was not the only reverse Jameson suffered that session. A few days later by a majority of ten, the Assembly condemned the most important part of the Government's scheme for railway construction. The Government proposed a scheme of £1,100,000 and of this £895,000 was to be spent on a line Aliwal-North, Wepener and Lady Brand and it was this part of the proposal which Parliament rejected. "The position of the Ministry is now in the last degree discreditable and ridiculous. It holds the seals of office. But it has lost all the semblance of real power.... the Ministry is tied hand and foot. It can only remain in office by carrying out the policy of a triumphant Opposition".⁶³ Thus the South African railway and tariff question played a leading part in breaking up the Progressive Party, but, as we shall see, played an important rôle in advancing South African Union in succeeding years.⁶⁴

Soon after the war, the cry in South Africa was "Reconciliation". Byegones had to be bye-gones. Yet, for several years there was little reconciliation between the English and the Afrikaners; the memories of the war were still too clear in men's minds, and racial friction and animosity still survived. By 1905, however, the memories of the war began to fade and economic depression was hitting all sections of the population very hard. It was then that a marked change came over public feeling. Both sections of the European population made a true

63. S.A. News, 6/6/'05, et vide Journal, 22/6/'05.

64. *Infra*, p. 416.

effort at reconciliation.⁶⁵ On several occasions this new spirit was evident in debates in Parliament. During the session of 1905, F.S. Malan moved that Dutch be made a compulsory subject for the Civil Service Examination. To raise such a matter at that time when there was not yet equality between the English and Dutch languages, was to raise a very contentious one. The debate, however, was conducted in a very tolerant spirit and without bitterness. Eventually, by a majority of seven votes, Malan's motion was referred to the Civil Service Commission. Writing about this debate the "Cape Argus" of 6th April, 1905, stated that "the two parties had made a very rapid advance towards mutual good-will". In introducing the Estimates in 1905, for the following financial year, the Treasurer made a full statement on the Colony's financial position. On 11th May, however, Merriman moved that the House should not go into Committee of Supply on the Estimates until it had more information as to the financial position of the Colony. In view of the Treasurer's statement, this was tantamount to a motion of No-Confidence. A long debate took place and the motion was lost. During this debate the feeling between the two parties was "unquestionably....better than at any time; not only of the war, but of long before it...."⁶⁶ The most important bill

65. The "Cape Argus" of 28/5/'04, and 9/6/'09, claimed that the better understanding between the two parties was due to Jameson's tolerance. Molteno, who was violently anti-Progressive, in his "South African Recollections", page 110, also states that about 1905, a change came over Jameson and continues: "I record my own conviction that from now onwards Dr Jameson became a friend of Afrikanerdom".

66. C.Argus, 12/5/'05.

of 1905, was the "School Board Act". This Act took up almost all the time of the House in that session. With regard to this Act "Ons Land" of 8th June, 1905, wrote: "De sessie van 1905 begon in stilte; gedurende de bespreking van de Schoolraden bill, in de wetgevende vergadering soowel als in de conferentie, werd er een geest van kompromis duidelik te besporen tussen de twee partijen. Het rassen-gevoel werd daardoor verzwakt,...."⁶⁷ The policy of the Jameson Government towards the Anglo-Boer War prisoners and disfranchised rebels also promoted a friendlier feeling between the English and Dutch. The Governor's speech at the opening of the session of 1905, announced that all prisoners who had been connected with the Anglo-Boer War and Rebellion had been released and there would be no further prosecutions for offences that were contrary to the usages of war. The next year the Governor's speech announced that all sentences to disfranchisement would be remitted.⁶⁸

X The Progressive Party had been returned to power at a time when the bitterness between the English and the Afrikaners was at its height. As the relationship between the two sections improved, under the pressure of external events, the strength and influence of the Progressive Party waned correspondingly. It was a sectional party pandering to the wishes desires and sentiments of the British only; its opponent, the South African Party, however, was a broader, more national movement welcoming both English and Afrikaners and therefore gained strength as

67. Et vide Ons Land, 10/6/'05.

68. Hansard, 1905, p.1, et 1906, p.3.

the relationship between the two sections of the population improved; as Henry Burton expressed it at a meeting of the S.A. Liberal Association:

"The Union of the S.A. Party and Bond was based upon the common principle of South African patriotism.....which was not confined to one section or one race of our people. Their union and parliamentary work was based upon the fact that South Africa was capable of being made (and they hoped to make it English and Dutch together, and he believed in the principle of making it) one powerful united nation"⁶⁹

On the part of the S.A. Party there had never been any suggestion that the English section of the community should be kept under, whereas the Progressive Party had made the motto of "fighting the Dutch politically" one of the major planks in its platform at the last elections. Then there had been a general feeling that British rule would be threatened by the return of the South African Party to power. That feeling had secured the Progressives their majority in Parliament but that feeling had subsided and would have little influence at the next election. With much justification "Oms Land" of 1st January, 1907, could write: "De verstandhouding tussen de in dit land samen wonende nationaliteiten wordt voortdurend beter, de eene grote klasse der bevolking erkent meer en meer het recht van bestaan van de andere grote klasse, met behoud van ieders nationaliteit, moedertaal en zeden...." It must not however, be presumed that the race question no longer existed. It was still there, but in a less accentuated form.

The despair of the Progressives increased when Lord Milner,

⁶⁹. S.A. News, 8/12/'06, Burton at S.A. Liberal Association, 7/12/'06.

one of their main props, left South Africa in 1905; in England there was a general election which swept the Liberals and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman into power by an overwhelming majority.

They had always been opposed to the war in South Africa and the introduction of Chinese, and so the Progressive Party found that also in Great Britain the policy which they had favoured, had suffered a reverse and the party in power there was in active sympathy with their political opponents at the Cape. The manner in which Responsible Government was given to the Transvaal increased the apathy of the Progressive Party; no safeguards were granted for the welfare of the British minority and the Progressives realised that under Responsible Government in the Transvaal, the Afrikaners would be in the ascendant.⁷⁰

The economic depression following on the heels of the Anglo-Boer War had already set in when Jameson took office. During his term of office it became worse and was further accentuated by severe droughts throughout Southern Africa. A political party taking office during a period of depression has to face most unpleasant tasks which make it very unpopular. There must be reductions in state expenses and also retrenchments; the public becomes dissatisfied, a scapegoat must be found and the one most handy is the government. Such was only too true in the case of the Progressive Party. The Opposition press accused it of gross financial maladministration; thus "Oms Land" of 23rd August, 1906, described the Government's

70. Fort, C.S.; Dr Jameson, p.263, et vide Koltone: S.A. Recollections, p.113.

financial policy as: ".....een doorbrongerspoltiek, die berokend is het krediet der Kolonie te bederven, en de toekomst van 't land met ondragolike schulden te bezwaren".

As the first decade of the twentieth century progressed, the financial affairs of the Cape Colony become progressively worse; the gold mines could not provide a financial revival on account of the scarcity of labour. During the session of 1905, it became only too evident that the finances of the Colony were in a hopeless muddle; its revenue had declined by £4,000,000 since Jameson had taken office. Jameson now appointed a Select Committee to investigate the financial position of the Colony. It included several members of the Opposition and Jameson was very pleased with the Committee's work. He now showed little confidence in his Treasurer, Walton, and listened more and more to the opinions of the Opposition. Jameson, however, could not stave off fresh taxation and retrenchment; the latter measure, always unpopular, fell most heavily on the British urban community which was the chief support of the Progressive Party. A rapid political reaction therefore set in among the British on the railways, harbours and in the Civil Service. Jameson wrote to his brother, Sam, in 1907: "We are having a beastly time of retrenchment and a consequent growling public, and a party at sixes and sevens - a continuous egg dance; but we shall pull through as everybody is more frightened of the other lot. ((South African Party))".

71. The members of the Select Committee were: Dr. Jameson, Messrs Jagger, Merriman, Currey and J.T. Molteno. Molteno: S.A. Recollections, p.111.

72. Molteno: S.A. Recollections, p.112.

73. Colvin; Jameson, Vol.II, p.262-3.

During the session of 1906, the Progressive Government just managed to hold together and the Opposition did not yet think the time ripe for opening a determined attack with the object of unseating the Ministry. In 1907, however, the Opposition was so strong that the Government was obliged to adopt Morrison's proposal of a tax of ten percent on the profits of diamond and copper companies.⁷⁴ In a debate on meat duties however, the Government suffered a heavy defeat. The Progressive Party agreed to a tax of one penny per pound of imported meat; the South African Party wished to add another penny, but Jameson would not agree. The anti-protectionists held that it would mean dearer meat and that the inhabitants of the cities would have to pay the tax; the Progressives however, did not raise this argument when the first penny was levied. On 13th August, 1907, the House of Assembly rejected by a majority of fifty-seven to thirty-eight votes Sir Pieter Faure's proposal that the debate on meat duties be adjourned.⁷⁵ The House followed this up by adopting by sixty-two to thirty-one votes,⁷⁶ Tobor's motion: "That in the opinion of this House the Government should consider the advisability of approaching the other parties to the Customs Union with a view to securing the imposition of a further duty of one penny per pound on frozen imported meat".⁷⁷ This meant that many of the Progressives broke their

74. *One Land*, 19/10/'07.

75. S.A. News, 14/8/'07, *et Hansard*, 1907, p.312.

76. *Ibid.* *Hansard*, 1907, p.313.

77. *Ibid.* p.306.

pledge and voted with the South African Party. Jameson, however, did not resign; to his brother Sam, he wrote:

*Jameson
seen under
gray paper
bookish
with...*

"Yesterday we were defeated by 2 to 1 on an extra penny on meat which I refused to have, though I don't really think it would raise the price as the farmers are doing so well and the stock in the country enormously increasing; but the very defeat will do us good politically as emphasising our sticking to the towns when necessary. Having originally put on a penny I could not resign for another penny, though I should much have loved to do so and get a rest from the show"⁷⁸

Thus, slowly the Progressive Party divided up into groups with different economic rather than different political aims. A small British farmer group demanded increased protection for agriculture; a manufacturing group demanded protection for factories; there was a free trade group under the leadership of Mr. Jagger. The Progressive Party became indifferent to all political issues except those which affected their material interests.

and J. Logan bedankt. 160 p 409

The overthrow of the Progressive Ministry finally came as a result of the action of the Legislative Council. In that House there was one Progressive, namely, J.D. Logan on whose fidelity the Party could not rely, - the very same man who had indirectly brought about the fall of the first Rhodes Ministry in 1893. Already in 1904, he showed that he was an unreliable supporter. He did not dare to vote against the Government and announced his intention of returning to Scotland before the end of that session. The important bill of that session 1904, was

⁷⁸ Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p. 262-3.

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the one providing for additional representation.⁷⁹ A deputation of two hundred and fifty Progressives waited on Logan and pointed out to him that if he left, Jameson's scanty majority in the Council would vanish, the Additional Representation Bill rejected, the Ministry overthrown and the Progressive Party wrecked. Logan promised to remain, but soon it transpired that he had quietly booked his passage and on 18th May, 1904, he left Cape Town. Throughout that session the voting on every matter in the Legislative Council was a tie: eleven contents versus eleven non-contents, and had to be decided by the casting vote of the President in favour of the Ministry.⁸⁰

On 12th September, 1907, the Treasurer, the Hon. Mr. Walton, moved the second reading of the Appropriation Bill. This was carried and the Council then went into committee. As soon as the Chairman of Committees had taken the chair J.D. Logan who was again in his seat in the Legislative Council, launched an attack on the Government's Appropriation Bill.⁸¹ According to his own testimony, Logan turned against the Government because Jameson had refused a tax on diamonds and had failed to introduce a Redistribution Bill.⁸² Logan then moved that the Chairman of Committees the Hon. Ross, leave the chair. With the support of the S.A. Party members of the Council, Logan carried his motion by eleven votes to ten.⁸³ The Council could therefore not proceed with the consideration of the Appropriation Bill in Committee. The following day, 13th September, the Treasurer again

79. Supra, p. 389.

80. Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p. 244.

81. Cape of Good Hope Debate in Legis. Council, 1907, Columns 337 - 340.

82. C. Argus, 7/11/'07, Letter from J.D. Logan.

83. Cape of Good Hope Debate in Legis. Council, 1907, Column 343.

moved that the Council go into Committee for the consideration of the Appropriation Bill. This was carried, and as soon as the Chairman of Committees had again taken the chair he was again voted out and the passing of the Appropriation Bill obstructed. Thereupon the Hon. Mr. Wilmot gave notice of a motion which was discussed the following day; amended by the Hon. Mr. Powell it was carried by the casting vote of the President and read as follows:

"This Council, while not abandoning its abstract claim to reject the money Bill, when it feels it is warranted by the public necessities in resorting to so extreme a measure, is of opinion that in the present circumstances of the Colony further progress on the Appropriation Bill should be no longer delayed"⁸⁴

The Council in Committee however, still persisted in blocking supplies as Powell's motion was not a direction but an expression of opinion which was not binding on the Committee.⁸⁵ This obstruction in the Council continued till 17th September, 1907. On that day there were only the eleven Government supporters and one S.A. Party supporter - the Hon. Michau - present in the Council - the other S.A. Party members having withdrawn from the Council chamber. The Hon. Wilmot now gave notice that he would move that they pass through the Committee stage and go on to the third reading immediately. This involved the suspension of the Standing Rules and Michau pointed out that the Standing Rules and Orders laid down that such a motion could not be put unless there were fifteen members in the Council. Wilmot's

84. Cape of Good Hope Debate in Legis. Council, 1907, Column 348-359.

85. Ibid.

Column 364.

strategic move therefore collapsed and the Prime Minister addressed the Council. He realised that Wilmot's motion to proceed to the third reading would never be carried in the Council as members would simply stay away and thus prevent its being put. It was therefore clear that the work of government had come to a standstill and as there was no other way of solving the deadlock, Jameson informed the Council that there would be an appeal to the electorate and that the great question at the election would be the emendation in the constitution of the Legislative Council which had made the blocking of supplies by the Council possible.⁸⁶

In the Assembly, on 17th September, the Treasurer, Walton, moved ^{for} ~~that~~ a "Partial Appropriation Bill" for a sum of not more than three million pounds, to cover expenditure till 31st March, 1908, by which time elections would have been held and a new Parliament called together.⁸⁷ This Bill was agreed to.

Thus, in the words of Jameson's biographer the Progressive Government was "ignominiously slain by the treachery of one supporter".⁸⁸

The "Cape Argus" on 20th January, 1908, on referring to the Cape elections then still in progress wrote: "South Africa is at the turning of its most important page in history, and this election is the rustling of the leaf". The people of South Africa had come to realise that another serious bid should be made at some form of union or federation - an ideal so often,

86. Cape of Good Hope Debate Legis. Council, 1907, Columns 370-372.

87. Hansard, 1907, p. 590.

88. Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p. 265.

and often blunderingly pursued ever since the days of Sir George Grey. Since the Progressives had come to power there had been a great swing-round in South African politics. In the Transvaal Botha held power, in the Orange River Colony, Fischer; the Cape rebels had served their time of disfranchisement; the Progressive hold on the Cape Colony was precarious and was to be wrung from their hands during the elections. Thus the Progressives were to lose their hold on yet another colony south of the Zambesi.

Another feature of political life in South Africa was the decline in racial animosity; it did not disappear entirely but it was by no means so intense as it had been at the time of Jameson's assumption of office. In the Transvaal, for example, Botha, a former general in the forces of the South African Republic took into his cabinet as Treasurer, H.C. Hull, an ex-Reformer, who had been imprisoned for several months in Pretoria in 1896. Some of the Progressives however, would not accept the new order of things and in their hearts continued to distrust the Dutch; moreover, they refused to be reconciled with some Englishmen who had co-operated with the main body of Dutch-speaking South Africans, and continued to regard such Englishmen as renegades to their race.⁹⁰ That Jameson himself did much to tone down the extreme racial antipathy of his followers is borne out by W.F. Schreiner who once referred to Jameson's "earnest efforts to remove racialism".⁹¹ In a speech at Victoria

89. S.A. News, 8/10/'07 et 11/10/'07.

91. C.Argus, 9/10/'07. Schreiner in interview with C.Argus.

*J. w. ...
ap. Eng*

West, Merriman also referred to the disappearance of racialism and he also wished to do justice to those Progressives who had four years previously dropped their cry of: "Fight the Dutch politically", and began to give attention to South African unity.⁹² It is safe to say therefore, that at the time of the elections of 1907-8, there were only the dying embers of racial passion engendered by the Anglo-Boer War that had still to be extinguished. It was generally admitted that "our Colonial conditions call for mutual forbearance, and reunion of hearts. To cherish hostile memories is to court danger from other quarters, and to keep back the progress of the country....A glorious future lies before us, on condition of our forgetting our differences, and uniting to promote the prosperity of the land in which we dwell".⁹³

Constituted as the "Progressive" Party, Jameson and his supporters knew that they stood no chance at the elections. They knew that affairs had changed very much since the Party had taken form in 1903. Moreover, on the dissolution of Parliament in 1907, many candidates for Assembly honours came forth as Independents. Jameson hoped to reorganise his party on a broader basis and so include these Independents. The Progressive Party and its party organisation the "Imperial South African Union" therefore abandoned the "Progressive pledge" and assumed the name of "South African Unionist Party", - or "Unionist" for short - and asked for the support "of all moderate and indepen-

92. C. Argus 4/3/'08, Report Merriman at Victoria West, 3/3/'08, et vide Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p.271.

93. Journal, 15/11/'06.

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W. van der

dont men to carry out a policy which will lead to the union of the peoples and colonies of South Africa".⁹⁴ After the Council elections - in which the Unionists were badly beaten⁹⁵ - Jameson tried to get Schreiner who himself stood as an Independent for Queenstown to lead the Unionist Party. Schreiner, however, preferred to remain independent of all party connections and refused Jameson's advances.⁹⁶

A defect in the constitution of the Legislative Council had brought Jameson to a fall and, it was natural, that at the elections he should appeal to the country for a mandate to amend the constitution of the Legislative Council;⁹⁷ the public, however, harassed by economic depression was little interested in constitutional questions, and voted on other issues.⁹⁸ The programme of the South African Unionist Party, barring the constitutional question, further included a pious wish for the development of South African products and industries, equal rights for all civilised men and more in earnest "the Union of the European races and the Union of British South African Colonies".⁹⁹

J.H. Hofmeyr in a speech at Wollington on 1st May, 1907, - some time before the defeat of Jameson - lucidly stated the attitude of the South African Party towards the great questions then claiming public attention. He stated that the aim of the Bond was:

94. C.Argus, 27/9/'07, Jameson's Manifesto.

95. Infra, p. 413.

96. One Land, 9/11/'07, et Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p.270.

97. C.Argus, 27/9/'07, Jameson's Manifesto.

98. Journal, 28/9/'07.

99. C.Argus, 27/9/'07, Jameson's Manifesto.

"the establishment and fostering of a feeling of national unity, selfrespect and pride in British South Africa, resting (with consideration of the supremacy of the British Crown) on the independent development of our own national resources, still more on the recognition and respect of one another's feelings with regard to religion, education and language".

Then he proceeded to discuss the question of unification of South African colonies and the attitude of the English and Dutch-speaking colonists towards each other:

"This national unity, self-respect, pride, are, in my opinion, more than ever indispensable, now that the establishment of a South African Federation begins to become a matter of practical politics.

"Without a powerful feeling of nationality, binding all, English-speaking and Dutch-speaking, firmly together as an indivisible South African nation, our Federation to be established would be in danger of being broken up by all kinds of diverse interests, such as of race feeling, religious jealousy, disputes about the capital, and other local interests.....

"In a word, the greater part of our English fellow-citizens repose no political confidence in their Dutch Afrikaner brothers. Least of all do they believe, that we have any affection for the British Empire as a whole, although our programme of principles gives evidence of the opposite, although our Afrikaner members of Parliament vote every year for the contribution to the British fleet, and although we give a preference on British goods of 25 per cent. in our Customs Duties.

"I really believe, that (however much they may err on other points) as far as our interest in the Empire is concerned, they have some truth however little, on their side. We Bondswen are, with few exceptions, not of British descent. We can hardly be expected to show that idolatrous feeling of attachment to the British Empire, that sits in the marrow and bone of the born Britisher. We can hardly sing without a smile, 'British, never, never, shall be slaves,' nor can we jump out of our skin with excitement, when we hear the glad tidings, 'Britons rule the waves'.

"And yet I am firmly convinced of it, that we have a real and actual interest in the maintenance of the British Empire and of the British sea power as the means thereto....

"Could we convince our English fellow-Colonists, that our programme of principles is honest and straightforward in its intention, that we are decent Imperialists though not exactly Jingoos, their lack of confidence in us would perhaps fall away.

"And then they would, I hope, also be a little more indulgent with regard to our language rights, rights at which every Bondsman should hammer year in, year out, never resting, never growing cool, never weakening or growing weary in the struggle, before the victory shall have been obtained.

"On this point there can be no mention of surrender or compromise, and yet it is just on this point, that our opponents are labouring under the most terrible misapprehension. They believe that 'the Taal' is the cause of the majority of the so-called 'race-divisions' and 'race-animosity' in South Africa. But examine our Colonial circumstances, investigate our Colonial history, and it appears, that the language question is only one of the minor causes of many, which can be brought forward in connection with the 'race question'.....

"Let the Bond on our side recognise the value of the British connection. Let our English friends on their side bid farewell to all narrowness with regard to what they mockingly call 'the Taal', and we shall have a chance of seeing that the national unity and pride established, without which Federation would be venturesome indeed".¹⁰⁰

This speech was very well received by the public; there was a general agreement that here, at last, was a basis on which a united nation could be built. As leader of the Progressive Party, Jameson, in the main agreed with Hofmeyr's views as expressed in his Wellington speech. He responded favourably at the Mount Nelson Hotel, Cape Town:

"Since reading the speech", he declared, "Federation is infinitely nearer than it ever was before.....It was practically, so far as we South Africans are concerned, an epoch-making speech....He says our party has shown a want of political confidence in the Dutch people. It was true at one time, it is no longer true....After I read that speech of Mr. Hofmeyr, I say that all those grievances are past, and that we are going to work together for the future. I say we are prepared to work hand in hand with them with this Federation.....and there is no reason why the two great parties in this country should not settle down and bring about the natural realisation of that South African nationality in a Federated South Africa, which will be part of the British Empire".

100. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.611-2, et vide S.A.News, 2/5/'07, Hofmeyr's speech at Wellington, 1/5/'07, et Ons Land, 2/5/'07, Report on Hofmeyr's speech, 1/5/'07 et Merr. Papers, No.47, 1907. J.H. Hofmeyr to J.X. Merr. 13 May.

On one matter, however, Jameson could not accept Hofmeyr's thesis, namely on the language question. The Progressives did not realise the proportions that the language question had assumed. They did not realise its importance to those using "the Taal" and its importance in forming a South African spirit.¹

*Merriman an-
noted*

When the elections took place, Merriman, as leader of the South African Party, promised educational reform and the appointment of a Minister of Education, reform of Divisional and Municipal Councils. With regard to the Customs Tariff, the policy of the S.A. Party could be summed up in the words of the Parliamentary resolution as "a reasonable protection for the products of the soil and existing manufactures". The greatest accent however, as was to be expected, fell on careful economic administration. The country's prosperity, Merriman maintained, could only be revived by hard work, self-sacrifice and thrift. The question of federation or union took second place because the financial affairs of the Cape had to be placed on a sound basis before the Colony entered into a partnership with the other South African Colonies; if this union could be brought about, it had to be as close as possible.²

Working

The elections of 1907 to 1908, first for the Legislative Council and then for the Assembly, lasted seven months in all.³ Jameson and the Unionists assumed a defeatist attitude and were content to fight the election without any thought of being returned to power. The "Grahamstown Journal" of 17th October,

1. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.612-3.

2. C. Argus, 28/9/'07, Merriman's Manifesto, at Merr. Papers, No. 111, p. 1907. J.X. Merr. to G. Smith, 26 Oct.

3. S.A. News, 31/3/'08, Merriman at Rondebosch, 30/3/'08.

1907, complained that the English in the Colony had assumed an attitude of inaction, perplexity and even of apathy and despair; this was highly detrimental to their interests in the electoral struggle. Moreover, the results of the Council elections were finally announced on 29th January, 1908, and two days later, before the Assembly elections had even started, the Jameson Ministry resigned. This deprived the party of a rallying cry and meant that its policy and principles were no longer worth fighting for. The Unionists admitted defeat before the end of the struggle was even in sight. The change of name was also illadvised; it discouraged some adherents who now felt that they were absolved from their allegiance to the party led by Jameson. The name of a political party is always a strong rallying-point and should not lightly be discarded. The party organisation has also fallen into neglect and there was no clever and energetic electioneering expert such as Crews had been in 1904.⁴

The South African Party won the Legislative Council elections handsomely. It retained all the seats it had held previously and gained six additional seats from the Unionists so that there were eighteen S.A. Party members against eight Unionists.⁵ The victory of the South African Party in the Assembly elections was even more striking. The S.A. Party took sixty-nine seats, the Unionists thirty and there were eight

4. Journal, 22/9/'08.

5. One Land, 29/2/'08. Jameson's biographer is in error where he gives the position of parties in the Council as: S.A. Party, 15; Unionists, 6; and Independent, 1.- Colvin: Jameson, Vol. II, p. 270.

Independents.⁶ This gave Merriman the largest majority in the history of responsible government at the Cape. Thus, although the Bond was defeated at the elections of 1903, it never weakened. Its members stuck together and worked to gain a sound grip on the political situation. Messers Sauer and Merriman were politically buried in 1903, yet in 1908, they were in office - thanks to the sound organisation of the S.A. Party and the determination of their supporters.

III. THE LAST PHASE.

Kilind
The Merriman Ministry took office on 3rd February, 1908, J.X. Merriman became Treasurer as well as Prime Minister; J.W. Sauer, Commissioner of Public Works and Railways; H.P. de Waal, Colonial Secretary; Henry Burton, Attorney-General and the Secretary for Agriculture was F.S. Malan. There were also two ministers without portfolio, namely D.P. de Villiers-Cranff and H.L. Currey.⁷

te Kort
The Ministry took over an accumulated deficit of nearly three million pounds, but fortunately, the financial depression had already reached its lowest ebb, and the economic life of the country was showing signs of improvement.⁸ One matter which called for settlement was the question of union or federation of South African Colonies. Merriman was determined that the Cape's finances should be put straight first so that if union were achieved the Cape Colony would enter as a solvent partner. On this point there was some difference with F.S. Malan who

6. One Land, 7/4/'08.

7. C. Argus, 3/2/'08.

8. C. Argus, 4/2/'08.

fully realised that stringent economic measures would be bound to cause resentment and make the Government unpopular, whereas, if the Ministry made unification its prime object, it would have popular support, at the Assembly elections of 1908. When the Ministry took office, it was decided that "finances" and "unification" would be given equal support in the programme of action at the elections.⁹

The mandate to the Ministry at the elections was that the finances of the Colony should be put on a sound footing. Immediately after the elections the Ministry proceeded to carry out this mandate. The Treasurer made drastic retrenchments, imposed a severe income tax, reduced the salaries of civil servants, and imposed a voters' registration fee.¹⁰ Slowly the old Cape Colony recovered its financial stability and the Merriman Ministry fulfilled its promise to the electors at the general election. When eventually the Union of South Africa was consummated the Cape Colony entered as a solvent partner with a credit balance of £172,000.¹¹

The Ministry's retrenchment and taxation policy made it very unpopular. The wine-farmers were also very angry with the Ministry on account of its refusal to support a "Bill on Licences for Light Wine" which, if carried, would expand the market for the wine farmers' produce. There was even a movement to replace Merriman by Malan but the latter refused to lend support

9. Huisgenoot, 6/8/'37, Article, Malan: 'n Oud-Journalis kyk terug.

10. Walker: De Villiers, p.425, et C. Argus, 6/10/'09.

11. S.A. News, 20/5/'10.

to any such move.¹² Merriman, therefore, on his return from England as a member of the delegation which had to see the South Africa Act through the Imperial Parliament, found that the parliamentary situation had changed much during his absence and he no longer led such a large majority as he had previously.

14 Kom When the Merriman Ministry took office, a new spirit, that of South African nationhood had taken hold not only of the Cape Colony but also of the ex-Boer Republics and the colony of Natal. To cope with the various South African problems South Africa had to be a united country. Railway problems, and tariff questions presented a field which, in the words of the High Commissioner, Lord Selbourne, was "thickly sown with the seed of future quarrel and strife".¹³ Further there were also the native and Indian questions which only a united South Africa could attempt to solve. Self-government, in the true sense of the word could only be realised in South Africa if the country were united. All the problems facing South Africa created so much inter-colonial friction that the aid of the Imperial Government, which was not directly concerned with the government of the South African colonies would have to be called in to solve problems in which it had no direct interest.¹⁴

A "United South Africa" had always been a deep-seated sentiment among Afrikaners. The second article of the constitution of the Afrikaner Bond put this ideal as its object.¹⁵

12. Duisgenoot, 6/8/'37, Article, Malan: 'n Oudjoernalis kyk terug, et C. Argus, 16/12/'09.

13. Selbourne: Review of Present Mutual Relations of British South African Colonies, p.viii.

14. Ibid. p.153.

15. Vide Appendix, C.

After the failure of Lord Carnarvon's attempt at federation, the northern states of South Africa had drifted politically further and further away from their southern and eastern neighbours. Now however, the moment for federation or union appeared to be opportune. All the South African states except Rhodesia had the same constitutional status - namely, self-governing British Colonies. In the words of General Smuts, written to J.X. Merriman on the day that the Botha Ministry was sworn in, in the Transvaal, "...the people of South Africa have advanced at an astonishing rate for the last six years, that they are really ripe for great things, and that failure will be due rather to the weakness of leaders or to cursed fate, but not to the people".¹⁶ Slowly, with the quieting down of the fierce racial passions engendered by the Anglo-Boer War a national spirit arose; Steyn expressed this idea to Merriman as follows: "I think the idea of loyalty to South Africa is gaining ground fast....the seed you and other good men have sown has not fallen by the wayside but in good earth. I think there is now a brotherhood of all those who love South Africa".¹⁷ Statesmen in all four colonies began to realise that because each had pursued its own course South Africa had experienced intense misery and confusion. Now South Africa was imbued with a spirit which looked beyond parochial colonial boundaries: "I must admit that we are, in our present sort of existence, neither good to

16. Merr.Papers, No.18, 1907. J.C.Smuts to J.X. Merr. 4 March.

17. Ibid. No. 205, 1905. H.T.Steyn to J.X. Merr, 10 Nov.

ourselves or to the rest of South Africa.... The only way that I see out of our politic and economic difficulties, is a union not a federation of South Africa. This is I am informed your opinion too".¹⁸ It was also a spirit of tolerance which, in the future, wished to avoid the errors of the past:

"Dat streven naar hare eenheid, die begeerte om niet langer gescheiden te houden wat in waarheid één is en bestend is geweest om één te zijn, dat verlangen om één - zelfde Zuid-Afrikaanse nationale geest over geheel Zuid-Afrika te ontwikkelen en te belotten, dat er in iedere afzonderlike staat of kolonie langzamerhand een aparte nationaliteit met eigen idealen en aspiraties zou ontstaan, steeds meer afwijkende van die van de andere kolonies, dat was de drijfveer achter de verenigings-beweging; en de verwezenliking van de vereniging van het volk en niet slechts van het land of de regering, dat is het ideaal geweest. De politieke vereniging van de koloniën moet het middel zijn om de volkeenheden te bewerken"¹⁹

This new spirit of South Africanism carried with it sweeping changes in the sphere of political parties. In the Cape, after the Anglo-Boer War, the South African Party and its leaders, Merriman, Sauer and Malan were politically buried but, as we have noticed,²⁰ held the reins in 1908.

In the Transvaal the Boer leaders, Louis Botha, J.C. Smuts and J. de la Rey, refused to serve on Milner's "Legislative Council". The High Commissioner's administration was so incapable that even some of his former supporters started to agitate for responsible government.²¹ The political organisation of the Transvaal took on a more defined shape when Milner proposed introducing Chinese labour onto Rand Mines. On 2nd July, 1903, Botha

18. Merr. Papers, No. 205, 1905. N.T. Steyn to J.X. Merr, 10 Nov.

19. Ons Land, 22/5/'09, et vide Journal, 31/10/'07, Schreiner speech at Queenstown 28/10/'07 et Merr. Papers No. 189, 1909. J.X. Merr. to Julia Merr. 12 May.

20. Supra, p. 414.

21. Van den Heever; General J.B.M. Hertzog, p. 185.

addressed a large meeting at Heidelberg convened to protest against the introduction of another Asiatic element into South Africa. However it was of no avail. In June, 1904, the first Chinese arrived in South Africa. Botha and Smuts continued to address meetings protesting against the introduction of Chinese. In this way the introduction of Chinese led to political revival and the consequent growth of political organisation. They advocated racial co-operation as the only way of ending the Milner régime, and obtaining responsible government which would best be able to deal with Transvaal problems. Botha and Smuts organised a large congress at Pretoria and founded their party "Het Volk" on 23rd May, 1904.²²

In 1904, two English parties were also founded in the Transvaal. The one was the Transvaal Progressive Association which favoured Chinese labour; it was led by George Farrar, Percy Fitzpatrick and Abe Bailey. The other was the responsible government Party led by E.P. Solomon and Harry Solomon. They were dissatisfied with the results of the Milner régime and were ready to co-operate with "Het Volk" in obtaining responsible government so that at the ensuing elections Botha had a large number of English-speaking allies. Finally there was also a small Independent Labour Party under the leadership of H.W. Sampson.²³

In February 1907, the first general election took place in the Transvaal. Here again the Afrikaner leaders triumphed.

22. Van den Hoever: Generaal J.B.M. Hertzog, p.210 et seq., et vide Engelenburg: General Louis Botha, p.128.

23. Coetzee: Politieke Groepering in die wordings van die Afrikanernasie, p.327.

The Labourites and Independents weakened the English section and Solomon's followers supported Botha whose party gained an absolute majority over all the other parties. General Botha became Premier with General Smuts Colonial Secretary.²⁴ Further Botha took the leader of the "Responsibles" into his Cabinet and soon afterwards the "Responsibles" joined "Het Volk". To Herriman Smuts wrote significantly: "I am exceedingly anxious not to have a pure Het Volk Ministry. On a policy of racial peace we carried many English constituencies with us, and I wish we should continue that policy night and day".²⁵

In the Orange River Colony also, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the Milner régime on account of lack of compensation, and the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war, concentration camps, language, education, courts of justice, responsible government and the material wants of the people of the Orange River Colony. On all these questions the people of the Orange River Colony had legitimate grounds for complaint.²⁶ The men who had led the Orange River Colony during the war President Steyn, Hertzog, Fischer and Christian de Wet now also emerged as their leaders in time of peace. A congress of representatives from all over the Orange River Colony assembled at the beginning of December, 1904, at Brandfort to discuss grievances. General Hertzog was chosen chairman.²⁷ This congress revealed that

24. Van den Heever: Op. cit. p. 219 et Terr. Papers, No. 14, 1907, J.C. Smuts to J.X. Kerr. 25 Feb.

25. Ibid. Ibid.

26. Van den Heever: Op. cit. p. 200.

27. Ibid. p. 200, et Cootsee: Politieke Groepering, p. 323.

the Orange River Colony could be relied on to act with unanimity. General Hertzog realised that this unanimity could easily lead to the founding of a new political organisation. The Transvaal was given responsible government on 6th December, 1906, but the Orange River Colony remained a Crown Colony. Hertzog now set to work to establish a political organisation for the people of the Orange River Colony. On 3rd and 4th May, 1906, a large congress with General Hertzog again as chairman was held at Bloemfontein. President Steyn delivered the opening speech. On this occasion the political organisation of the Orange River Colony was founded. It was called the "Orangia-Unie". Its main object was to agitate for full Responsible Government for the Orange River Colony and with this weapon once gained, it would fight for the redress of other grievances.²⁸

In 1907, however, the Orange River Colony was also given responsible government. The results of the first general election were announced on November, 1907. The Orangia-Unie^{gained} a handsome victory in the Legislative Assembly, securing thirty seats as against four of the "Constitutional Party" and four of the Independents.²⁹ Although Hertzog was the real leader of the Orangia-Unie he insisted that Fischer should accept the Premiership in the Orange River Colony, and willingly stood down in favour of the man who had rendered the Model Republic faithful services both during and before the war.³⁰

28. Van den Heever: Op.cit. p.212, et v.d. Merwe: H.T. Steyn, Vol.II, p.207.

29. Neame: General Hertzog, p.62.

30. Van den Heever: Op. cit. p.219-220, et Coetzee: Politieke Oorsprong, p.329.

There was some slight opposition against the Orangia-Unie; it emanated from the so-called "Constitutional Party" which was the forerunner of the later Unionist and Dominion Parties. It consisted of ultra-English who were against the introduction of responsible government and held that England, if it should grant responsible government, would lose its hold on the political situation in the Orange River Colony. Its leaders were J.G. Fraser and Arthur G. Barlow who published the party's manifesto in the beginning of 1907.³¹

As South Africa came nearer to the consummation of Union a better understanding grew up between parties in the Cape Colony. The enactment of a paper document however, cannot be expected to remove the broad lines which divided parties in the past. It was only natural that there should be a rearrangement of parties but this rearrangement would be determined largely by the lines of the pre-Union parties.

It was only natural that those who had stood together in the greatest crisis in the history of South Africa - the Anglo-Boer War - should after the war continue to maintain contact.

In the Cape Colony the Afrikaner Bond had a long and honourable record; it was now necessary to broaden its organisation ^{to} ~~so that~~ ~~it could~~ include Englishmen so that they could also take their place beside the Boer.) In the Transvaal, General Smuts was anxious to organise such a political party on broad lines including both English and Dutch and as early as May, 1904, he sought Merriman's advice on the matter. From that time onward Merriman

31. Coetzee: Politieke Groepering, p.328, et v.d. Heever: Op. cit. p.215 et 219.

32. Merr.Papors, No.146, 1904. J.C. Smuts to J.K. Merr. 20 May.

carried on a regular correspondence with Smuts and Botha and discussed with them all questions of South African importance.³³ Merriman also sought contact with the Orange River Colony leaders Hertzog and Steyn.³⁴ Among them there was sober confidence that ere long the guidance of South Africa's destiny would again be in the hands of the true citizens of the land and that in the words of General Smuts, "this Jingo fever" was "a moral and political distemper which must work its way.....the renovating influences are at work, the fever has even now passed its crisis, and the future improvement may be more rapid than we think. You must remember that the war was bound to react unfavourably on the prospects of the popular party".³⁵

In the past years of the first decade of the twentieth century, three political parties with very similar ideals controlled the political situation in the Cape, Orange River Colony and Transvaal, namely the South African Party, the Orange-Union and Het Volk respectively. When the South Africa Act which founded the Union of South Africa, was passed all three agreed to support General Botha, who, in consequence of this aid, was able to become the first Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. In 1911, these three political parties as well as a number of Natal English joined forces as the South African Party with General Botha as leader.³⁶

33. Merr.Papers, No.198 at 230, 1906. J.C. Smuts to J.X. Merr. 30 Aug. at 23 Dec. respectively.

34. Ibid. No.58, 1907. H.T. Steyn to J.X. Merr. 9 June.

35. Ibid. No.146, 1904. J.C. Smuts to J.X. Merr. 20 May.

36. Ibid. No. 1, 1910. J.X. Merr. to Genl. Botha, 5 Jan., at Verslag van Soveen en Twintigste Centrale Vergadering van de Afrikaander Bond en Eoeron Vereniging te Kaapstad. 7th Dec., 1911, p.35.

The post-Union South African Party was not the only outcome of party groupings of the Pre-Union days. In the Orange River Colony, the Constitutional Party and in the Cape the Unionist Party had been defeated. Both these had much in common; both had an ultra-British outlook and both consisted of Englishmen whose mentality and outlook had caused the Anglo-Boer War. Jameson, the leader of the Unionists had urged that the first Union Government should be a coalition or "Best Man" government, but the leaders, Botha, Smuts and Merriman turned down the suggestion.³⁷ Thereupon, Jameson decided to establish the "Unionist Party of South Africa". A conference was convened at Bloemfontein on 24th May, 1910. This Unionist Party took into its bosom the Constitutional Party of the Orange Free State (River Colony); Jameson was chosen leader and he defined the policy which he as Leader of the Opposition was to follow, namely, "to oppose racialism, to work for the progress of South Africa, and to support General Botha against the extremists".³⁸

37. Merr. Papers No. 37, 1910, J.C. Smuts to J.X. Merr. 22 Feb.
38. Colvin; Jameson, Vol. II, p. 293.

RETROSPECT.

Before the unification of South Africa, the Cape enjoyed responsible government for close on forty years and ^{representative} ~~responsible~~ government for close on an additional twenty years. One is struck by the fact that during this period political parties organised on rigid party lines, were of slow growth. Ministries were formed and reshuffled out of loose unstable political groups. To those acquainted with the strict party discipline of modern South-African politics such a state of affairs forms a strange contrast. The lack of sharp party divisions at the Cape is probably due to the fact that there was a very small number of men in the political arena¹, and this tended to break down party distinctions. Moreover, in the early stage of Responsible Government, members were too much concerned about getting some local advantage for their constituents such as a railway, a bridge, a road or some other public work, instead of recognising general principles and looking to the general interests of the country which require a definite broad policy to be relentlessly pursued by an organised party.

The manner in which railways were constructed clearly shows how considerations of local interest affected political groupings. This was especially the case during the first years of responsible government which co-incided with the construction of the first railways. Many members were determined to gain some local advantage for their constituencies and forced the

1. In 1878² the number of members was sixty-eight.

Treasury to give them something in return for their support.²
 In 1876, for instance, no less than four lines were under construction from the coast towards the Diamond Fields. One started from the Cape and ran over the dry Karroo plains (and the Premier's constituency); two proceeded from Port Elizabeth to the North; one via Gradoek, and the other, favoured by John Paterson to Graaff-Reinet. East London refused to be left out in the cold and its influential member, Sprigg, determined that it should be linked up with Queenstown and have a branch line to Kingwilliamstown from Blaney. One cannot condemn progress, but for the Cape to undertake the construction of four lines at one and the same time, was to tax its slender resources beyond their capacity.

In order that the parliamentary system may work efficiently there must be well-organised parties - at least two, so that the one can act as a check on the other and provide an alternative government should the ministry in office have to resign. Without such parties there can be no effective cohesion in the working of the legislative machinery; on the other hand, there must not be too many parties otherwise they degenerate into factionous groups which hamper the effective administration of the state. At the Cape, till the organisation of the Progressive Party in 1893,³ the only well-organised party was the Afrikaner Bond which consisted mainly of Dutch-Speaking Colonists. For

2. Merr. Papers, No. 27, 1880. C.J. Rhodes to J.X. Merr. 16 May, et Merr. Papers, No. 83, 1881. Julia Merr. to Agnes Merr. undated, et vide Supra, p. 254.

3. Supra, p. 254.

the rest, at various times, there were the personal followers of Molteno, Sprigg, Upington and Rhodes who came to terms with the Afrikaner Bond and took office as long as it behove the Bond.

To the Dutch-speaking Colonists the grant of responsible government was a great boon. It made possible the Afrikaner Bond which created a political refuge for the Afrikaner as well as an organisation which cared for his economic, and, to a lesser extent, for his language and cultural interests. At the time of the foundation of the Bond, the Afrikaner of the Cape, was being subjected to a severe anglicising process and he was in imminent danger of losing his national identity. In this hour of need the Dutch tradition revived and the Cape Afrikaner could rely on the Bond for support till success was achieved. It was largely due to the efforts of the Bond that the Dutch language received official recognition in 1882.⁴ Further it provided an organisation which could act on behalf of the national interests of the Afrikaner, and whose views carried weight with those at the head of the state. Thus "Di Patriot" of 1st June, 1888, wrote: "Di Bond het langamerhand sodanig 'n plaas in di land ingoneem, dat in politieke sake met di Bond moet gerokend worde, en di gevoele van di Afrikaner deel van di volk wat deur di Bond uitgesproek word ni somar op sy kan gesteld worde ni. In dit opsig is veel verander".⁵

Moreover, the Bond was a thoroughly democratic organisation,⁶ working for the interests of the people and organised by them. ✓

4. Supra, p. 213.

5. Pat. 1/6/'88.

6. Supra, p. 145

As a source of national unity it was a tower of strength for it carried in its ranks men from all social strata - the rich, the poor, the educated, the uneducated, the townsman and the farmer all belonged to it. The Bond did not ^{seek} to further the interests of Cape Afrikaners only. Its horizon stretched up to the Limpopo River and it aimed at uniting all South African territories into one state and all Afrikaners into one nation having a South African patriotism. In 1887, T.P. Theron, the Secretary of the Bond, and later its president, wrote as follows on the national importance of the Bond:

"Hij ((Bond)) was, en is nog, en zal wezen de hefboom in de hand van een bekwaam leider, om, indien met verstand en oordeel gebruikt, ons Afrikaansche volk die plaats te bezorgen die ons wettig toekomt in de reik der volkeren waarover onze Koningin haar scepter zwaait. Hij is de band die langzaam maar zeker Kolonie, Vrijstaat en Transvaal aan elkander snoert, en niet rusten zal vóórdat hij zijn doel lange constitutionelen weg heeft bereikt".

This lofty ideal drew into the ranks of the Bond all true ^{Patriots} patriots so that it soon became a force of great influence. Even those who were, at first, unsympathetic or indifferent, soon ^{came to realize} saw the value of the Bond organisation and joined its ranks and thus it was representative of all shades of opinion of the Afrikaner people and loyally fought for the views held by the mass of Afrikaners.

The Bond did an infinite amount of good in that it led men to take a keener interest in public affairs. It brought out men who would otherwise have been virtually lost to the public life of the country. These men were mostly from the

7. Z.-Afr. 19/4/'87, History of the Bond, et vide C.Timos 28/10/'81, Afrikaner Bond Address to Kerrinan at Graaff-Reinet, 26/10/'81.

country districts, hence they brought a healthy country influence to bear on political affairs.

As originally conceived by the Revd Mr du Toit, the Afrikaner Bond had a strong republican and racial tendency and had not Hofmeyr assumed its leadership it is doubtful whether it would have become the force it did; the Revd du Toit was an eccentric leader whose enthusiasm sometimes, led him to take up untenable attitudes. It was Hofmeyr who gave form to the rather vague ideas of the original Bond enthusiasts and used their enthusiasm to create the first political party organisation in South Africa. Hofmeyr had little sympathy with the Bond's cultural aspirations, its republicanism and racial appeal; his aims were political and therefore he set about organising the newly awakened political consciousness of the country Afrikaner till he commanded a block of votes which enabled him to dominate the Legislative Assembly. When Hofmeyr entered Parliament in 1879, the few Afrikaner members in the House did not act together; soon they flocked to Hofmeyr's banner and after the general election of 1884, the fate of the Colony was to a great extent in the hands of the Bond as successive ministries had to consider the wishes of the Bond in framing their policies. Although he wielded so much political power, Hofmeyr was loathe to assume office and once only, for a short period, did he join the Scanlen Ministry without portfolio. His subterranean political methods ensured for him the sobriquet of the "mole".

✱ Although the Bond was a compact body and voted as Hofmeyr directed, it was not strong enough to maintain a ministry of its

own in office; on the other hand, (no ministry which did not have the support of the Bond would be able to maintain itself. In the Cape Parliament, the Bond, commanding a third to a half of the votes in the Assembly, stood solid while the rest of the House was divided into a number of cliques not entirely in love with each other. Such a position left the Bond master of the situation. The Bond further strengthened its influence by its annual congresses. These were usually held before each Parliamentary session so that D.P. van den Haever, one of the leading Bondsman, could justly call the annual Bond Congress "het voorportaal van het parlement".⁸ These congresses were representative especially of the farming and country interests of the Cape Colony. Many of the Congress resolutions were embodied in the laws of the land. ✓

Finally, one may note that the Afrikaner Bond did not cease to exist on the establishment of Union. It held its last meeting in 1911, and was then absorbed by the South African Party organised by General Botha on a Union-wide basis. Thus the Bond became one of the main props of the strongest political party founded on the formation of the Union of South Africa.⁹


When responsible government was introduced many had grave misgivings about its success, yet it gave a fresh impulse to political life, provided a safety-valve for the more restless and active political spirits in the country, stimulated the undertaking of public works, caused railways and telegraphs to

8. One Land, 24/3/196.

9. Supra, p. 424, et vide Merr. Papers, No. 1, 1910. J.X. Merr. to Genl. Botha, 5 Jan.

be extended. The introduction of responsible government went to the very root of the national life of the Colony and for the first time in the long history of the Cape Colony its inhabitants began to feel that their own future as well as the country's destiny lay in their hands. On account of the discovery of diamonds and gold, the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century witnessed an economic revolution in South Africa; if it were not for responsible government which placed the government of the country in the hands of the Colonists and which introduced a more flexible system of government than the country had previously enjoyed, the Cape would not have been able to derive its full share of benefit from the progressive economic impulses of the last few decades of the Nineteenth Century.

The introduction of responsible government was a logical result of the system of representative government which had already been in existence at the Cape for almost twenty years. In 1872, the British political system with all its implications, was fully introduced into the Cape Colony. The British system, was, after all, the result of a series of accidents, and its introduction into the Cape hardly took into account the local character and problems of a distant colony. The British parliamentary system with its division into the two great historical parties was a pre-eminently successful system of government on account of the fundamental national unity of the British people - a unity it has enjoyed since the days of Queen Elizabeth. The British party system can only be fully successful when a people enjoys that national unity. The Cape Colony did not enjoy this national unity. There were the Dutch and English Colonists



- the former predominant in the country and the latter in the towns¹⁰ - and they did not always see eye to eye with each other on national questions. This was especially the case when the British Government interfered with matters beyond the borders of the Colony. The English Colonists supported the British Government while the Dutch were generally opposed to British interference. Friction between the two sections of the population was especially evident during the ten years following the Jameson Raid and reached white heat during the Anglo-Boer War. This lack of national unity brought about firstly, the disruption of the Cape Parliament during the years 1901-2,¹¹ and secondly, a serious effort on the part of one party, the British, to suspend the constitution of the Colony.¹² Despite this defect, the party system at the Cape could claim a not inconsiderable amount of success as has been pointed out above.

Caucus

X An indispensable element of party government is the caucus. In the caucus the real deliberation takes place and the Assembly, to a great extent, has merely to ratify decisions which the majority of the party in office had already taken. During the first years of Responsible Government when parties were still ill-defined, the party caucus was naturally not much in evidence and members enjoyed a large amount of independent action. During the twenty years preceding Union, however, the caucus acquired an ever increasing influence in the Cape Parliament and in consequence it became more and more difficult for a

10. Supra, p. 261.
11. Supra, p. 339.
12. Supra, p. 342.

member to express his own views on a particular subject in the House as he was bound to adhere to caucus decisions.¹³

Finally, a word must be said about the general behaviour of the Cape Parliament during its long and distinguished career. At all times its proceedings were conducted worthily and with the utmost decorum and propriety. Apart from occasional heckling by an opponent, a speaker was always given a fair hearing in the House and in the Council. On no occasion did rowdy or violent scenes disgrace the proceedings of Parliament. Early in its career, under responsible government, Frere bore the following testimony:

"It has been in many respects a very important Session, and, as the last Session of the first Parliament elected since responsible government was introduced, it may not be out of place that I should testify to the temper, discretion, and public spirit, as well as industry of which the Assembly gave proof in a manner to impress observers with a high sense of its capacity to be responsible for Administration as well as the Legislation of this important Colony"¹⁴

On the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War Merriman wrote to Goldwin-Smith:

"I question whether any Colonial Parliament has shown more moderation or more true Parliamentary spirit, owing doubtless to the fact that the bulk both of voters and representatives belong to the yeoman class"¹⁵

Finally there are the laudatory remarks of the Governor on opening the last session of the Cape Parliament in 1909:

"This is probably one of the last sessions, and, in view of the momentous question ((ratification of draft of Union Constitution)) which you will be called upon immediately

13. C. Times, 17/1/'10. Report Schreiner's speech at Queenstown, 15/1/'10.

14. C.H. 31/14.Desp. to Sec. of state. No.199. 6 Aug., 1878.

15. Merr. Papers, No. 376, 1899. J.X. Merr. to G. Smith, 10 Oct.

to decide, it is perhaps the most important of all the sessions of the Cape Legislature. I hope that it may long be held in remembrance as a worthy climax of your dignified and useful career. and that the Parliament of South Africa, which will be called to take your place, may create as honourable a reputation as that which the Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope has achieved"¹⁶

16. Hansard, 1909, p.158, et vide: C.Times, 4/12/'09; S.A. News, 4/12/'09; Michell; Rhodes, Vol.II, p.187.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX, A.

PROPOSAL FOR AN AFRIKANER BOND,
as suggested by S.J. du Toit in "Di Patriot"
of 20th June, 1879 and 31st October, 1879.¹

An Africander Bond in which everyone who is an Africander can feel himself at home and work together for the whole of an United South Africa.

An Africander Bond wherein no nationality divides us, but wherein all who acknowledge Africa as their Fatherland live together and work together as brothers of one house, whether they are English, Dutch, French or German, those alone excepted who speak of England as their home or Holland or Germany as their Fatherland and who only wish to fill their purse, and return to Europe.

An Africander Bond which shall look after the true interests of our land and shall prevent the sacrifice of the interests either of Farmer or ((to)) Merchant or of Africa or ((to)) England.

An Africander Bond which guards politics and keeps traitors out of Parliament and sees that the true friends of the Fatherland take their places?

An Africander Bond which shall take care of the awakening of the whole people and not spend millions of pounds on the education of a portion of the population, and leave the other totally uncared for, and must thus of itself provide that in education the language of every part of the population must be acknowledged alike in school and office in Court and Parliament.

An Africander Bond which encourages commerce and industry for the good of the country and not to the enrichment of speculators; which first of all does not allow our circulation to depend entirely on English Banks and which when opportunity offers encourages the establishment of manufactories.

An Africander Bond which includes the Free State and Transvaal with separate branches over the whole of South Africa to protect individual interests and a council and central government to look after general interests.

We have need of such a Bond and every day makes us feel the need of it more and more. Such a Bond will be welcomed by thousands and is absolutely necessary for the advantage of Africa.

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1. The text given here is a translation given in P.M. 304. Copies of Confidential Minutes to H.E. the Governor. 8 May, 1882.

2. This paragraph is not contained in the translation submitted to the Governor. It has here been translated from the original "Di Patriot" of 20th June, 1879, by the author.

APPENDIX, B.

THE BOEREN BESCHERMINGS VERENIGING.¹

RULES AND REGULATIONS.

- I. The Association shall be called the South African Farmers' Protection Association.
- II. The object of the Association is to watch over and protect the Farming Interests of this Colony.
- III. The Association proposes to attain this object:
1stly. By promoting the election of Members of both Houses of Parliament, who will generally oppose all measures calculated to press unduly on the farming population, -who will resist the imposition of all export duties or other one-sided taxes on articles of Colonial produce and industry, -who will avail themselves of every favourable opportunity for repealing or rendering less oppressive the excise tax on colonial spirits -who, in all proposed legislation on the relation of Masters and Servants, will keep in view the special wants of the farming population, and who will advocate the judicious application of grants out of the public revenue for the development of the agricultural pastoral resources of the country;
2ndly. By endeavouring to secure the registration as Parliamentary voters of all men interested in the farming pursuits of the Colony and to guard against all abuse of the franchise.
3rdly. By providing proper machinery for informing the farmers of all measures proposed in Parliament, by which their interests may be endangered.
- IV. The Association shall consist of the Central Board of Management and Local Associations, spread as far as possible over the Colony.
- V. There shall be three classes of members, named Local Members, General Members and Life Members, respectively. Local Members shall be those who shall subscribe and pay in advance the sum of not less than 10s. 6d. per annum; General Members those who shall subscribe and pay in advance at least £1 1s. per annum, and Life Members, those who shall either on joining or at any time thereafter, pay a contribution of £10 or upwards to the funds of the Association.
- VI. Every Fiscal or Electoral Division of the Colony shall have its own Local Association, but whenever this is found to be inexpedient, two or more Divisions may unite to establish one such Local Association.
- VII. All the Local, General and Life Members resident in any district shall form the Local Association of that district.

1. Hofmeyr: The Life of J.H.Hofmeyr, p.643.

VIII. Every Local Association shall elect its own Local Committee, selecting, if practicable, at least one member from each Fieldcornetcy, and shall appoint its own Chairman and Secretary.

IX. Every Local Committee shall once a year call a meeting of all the members of the Local Association, which meeting shall elect the Committee for the ensuing year.

X. Every Local Association shall, through its Local Committee, account for and remit all moneys received for the objects of the South African Farmers' Protection Association to the Central Board of Management; to which it shall also communicate the names of its office-bearers and Committee-men, and with which it shall loyally co-operate for the promotion of the objects set forth in Section II and III of the Rules and Regulations.

XI. Every Local Committee shall have the right to depute, from time to time, one of its Members to attend the meetings of the Central Board of Management, to submit its views to and take part in the discussions of and to vote on all questions brought before said Board.

XII. The Central Board of Management shall have its office in Cape Town.

XIII. The Central Board of Management shall consist of thirteen of the General Members and Life Members, who shall appoint from amongst their own number a President, a Vice-President, a Treasurer and a Secretary.

XIV. The first members of the Central Board of Management shall be.....
....., who shall hold office till the month of August, 1879, and thereafter until others are appointed in their place, until they resign or become disqualified.

XV. A meeting of all General Members and Life Members of the Association shall be called by the Central Board of Management in Cape Town in the month of August of each year, before which meeting the said Central Board of Management shall lay a Report of the proceedings during the past year, such report, upon being adopted, to be printed and circulated with the assistance of the various Local Committees among all the Members of the Association.

XVI. The Annual Meeting described in the previous Section shall, before separating, elect a new Central Board of Management, to hold office for one year, in the place of the retiring one, the members of which shall, however, be eligible for re-election.

XVII. The Central Board of Management shall endeavour to establish Local Associations in the various divisions of the Colony, and enter into correspondence with the Local Committees and with other parties to carry out the objects of the Association.

XVIII. The Central Board of Management shall consult with Local Committees and other parties about the nomination of candidates for both Houses of Parliament, who are in favour of the objects of the Association, and it shall promote the election of such candidates by pecuniary assistance or otherwise, as it may deem fit.

XIX. The Central Board of Management shall, as a rule, discountenance contests between candidates holding the views of the Association so as not to encourage the candidature of antagonistic candidates.

XX. All the Members and Officers of the Association shall render their services without any remuneration, provided that the Central Board of Management shall be at liberty to allow such amounts to its Treasurer and Secretary for clerical assistance and to the Local Committees for defraying current expenses as may be found necessary.

XXI. The Central Board of Management shall convene a Special General Meeting of General and Life Members, whenever petitioned to do so by at least 50 members, and also whenever it shall deem such meeting necessary.

XXII. The Central Board of Management and the Local Committees shall pass such bye-laws as may be necessary to properly carry into effect the duties entrusted to them.

XXIII. The S.A. Farmers' Protection Association shall not interfere with party politics as such, but shall steadily and persistently pursue the objects set forth in the second and third sections of their rules and regulations, regardless of any effect such course of conduct may have on the state of Parliamentary parties.

XXIV. These Rules and Regulations may be amended at any Annual General Meeting, or at any Special General Meeting called on a petition received by the Central Board of Management from at least fifty (50) General Members and Life Members, provided the proposed amendments shall be clearly set forth in the petition and the Central Board of Management shall have given at least three weeks' notice of those proposed amendments, either by circular to the Local Associations or in at least one Dutch and one English colonial newspaper,

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APPENDIX, C.

CONSTITUTION OF THE AFRICANDER BOND.¹

(As adopted in 1883.)

GENERAL CONSTITUTION.

Art.I. The Africander Bond recognises no nationality⁴ of any kind, save that of the Africander, and looks upon all as belonging to it of whatever descent, who aim at the welfare of South Africa.

Art.II. The object of the Bond is: the formation of a South African nationality by the fostering of true patriotism, as preparation for its final destiny; A United South Africa.

Art.III. This object the Bond will strive after⁸ by encouraging the Africanders to assert themselves, both politically and socially, as a nation.

Art.IV. Admission as an ordinary member is to be subject to the regulations to be laid down by the various Provinces.

Art.V. The Bond will be divided into Provinces, one of which shall be established in each Republic, each State and each Colony of South Africa.

Art.VI. As far as practicable, the administration is to be carried out by means of Ward Committees, Divisional Committees, Circle Committees, Provincial Committees, and a Central Committee.

Art.VII. The Central Committee shall consist of two delegates from every Provincial Committee, who shall remain in office, till their respective Provincial Committees have appointed other delegates in their place.

Art.VIII. The Central Committee shall meet at least once a year in each Province, on a day to be appointed by it, and at a place that is situated as centrally as possible, to be indicated by the representatives of the Province, whose turn it is; but if these representatives cannot agree, the Central Committee shall itself determine, at which place in the Province whose turn it is, it shall meet.

Art.IX. The Central Committee shall be responsible for the general interests of the Bond and for the publication of a report of its proceedings, as well as of the general position of the Bond, as early as possible after the close of the meetings.

1. Hofmeyr: Op. cit. p.649.

Art. X. The Provincial Committees shall

- (a) be responsible for the collection, and, in conjunction with the Central Committee, for the payment of all moneys coming under their care;
- (b) forward one-third of the money paid into their treasuries to the Central Committee;
- (c) exercise supervision over their subordinate committees; and
- (d) must at least once a year send up reports of their proceedings to the Central Committee in accordance with the instructions of that body, and shall fix, before dispersion, when and where the next ordinary meeting is to take place.

Art.XI. Every Province shall be permitted to draw up a Provincial Constitution to regulate its own affairs, provided that the provisions are not discordant with its general Constitution.

Art.XII. Owing to the special circumstances there existing, the Cape Colony shall be permitted to comprise a branch of the Bond under the title of "Africander Bond and Boerenvereniging of the Cape Colony"

Art.XIII. All elections of Committee members shall take place by ballot.

Art.XIV. The Central Committee shall be permitted to amend this Constitution, with due respect to the feelings of the Provincial Committees.

Art.XV. This Constitution shall be submitted to every branch of the African-der Bond in South Africa and of the Boerenvereniging in Cape Colony, with the request to communicate their feelings to the Central Committee before 26th September, 1883, and the Central Committee shall then have the right to amend it in accordance with the feelings thus expressed, and shall thereupon generally determine it.

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APPENDIX, D.

1

PROVINCIAL CONSTITUTION FOR THE CAPE COLONY.

Art.I. This Province shall be called "The Africander Bond and Boerenvereniging of the Cape Colony"

Art.II. All may become ordinary members of the Bond, who by signing Schedule A declare that they will maintain the expressed principles of the Bond and observe their obligations as such.

Art.III. This Province shall give effect to the objects described in the general Constitution by:

- (a) attending to the registration of qualified citizens;
- (b) ensuring the election of competent men for civil and state affairs;
- (c) promoting effective, sound, Christian education;
- (d) assisting in the advancement of our people by spreading wholesome literature; and by
- (e) watching the interests of our national industries, especially of agriculture and stock-farming, as being the principal sources of the wealth of this land.

Art.IV. To that end it shall make use of:

- (a) Ward Committees, one or more in every Field-Cornetcy, or one in every Municipal Ward or in two or more Field-cornetcies and Municipal Wards together, where not less than ten ordinary members combine to form a branch of the Bond;
- (b) Divisional Committees in every Fiscal or Electoral Division, or in two or more Fiscal and Electoral Divisions together, the District Committee to fix the number of representatives for each of its Ward Committees;
- (c) Circle Committees in every Electoral Circle, to consist of one delegate from every Divisional Committee in the Circle;
- (d) Its Provincial Committee, consisting of two delegates from every Divisional Committee in the Province, each Divisional Committee being entitled to appoint a secundus for each primarius.

Art.V. Ward Committees shall be charged with;

- (a) the admission or rejection of ordinary members;
- (b) the collection of subscriptions from members in their respective wards;
- (c) the expulsion of members, who, owing to non-payment of their subscriptions or to misconduct, have rendered themselves unworthy of membership;
- (d) the forwarding of one-third of the subscriptions collected by them to their respective Divisional Committees;
- (e) the promotion in their respective Wards and in conjunction with their respective District Committees, of the interests of the Province, as described in the Third Article of this Provincial Constitution, and the regular rendering account of their doings to their respective Divisional Committees.

Art.VI. The Divisional Committees shall:

- (a) forward one-third of the moneys received by them to the Provincial Committee;
- (b) regularly render account of their doings to the Provincial Committee;
- (c) in agreement with the Central Committee as well as with the respective Ward Committees under them, promote the interests of their Province, within their respective districts, as described in Article 3 of this Provincial Constitution.

Art.VII. The Circle Committees shall promote the interests of the Province, more particularly in connection with the elections for the Legislative Council, and shall receive contributions thereto from the Divisional Committee in their respective Circles.

Art.VIII. Every two years general elections shall be held of:

- (a) new Ward Committee members, by ~~the~~ the ordinary members, in the month of December;
- (b) new Divisional Committee members, by the Ward Committees, in the month of January;
- (c) new Circle Committees and a new Provincial Committee, by the Divisional Committee in the month of February; and
- (d) new members of the Central Committee, by the Provincial Committee, not earlier than the month of March, and not later than the month of November.

Art. IX. Newly-established Ward Committees shall have to be approved by their respective District Committees, and newly-established District Committees by the Central Committee, before they ~~can~~ can be finally recognised.

Art. X. The various Committees may frame rules for the regulation of their own internal business, such rules, however, not to conflict with the Constitution.

Art.XI. In ~~some~~ cases requiring special haste, higher Committees may communicate with Lower Committees, and Lower Committees with Higher Committees, passing over intermediate Committees.

Art.XII. All existing Ward Committees of the Afrikaner Bond as well as all now existing Committees of the B.B. Vereniging, shall be considered as Ward Committees under this Constitution till next following election of Committee members, in accordance with Article 8 of this Constitution; but from that time forward and subsequently the members of the Afrikaner Bond and Boerenvereniging shall elect new Ward Committees together.

Art.XIII. All now existing Ward Committees of the Afrikaner Bond, as well as all now existing local committees of Farmers' Associations, which each represent not less than 70 ordinary members, and have not yet elected any Divisional Committees, shall up to the month of January, 1884 be permitted to exercise the same rights as those of Divisional Committees under this Constitution.

Art.XIV. This general Constitution may be amended by the Provincial Committee, with the approval of a majority of Divisional Committees.

Art.XV. This Constitution shall be submitted to every branch of the Africander Bond in South Africa and of the Boerenvereniging in Cape Colony, with the request to communicate their feeling with regard to it to the Central Committee, before the 26th September, 1883 and the Central Committee shall then be permitted to amend it, in accordance with the feelings thus expressed, and shall thereupon finally determine it.

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SCHEDULE, A.

I, the undersigned, A.B., hereby solemnly declare, that I have seen and read the Constitution of the Africander Bond and Boerenvereniging, that I submit myself to its provisions, and that I promise to pay to the Treasurer of the..... yearly from to-day till further notice, the sum of 5s., payable within a month of demand by said Treasurer.

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APPENDIX, E.

PROGRAMME OF PRINCIPLES OF THE AFRICANDER

1.

NATIONAL PARTY.

(As adopted in 1889.)

1. The Africander Party recognises the guidance of Providence in the destinies of countries and nations.
2. Its aim is, under the guidance of Providence: the formation of a pure Nationality, and the preparation of our people for the establishment of "a United South Africa"
3. To that end it considers necessary:
 - (a) That a firm UNION of the different European nationalities in British South Africa be brought about; and
 - (b) That the SELF-DEFENCE of South Africa be promoted.
4. It holds that the UNION referred to in Clause 3(A) should rest on a clear and definite conception of one another's common interests in politics, agriculture, stock-farming, commerce and industry, and on the recognition of one another's special rights regarding religion, education and language, so that all national jealousy between the different sections of our people may be removed and make room for an unmistakeable South African National sentiment.
5. To promote the SELF-DEPENDENCE indicated in Clause 3 (b) it expects:
 - (a) that the feeling of National self-respect and of South African patriotism should be developed and fostered, especially at school, in the domestic circle and the press;
 - (b) that an electoral system be applied, recognising the claims not only of population, but also of worth and intelligence, and guarding as far as possible against bribery and intimidation at the polling-booth;
 - (c) that agriculture, stock-farming, commerce and industries be aided by all legitimate means, as inter alia, by an efficient Masters' and Servants' Act, and by a circumspect and judicially-applied system of protection;
 - (d) that the South African Colonies and States shall regulate their native question themselves, either separately or in concert, to that end developing the fighting power of the country by means of effective Burgher Laws;
 - (e) that outside interference with the internal concerns of South Africa be discountenanced.
6. While recognizing the Governments existing in South Africa, and intending faithfully to fulfil its obligations towards them, it holds, that it is the duty of these Governments to promote the interests of South Africa, in

accordance with the foregoing clauses, and that they should, while abstaining on the one hand from all unnecessary and high-handed interference with the domestic and private concerns of the citizen and from all direct intermeddling with the spiritual development of the people, and from enactments that might impede the untrammelled influence of the Gospel on our national life, on the other hand, they should discharge all the direct duties of good Governments, among which may be classed: -

- (a) The recognition in all their doings, of the Christian character of the people;
- (b) the maintenance of religious liberty for everyone, as long as public order and decency are not outraged;
- (c) the recognition of, and giving practical effect to, the people's religious, social and physical need of the existing weekly day of rest;
- (d) the application of an evenly-pressing and judicious system of taxation;
- (e) the giving effect to an impartial and, as far as practicable, inexpensive and efficient judicial system;
- (f) the protection of public decency and the guarding against the adulteration of foodstuffs and pollution of soil, ~~and~~ air and water, as well as against the spreading of infectious diseases.

7. To further these principles, it acts as a self-dependent party, and only thus accepts the co-operation of other parties, when reconcilable with the unimpaired maintenance of ~~these~~ its principles.

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APPENDIX, F.

1.
LIST OF MINISTRIES UNDER RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT.

I. MOLTENO MINISTRY.
(1 Dec., 1872 to 5 Feb., 1878.)

<u>Office.</u>	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Circumstances and proximate cause of change.</u>
Premier & Col. Sec.)	J.C.Molteno.	During recess.
Treasurer.)	H.White. (x)	Dismissed by Governor owing to policy pursued in regard to use of Imperial troops and control of Colonial forces.
Attorneys-General.)	J.H. de Villiers.	No appeal to country.
	S. Jacobs.	
	A. Stockenström.	
Comms. of Crown Lands & Public Works.)	C.A. Smith.	
	J.X.Merriman.	
Sec. for Nat. Affairs.)	C.Brownlee.	

II. SPRIGG MINISTRY. (FIRST.)
(6 Feb., 1878 to 8 May, 1881.)

Premier & Col. Sec.)	J.G. Sprigg.	During session.
Treasurers.)	J. Miller. (x)	Native administration including disarmament of Basutos. Attorney-General disagreed with native policy and left Ministry with bare majority. Sprigg, unable to meet demands for Kimberley Railway would not face proposed motion of No-Confidence by Scanlen and resigned.
	H.W. Pearson.	No appeal to country.
Attorneys-General.)	T.Upington.	
	J.W. Leonard.	
Commissioner.)	J. Laing.	
Sec. for Nat. Affairs.)	W. Ayliff.	
Without Portfolio.)	J.Miller. (x)	

1.Kilpin: The Old Cape House, Annexure, B.
(x). Indicates a member of the Legislative Council.

III. SCANLEN MINISTRY.

(9 May, 1881 to 12 May, 1884.)

Premier & Att.- Genl.))	T.C.Scanlen.	During session following general election. Ostensibly on account of defeat by 37 votes on motion for repeal of proclama- tion on phylloxera but defeat was in- evitable on pending motion by Scanlen which proposed to cede portions of Transkeian Territories to Imperial Government.
Colonial Secretaries.))	J.C.Molteno. T.C.Scanlen.	
Treasurers.))	C.W.Hutton. (x) C.J.Rhodes.	No appeal to country.
Attorneys- General.))	T.C.Scanlen. J.W.Leonard.	
Commissioner.)	J.X.Merriman.	
Sec. for Nat. Affairs.))	J.W.Sauer.	
Without Port- folio.))	J.H.Hofmeyr.	

IV. UPINGTON MINISTRY.

(13 May, 1884 to 24 Nov., 1886.)

Premier & Att.-Genl.))	T.Upington.	During recess. Sprigg, the Treasurer, took Upington's place as Premier and Upington became Attorney-General only. On being formally questioned Sprigg declined to give reasons for change, but Upington afterwards stated that it was made on account of his ill-health. No appeal to country.
Colonial Secretaries.))	J.Ayliff. J.Tudhope.	
Treasurer.)	J.G.Sprigg.	
Commissioner.)	F.Schermbrucker.(x)	
Sec. for Nat. Affairs.))	J.A. de Wet.	

V. SPRIGG MINISTRY. (SECOND.)

(25 Nov., 1886 to 16 July, 1890.)

Premier & Treasurer.))	J.G.Sprigg.	During session. Several defeats on motion to raise loans amounting to seven and a half million pounds for railway construc- tion.
Colonial Secretaries.))	J.Tudhope. H.W.Pearson.	
Commissioner.)	F.Schermbrucker.(1)	No appeal to country.
Sec. for Nat. Affairs.))	J.A. de Wet.	

(1) M.L.C. till 1888. Then member of the Assembly.

VI. RHODES MINISTRY. (FIRST.)
(17 July, 1890 to 3 May, 1893.)

Premier)	C.J.Rhodes.	During recess.
Col. Sec.)	J.W.Sauer.	Change of ministers owing to
Treasurer.)	J.X.Merriman.	Cabinet disagreement on grant-
Att.-Genl.)	J.Rose-Innes.	ing of Railway Refreshment
Commissioners.)		C.J.Rhodes.	Contract to J.D.Logan.
)	J.Sivewright.	No appeal to country.
Sec. for Nat. Affairs.)		P.H.Faure.	

VII. RHODES MINISTRY. (SECOND.)
(4 May, 1893 to 12 Jan., 1896.)

Premier)	C.J.Rhodes.	During recess.
Col. Sec.)	P.H. Faure.	Jameson Raid, Rhodes resigned,
Treasurer.)	J.G.Sprigg.	and his Treasurer, Sprigg,
Attorneys-General.)		W.P. Schreiner.	formed a ministry.
)	H.H.Juta.	No appeal to country.
)	W.P. Schreiner.	
Commissioner.)		J.Laing.	
Sec. for Nat. Affairs.)		J.Frost.	
Sec. for Agric.)		J.Frost.	

VIII. SPRIGG MINISTRY. (THIRD.)
(13 Jan., 1896 to 13 Oct., 1898.)

Premier & Treasurer.)		J.G.Sprigg.	During session following general
Col. Secs.)		T. te Water.	election. Motion of No-Confid-
)	T.W.Smartt.	ence by Schreiner carried by
Attorneys-General.)		T.UPington.	41 votes to 36. No appeal to
)	T.L.Graham. (x)	country, but in previous session
Commissioner.)		J.Sivewright.	Sprigg had been defeated on a
Sec. for Agriculture.)		P.H. Faure.	motion of No-Confidence and had
			then appealed to country.

IX. SCHREINER MINISTRY.
(14 Oct., 1898 to 17 June, 1900.)

Premier &)		
Col. Sec.)	W.P.Schreiner.	During recess.
			Cabinet disagreement on compensation for war losses and punishment of those engaged in rebellion.
Treasurer.)	J.X.Merriman.	
Att.-Genl.)	R.Solomon.	No appeal to country.
Commissioner.)	J.W.Sauer.	
Sec. for)		
Agriculture.)	A.J.Herholdt. (x)	
Without Portfolio.)	T. de Water.	

X. SPRIGG MINISTRY. (FOURTH.)
(18 June, 1900 to 21 Feb., 1904.)

Premier &)		
Treasurer.)	J.G.Sprigg.	During recess following general election. Defeat by 10 votes on motion by Burton for revision of Martial Law sentences. (By not supporting movement for Suspension of Constitution Sprigg had previously been left in minority and had to rely alternately on Bond and Progressive support.) Appeal to country (without obtaining supplies) a few days before expiration of House of Assembly by effluxion of time.
Col. Secs.)	T.L.Graham. (x)	
)	A. Douglass.	
)	P.H.Faure.	
Attorneys-General.)	J. Rose-Innes.	
)	T.L.Graham. (x)	
Commissioners.)	T.W.Smartt.	
)	A.Douglass.	
Secs. for)	P.H.Faure.	
Agriculture)	J.Frost.	
Without Portfolio.)	J.Frost.	

XI. JAMESON MINISTRY.
(22 Feb., 1904 to 2 Feb., 1908.)

Premier.)	L.S. Jameson.	During recess following general election.
Col. Secs.)	C.P. Crewe.	Deadlock in Legislative Council
)	P.H. Faure.	in Committee of Supply on Estimates.
			Appeal to country.
Treasurer.)	E.H. Walton.	
Att.-Genl.)	V. Sampson.	
Commissioner.)	T.W. Smartt.	
Secs. for)	A.J. Fuller.	
Agriculture.)	C.P. Crewe.	
Without Port-)	L.L. Michell.	
folio.)	A.J. Fuller.	

XII. MERRIMAN MINISTRY.
(3 Feb., 1908 to 30 May, 1910.)

Premier &)		
Treasurer.)	J.X. Merriman.	During recess.
			The 31st May, 1910, was fixed by
Col. Sec.)	N.F. de Waal.	Royal Proclamation as date of
			Union.
Att.-Genl.)	H. Burton.	
Commissioner.)	J.W. Sauer.	
Sec. for)		
Agriculture.)	F.S. Malan.	
Without Port-)	D.P. de V. Graaff.	
folio.)	H.L. Curry.	

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